The Battle of Long Tan

by David W. Cameron

  Corporal Rod Armstrong, a member of Dinham’s platoon, saw Major Smith ‘standing there waving his arms around, giving directions to his survivors of D Company, while close by Sergeant Jim Myles witnessed Jack Kirby, who had somehow not only cheated death but had escaped being wounded, supporting two Australian casualties, one over each shoulder.’ He thought that they must be dead because that was not the normal way to carry a wounded soldier.25 Close by, Private Russ Perandis discovered that his M60 had been crushed by a carrier so he picked up an SLR, checked it over and got ready to continue the fight, if necessary. Private Ken Branch of 10 Platoon came across his mate Private Rick ‘Doug’ Aldersea: ‘I passed Doug, my fellow scout and mate, lying there with a hole in his head, and I thought sadly, Well, well and just burst into tears.’26 Private Terry Burstall was walking around as if in a trance, amazed at his survival – but it didn’t take long for some reality to hit:

  I can recall walking in a sort of a daze towards the area where the wounded were and saw some Australian troops coming towards me. John Loader, a bloke I was with in Kapooka, said something to me but I don’t know whether I answered him or not. They had two carriers in the centre with the back hatches down and were doing something with the wounded. I came across Peter Dettman and Dave Beahan [both 12 Platoon], and poor Dave was just hanging on to a rubber tree with his head down. I thought he may have been hit but Peter grabbed me and told me that Paul Large had been killed. Dave and Paul had been good mates and Dave was taking it pretty hard.27

  Private John Heslewood also recalled feeling stunned after the adrenaline of being in battle subsided: ‘After Alpha Company arrived and the firing died down, we started to move around and regroup into our sections. It was only then that the full picture became apparent. It was a very sobering sight to look at the aid post with the wounded being treated and realising a lot of blokes had not made it back at all.’28

  Robbins commented that the badly wounded were placed inside two of the carriers, where medics worked on them. He remembered sitting with Heslewood, who was smoking, and thinking that he had never seen him smoke before; he certainly went through a few that night. Kendall had also made his way to the aid post to check on the wounded. He estimated that Corporal Phil Dobson had been caring for about 18 wounded. Most of the unconscious had their tongues pinned to their bottom lips with a safety pin so they wouldn’t swallow them and choke.29

  Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adrian Roberts had swung his carrier force into a north–south line to the east of D Company’s position. On his own initiative, Dinham advanced his platoon to take up a position between the carriers to help provide a line of defence against any enemy attack. Mollison soon called Dinham on the radio and told him to secure the newly established eastern part of the perimeter. Dinham called back to say he’d already done so.

  What Roberts remembered most vividly after setting up his defensive position was ‘this silvery blue of the cordite from the artillery that had been dropped. It was floating like a mist and you could hear the groans of the wounded and what have you out to the front and you were sort of straining, looking into the mist, and then the darkness came on and you couldn’t see anything after that.’30

  It was then that Corporal Ross Smith’s forward scout yelled out, ‘Contact front!’ The corporal recalled: ‘Heeding Captain Mollison’s warning, I stopped him opening fire. As we ran forward, this figure jumped up with his “hand” in the air yelling, “I’m a Yank! I’m a Yank!” I had captured a goddamn Yank! He was one scared soldier.’31 Lieutenant Gordon Steinbrook’s missing NCO was missing no more. Corporal Smith also recalled trying as best they could to improve their position: ‘I have never seen a defensive position dug so quickly, even though the trenches filled with water as soon as they were dug. I heard someone calling out, “Help me! Someone please help me!” I looked up and could just see a soldier dragging another soldier by the yoke of his webbing. I’m no hero, so I told Bruce McLay to go and help. “Thanks a bunch,” was his muttered reply. When he came back, I asked how the other bloke was. Bruce told me he thought he was dead. What impressed me at the time was, that soldier was not going to leave his mate behind no matter what.’32 Also digging in with Corporal Smith was his new-found best friend, US sergeant Frank Beltier. ‘As soon as I stopped digging, I threw my entrenching tool to the Yank so he could dig his personal swimming hole also.’33

