The Battle of Long Tan

by David W. Cameron

  Back at Smith’s position, about 500 metres west of 11 Platoon, Smith reported to Townsend at 4.53 that enemy troops were moving to his right (south) at position 485668.5 A few minutes later he reported that CHQ was located at 479674; 10 Platoon was still about 200 metres east of his position, while 11 Platoon was at 484670. Smith estimated that the enemy they had previously seen moving around his right was about three companies strong.6 By now, Lieutenant David Sabben and 12 Platoon were at CHQ. He noticed how the tracer rounds buried themselves in the mud to his front, indicating that someone was in the trees firing down at them. Sabben recalled that the radio traffic was constant, with 11 Platoon reporting on the tactical situation and helping Captain Stanley adjust the falling artillery shells. Listening to the transmission from 11 Platoon, the sound of the small-arms fire was loud and sharp, but from his position about 500 metres to the rear the sound had ‘lost its crack’.7

  Smith now ordered Sabben’s 12 Platoon to move forward towards 11 Platoon, and Sabben left Corporal Merv McCulloch’s 9 Section to help defend CHQ’s position. Moving out with 12 Platoon was Private Alan Parr, the machine gunner for 7 Section, along with his mate and No.2 on the gun Private Noel Grimes, who was carrying the spare machine-gun barrel and extra ammunition. On hearing the order that they were moving forward, Parr recalled: ‘I looked at Noel and said “Now we’re going to find out what it’s like to be in action,” and with that we jumped up with the rest of the platoon and headed in the direction of the first shots we heard.’8

  Meanwhile, Private Terry Burstall of Sabben’s 9 Section recalled going into all-round defence with his section placed on a slight slope looking back towards the Task Force area, facing away from the sound of the firing. They were to dig in, so he and the others of the section threw off their packs, got out their entrenching tools and started to dig shell scrapes. They had no idea what was happening just a few hundred metres behind them.9 Sabben and the rest of his platoon (now just two sections strong), Corporal Laurie Drinkwater’s 7 Section (Drinkwater had served in Malaya) and Corporal Kevin Miller’s 8 Section pushed forward in a south-east direction into an enemy maelstrom of small-arms, RPG and mortar fire with the aim of trying to extract and rescue 11 Platoon. Unknown to Burstall and the others of 9 Section, as Sabben and his men moved out, Smith and CHQ moved forward with them.

  By now, the wounded Private Brian Hornung, radio operator for 10 Platoon, had arrived at the former CHQ position, the rear of which was still being held by 9 Section. Burstall recalled seeing him come in: ‘He was bleeding down the front of his shirt and holding a field dressing on a wound low in his shoulder, almost in his chest. He looked at me, blank-eyed, and said, “There’s hundreds of them out there.” I looked at [privates] Brian Reilly and [Richard] Shorty Brown and I think we all wondered, “What the hell have we hit?” Hornung moved through us and over the slight rise and disappeared.’10 Burstall could not help thinking that something was wrong, and he moved over the rise to see that CHQ had gone. He grabbed his rifle and ran through the rubber to the east towards the sound of the firing.11

  Meanwhile, CHQ had only gone about 150 metres when it was forced to bunker down. The casualties from 10 Platoon began to arrive at Smith’s position, including the wounded machine gunner from 10 Platoon, Private John Cash, with Corporal Buddy Lea.12 Miller, commanding 8 Section, 12 Platoon, recalled that as other wounded started coming in from 10 Platoon, some were saying ‘there were heaps of Charlie out there . . . Buddy Lea was wounded and his eyes had become as big as saucers and he was saying “Don’t go up there”. . . He said there’s “thousands of them”.’13 A rough company aid post was quickly established in a slight hollow in the ground.

