Refuting suggestions that Zubaydah may not have given good information, or that he may even have been mentally unstable, Kiriakou said he thought the contrary was true, that he did give reliable information and was “not crazy” but “bright, well-read, a good conversationalist.”
The Kiriakou interview for this book is first corroboration of the core elements of an account written by author Gerald Posner in 2003, with different detail and citing only anonymous sources. The Posner account, according to Kiriakou, got important detail and chronology skewed. The relevant interrogation of Zubaydah that produced the lead about the Saudi prince did not occur—as Posner wrote—within days of his capture but only months later, after he had been waterboarded. (This would fit with the account of FBI investigator Ali Soufan, who took part in interrogations of Zubaydah until June. During that early period, the link to the Saudi princes did not come up.)
As reported by Posner, Zubaydah was tricked into believing that he had been moved from U.S. to Saudi custody—in hopes that fear of the truly gruesome torture practiced in Saudi Arabia would lead him to start talking. Instead, by the Posner account, he seemed relieved and promptly urged his “Saudi” interrogators to telephone Prince Ahmed bin Salman—even providing the prince’s phone numbers from memory. Prince Ahmed, he said, “will tell you what to do.” Later, according to Posner’s account, he added the names and numbers of the two other princes. Bin Laden, Zubaydah reportedly said, had made a point of letting the Saudi royals know in advance, without sharing details, that there was going to be an attack on the United States on September 11.
Again according to Posner, the CIA decided to share what Zubaydah had said with Saudi intelligence, with a request that it probe further. New York Times journalist and author James Risen added a new detail in 2006. When Zubaydah was captured, sources told Risen, he had on his person two bank cards, one from a Saudi bank and another from an institution in Kuwait. American investigators worked through a Muslim financier to check on the accounts, only to be frustrated. There no longer was a way to trace the money that had gone into the accounts, the financier reported, because “Saudi intelligence officials had seized all the records relating to the card from the Saudi financial institution in question; the records then disappeared.”
Not only Posner and Risen but also a third writer, Tom Joscelyn, have probed the Zubaydah story. Joscelyn told the authors that one of his interviewees said he had seen the Zubaydah interrogation logs and that they corroborate the Zubaydah/princes scenario. Kiriakou’s interview with the authors now becomes the first on-the-record corroboration from a former CIA officer.
Absent the logs, proof positive that Zubaydah did make the claims attributed to him is unobtainable—for the worst of reasons. Though the 2002 interrogations of Zubaydah were videotaped, the Agency has admitted that it has since destroyed the tapes. While the destruction was deplorable, it may have been done to obscure evidence of brutal interrogation rather than of what Zubaydah said. The waterboarding of the prisoner occurred weeks before the CIA received formal authority to use that violent measure (Kiriakou: int. John Kiriakou; Soufan: Testimony of Ali Soufan, 5/13/09, http://judiciary.senate.gov, corr. Daniel Freedman, the Soufan Group; 2011 Posner account: Posner, Why America Slept, 202–; gruesome torture: e.g., Hollingsworth & Mitchell, 11–, 21–, 56, 62; princes died: AP, 9/2/03, “Prince Ahmed Cited in New Book on Sept. 11 Attacks,” 9/4/03, www.bloodhorse.com; Risen: Risen, 173–, 187; Joscelyn: conv. Thomas Joscelyn; destroyed tapes: WP, 12/12/07, NYT, 3/3/09).
100 “wrongdoing”: LAT, 8/1/03;
101 credible: int. Bob Graham;
102 “assistance”: Financial Times (U.K.), 7/25/03;
103 40 clamored: CNN, 7/30/03;
104 “engaged”/“to protect”/“He has”: Graham with Nussbaum, xv, 231;
105 “being kept”/“It was”: ibid., 215–;
106 “If the 28”: New Republic, 8/3/04.