  Townsend now took command of his battalion. All expected a renewed attack at any time. Alcorta, who was with Dinham along the eastern perimeter, recalled that suddenly the Viet Cong had vanished: only the moans of the enemy wounded and the jungle silence remained.34 They were not to know that the Viet Cong commanders had no intention of renewing the fight and that what was left of the 275 VC Regiment and D445 VC Battalion had melted away, heading east. A company commander from D445 VC Battalion, Nguyen Duc Thu, later recalled: ‘We saw the tanks [APCs] coming and we knew that we did not have the weapons to fight them.’35

  While the rain had slackened off, it would not be long before it again came down in a torrential downpour.

  27

  ‘Frank said we would take the bodies’

  1930–2400 hours

  Australian Red Cross volunteer Jean Debelle was anxious to make her way to the US 36th Evacuation Hospital to help any Australian wounded who were brought in. She asked her supervisor, Hilda Zinner, ‘Are you coming with me to the 36th Evac?’1 However, the older and more experienced Red Cross officer knew that at this point it was up to the medical staff to receive and treat the wounded, and that she and Jean would only get in the way. She replied that she was not going, and nor should Jean. ‘I was dumbfounded,’ recalled Debelle. ‘Wasn’t this what we had been sent to Vietnam for? “I’d like to go tonight,” I persisted, but Hilda was adamant that there was nothing that couldn’t wait until morning and that I would be in the way.’2

  The Red Cross was stationed with US military doctors and nurses at the ‘Villa’ and these personnel were all being called back to the hospital even though most had just completed an exhausting shift, as Australian wounded would soon be arriving. Debelle believed she could be of some use, if only by holding the hand of a wounded or dying soldier and letting him hear an Australian voice among the cacophony of Americans – hear a voice from home. She later wrote: ‘I pleaded, but to no avail. Inwardly pouting, but fearful of disobeying a direct order, I went to bed early, planning to be at the hospital at dawn. The decision not to go to the hospital that night still bothers me today.’3

  Back at 1 ATF, the expenditure in artillery shells had been extremely heavy and the batteries needed urgent resupply. US Army Chinooks were made available to fly in the heavy payloads of shells. While the choppers brought in the resupply, 5 RAR was sent to patrol the outer area around Nui Dat. Others from the headquarters company of 1 ATF were sent out as working parties to help the exhausted gunners bring in the rounds. All of this had to be done in the dark and rain.4

  Brigadier David Jackson and others were still concerned that the base might be the ultimate target – he had only five companies available to protect his long perimeter – but he was also aware that further attacks might be conducted against the depleted 6 RAR, still in the plantation 5 kilometres away. By now, Wing Commander Ray Scott had assembled six RAAF helicopters at Kangaroo Pad at 1 ATF. He recalled that they were not about to leave their helicopters because ‘I’d been told that we had a very critical situation on our hands . . . It was quite some time before we had anyone come down from the Army Ops Room to tell us what it was all about.’5 Among the helicopters were those that had flown in the original ammunition-resupply mission. Flight Lieutenant Bob Grandin recalled being ‘nervous all the time, the sort of nervous energy that keeps you on edge . . . but we remained ready to do whatever we had to do’.6

  Back in the plantation it was 7.38 p.m. when Lieutenant Colonel Townsend radioed Jackson at Nui Dat to tell him: ‘D Coy is to reorganize his force. I propose for D Coy to withdraw to a likely LZ [landing zone] to
regroup and evacuate casualties or they may die. The proposed LZ is 750 metres NW of this loc. Dustoff expected in 60 minutes approx.’7

  Lieutenant Roberts now set about reorganising his troops for all-round defence. The men were anxious and expected to get the call to re-form and move up to 11 Platoon’s former position to recover the Australian dead and hopefully find some wounded among them. As they waited, Roberts heard a lot of sniper fire but there was no assault.8