  With this, Sabben and his two sections continued their advance to try to extract 11 Platoon. They headed towards the tapper’s hut to get their bearing; from there they would turn east and head for 11 Platoon’s position. Smith halted CHQ because with the wounded from 10 Platoon they were now committed to remain static. Stanley recalled that it was also impossible to control the situation on the move: he had two lots of radios sorting out information, and the artillery needed to know exactly where each platoon was located, so they were forced to stop.14 The situation had deteriorated considerably and Smith knew that neither he nor Stanley could perform his critical role while moving around the plantation. If they failed their command and communication tasks, the platoons would be in even more dire straits. They stopped to establish a secure area for the wounded, and as they did so the torrential rain continued, seemingly getting heavier by the minute.15

  At this point Smith was focusing on trying to establish some sort of defence position and Stanley found that he and his radio operator, Lance Corporal William Walker, had plonked themselves into the same hole. Walker was carrying Stanley’s radio, while Bombardier Murray Broomhall was temporarily manning a machine gun. While Murray was only 10–20 metres away, in the current conditions Stanley recalled that this was a very long distance.16 Indeed, Smith’s signaller, Corporal Graham Smith, who would remain at his CO’s side throughout the battle, having the critical role of maintaining communications, recalled that ‘once company headquarters had gone to ground we could actually see some enemy and it was pissing down rain’.17

  By now Burstall had found CHQ. He recalled that on seeing Sergeant Major Jack Kirby he yelled at him ‘did he want us up there, and he almost turned purple. “Of course I want you up here, you stupid bastard!” he called back. I ran back again to the section and we collected our packs and came up to Company Headquarters.’18 As they arrived, Kirby put them in a line facing south, covering the right flank, and they saw enemy movement through the rubber trees. Even though it was still daylight, the distance was too far for effective fire and they had been told to conserve ammunition, so they held their fire. It is likely these enemy troops were advance elements from D445 VC Battalion, although they may have been elements of 275 VC Regiment who were trying to locate the southern flank of the Australian position. Burstall and his mates lay prone in the mud watching and listening to the sound of the firing to their left, and watching the artillery explode further to the left near 11 Platoon. They were still in the dark about what was happening.

  At this point it looked like the enemy did not know of the presence of CHQ and 12 Platoon, although probes by small groups were beginning to be attracted to Smith’s position. The perimeter of CHQ to the right (south) was relatively flat, but to the left (north) and front (east) it sloped downwards. Here they were in among the young rubber trees, which Burstall later remembered as not being very high – not high enough to form a canopy – and the ground was fairly clear and clean with little undergrowth.19

  Company No. 2 signaller Private Bill Akell, attached to CHQ, recalled that ‘the noise was frightening, just like sitting in the middle of a company rifle-range, with the crack of shots falling all around you. I was wet, cold and frightened.’20 Word reached CHQ that the radio of 10 Platoon was out of action. Smith ordered Lance Corporal Dennis Spencer to advance to 10 Platoon with the spare company radio; however, Spencer didn’t get far before he was wounded. He moved off in the general direction of 10 Platoon but got no further than 20 or 30 metres when he saw a line of mortar bombings exploding along his path. He later said that he didn’t remember much after that. He reckoned he was unconscious for about ten or 15 minutes, because when he regained his senses it was still daylight and the battle was still raging all around. It soon became clear to him that he had shrapnel in his back and in both legs. He managed to crawl back to CHQ.21

  Private Bill Akell now turned to Kirby, telling him he would go down to 10 Platoon with his radio to re-establish contact. Regimental signaller Graham Smith recalled: ‘We had a spare radio set at company headquarters and . . . my number two radio operator, who was Private Bill Akell . . . picked up the radio set and took off with it.’22 Akell recalled:

  Brian Hornung was the radio operator for 10 Platoon and he was on the company internal radio net [CHQ – platoon co
mmunications net] and when he came in [wounded] I heard him talking with Jack Kirby CSM and Jack Kirby was trying to organise the wounded into a small depression just to the rear of company headquarters and they were trying to get them into that small depression to keep them out of the small-arms fire and Hornung came in and said something like ‘I’ve been shot and the radio is stuffed’ because a round went through the radio. It was then that I realised that 10 Platoon had no internal communications, they had no way of talking to Harry Smith and because the radio set that I had was serviceable, but on the wrong frequency, it was on the air admin [administration back at base for supplies, etc.] I decided to turn the channels and get onto the company internal frequency. I just said to Jack Kirby, who was looking after Hornung, that I’ve got a spare radio set and I’ll go forward and Kirby was a big, big bear of a man and I say that in the nicest way . . . he was a typical CSM, kind when he needed to be, rough when he needed to be as well, and firm as well. Anyway Kirby in his usual bear-like manner just yelled out ‘Go, go, go!’ He was more worried about the wounded then anything else, he just said go, go, go and I just took off. Unfortunately when I took off I [only] had a rough idea where 10 Platoon was, but I certainly had no idea where [Lieutenant] Geoff Kendall would have been and I was really running blindly when I took the set forward.23