CHAPTER 34
1 Bush seeded/Cheney said: In his address to the nation of October 7, 2002, for example, Bush said: “We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade.… After September 11, Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America.” The President mentioned 9/11 eight times at his press conference just before the invasion of Iraq. “The White House played endless semantic games on the issue,” The New York Times’s Philip Shenon has written. “When pressed, Bush was careful not to allege that Iraq had any role in the 9/11 attacks, at least no direct role. But he insisted that if Saddam Hussein had remained in power, he … would have been tempted to hand over [weapons of mass destruction] to his supposed ally Osama bin Laden. Vice President Cheney went further … suggesting repeatedly, almost obsessively, that Iraq may in fact have been involved in the September 11 plot.” The Vice President liked to cite the Czech intelligence report suggesting that hijack leader Atta had met with an Iraqi agent in Prague. See note below—evidence was developed strongly suggesting that the report was unreliable (10/7/02 address: “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” www.presidency.ucsb.edu; mentioned 9/11: Christian Science Monitor, 3/14/03; “White House played”: Shenon, 126–, 381–, & see Report, “Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Offcials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information,” U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, 110th Cong., http://intelligence.senate.gov).
2 polls: The references are to a Pew Research poll of February 2003, a Knight-Ridder poll in January that year, and a Washington Post poll in September 2003. (Editor & Publisher, 3/26/03, USA Today, 9/6/03).
3 Atta/Prague/Iraqi intelligence: An informant reported to Czech intelligence after 9/11 that photographs of Mohamed Atta resembled a man he had seen meeting with an Iraqi diplomat and suspected spy named Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani in Prague at 11 A.M. on April 9, 2001. Investigation indicated that neither Atta nor Ani had been in Prague at the time alleged. Atta was recorded on closed-circuit TV footage in Florida on April 4, and his cell phone was used in the state on the 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th. Atta and Shehhi, moreover, apparently signed a lease on an apartment on the 11th. This information, while not certain proof, strongly suggests that Atta was in the United States on April 9. CIA analysts characterized the alleged Prague sighting as being “highly unlikely.” Nevertheless, the report crept into prewar intelligence briefings as having been a “known contact” between al Qaeda and Iraq.
In addition to the alleged Atta meeting, rumors have long circulated that two other hijackers, Mihdhar and Hazmi, had contact with an Iraqi agent. This was alleged to have been Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, who acted as a greeter for Arab visitors in Kuala Lumpur at the time of the terrorist summit there in 2000. Shakir was captured in 2002. The CIA later received information that “Shakir was not affiliated with al Qaeda and had no connections with IIS [Iraqi intelligence].”
(Atta/Prague: CR, 228–, Report, “U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 2004, 340–, “Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of Defense, 2/9/07, 5–, but see Edward Jay Epstein, “Atta in Prague,” NYT, 11/22/05; Shakir: Report, “Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 9/8/06, 111.)
4 Mylroie propagated: e.g. National Interest, Winter 95/96, New Republic, 9/24/01, CR, 336, 559n73, Laurie Mylroie, The War Against America, NY: Regan, 2001, WSJ, 4/2/04, “The Saddam-9/11 Link Confirmed,” 5/11/04, www.frontpagemagazine.com;
5 Investigation: Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris, NY: Three Rivers Press, 2007, 72–, and refs., Clarke, 94–, 232;
6 multiple/“My view”: Washington Monthly, 12/03.
7 “We went back”: int. of Michael Scheuer fo
r Frontline: “The Dark Side,” www.pbs.org. As described earlier in this book, bin Laden had an antipathy for Saddam Hussein and had sought Saudi government backing to use his fighters to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait (see p. 212). Though there are reports that bin Laden and Iraqi representatives did meet to discuss possible cooperation as early as 1992, there is no evidence that anything came of the encounters. Reporting in 2004, the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that prior to the invasion of Iraq, the CIA had “reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship … no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al Qaeda attack” (e.g. Wright, 295–, Report, “U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” 346–).
8 CIA Report 2003/“no credible”/pressure/“questions”: Report, “U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” 314, 322, 353, 363, 449–.
9 Duelfer/senior intelligence officials: The detainee to whom Duelfer referred was Muhammed Khudayr al-Dulaymi, who had headed the M-14 section of the Mukhabarat, the principal Iraqi intelligence agency. Duelfer noted the episode in a 2009 book and in an interview. The story was reported by Robert Windrem, senior research fellow at New York University’s Center on Law and Security and a longtime producer for NBC (Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, NY: PublicAffairs, 2009, 416, Robert Windrem, “Cheney’s Role Deepens,” 5/13/09, www.dailybeast.com).
10 “There were two”/“We were not”: McClatchy News, 4/21/09, Report, “Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services,” 110th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11/20/08, 72.
