27 newspaper: McDermott, 189;
28 “description”/sought out/apartment: MFR of int. Bayoumi, MFR 04016481, 1/12/04, National Drug Enforcement Center for the FBI, “265D-NY-280350, TWINBOM-PENTTBOM, Biographical Report,” 11/26/01, authors’ collection;
29 pure chance: MFR 04019254, 4/20/04, MFR 04016231, 11/18/03, CF;
30 “to pick up”: Report, JI, 173;
31 contacts imam: Dieter Snell, et al., to Philip Zelikow, “Summary of Interviews in Saudi Arabia,” 2/25/04, MFR, CF;
32 cell phone: MFR, 040175541A, 11/17/03, CF, CR, 516n26;
33 jihad material/salary: Report, JI, 174;
34 distinguishing mark: CR, 516n19;
35 “We do not”: CR 218;
36 “very suspicious”: int. Eleanor Hill.
37 “We firmly”: Newsweek, 8/3/03. As noted earlier in this chapter, KSM has denied that there were helpers in place in the U.S. He also specifically denied that he had ever heard of Bayoumi (CR, 516n19, CBS News, 8/3/03);
38 Aulaqi 29/imam: FBI Memo, “Ansar Nasser Aulaqi, IT-UBL,” 9/26/01, INTELWIRE;
39 four calls: MFR 04017541A, 11/17/03 & MFR 04017531, 11/17/03, CF, “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, CR, 221, 517n33;
40 attended mosque: CR, 517n33, MFR 04017542, 11/18/03, CF;
41 “closed-door”: Report, JI, 178, NYT, 5/8/10, Jamie Reno, “Public Enemy #1,” www.sandiegomagazine.com;
42 Hazmi respected/spoke: MFR of [name redacted], 4/23/04, CF—since reported to have been Abdussattar Shaikh;
43 “very calm”: FBI Memo, “Ansar Nasser Aulaqi, IT-UBL,” 9/26/01, INTELWIRE;
44 “spiritual advisor”: Report, JI, 27.
45 Aulaqi relocated/no contact: The record seems contradictory on this. The Commission Report quoted Aulaqi as denying having had contact in Virginia with Hazmi or his companion at that point, future fellow hijacker Hani Hanjour. A May 2004 Commission memo, however, states that Aulaqi “admits contact with the hijackers” at both the Virginia and San Diego mosques. (CR, 229–, MFR 04019202, 5/6/04).
46 had investigated/“procurement”: CR, 517n33;
47 “potentially”: CR, 221;
48 prison: WP, 2/27/08;
49 terrorist attacks: (Fort Hood shooting/bomb on Detroit-bound plane/Times Square car bomb) Christian Science Monitor, 5/19/10, Fox News, 10/20/10, CNN, 1/7/10, Guardian (U.K.), 10/31/10, MSNBC, 11/1/10;
50 Harman: Christian Science Monitor, 5/19/10;
51 KSM suggested: KSM SUBST;
52 passes Zoo/SeaWorld: LAT, 9/1/02;
53 bank accounts/car/ID: FBI IG, Staff Report, Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” CO, MFR.
54 driver’s licenses/phone directory: CR, 539n85, Lance, Triple Cross, 349. The two terrorists moved in May 2000 to the home of a man named Abdussattar Shaikh, and—though Mihdhar left that summer—Hazmi stayed until December. Shaikh, the subject of controversy not least because he was an FBI informant, will be covered in the notes for Ch. 33 (CR, 220, 516n28, MFR of [name redacted], 4/23/04, CF, www.scribd.com, Nawaf al-Hazmi timeline, “Hijacker Primary Documents,” B50, T5, CF, Graham with Nussbaum, Shaikh refs., Shenon, 53–);
55 sociable/“brooding”: Corbin, 174—, Newsweek, 6/10/02;
56 soccer/“psychotic”: CR 220, MFR 04017531, 11/17/03, CF;
57 “You’ll know”: Newsweek, 6/10/02;
58 phone calls/computer/Yahoo: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 25;
59 KSM told: KSM SUBST;
60 Hazmi enrolled/Mihdhar not start: ibid., Staff Statement 16, CO, CR, 221, 517n30, 36, FBI 302 of int. Omer Bakarbashat, 9/17/01, INTELWIRE;
61 flight school/few lessons: CR, 221–, 517n36;
62 praying: Corbin, 174;
63 “They just”/“Dumb”: Newsweek, 6/10/02;
64 flying not for them: WP, 9/30/01.
65 dropped out/flew back: KSM SUBST, CR, 220. Though Mihdhar supposedly went home to rejoin his family, he also went on to travel to Malaysia, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. FBI director Mueller suggested to Congress’s Joint Inquiry that his role may have included helping to organize the so-called muscle hijackers. (CR, 222, Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02).
