142 “As I briefed”: Richard Clarke, 229;
143 “sitting”/“cognizant”: Rice int., www.whitehouse.gov, 3/24/04, Testimony, 4/8/04, CO;
144 did not know: Richard Clarke, 31;
145 “not an amateur”: ibid., 328;
146 Commission/“on American”: Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, U.S. Commission on National Security, 2/15/01, viii, 6, Tenet, 16, Columbia Journalism Review, Nov/Dec 2001;
147 pressed to see: Hurley to Gorelick, 4/5/04, “Commissioner Prep for Rice,” B7, T3, CF;
148 “did not remember”: CR, 199, Ben-Veniste, 302–;
149 OBL biggest/“listened”: Clinton, 935–.
CHAPTER 26
1 “We are not”: George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 1/20/01, www.bartleby.com, Time, 1/20/01;
2 “empty rhetoric”: WP, 1/20/02;
3 “They ridiculed”: int. of Clinton for Fox News, 9/24/06;
4 “What we did”: “Report: Rice Challenges Clinton on Osama,” http://wcbstv.com, 9/26/06;
5 “I’m tired”: CR, 202 & see Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO, CR, 510n185, int. of Stephen Hadley, 60 Minutes, CBS, 3/21/04;
6 “just solve”: “Transcript: Clarke Praised Bush Team in 02,” Fox News, 3/24/04.
7 nothing effective done: As Rice recalled it, it was in May that the President told her he was tired of swatting at flies. Clarke said Bush’s directive came to him in March. Bush did write to President Musharraf in February 2001, emphasizing that bin Laden was a threat to the United States that “must be addressed.” Though he urged Musharraf to use his influence with the Taliban over bin Laden, the approach proved unproductive. So were further Bush administration contacts with the Pakistanis later in the year (Rice/Clarke: CR, 510n185; Musharraf: CR, 207).
8 memo/“not some narrow”/“multiple”: Clarke to Rice & attachments, 1/25/01, www2.gwu.edu. The memorandum and the December 2000 “Strategy” document have been released, with some redactions. The September 1998 “Political-Military Plan DELENDA” [a reference to the vow to destroy Carthage, in the days of ancient Rome] has not been released (Clarke to Rice, 1/25/01, & Tab A, released to National Security Archive, www2.gwu.edu, CR, 120, Richard Clarke, 197–).
9 Cole linked al Qaeda: FBI IG;
10 “No al Qaeda plan”: WP, 3/22/04;
11 no recommendations: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO;
12 “Having served”: int. Eleanor Hill;
13 no longer member/instead report: CR, 200, 509n169, Clarke, 230;
14 no retaliation for Cole: CR, 201–;
15 “tit-for-tat”: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO & see Ben-Veniste, 304–;
16 “ancient history”: MFR 04018415, 12/16/03, CF;
17 deputies not meet/April: CR, 203, Richard Clarke, 231;
18 Wolfowitz/tetchy: Richard Clarke, 231;
19 “We are going”: Benjamin & Simon, 336.
20 “to be paying”: “Big Media Networks Ignore Gorelick Role, Highlight Bremer Rebuke of Bush Team,” 4/30/04, citing Bremer int. for CBS News, 2/26/01, www.freerepublic.com, LAT, 4/30/04. Three years later, by which time he had become U.S. administrator in occupied Iraq, Bremer would attempt to backtrack and say his 2001 comment had been “unfair” to Bush, that his speech had reflected frustration that none of the National Commission’s recommendations had been implemented by either the Clinton or the new Bush administration. (AP, 5/2/04);
21 “The highest”: DCI’s Worldwide Threat Briefing, 2/7/01, www.cia.gov; Le Monde scoop: “11 Septembre 2001: Les Français en savaient long,” Le Monde, 4/16/07.
22 passed on to CIA: The DGSE document, one of more than three hundred pages leaked, is dated January 5, 2001, and numbered 00007/CT. Its heading reads: “Note de Synthèse—Projet de Détournement d’Avion par des Islamistes Radicaux,” and it draws on information passed on by the intelligence service of Uzbekistan. The overall dossier leaked is entitled “Oussama bin Laden” and dated 9/13/01. The authors have seen the entire dossier. The celebrated French fortnightly, Le Canard Enchaîné, reporting on the material as early as October 2001, stated that “most” of the reports on bin Laden had been shared with the CIA and the FBI. Le Monde, in its major story of April 19, 2007, reported as a fact that the January 5 report was passed to the CIA. Le Monde quoted former senior DGSE official Pierre-Antoine Lorenzi as saying that such information would have been passed to the Agency as a matter of routine. Alain Chouet, former head of the Security Intelligence department, took the same view when interviewed by the authors (attachment, James to Zelikow, 4/14/04, “Motley Submission,” B10, T2, CF).