  Akell bolted into the bullet-swept no-man’s land, trying to find 10 Platoon among the exploding mortar and RPG fire, falling trees and torrential downpour. He recalled that as he was searching for 10 Platoon ‘there was a mortar round that landed relatively close to me as I was heading forward’.24 As he raced down the slope he came across two Viet Cong coming towards him on his left. Armed only with his World War II vintage 9mm Owen submachine gun, he swung around and squeezed the trigger, firing the whole magazine into them. They both went down, and he kept running towards where he hoped 10 Platoon was located. He recalled that as he ran forward, ‘I was very concerned. I won’t say I panicked, I didn’t panic, it was a matter of I needed to get this radio to Geoff Kendall . . . as I said I had no idea where Kendall was.’25 He saw a couple of 10 Platoon soldiers, each behind a rubber tree, and ‘I just yelled out where’s Mr Kendall, and they just pointed to their right and I just moved around yelling “Mr Kendall, Mr Kendall” until I made contact with Geoff Kendall’.26 Indeed, many men from 10 Platoon remember hearing through the noise of battle, someone shouting ‘Mr Kendall, Mr Kendall’.27 Kendall recalled seeing Akell running up through the rubber having completely disregarded his own safety – he came running through the hail of fire directed at Kendall’s platoon, and Kendall couldn’t believe that Akell not only survived but managed to find him among the confusion of battle.28

  Akell himself can’t explain how he survived his dash through the torrent of enemy fire being poured into and around D Company’s position: ‘I have no idea how I didn’t get hit. Even to this day I realise just how bloody lucky I was to make it through there – rounds were binging off everywhere. People talk about hearing the round passing you, and that’s a true thing – you virtually can hear it – and how I didn’t get hit I don’t know. Somebody was looking after me that day and that’s for sure.’29 Akell gave the radio set to Kendall so he could speak directly to Smith. Thanks to the Victoria Cross–like actions of Akell, communications were restored – but 10 Platoon, like 11 Platoon, was still fighting for its very existence.

  Private Akell now took up a position close to Sergeant Neil Rankin, armed with his World War II submachine gun, to help repel the Viet Cong assaults against 10 Platoon. ‘Neil and I just kept firing to our front because they just kept coming and coming and you would see the yellow-type blast of the artillery rounds, and how they didn’t turn around and flee – I wouldn’t have had the guts that the Viet Cong had to run through that artillery barrage [in fact he had just done something similar]. It was almost suicide. Up front it was small rounds coming our way, it was the enemy coming our way, and of course the artillery just kept pounding away.’30

  What was left of 11 Platoon was just hanging on. Private Brian Halls heard, even above the sound of battle, a lot of yelling coming from the enemy. He reckoned they were trying to get adrenaline pumping through their veins – they were charging through an Anzac bombardment of shells and needed something to steady their nerve. Australian survivors of the battle would later talk about hearing a loud babbling sound in the rubber, followed by a yell, and the Viet Cong would then come on. The babbling was the enemy psyching themselves up before the attack, and that’s when a bugle would sound – a short, sharp, hair-raising blast.31 The Vietnamese troops would bravely stand up and advance towards the thin Australian firing line among a hurricane of exploding Anzac shells. They didn’t run – they just advanced. In all, however, there ‘was only one sort of a wave at a time,’ recalled Halls. ‘I couldn’t say how many in all . . . one would finish and another would come in.’32

  Similar attacks were happening all along the scattered firing line of 11 Platoon. Something had to give – it was just a matter of time. In the centre, close to 4 Section and platoon headquarters, the Viet Cong had heavier weapons, including what some believed to be .50-calibre heavy machine guns, one of which was seen to be moving to the right. Halls of 5 Section recalled how their machine gunner, Private Ian Munro, protected their position by pouring enfilade into the Viet Cong machine-gun crew that had just taken up a position in front of Halls’ section. He also recalled that after the battle they found the .50-calibre machine gun right out in front of their position, with the crew’s bodies slumped over (it turned out to be a pre-World War II Soviet vintage 7.62mm heavy machine gun).33