11 Suskind/forgery/brief storm/denials: Following Ronald Suskind’s account of the forgery’s origins in his 2008 book, The Way of the World, House Judiciary Committee chairman John Conyers wrote letters saying he intended to follow up. As this book went to print, however, there was no sign that he did. The Suskind book suggests that the forgery was handwritten by former Iraqi intelligence chief Tahir Habbush, who began cooperating with the CIA even before the Iraq invasion and was eventually paid off and “resettled.” The purported memo was slipped to a British reporter, billed as authentic, by an aide in the Interim Governing Council in Iraq, and published in late 2003 in Britain’s Sunday Telegraph (Ronald Suskind, The Way of the World, NY: Harper, 2008, 361–, CIA statement, 8/22/08, www.cia.gov, “Statement from Rob Richer,” http://suskinsresponse.googlepages.com, “A Note to Readers,” www.ronsuskind.com, Letters from Rep. Conyers to Rob Richer, John Maguire, A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, & John Hannah, 8/20/08, www.judiciary.house.gov).
12 Giraldi: Philip Giraldi, “Suskind Revisited,” 8/7/08, www.amconmag.com;
13 “manufactured”: int. Paul Pillar for Frontline: “The Dark Side,” www.pbs.org;
14 “Unfortunately”/It’s my belief: press release, 6/5/08, http://intelligence.senate.gov, Report, cited above.
15 reputable estimates re deaths: www.iraqbodycount.org, http://icasualties.org. In addition to the American military casualties, more than three hundred non-U.S. troops had died as of early 2011 (Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, www.icasualties.org).
CHAPTER 35
1 “led and financed”: Richard Falkenrath, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” International Security, Vol. 29, Winter 04;
2 only three nations: CR, 122;
3 “Pakistani military”/“held the key”: CR, 63–.
4 financial transactions: Known 9/11-related money transfers were handled out of Dubai in the UAE. In anticipation of pursuit in the wake of the attacks, the al Qaeda agents involved headed for Pakistan.
5 Rawalpindi, headquarters: Fouda & Fielding, 181;
6 Defense Society: ibid., 15;
7 Zubaydah caught: ibid., 20, int. John Kiriakou;
8 “Pakistani people”: Scheuer, Osama bin Laden, 121;
9 “We found”: ed. Lawrence, 71;
10 “As for Pakistan”: Rashid, 138;
11 called on the faithful: Scheuer, Osama bin Laden, 121.
12 “the most complicated”: Sunday Times (U.K.), 8/1/10;
13 Kashmir: CR, 58, 63–, Coll, Ghost Wars, 292. China also controls part of Kashmir. The region is a tinderbox.
14 Hamid Gul: Rashid, 129;
15 trained in camps: CR, 67, Clinton, 799, Rashid, 137, Coll, Ghost Wars, 341;
16 “Whatever”: Scheuer, Osama bin Laden, 121;
17 security system: Coll, Ghost Wars, 341;
18 “shoehorned”: Time, 8/19/08;
19 “always” support: Foreign Policy Journal, 9/20/10;
20 “actually were”: MFR 03012967, 10/8/03;
21 additional cash: Coll, Ghost Wars, 296;
22 “the most influential”: Sunday Times (U.K.), 8/1/10, Salon, 10/18/03, Napoleoni, 82;
23 “shadow government”: Coll, Ghost Wars, 296, NYT, 5/12/11;
24 “helplessness”/tensions: MFR 04021470, 12/12/03;
25 commando operation: WP, 12/19/01;
26 Clinton visit/“the moon”: WP, 12/20/01, CR, 183, 503n64;
27 “people who”/“not persuasive”: WP, 12/19/01;
28 Sheehan: Benjamin & Simon, 515;
29 “influential”: Clarke to Rice, 1/25/01;
30 “loss of urgency”: Tenet, 139;
31 “Full Monty”: NYT, 5/12/11.
32 foreknowledge: The authors have seen no evidence of Pakistani involvement in 9/11. Soon after publication of the 9/11 Commission Report, however, the distinguished reporter Arnaud de Borchgrave reported that—according to an “unimpeachable source”—former Pakistani intelligence officers knew beforehand all about the September 11 attacks.” This information, de Borchgrave wrote, had reached the Commission only as its report was being printed. UPI, 8/3/04.
33 “Stone Age”: Musharraf, 201.
