Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adrian Roberts, whose 3 APC Troop would soon be in action, was having a shower and didn’t take any notice, thinking that the fire was of no significance to him. Captain Ian Darlington, in the Fire Support Coordination Centre (FSCC), had just minutes before left the concert as he was to take over command of the FSCC at 4 p.m. He was chatting with Major Peter Tedder of 105 Battery about developments when Captain Alan Hutchinson, one of Tedder’s FOOs, came in looking for a place to bunker down for a few days. He had just returned to base with 5 RAR and within days was to fly back to Australia, having completed his first tour of duty.7
Not far away, Captain George Bindley of 103 Field Battery, whose tent had gone up in flames during the early-morning attack against the base the day before, did take notice, as the day had been relatively quiet and he wasn’t aware of any plans to fire the battery at this time. Even so, it was still not that unusual, and he enjoyed his hot shower from the standard army canvas bucket, taking in the view across the gun position to the hills in the south and west, where a tropical storm was developing. It would soon be upon them.8
Back in the plantation, each soldier had released his safety catch and had his fingers on the trigger guard, eyes focused on identifying any sign of movement up ahead through the rubber trees. It was not long before a Chinese-made AK-47 was picked up by Lieutenant Sharp, who radioed in his find to Smith, who contacted battalion headquarters at 3.55 p.m. stating: ‘Recovered one AK-47 carbine at scene of contact.’9 The fact that the enemy were dressed in khaki trousers and shirts resulted in some discussion, as the men of D445 VC Battalion usually wore black and mostly carried bolt-action rifles or carbines, even though some from this battalion had been seen carrying AK-47s previously. Indeed, an AK-47 had been taken weeks earlier from a killed member of D445 VC Battalion; the fact that an enemy soldier was carrying an AK-47 was not in itself significant.10 Even so, Lieutenant Sabben of 12 Platoon recalled that it occurred to him at the time that something was amiss, as they were not expecting to encounter uniformed troops carrying AK-47s. However, Sabben also knew they were searching for a Viet Cong heavy-weapons platoon consisting of mortars and recoilless rifles, and he didn’t really know what equipment these blokes normally carried – maybe this equipment was the norm.
Smith radioed back to base at 3.50 p.m. that the enemy was ‘probably local’, but also that they were wearing khaki; five minutes later he radioed in that they had found the AK-47. Smith believed, not unreasonably, that the soldiers were likely from D445 VC Battalion. Unknown to Smith, however, at this point D445 VC Battalion was still in and around Long Tan village to the south, preparing for their part in the planned ambush operation and having not yet entered the plantation. Smith later admitted in relation to the enemy’s dress and equipment that the penny didn’t drop that they might represent a North Vietnamese main-force unit. In reality, however, the penny didn’t drop at battalion headquarters at Nui Dat either, as Townsend was notified of the contact, including the enemy in uniform and the AK-47, and failed to make any connection. In reality, it was not an NVA main-force unit. Rather, it was a PLAF (VC) main force, with one recently integrated NVA battalion – D605 Battalion, now representing the 3rd Battalion of 275 VC Regiment.11
At Nui Dat, Lieutenant David Harris (aide to Brigadier David Jackson), was at the Task Force operational centre when the messages from D Company started coming in. He was the most junior officer attached to headquarters. Harris had been privy to some of the intelligence (unlike Lieutenant Colonel Townsend or Major Smith) that indictated the possible westward movement towards Nui Dat by 275 VC Regiment. He had been impressed with Captain Bob Keep’s assessment. He had heard on a spare radio in the operations centre the discussion between Smith and Townsend of the contact just made, and recognised the possible significance of the uniforms and AK-47. He believed that D Company may have come into contact with advanced elements of 275 VC Regiment, as opposed to the local D445 VC Battalion. It was 4.07 p.m. when Task Force command was first officially made aware of the contact by Townsend, but by then Harris had already alerted Jackson, who at the time was preparing to conduct his usual afternoon briefing. Jackson quickly made an appearance at the operational centre. Harris also called Major Bob Hagerty, commander of 1 APC Squadron, unofficially warning him to stand-by one of his troops, as they may be needed.12