66 overruled/progressive: KSM SUBST.
67 shed clothing/beards: CR, 167, FBI report, “The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model,” 2/03, INTELWIRE.
68 31 emails/“We are”/“lost”/new passports: Testimony of George Tenet, 6/18/02, JI, CR, 168, 497n108, Transcript of Jury Trial, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 3/7/06. Atta had entered a lottery for a U.S. visa as early as October the previous year, perhaps a further indication that he knew something of the bin Laden plan before heading to Afghanistan in November. He applied for and got a visa in the regular way, however, only in May 2000 (MFR 04019351, 12/10–11/03, Staff Report, “9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” CO, 15–).
69 Binalshibh: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 17–, CR, 225, 519n52. Binalshibh applied for a visa three times in the year 2000, each time unsuccessfully;
70 Shehhi/Atta to NY: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 15;
71 Bronx/Brooklyn: Staff Statement 16, CO, Report, JI, 136;
72 calling card: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 53;
73 Jarrah arrives: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 17;
74 flight school: MFR 04019350, 3/18/04, CF, Herald-Tribune (Sarasota), 9/10/06;
75 “He was”: Corbin, 160, & see MFR 04018408, 4/12/04, CF;
76 “occasional”: Fouda & Fielding, 131;
77 Private Pilot License/aviation mechanics: CR, 224, biographical note “Ziad Jarrah,” FBI 03212, JICI 4/19/02, www.scribd.com, “Airman Records for Jarrah,” B45, T5, CF;
78 “He wanted”: Corbin, 161;
79 Oklahoma school/FBI regional office: Statement of Eleanor Hill re “The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to Sept. 11, 2001,” 9/24/02 (as updated 10/17/02), JI.
80 toured school: Title: PENTTBOM, “Summary of Captioned Investigation as of 11/4/01,” 11/5/01, authors’ collection, CR, 224. The two hijackers’ visit was to Airman Flight School, where bin Laden pilot Ihab Ali had trained several years earlier. Zacarias Moussaoui, who was part of KSM’s wider operation and would be arrested shortly before 9/11, would also train at Airman, in early 2001 (Ali: CR, 224, “Paving the Road to 9/11,” www.intelwire.com; Moussaoui: “Paving the Road to 9/11,” www.intelwire.com, CR, 246, 273–).
81 Huffman: CR, 224. Daniel Hopsicker, an author who has concentrated on the hijackers’ Venice stay, has written extensively about Venice Airport and those who operated flight schools there in 2000. In a 2009 article, he reported having discovered “covert CIA and military operations dating back to at least 1959” involving the airport. Hopsicker has focused on information indicating that the airport has a history of narcotics trafficking. He refers, too, to the seizure in July 2000—the month Atta and Shehhi began flight training—of a Learjet co-owned by Wallace Hilliard, the financier behind Huffman Aviation, with a large shipment of heroin on board. Hilliard maintained that he was the “innocent owner” of the plane. Huffman’s Rudi Dekkers, for his part, had what the St. Petersburg Times termed “a checkered history” of bankruptcies, business problems, and visa issues (he is a Dutch national). According to the Times, he was cited by the FAA in 1999 for several violations, and his pilot’s license was suspended. In interviews with a law enforcement official and an aviation executive, the authors got the impression that Venice Airport has indeed seen much illegal activity over the years. A Commission staff memo suggests that Atta and Shehhi were accepted as students of Huffman without strict adherence to INS regulations—sloppy procedure that had the effect of legitimizing their continued stay in the United States. It may conceivably be of significance that Yeslam bin Laden, one of Osama’s half-brothers, had paid for an acquaintance’s flight instruct
ion at the school—a bizarre fact that may be no more than a coincidence (Hopsicker: Daniel Hopsicker, Welcome to Terrorland, Eugene, OR: MadCow, 2004/2007; CIA: “Big Safari, the Kennedy Assassination, & the War for Control of the Venice Airport,” 9/9/09, “The Deep History of the Venice Municipal Airport,” 9/21 & 9/24/09, “Venice Was a Quiet Mena, Arkansas,” 4/16/10, www.madcowprod.com, Hopsicker, 128–; Hilliard: Orlando Sentinel, 8/2/00; Aircraft Bill of Sale, N351WB, U.S. Dept. of Transportation (FAA), World Jet, Inc., to Plane I Leasing—Wallace J. Hilliard, President, filed 11/15/99, Hearing on Motion of Forfeiture Proceedings, U.S. v. Edgar Javier Valles-Diaz, et al., U.S. District Court for the Middle District of FL, 11/3/00; Dekkers: St. Petersburg Times, 7/25/04; Commission/legitimizing: Kephart-Robert to Ginsberg, 2/26/04, “Hijacker Pilot Training,” B21, T7, CF; interviews: ints. Coy Jacobs & FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force agent; Yeslam: New Yorker, 11/12/01).