23 FAA 50 summaries/no action: Staff Report, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” CO, Farmer, 96–, New York Observer, 6/20/04;
24 met Tenet almost daily: Tenet, 137;
25 40 PDBs: CR, 254.
26 Atta January trip: Staff Statement 16, CO. Atta flew to and back from Europe via Madrid, leaving on January 4 and returning on January 10. There is evidence suggesting he was in Berlin during that period, and the Commission Report states that his purpose in going was to see Binalshibh in Germany. It has been suggested that Madrid was more than a stopover en route to Germany, that at one point in the round-trip from the States Atta paused to meet a contact in Spain. An al Qaeda cell was active in Spain at the time. An allegation that Atta made another trip to Europe in April, during which he met with an Iraqi official in Prague, will be covered in Ch. 34 and related notes (trip: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 23–, “Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE; Binalshibh: CR, 227, 243 Staff Statement 16, CO; contact/cell: Der Spiegel, 10/27/03, CR, 530n145; Prague: CR, 228).
27 Shehhi Morocco: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 26–, 215n95;
28 Jarrah reentered/Aysel to U.S./Key West/tourist: Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection, Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 21–.
29 Atta hurdle/Shehhi referred/“I thought”: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 22–, FBI int. [name redacted], Primary Inspector for Atta on 1/10/01, 11/27/01, “Inspector Interviews, AA11” B49, T5, CF & see “The Immigration & Naturalization Service’s Contacts with Two September 11 Terrorists,” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 5/20/02. In early May, Atta and two companions—one of whom was probably Jarrah—would go to the Miami Immigration Office to try to get the visa of one of the trio extended to eight months. The inspector not only declined that request but shortened Atta’s own permitted stay to six months. Atta left without making a fuss. The second of his companions, the inspector came to suspect after 9/11, had been Adnan Shukrijumah. Shukrijumah, believed to have been an al Qaeda operative reporting to bin Laden, had as of this writing long been on the FBI’s Most Wanted List. Though born in Saudi Arabia, he was entitled to live in the United States—his family had moved to Florida in the mid-1990s, but left the country shortly before 9/11. Shukrijumah’s late father, an imam, had once served at the al-Farooq mosque in Brooklyn, the hub for jihadi recruiting during the anti-Soviet war (INS visit: [name redacted] Immigration Inspector to Mr. Garofano, 10/23/01, appointment list for May 2, 2001, follow-up interviews, Miami District Office, INS, 4/16/02, & MFR of [name redacted] Customs & Border Protection, 3/25/04, “Inspector Interviews,” B49, T5, CF, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 30–; Shukrijumah: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 216n114, 256n138, CNN, 8/6/10, NY Daily News, 8/6/10, “Father Knows Terrorism Best,” 10/27/03, www.frontpagemag.com, Newsweek, 4/7/04, NYT, 9/3/06).
30 Atta/Shehhi turned up/rented/asked: Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Counterterrrorism to All Field Offices, 9/15/01, FBI 265A-NY-280350, Serial 2268, released under FOIA to Mike Williams of www.911myths.com, FBI memorandum, PENTTBOM, Summary of captioned investigation as of 11/4/01, 11/5/01, authors’ collection, AP, 10/19/01, WP, 12/16/01.
31 optional targets: KSM SUBST. Separately, there was to be much reference to a claim by Johnelle Bryant, a loan officer for the Department of Agriculture in Homestead, Florida, that Atta came to her office to inquire about a loan to buy a plane for conversion into a crop duster. When told he did not qualify, she said, he made threats, spoke of the destruction of U.S. monuments, and praised bin Laden. Bryant dated the incident as having occurred between late April and mid-May 2000. So far as is known, however, Atta did not arrive in the United States until June 3, 2000 (Timeline Pertaining to Hijackers in Florida, “Timelines 9/11, 2 of 2,” B20, T7, CF, ABC News, 6/6/02, Edward Epstein, “The Terror Crop Dusters,” www.edwardjayepstein.com, but see Miller & Stone, 268–).
32 Hanjour certificate: Hani Hanjour, AA Flight 77, FBI summary 03096, 4/19/02, www.scribd.com, Counterterrrorism to All Field Offices, 9/15/01, FBI 265A-NY-280350, Serial 2268, released under FOIA to Mike Williams of www.911myths.com, FBI 302 of int. FNU Milton, 4/12/02, INTELWIRE, CR, 226–;
33 Sporty’s video: Hijackers’ Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE;
34 Grand Canyon: Nawaf al-Hazmi, AA Flight 77, FBI summary 03177, 4/19/02, www.scribd.com;
35 greet muscle: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 50, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–.