Major Hagerty was no doubt grateful for the early heads-up. The APCs of 1 Squadron were M113s and more than a little worse for wear and tear. Many had operated with 1 RAR during their 12-month tour and were in urgent need of an overhaul, but the ongoing demands placed upon them and their crews made that impossible. To make matters worse, a number of these tracked vehicles did not have a mounted gun shield around their .50-calibre machine gun, which left the gunner – and APC commander – completely exposed to enemy fire. Worse still, some had no intercom system, which made verbal communications impossible within the noisy APCs. To help rectify this, a string was attached to the left and right epaulets of the driver so the commander could provide steering directions. Also, in some APCs the pivot steering used during stream crossings was worn out, which added to the problems of getting across the often-flooded Suoi Da Bang.13
Sergeant Bob Buick, back in the plantation, recalled: ‘Moving very quickly and with all three sections now in a battle assault formation – that is, in extended line – we spread out in a single-line frontage some 250 to 300 metres wide.’14 Sharp’s forward movement in trying to follow up on the retreating Viet Cong had further widened the gap that had developed between the two forward platoons – 11 Platoon was now about 300 metres forward of 10 Platoon, with 12 Platoon bringing up the rear with CHQ. The forward position of 11 Platoon and its rapid advance in line formation meant that the inner flanks of 10 and 11 platoons had lost sight of each other. The space between the two forward platoons was now greater than the maximum combat opening range for either the rifle or machine gun: about 300 metres.15 Private John Heslewood recalled that at the time ‘no one really expected anything much to happen after that [first contact]’.16
The company moved on another 250 metres or so. At 3.59 p.m., Sharp radioed Smith they had reached the small tapper’s hut – the same hut that had been searched earlier that day by Sergeant Harry Keen of B Company – and he reckoned there were voices coming from inside. He said he would check it out and search the immediate area. A few hundred metres to the rear and north of Sharp was Lieutenant Geoff Kendall of 10 Platoon, who remembered thinking at the time: ‘“Sharp, you lucky so-and-so!” It was every platoon commander’s dream: a platoon attack, bowling over an enemy section or squad – and picking up an MC [Military Cross] on the way through.’17 Sabben, commanding 12 Platoon, was thinking along the same lines: ‘When the firing broke out with 11 Platoon I really thought that Gordon Sharp had had the contact that we were out looking for. He had had the fire-fight. In military terms he had won, he had got the contact. It was his battle. We didn’t expect more than a half a dozen or so [contacts] for our whole tour. The radio news came back, “Yes, I’ve contacted half a dozen or so.” Once this fire-fight was over, that was all. He would perhaps get a Military Cross for Christmas.’18
After a few minutes, Sharp reported in at 4.02 p.m., having found nothing in the hut or in the immediate area other than a few hand grenades.19 Private Jim Richmond of 6 Section recalled that after they moved out from the hut they moved out again into extended line and a fair way into the rubber to the east. Sharp and his men continued their advance eastward with the three sections abreast – 6 Section on the left, 4 in the centre and 5 on the right.20 As recalled by Buick, they were all keen to catch up to the retreating enemy with the three sections strung out in a single line – except for the platoon headquarters, which remained behind and to the centre to help with communications.
Each soldier was spaced about 8 to 10 metres apart and with the front line numbering about 20 or so, it provided a frontage of around 200 to 250 metres.21 As such, the platoon had no depth. The most
efficient way of catching up to the fleeing enemy was to shake out into extended line. As they pushed on Buick was thinking, ‘Oh well, these blokes have shot through again. You know, this has been the story of every contact we’ve had for weeks and really, I suppose, I was like everyone else, you know. “Where have these bastards gone, can’t we get into a decent fight?”’22 Be careful what you wish for.