82 No reliable source: McDermott, 195;
83 “had an attitude”/“likeable”: transcript int. Rudi Dekkers, Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au;
84 “When you”/immaculate/“Generally”: int. Mark Mikarts;
85 no better/another school/failed/argued: FBI 302 of int. Ivan Chirivella, 9/16/01, INTELWIRE, Corbin, 10–, “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, CR, 224, WSJ, 10/16/01;
86 “a gesture”/Saudi/cushion: transcript of int. Ann Greaves, Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au;
87 “I don’t want”: “Mohammed Atta’s Last Will & Testament, Frontline: “Inside the Terror Network,” www.pbs.org, NYT, 10/4/01;
88 “We had female”: int. Mark Mikarts;
89 “very rude”: FBI 302 of Ivan Chirivella, 9/16/01, INTELWIRE;
90 Outlook bar: int. Lizsa Lehman. Allegations that several members of the terrorist team—Atta included—indulged in heavy drinking at bars in Florida in the days prior to the attack are covered in Ch. 28, on this page. Reports of Atta’s heavy drinking are probably apocryphal. Lizsa Lehman’s firsthand recollection of Atta and Shehhi drinking beer in moderation at the Outlook, however, seems credible.
91 Jarrah License: MFR 04021445, 1/13 & 1/25/04, CF, Staff Statement 16, CO;
92 fall trip/Paris/photographed: Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection, Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 21–, [Name Redacted] to [Name Redacted], INS, 9/19/01, re Saeed A.A. Al Ghamdi, & attachments, “Inspector Interviews, UA 93, Notes & Memos,” B49, T5, CF;
93 “I love you”: McDermott, 198;
94 Mitsubishi: Jarrah timeline, “03009470, Packet 6, Ziad Jarrah chronology,” www.scribd.com;
95 Bahamas: Report of Investigation, U.S. Customs Service, Case no. TA09FR01TA003, & Letter re plane piloted by Jarrah, N833OU, “Hijacker Primary Docs, UA 93,” B51, T5, CF;
96 Atta/Shehhi licenses: MFR 04021445, 1/13 & 1/25/04, CF, Staff Statement 16, CO;
97 Christmas trip: Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection, Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 21–;
98 abandoned plane: MFR 04021445, 1/13 & 1/25/04, CF, Testimony of Rudi Dekkers, Subcommittee on Immigration & Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Reps., 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3/19/02;
99 videos: Indictment, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 12/01;
100 727 simulator/“They just”: Daily Record (Glasgow, Scotland), 9/15/01, NYT, 9/14/01, Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE.
101 Some have argued: Skeptics have questioned whether Hani Hanjour had the piloting skill to fly American 77 into the Pentagon at almost ground level. While some flying instructors commented on his inadequacies, however, others recalled having found him competent. One, who flew with Hanjour in August 2001, went so far as to describe him as a “good” pilot. (Skeptics: e.g., Griffin, New Pearl Harbor, 78–; inadequacies/competent: e.g., CBS News, 5/10/02, Newsday, 9/23/01; “good”: MFR 0401840, 4/9/04—citing Eddie G. Shalev. Contrary to an assertion by skeptic Griffin, who questioned the existence of instructor Shalev, 9/11 Commission files contain the record of an interview of him by a commission staffer and an accompanying FBI agent. Shalev, moreover, is listed in various public records. Griffin, New Pearl Harbor, 286n99, & see, e.g., www.intelius.com.)
102 767 simulator: ibid., Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02, Transcript of Jury Trial, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Vol. II-A, 3/7/06. Jarrah and Hani Hanjour, the other 9/11 hijack pilots, also trained on simulators (CR, 226–, Testimony of James Fitzgerald, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 3/7/06).
103 OBL impatient 2000: CR, 251. The authors here cite the date used in the Commission Report, which in turn refers to KSM interrogations of 2003 and 2004. The longer account of KSM’s statements, the one generally used in this book, states that bin Laden tried in spring 2000 to bring the attacks forward—surely unlikely, as he well knew the hijack pilots had at that time barely embarked on their training (CR 250, 532n177, KSM SUBST).