36 new arrivals/“The Hour”: CR, 231, BG, 3/3/02, 3/4/02. The thirteen were: Satam al-Suqami, Wail al-Shehri, Waleed al-Shehri, Abdul Aziz al-Omari, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Mohand al-Shehri, Majed Moqed, Salem al-Hazmi, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ahmad al-Haznawi, and Ahmed al-Nami—all Saudis—and Fayez Banihammad, from the UAE. Also in the muscle group on 9/11 would be Hamzi and Mihdhar (the latter having arrived back in the United States as of early July). The group included two pairs of brothers, Nawaf and Salem al-Hazmi and Wail and Waleed al-Shehri—though Mohand al-Shehri was unrelated. The three Ghamdis appear to have been not close relatives but merely members of the large Ghamdi tribe. Saudi press reports noted that in Saudi Arabia “the names al Ghamdi and al Shehri are as common as the name Smith in the United States” (CR, 231, 237, Arab News, 9/18/01, 9/20/01, 9/22/01, BG, 3/3/02).
37 OBL picked: CR, 235;
38 5’7”: ibid., 231;
39 martyr: ibid., 234;
40 visa easy/Express: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 32–, 111–, CR, 235, “teater”/“Wasantwn”: Non-immigrant Visa Application of Wail al-Shehri, Joel Mowbray, “Visas for Terrorists,” National Review, archived at www.webcitation.org;
41 “did not think”: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 125, MFR 04016462, 12/5/03, CF;
42 sky marshals: CR, 236;
43 butcher/“to muddy”/told Dubai: KSM SUBST.
44 travel pairs/“businessman”/tourists/unsatisfactory: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–, Janice Kephart, “The Complete Immigration Story of 9/11 Hijacker Satam al Suqami,” 9/10, www.cis.org. The authors refer here to documentation that was inadequate on its face, but passed muster at Immigration or Customs control. Four of the muscle hijackers, meanwhile, had markers in their passports later understood to have been signs of tampering associated with al Qaeda (Staff Report, 9/11 Terrorist Travel, 29, 33, 34).
45 prior arrangement: KSM SUBST;
46 flew DC/NY: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–;
47 Atta/Hazmi/money: CR, 237;
48 videos/“We left”: Guardian (U.K.), 4/16/02, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 2006, 133, CR 235, 525n104. The first hijacker videotape was released in April 2002 (Guardian [U.K.], 4/16/02).
49 Massoud/“If President Bush”: Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2008, 246–; Steve Coll, “Ahmad Shah Massoud Links with CIA,” 2/23/04, www.rawa.org, WP, 1/19 & 20/02;
50 “gained limited”: Defense Intelligence Agency, cable, “IIR [redacted]/The Assassination of Massoud Related to 11 September 2001 Attack,” 11/21/01, as released to the National Security Archive, www.gwu.edu, Schroen, 95–;
51 “was sending”: Tenet, 156;
52 Cairo/“We knew”: NYT, 6/4/02;
53 “something big was coming”: MFR 03009296, 11/3/03, MFR 04017179, 10/3/03;
54 Freeh/Ashcroft/denied: Newsweek, 5/27/02;
55 briefing documents/“public profile”: Staff Statement 10, CO, Shenon, 151–. The exception is the PDB of August 6, which is covered later in this chapter;
56 triumphalist speeches: Bergen, OBL I Know, 293–, Orange County Weekly, 9/7/02;
57 “They send”: The Australian, 12/21/07, The Age (Melbourne), 12/21/07;
58 “All the people”: Guardian (U.K.), 11/28/02;
59 Mihdhar/“I will make”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 64;
60 “the success”: CR, 251;
61 “It’s time”: Fouda & Fielding, 166.
62 Taliban asked: CR, 251. The Taliban appear to have been concerned not only about U.S. reprisals, but also as to what bin Laden should target. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reportedly favored attacking Jews—not necessarily the United States. Emails found later on the terrorist computer obtained by Wall Street Journal reporter Cullison show there was also dissension amongst the terrorists as to whether to give bin Laden full support at this time. “Going on,” one writer complained, “is like fighting ghosts and windmills” (CR, 250–, WSJ, 7/2/02).
63 MBC reporter/“some news”/“coffin”: In the Footsteps of Bin Laden, 8/23/06, www.cnn.com, Bergen, OBL I Know, 284–. According to CIA reporting of KSM’s interrogations, KSM and Atef “were concerned about this lack of discretion and urged bin Laden not to make additional comments about the plot.” It seems odd then that Atef, normally described as having been professional, should have taken part in the MBC interview. He may have hoped at least to blur the truth by referring to the coming attacks as targeting “American and Israeli interests”—thus avoiding giving away the fact that the attack would be on U.S. territory. If that was his intention, the deception was successful—many in the U.S. had the impression that the attack would take place overseas (“were concerned”: KSM SUBST, Atef: CR, refs.; successful: e.g. CR, 256–).