Undoubtedly the contact would have been heard by the officers and soldiers of 275 VC Regiment, just east of D Company. As Sharp and his men pushed further into the young rubber trees, they approached a clearing with a green wall of scrub beyond. The young lieutenant was still carrying the captured AK-47. They now came across a strand of wire running through the trees and, as Private John Heslewood recalled, ‘Then the shit hit the fan – this huge, huge amount of bloody fire, automatic and single fire, and we were ordered to hit the ground.’23 Buick recalled that the enemy opened fire from the north-east at the base of Nui Dat 2.24 Lance Corporal Barry Magnussen remembered going to ‘ground in a long line . . . I raised myself up so I could see . . . I yelled for them to get back, then all hell broke loose. The incoming fire was unbelievable. [Private] Jim Houston was dead. A couple of others wounded.’25
The bulk of the original enemy fire focused on Robbins’ 6 Section on the left. The immediate volume, concentration and intensity of fire was unbelievable. It was not only that: as the men hit the ground to return fire, they saw the Vietnamese advancing straight towards them. Robbins recalled how well dressed they were and believed them to be North Vietnamese; they were likely members of 275 VC Regiment’s 3 Battalion, consisting mostly of NVA:
The thing that surprised me was that they were attacking and we weren’t expecting to run into any well-trained soldiers. We thought we were following Viet Cong in the black pyjamas and when they started to attack . . . they were pretty well trained, this group . . . It was pretty much a surprise to me that they were coming towards us . . . The first time I saw them was 200 metres [away] and there was a lot of them, they were forming up and moving forward [from the left] – that was the thing that struck me was that they were attacking us. I saw them.26
Those a few hundred metres behind in the other platoons of D Company were also shocked by the sudden avalanche of fire breaking out. Private Parr of 12 Platoon recalled: ‘It just exploded into this frightening roar that lasted for the rest of the day. When we heard the battle start I can’t properly explain in words how we felt. But I know I’ll be haunted by it for the rest of my life.’27
A few minutes earlier, the Vietnamese company that had sent out a six-man patrol was reacting to the firefight that had apparently broken out just west of its position. The survivors of the patrol likely made their way back to the company just as the enemy shelling exploded close by. Clearly, the Australians would have radioed through to their base at Nui Dat of the contact, and the Vietnamese knew they could expect to be targeted by enemy artillery. Even so, they assessed that the Australians were only in platoon strength and could be easily overrun given their own overwhelming superiority in numbers.
A number of platoons took up a position within low-lying scrub that blocked the Australians’ advance. They didn’t need to wait long before they saw a line of Australian soldiers advancing straight towards them, but before they could react, a heavy-weapons unit to their north opened fire, tearing into the open left (north) flank of the Australians’ extended line. The mobile ambush was now prematurely underway, 24 hours ahead of schedule. The company engaging the Australians’ front would act as the blocking force, while other elements of the 275 VC Regiment would be organised to move around and locate the Australian flanks and attack them from there. Meanwhile, the D445 VC Battalion located around Long Tan village south of the Australian force, when they got the word, would move west of the Australians’ position to attack it from the rear, sealing off any chance of escape. Even though they had been surprised and were not entirely prepared, they could still crush the unexpected Australian force now fighting against them in Long Tan Plantation.
Sharp ordered 5 Section on the right to sweep across the front of the platoon to offer some protection to 6 Section. No sooner had the men begun to move out in a 45-degree arc to the front of the rest of 11 Platoon than the Viet Cong who had taken up a position in the scrub to their front opened up with intense fire on a broad front from several directions.28 Private Peter Ainslie saw ‘a million little lights seem[ing] to come out of the rubber, from knee height to above our heads, and a helluva noise’.29 The men had no choice but to try to return to their former position; most made it back as others provided covering fire. Private Heslewood of 5 Section recalled that by now ‘4 Section was inside us and literally for the first few minutes, there wasn’t panic – you just didn’t know what was going on. And then the training kicked in, and the orders [came] in telling people to go here, there and everywhere.’30
Private Brian Halls from the same section recalled being forced to the ground. It was a ‘natural reaction bred into us before going to Vietnam . . . I remember being left out forward by myself, and Johnny Heslewood from Brisbane was next to me. There was a VC coming up on my right . . . [Johnny] yelled out, “Can you see him?” I said, “No!” “Well, keep your bloody head down” and he fired across the top of my head and got this bloke, then said, “You’re right now – you can pull back.” And we did, into a single line.’31