34 demands: There are differences between the language of Washington’s demands as rendered in Musharraf’s memoir—seemingly verbatim—and the version reproduced in the 9/11 Commission Report. Musharraf found a demand to help “destroy” bin Laden illogical, he remembered. How could the United States be so sure that bin Laden and al Qaeda were behind 9/11, he wondered, if it was still searching for evidence? Musharraf, 205, CR 331, 558n37.
35 reservations/cooperated: CR, 331, Musharraf, 206;
36 “We have done”: Musharraf, 223;
37 3,021: Sunday Times (U.K.), 8/1/10;
38 some 700/369 handed over/bounty: Musharraf, 237, 369;
39 Grenier: NYT, 5/12/11;
40 best-known: Musharraf, 237–, 220, 240–.
41 “destroy”/“We have done”: Musharraf, 205, 220.
42 “still visiting”: MFR 03012967, 10/8/03;
43 McFarland: Fox News, 1/7/11;
44 “I’m convinced”: “Whatever Happened to bin Laden?,” http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com;
45 “You in the West”/poll: Sunday Times (U.K.), 8/1/10;
46 S Section: NYT, 5/12/11;
47 “They were very”: Sunday Times (U.K.), 3/8/08;
48 Better to do/officials: Sunday Times (U.K.), 8/1/10, Fox News, 1/7/11;
49 “We will kill”: transcript, 2nd presidential debate, 10/7/08;
50 no statements: NYT, 10/2/10;
51 “I think”: transcript, Meet the Press, NBC News, 8/15/10;
52 audio messages/still shaped: NYT, 10/2/10;
53 “senior NATO”: CNN, 10/18/10;
54 “sightings”/“years”: New York Daily News, 10/18/10.
55 intelligence: In late November 2010, Saudi Arabia’s Prince Turki said in an interview that he thought bin Laden was moving to and fro across the Pakistani/Afghan border, communicating by messenger, and still giving orders. “I think they should find him,” Turki said, “I think the United States should call the countries that are of interest, like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, China, and set a plan in motion to capture or—or eliminate him.” Trans
cript, int. of Turki, Situation Room, CNN, 11/17/10.
56 “launched”: Courrier International (France), 5/5/11;
57 bulletin/Post: breaking news alerts, WP, 5/1/11;
58 Tonight/Jubilant: text of Obama address, Telegraph (U.K.), 5/2/11, WP, 5/2/11;
59 shield/unfounded/“Resistance”/nightclothes: e.g., Telegraph (U.K.), 5/3/11, 5/4/11, 5/5/11, Reuters, 5/4/11;
60 “full authority”: Irish Times, 5/4/11;
61 “before the Pakistanis”: Independent (U.K.), 5/8/11;
62 “captured alive”: Al-Arabiya, 5/4/11, Guardian (U.K.), 5/5/11;
63 Abbottabad: Musharraf, 39–, Independent (U.K.), 5/4/11, Weekly Standard, 5/2/11, AP, 5/2/11;
64 “involved”/“inconceivable”/“whether there”: Financial Times, 5/4/11, Spectator, 5/7/11, LAT, 5/8/11;
65 “was not anywhere”: Independent (U.K.), 5/4/11;
66 “a bit amazing”: AP, 5/2/11;
67 couriers: WSJ, 5/4/11, Telegraph (U.K.), 5/4/11, 5/5/11, Independent (U.K.), 5/4/11;
68 Musharraf on al-Libi: Musharraf, 258–, 221;
69 “It was decided”: Irish Times, 5/5/11;
70 “a few minutes”: AP, 5/2/11;
71 under surveillance?: Telegraph (U.K.), 5/4/11.
72 Bush/Musharraf deal reported, et seq.: Guardian (U.K.), 5/9/11. As this book went to press, the authors were unaware of any response by either the U.S. administration or Prime Minister Gilani to the report that there had been a deal in place. The All Pakistan Muslim League, however, posted a legal notice denying the reported deal by Musharraf (http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150198113099339).
73 Musharraf denial: Indian Express, 5/10/11;
74 disposed of at sea: WP, 5/2/11;
75 “trophies”/Congress/DNA: Telegraph (U.K.), 5/5/11, Irish Times, 5/13/11, Sunday Times (U.K.), 5/8/11;
76 al Qaeda acknowledged: Telegraph (U.K.), 5/7/11, Irish Times, 5/7/11.
AFTERWORD
1 “We are sure”: Miller & Stone with Mitchell, 187;
The Eleventh Day Page 74