  Private Terry Burstall and the other survivors of D Company had collected into one area fairly close to the carriers. ‘Blokes were sitting and standing in little groups, just staring and smoking. Everyone gave anything to whoever asked for it. Blokes gave away their last cigarettes without even hesitating. I have never experienced before or since such communal unselfishness, and it disturbs me to think that it takes a tragedy to produce this spirit. All any bloke cared about was helping everyone around him.’9

  At 8.35 p.m. Townsend and Jackson discussed the possibilities of trying to move forward to 11 Platoon’s original position to recover the dead and any wounded who might still be out there. They agreed that they would have to wait until daylight, and that the current position could not be made secure and the force should retire to the west to help cover the evacuation of the wounded at the proposed landing zone. Townsend also reported that the casualties so far known were five dead, 16 wounded and another 16 missing; he mentioned the enemy had clearly suffered heavy casualties from D Company and the Anzac and US artillery.10 Jackson concluded that Townsend was preparing to ‘evacuate area to secure an LZ with the troops available’.11 Jackson was clearly distressed by the Australian losses. Once he had finished talking to Townsend he sat down on a chair and stayed there for some time, seemingly alone, with his head buried in his hands. One platoon destroyed, one company non-effective, 16 men missing – it looked like a disaster.12

  Meanwhile, the wounded and dead were being loaded into the APCs for the movement to the landing zone about 750 metres west of the present position, just beyond the rubber plantation. The handling of the dead and wounded took some time and the severely wounded had now been without professional medical care for several hours. Three of Major Smith’s wounded volunteered to remain on duty. The centre of the landing zone was just 200 metres from the earlier rendezvous position between majors Smith and Ford six hours before.

  The wounded Corporal Robbins remembered that time meant nothing to him at this point, and he even managed to have a light sleep. When he woke up, someone told him that they were clearing an area for the helicopter medevacs.13 At 8.45 the Task Force was advised that the ‘LZ GR 470670 [was] to be ringed by APCs with their red tail lights at extreme of LZ. Should be ready approx 1 hours time.’14 However, the APCs with the dead and wounded would not leave the battlefield for the landing zone for another two hours.

  Major Smith had no time to reflect on what had happened – he was still in command of D Company, and he and his men still had plenty of work to do. Lieutenant Sabben recalled that Sergeant Major Kirby had several parties organised: one group of NCOs supervised the distribution of ammunition and water bottles, while another cared for the wounded and helped load them and the dead into the carriers. Yet another was collecting all of the unclaimed gear, including damaged and undamaged weapons, while NCOs were doing roll calls and consolidating a list of missing and casualties. At a quieter time, Smith reflected on their survival against overwhelming numbers:15

  We only lost four killed in the final company defensive area – albeit not dug in – thanks to the gunners and their accurate artillery fire, and to the courage, tenacity and resilience of my own company in giving the VC back as much as we were receiving. My soldiers just kept up a steady and accurate volume of small arms fire into the assaulting VC, who were surging forward over the bodies of their fallen comrades. Thank heavens we had ample ammunition. Although not a religious person, I recall thanking God for the RAAF choppers and the gunners. Morrie Stanley and his crew were outstanding. Although Morrie was later to place much of the praise on his battery commander, let me make it very clear Morrie was the man on the spot and he called the tune of the song we wanted to hear to the guns back at base.16

  At 10.30 p.m. Jackson, back at Nui Dat, was informed that D Company was still in its original ‘location as the casualty loading is pretty slow and should leave in approx 15 minutes. Remainder here will follow later. A Coy patrol is investigating groaning to their front.’17

  Indeed, some of the men from A Company had been concerned for a while that some of the injured moaning out beyond the perimeter might be Australians. Company Sergeant Major Jack Roughley, a Korean War veteran and former member of the AATTV, crept out beyond the perimeter on his own initiative to investigate the moans originating to the north. While he was out there the moans begun to cease, and he made his way back to the perimeter having come across no one.18