Buick knew they were in an extremely serious firefight: the air was full of bullets and tracers.* He recalled that the tracers were like fireflies and were coming into their position from everywhere. So much ordnance was being fired that his head was full of a buzzing sound, and it was impossible to move. If you ‘moved you became a target. Once you became a target, you were dead.’32
It was 4.08 p.m. when Sharp radioed Major Smith that 6 Section on the left was being hit by ‘fairly heavy fire’33 and he was taking fire from what appeared to be at least a platoon to his front. Close by, Kendall (10 Platoon) and Sabben (12 Platoon) were listening and noticed the strain in Sharp’s voice – it was obvious to everyone in the company that 11 Platoon had run into a sizeable enemy force just a few hundred metres to their front. Indeed, the men of 11 Platoon had run into forward elements of 275 VC Regiment. Kendall later recalled that the fire was increasing and getting very heavy and Sharp came on the radio and said, ‘“It’s too big for me – I think they’re about to attack us” – not in fear, just surprise in his voice’.34 Robbins was commanding 6 Section on the left, which took the brunt of the fire. He knew instinctively that his section had suffered casualties. All around men were calling out that the Viet Cong were in the trees and on the ground. The fire was getting heavier, and Sharp was calling out to Robbins to bring his men closer to the platoon headquarters position to his right. However, Robbins was having difficulty getting the message to his men to his extreme left, and wasn’t about to abandon them. He got up and ran across to them to order them back towards Sharp’s position and only then realised just how serious his losses were. He immediately came across a couple of his men who were already dead, which staggered him.35
Buick recalled that two enemy machine guns were firing to his left front among the scrub and the creek line at the base of Nui Dat 2. He assessed that the fire from these machine guns had cut down nearly all those in 6 Section, who were about 75 metres from this enemy position. The other three sections, including the platoon headquarters section, immediately went to ground as the enemy fire swept the area with machine-gun and rifle fire. They were now pinned down as a storm of fire cut a swathe through their position.36
* Tracers are bullets with a small pyrotechnic charge in their base, so the shooter can see what/where they are hitting.
14
‘I could tell by his voice that the platoon was in trouble’
1610–1620 hours
At 4.10 p.m., Major Smith radioed to Lieutenant Colonel Townsend back at the 1 ATF base: ‘11 Pl under heavy fire from approx 485669’. This confirmed that the bul
k of the initial fire was enfilade from the area just forward of Nui Dat 2, which was joined by additional fire originating from the scrub to their front.1
At first, Sergeant Buick believed another two heavy machine guns were firing from the scrub in front, as he saw their green tracers. While Australians generally had red tracers, the Vietnamese usually used green, helping to further identify friend from foe. He reckoned that the return fire from his men had hit about half a dozen Viet Cong, but it was of great concern that the platoon was being engaged from the left flank and its front ‘by at least an enemy company using small arms and RPGs which I thought were heavy machine-guns with explosive rounds because the rubber trees were being blown apart’.2
Close by, Private Jim Richmond, who would be one of just two survivors from 6 Section, remembered the first tracers coming in. ‘We couldn’t return fire straightaway as there was nothing to be seen, from my angle anyway. The air was thick with fire, and bullets were taking chunks out of the rubber trees all around me. It was about then I noticed the tracers coming out of the trees, so myself and someone else fired into them and two or three Viet Cong fell out of them.’3 Private John Heslewood of 5 Section, on the other end of the line, also remembered lots of ‘heavy-weapons fire coming in, and a fair bit of tracer. I remember particularly some smoke rising from a fallen tree and I called to the blokes near me to try to fire into that, as I thought it was a heavy machine gun. We fired into it – I don’t know whether we achieved anything or not – but I think it was the weapon that did a fair bit of [initial] damage to our platoon.’4 Another member of 5 Section, Private Allen May, was ‘shocked and amazed when I saw the tracer . . . and a bloke stepped out from behind a rubber tree and opened up on us with an automatic weapon. I was so amazed that I said to [Corporal William] “Bluey” Moore, “That bloke’s trying to kill me,” and Bluey said, “Well, get the bastard first.” Next time he popped up I let him have it, and I hit him with a tracer in the chest, and he stood up screaming like a banshee and tearing at his chest, and did a backflip and I reckon he died.’5
The Battle of Long Tan Page 12