104 KSM resisted/new candidate: KSM SUBST, MFR 04019351, 12/10–11/03, CF;
105 well-to-do: BG, 3/3/02, WP, 9/10/02;
106 back and forth: Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02, Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, 12, WP, 9/10/02;
107 Hanjour license: MFR 04021445, 1/13 & 1/25/04, CF, copies of license documents, “Airman Records—Hanjour,” B45, T5, CF;
108 pretending: WP, 9/10/02, BG, 3/3/02;
109 “frail”: FBI 302 of [name redacted], 9/18/01, “FBI 302s of Interest,” B17, T7, CF;
110 “quiet”: MFR 04017517, 1/7/04, CF;
111 “mouse”: McDermott, 204;
112 drink/pray: MFR 04017518, 1/5/04, CF;
113 in tears: CR, 520n55;
114 Afghanistan at 17: Report, JI, 135, Staff Statement 16, CO;
115 Atef sent KSM/KSM dispatched/thought: KSM SUBST;
116 Hanjour to U.S./Hazmi/flight school: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 19–, Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02, CR, 226;
117 school owner/“No”: WP, 10/21/01, 9/10/02, Newsday, 9/23/01;
118 “content”/“warrior”: The Times (London), 9/20/01;
119 “ ’Orwah”: Fouda & Fielding, 111.
120 computer/“I went”: transcript of int. Ann Greaves, Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au, ints. Mark Mikart; Cole: Katz, 269–, Miller & Stone, 226–, Wright, 319–, Graham with Nussbaum, 59–, Fox News, 1/13/09;
121 OBL deny/praise: ABC News, 3/1/00;
122 A destroyer: Time, 9/24/01, Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, 229, Wright, 333;
123 “With small”: Newsweek, 9/24/01.
124 “To those”: Clinton address, 10/18/00, http://usinfo.org;
125 “Let’s hope”: NYT, 10/13/01;
126 “What’s it gonna”: Richard Clarke, 224;
127 “major”: State of the Union address in WP, 1/27/00;
128 “not satisfactory”: CR, 187, Report, JI, 301. National Security Adviser Berger dated this memo as February 2000. Without giving a clear source, the 9/11 Commission dated it as early March (Report, JI, 301, CR 187, 505n99);
129 Predator: Staff Statement 7, CO, CR, 506n118, 513n238;
130 negotiations: CounterPunch, 1/16/08, 9/9/09, 11/1/04, Reuters, 6/4/04;
131 U.N. resolution: Resolution 1333, 12/19/00, http://avalon.law.yale. edu;
132 Tenet warned: Tenet, 128.
133 Pakistani told FBI: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/18/02, JI, NBC News, 7/26/04, Sunday Times (London), 2/13/05. The Pakistani was Niaz Kahn, a former waiter from Oldham, near Manchester in the U.K., who apparently became involved in terrorism not because of his ideals but because he needed money. Two men he met in the U.K., he said, encouraged him to go to a camp in Pakistan, where he was given instruction in “conventional” hijackings, not suicide operations. He was eventually flown by a roundabout route to
New York, but evaded the contact waiting for him and went to the FBI. Kahn’s story was first reported publicly in late 2004 (NBC News, 7/26/04, Vanity Fair, 11/04, transcript, int. Niaz Khan, 5/18/04, in collection of Jean-Charles Brisard).
134 Italian police/“studying”: int. Bruno Megale, Bergen, OBL I Know, 281, Miller & Stone, 274–. A U.S. Justice Department official was quoted after 9/11 as saying that a “small cadre of U.S. intelligence experts might have been privy to the Italian surveillance material.” On the other hand, other press reporting suggests that the surveillance of the two Yemenis was “not translated by Italian police” until May 2002 (LAT, 5/29/02, Chicago Tribune, 10/8/02).
135 Olympics: Sydney Morning Herald, 9/20/01. In October, the Defense Department held a tabletop exercise simulating the crash of an airliner into the courtyard of the Pentagon. Critics have cited this as an indication that the Pentagon received early intelligence of terrorist plans to target the building with an airplane. On the evidence, however, the exercise may simply have been designed to ensure readiness for any possible sort of plane crash into the Pentagon—which is close to Reagan National Airport (“Contingency Planning Pentagon MASCAL Exercise,” 11/3/00, www.dcmilitary.com, UPI, 4/22/04).
136 FBI/FAA downplayed: In April 2000, an FAA advisory issued to airlines and airports had stated that U.S. airliners could be targeted but that hijacking was “more probable outside the United States.” The advisory would not have been replaced as of September 11, 2001 (Staff Report, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 59);
137 “do not suggest”: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/18/02, JI, Report, JI, 104–;
138 “imprudent”: Report, JI, 334.
139 “Americans would”: CR, 198;
140 Clinton authorized: Tenet, 135;
141 Cheney/Powell/Rice: Testimony of Sandy Berger, 3/24/04, CO, Time, 8/12/02, DeYoung, 344;
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