64 impatient/Cole: KSM SUBST, e.g. Mehnaz Sahibzada, “The Symbolism of the Number 7 in Islamic Culture and Rituals,” www.wadsworth.com;
65 dreams: e.g., Fouda & Fielding, 109, Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 21, WP, 9/11/02;
66 OBL bombarded/Sharon visit/Arafat not invited: KSM SUBST, NYT, 6/20/01;
67 “big gift”: Bergen, OBL I Know, 284–.
68 “like Captain Ahab”: Richard Clarke, 234;
69 “Clarke was driving”: Conclusions from Review of NSC papers, “Misc. 9/11 Commission Staff Notes About Drafting Final Report,” 16095055, CF;
70 “When these attacks”: CR, 256;
71 rated a seven: Tenet, 145–;
72 was “recruiting”/high alert: CR, 256–;
73 “very, very”/Clarke duly: CR, 257, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 55;
74 July 10 assessment/“There will”/“put his elbows”: Tenet, 150–.
75 “felt”/“The decision”/“Adults”: Bob Woodward, State of Denial, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006, 49–. It seems clear from this passage—in his 2006 book, State of Denial—that he interviewed Cofer Black. Also, perhaps, former CIA director Tenet. While Woodward reported that Tenet left the meeting “feeling frustrated,” Tenet stated in his memoir the following year that Black and the head of the Agency’s bin Laden unit departed feeling that “at last … we had gotten the full attention of the administration.” Within two days, a congressional report shows, Tenet went to the Capitol to give a similar briefing to U.S. senators. Only a handful turned up. It was a mystery to him, Tenet wrote, why the 9/11 Commission Report failed to mention the July 10 meeting with Rice—he had told the commissioners about the encounter in closed testimony. It was established that Tenet had indeed told the Commission of the meeting. As others have noted, the Commission’s executive director, Philip Zelikow, was closer to Rice and other Bush appointees than was healthy for
a man heading a supposedly even-handed investigation—he had even coauthored a book with Rice. According to 9/11 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, Tenet thought Rice “understood the level of urgency he was communicating.”
“It is shocking,” Peter Rundlet, a former Commission counsel, has written, “that the administration failed to heed such an overwhelming alert from the two officials in the best position to know. Many, many questions need to be asked and answered about this revelation” (meeting: Woodward, State of Denial, 50–, Tenet, 151–; congressional report: Report, “Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today,” Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 11/30/09, 4; indeed given: WP, 10/3/06; Zelikow: e.g., Shenon, 40–, 65–, 106–, Woodward, State of Denial, 52; understood: McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/06; Rundlet: Peter Rundlet, “Bush Officials May Have Covered Up Rice-Tenet Meeting from 9/11 Commission,” http://thinkprogress.org).
76 Black/Scheuer/UBL unit head resignations: MFR 03009296, 9/3/03, Shenon, 395, CR, 259–;
77 “The purpose”/Williams concerns/Zubaydah/connected/Hanjour/Williams recommended: Phoenix, Squad 16 to Counterterrorism, 7/10/01, www.justice.gov, FBI IG, Statement of Eleanor Hill re “The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to Sept. 11, 2001,” 9/24/02 [as updated 10/17/02]. The suspicious activity on the America West flight, which may have been reconnaissance for the 9/11 operation, is described in Ch. 24;
78 minimal circulation: NYT, 6/10/05, Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, 261n55;
79 “racial profiling”: Report, JI, 5;
80 “exercise”: NLETS Message (All Regions), from Counterterrorism, 7/2/01, INTELWIRE;
81 “I had asked”: Richard Clarke, 236–.
82 “I don’t want”: The Justice Department told the Commission that Ashcroft, his former deputy, and his chief of staff denied that he had made such a comment to Pickard. Ashcroft himself also denied it in his April 2004 Commission testimony. Pickard, for his part, reiterated his allegation in testimony, in Commission interviews, in a letter to the commission—and in a later long interview with reporter Philip Shenon. The commission was unable to resolve the contradictory accounts. It found, though, that—whatever the truth about the Ashcroft/Pickard relationship, “The domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan” (Justice Dept./Ashcroft denials: Hearing transcript & Testimony of Ashcroft, 4/13/04, CO; Pickard: CR, 265, 536n52, Shenon, 246, 432n, Ch. 35).
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