  Private John Heslewood and his mates were under no illusions about their chances of getting out in one piece, but they laughed and joked their way through it all in a desperate optimism:

  The five of us were pinned down and we were joking. It was pouring, really pouring. It was real thick mud and a bullet would hit the mud and fly up and you’d say that if it was coming straight then it couldn’t kick the mud up so there must be someone in the tree shooting down at us. So snipers in the trees. And one of the blokes looked up and said, ‘There’s one up in the trees, six rows back, three wide.’ And you’d say, ‘It’s your turn, have a go at him.’ This went on. And you might miss him and someone might say, ‘You idiot, I’ll get him.’ So that’s what kept everyone going. There was no real panic. Everyone just fed off each other.34

  Meanwhile, a few hundred metres behind and north of 11 Platoon, Lieutenant Kendall had ordered his men of 10 Platoon to get up and renew their advance through enemy fire towards the stranded platoon using fire and movement. They advanced in two leaps, one section offering suppressing fire and the other section advancing. However, because of the rain and exploding ordnance it was difficult to spot individual targets. They managed to push on another 50 metres. Kendall recalled: ‘I tried to go forward by fire and movement, but we took more casualties. Our guys couldn’t see while they were firing, because they [Viet Cong] were on the ground, it was bucketing down rain . . . and they were firing an absolute sheet of small-arms fire at about 8 inches [20 cm] from the ground.’35

  At the same time, Corporal Ross McDonald and his men of 3 Section, along with Corporal Buddy Lea’s 2 Section, attempted to move forward using fire and movement tactics, but they did not get far as the fire was too heavy. They were forced to ground, firing at opportunity targets, and their position was hit by a number of mortar bombs. Kendall had no choice and gave the order to hold where they were, at least until he could organise the wounded. He knew it was hopeless: there was no point in going further, as he would lose more of his men for no purpose to an enemy they could no longer even see.36 Private Tony Stepney of 3 Section distinctly remembered ‘it was pouring down rain, it was absolutely black, the only thing you could see was our tracers going out and that’s how they worked out where we were . . . we had gone to ground and we couldn’t see a thing.’37

  Even with the rain pouring and the battle ragin
g around him, Rankin believed he could hear the firing of 11 Platoon up ahead; all around it he noted a barrage of shells exploding. Some were likely from the Anzac batteries that had been ordered to fire against the enemy force to the left of 11 Platoon. Rankin was calling to no one in particular to lift the artillery fire when he saw a blue flash at his feet and felt the air suck him up into the rubber trees, with his marker-panel bag being torn from his shoulder. He landed with a thud but miraculously was unhurt. He wasn’t sure whether it had been an artillery shell or a mortar bomb, but he was happy to have survived. Kendall was just then turning around to call to his sergeant when he saw the explosion and Rankin seemingly disappear. ‘Gee, there goes poor old Neil Rankin, gone west!’ thought the lieutenant, but to his immense relief he soon saw his sergeant back in action.38

  Now back in radio contact with CHQ, Kendall radioed Smith to tell him that he was in contact with the enemy and had tried to go forward but was not able to get far using fire and movement. He asked his CO what he wanted him to do, and Smith said, ‘Withdraw to me.’39 Frustratingly, 11 Platoon was only about 200 metres from 10 Platoon’s position – not that Kendall knew it at the time. Even so, there was no way of breaking through the enemy force that had almost surrounded 11 Platoon and was now pouring heavy fire into 10 Platoon’s position.40

  Like the rest of 10 Platoon, McDonald and his men of 3 Section were still pinned down and found it difficult to fall back. Even though they had orders to withdraw, they couldn’t do so straight­away as one of their riflemen was wounded somewhere close by and had to be found before they could move out.41 Kendall begun pulling his men back as best he could, using fire and movement, with the section to the left giving covering fire while the section on the right fell back; when they went to ground they provided covering fire to the left, leapfrogging back towards CHQ as best they could.