  Another who conducted a self-appointed recce was Corporal Ross Smith, who searched the area south-east. He had warned Lieutenant Robert Toyer that they would be going out – the last thing he wanted was to be shot by ‘friendly’ fire. On hearing that Corporal Smith was going out, Private Peter Bennett volunteered to go with him as ‘one of my very good friends was still lying out there [Lance Corporal Jack Jewry – who had been killed earlier at 11 Platoon’s original position]. I wasn’t sure whether he was dead or wounded. I wanted to locate him or any other Australian before the Vietcong did so.’19 Toyer passed on the request to Captain Charles Mollison, who refused the mission; Smith and Bennett went out regardless.20

  As they crawled out into no-man’s land, Smith with an Owen submachine gun and Bennett with an SLR, they began to think it wasn’t such a good idea. Bennett understandably got the shakes, but to his credit he pressed on. ‘It was unbelievable. It was dark, there were people groaning and moaning everywhere . . . I didn’t really know who we were trying to make contact with. We just continued to crawl along the ground to that noise, to the groan . . . obviously hoping that we’d locate one of our own. The thing that I noticed was that as we got closer, the groans would move away . . . we seemed to be losing whatever contact we made. It was very dark – you couldn’t see a few feet in front of you – and raining.’21 It was only later that they realised the groaning was likely from Vietnamese wounded being dragged away.

  It wasn’t long before Smith and Bennett saw enemy troops that seemed to be moving about. Smith was the first to see them. ‘When the lightning flashed in the distance, we saw these people, the enemy, in front of us. Peter Bennett grabbed my leg – my leg was shaking enough to fall off, and his hand was shaking – and said “Did you see that?” and I said, “Shit, I saw that too. They’re in front of us – they’re coming in from both sides too.”’ Smith looked at his night compass and held out his arm, providing a direction back to the Australian position. He whispered to Bennett: ‘When I start shooting, keep going – don’t stop.’22 Both men crouched, ready to fire, but the lightning had ceased and they managed to get away without having to fire a shot, making their way back to the Australian perimeter.

  Soon after, they went out again, this time with permission from Mollison. They took with them their radio operator, Private Ernie Dare. As they crawled, and at great risk to themselves they would call out was there anyone from Sydney, or who had won the rugby league grand final?23 They never got a reply, and returned to A Company’s position having found none of the missing Australians. Smith recalled returning to their platoon location empty-handed and pretty much dejected, having nothing to show for their effort.24

  Townsend approached Major Smith and suggested that he and the other survivors of D Company be evacuated back to Nui Dat and from there on to Vung Tau. The major was strongly opposed to this. He insisted that the missing were from his company and there was no way he and his men were not going in to retrieve their dead and hopefully bring in any wounded who might have survived the night. It was also imperative to him that he and his men ‘assert a psychological dominanc
e over the area’.25 They had been thrown off a metaphorical horse and needed to get back on.

  Smith further argued that apart from the wounded, they should maintain their present position and not withdraw from the plantation. They now had a consolidated force, with A Company and a platoon from B Company, along with the APCs. There was also a regiment of artillery zeroed in, and they could have US air support in terms of helicopter gunships and strike aircraft overhead on immediate call. He argued further that their presence would keep the enemy well away from the missing:26 Smith and others had heard terrible stories from the Americans up in the northern provinces about atrocities committed on American soldiers captured on the battlefield. Smith tried to argue with his immediate superior that they should stay on the battlefield all night but he didn’t win the argument and was forced to withdraw to a safer area to get his casualties out.27

  Townsend was adamant about evacuating the present position. He did not have an intact battalion: A Company was down to two effective platoons (with the withdrawal of 1 Platoon and CHQ), B Company consisted of a composite platoon, and D Company was a spent force.28 While Smith didn’t win the argument about maintaining their existing position, he and his men would remain in the vicinity of the landing zone in order to go out at first light to look for the missing Australians. They would not be heading back to the Task Force base.