Edward I

by Michael Prestwich

  The determination and obstinacy which helped Edward to succeed in Wales could lead him into extraordinary miscalculations. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of the French war.[27] Trouble between Norman sailors and those of the Cinque Ports developed in 1293 into a full-scale naval war, in which the men of Bayonne were involved. This provided Philip IV with an opportunity to cite Edward as duke of Aquitaine before the parlement of Paris; he was anxious to define his rights and authority over Edward in much the same way as the English king had been doing in Wales and Scotland. However, what Edward wanted from Philip was not war but a wife, for Eleanor of Castile had died in 1290. Edmund of Lancaster was put in charge of the negotiations, which culminated in the drafting of a formal marriage treaty. Arrangements were made for much of the duchy of Aquitaine to be handed over to Philip for a nominal period, at the end of which Edward was to receive it back in full sovereignty. The English kept their part of the bargain in 1294, but the French did not. Philip failed to withdraw the summons requesting Edward to appear before the parlement and, instead of granting Aquitaine to the English king in accordance with the agreed terms, he declared the duchy confiscate. It was widely believed in England that Edward’s passion for the French princess, of whom he had seen no more than a full-length portrait, led to this situation. This seems unlikely, though, particularly since the chroniclers name Philip’s sister Blanche as the object of Edward’s desires, rather than Margaret, who was specified in the marriage treaty, and who eventually married the English king in 1299. But it is very understandable that contemporaries should have interpreted the remarkable scheme for the temporary surrender of Gascony to Philip as the result of lust rather than of a carefully calculated policy.[28]

  Edward I’s strategy in Wales had been very similar to that employed by Henry III in his Welsh campaigns. His strategy in the war with Philip IV was no more original, resembling as it did that employed by John after the loss of Normandy. Edward’s plan was to fight a largely defensive war in Gascony, while attacking Philip in the north with the aid of a massive coalition of rulers from the Low Countries, Germany and the eastern borders of France, who were paid substantial subsidies. Like John’s schemes, Edward’s did not work out as intended.

  The first expeditionary force to Gascony sailed in October 1294, under the command of John of Brittany. Some reinforcements were sent in 1295, but the next substantial expedition, headed by Edmund of Lancaster and the earl of Lincoln, did not set out until early in 1296. Although these forces, combined with local Gascon levies, did not distinguish themselves against the French, being defeated at Rioms in 1295 and Bellegarde in 1297, the English retained a foothold in Gascony. Edward’s main hopes of success in the war lay in operations in the north, rather than in Gascony, but his plans to take an army to the Low Countries were thwarted by the Welsh situation in 1295, and by his Scotch war in 1296. It was not until 1297 that the campaign took place. The lengthy delay made it hard to maintain the alliance, and the king was faced by increasingly bitter domestic opposition to his plans. Even so, Edward was too proud and stubborn to admit failure, and landed in Flanders with totally inadequate forces shortly after the defeat of some of his allies at the battle of Veurne. The only fighting that the English troops were involved in was rioting with their Flemish allies; no attempt was made to join battle with the French. The English chroniclers tried to explain the failure of the campaign in terms of the timidity of the count of Flanders and the fear felt by the French, but it seems clear that it was the English, with no desire to fight, who were glad to seize any chance of ending hostilities. Edward accordingly negotiated a truce with Philip in October 1297, shamefully deserting his Flemish allies and so exposing the fraudulence of his own propaganda in which he had stressed his obligations towards his allies. It has been argued that the German king Adolf of Nassau had been bribed by French agents to desert Edward, which weakened the allied cause further, though the evidence for this is highly dubious. Six days after Edward agreed to a truce Adolf was still expressing his willingness to fight, and it is most probable that it was the German ruler’s domestic difficulties, rather than French gold, that prevented his intervention.[29]

  With the truce of 1297 Edward I achieved the fundamental aim of his war with Philip — the retention of Gascony. Even if none of the points at issue were properly settled in the truce negotiations, neither country was prepared for a resumption of hostilities. War was succeeded by a lengthy series of negotiations, culminating in a peace treaty in 1303. That Philip IV was prepared to agree to this was largely due to the Flemings who, although deserted by Edward I, won a striking victory over the French at Courtrai in 1302.

  Just as the French difficulties in Flanders prevented Philip IV from reopening his conflict with the English, so his problems in Scotland prevented Edward I from engaging in any further continental wars, or in the crusade he hoped to conduct. Edward’s original intention had been to acquire Scotland by means of a marriage alliance between his son Edward and the heiress to the Scotch crown, Margaret of Norway.[30] Her death in 1290 put an end to this plan, and Edward determined to achieve his object in a different way. The succession dispute that took place on Margaret’s death provided him with a splendid opportunity of extending his influence, as he had in Wales, by deliberately misinterpreting treaties and manipulating legal processes. It is hard to dismiss, as Powicke does, the account of Edward’s explanation to his magnates that he intended to subdue Scotland just as he had brought Wales under control.[31] A feudal summons to the northern magnates was issued, so that in the discussion held at Norham, the Scots were threatened by force. Edward, invited to arbitrate, reserved any claims that he might have on the Scotch throne, attempted to obtain a full recognition of his suzerainty over Scotland from the Guardians, and instead received recognition of his standing as ‘superior lord’ of the northern kingdom from the contenders to the throne. The outcome of the hearings in the court set up under Edward’s authority was the coronation of John Balliol. While he does appear to have had the better claim, it was also plainly to Edward’s advantage that he should succeed and Robert Bruce fail. With Balliol king, Edward made his position clear. He had not obtained all that he wanted in the negotiations leading up to the hearing of the Great Cause, and he now calmly stated that he did not regard himself as bound by any promises he had made. Balliol was forced to free Edward from any such obligations, and the English king began to hear appeals from Scotch courts, and even to summon Balliol and his magnates to perform military service. No English king had made such extensive claims in the past, and Balliol’s attempts to co-operate with Edward led to very natural baronial resentment, which culminated in 1295 with the appointment of a council of twelve to take charge of the government. Allies were needed against the English. When agreement with Philip IV of France was reached, it was clear that war was inevitable.

  Edward I’s first campaign in Scotland took place in 1296, and was a triumph for the English. Berwick was captured, and the inhabitants put to the sword. Earl Warenne then won a decisive victory over the Scotch feudal host at Dunbar. Resistance was now virtually at an end, and the campaign turned into a progress through the conquered kingdom. Balliol was forced to abdicate; oaths of fealty were exacted from a substantial number of landholders and clergy. Edward set up a new form of government, ruling the country as direct lord and keeping the kingship in abeyance. His appropriation of the Stone of Destiny makes it difficult to imagine that he intended to revive the office. But the triumph of 1296 proved short-lived.

  In 1297 the Scots revolted. Not only was there a natural hostility towards the English king, but it was also believed that Edward was intending to introduce into Scotland some of the measures he was employing in England to raise men, money and materials for his war with Philip IV. The most successful and picturesque Scotch leader was William Wallace, who, with Andrew Murray, won a striking and startling victory at Stirling Bridge over Earl Warenne, the king’s lieutenant in Scotland. The achievement of 1296 was mo
st forcibly shown to have been superficial: Scotland could not be conquered in a single campaign.

  Despite the absence of the king and much of the administrative staff in Flanders, a limited counter offensive was mounted in the winter following the disaster of Stirling Bridge. When Edward I returned from abroad in the spring of 1298 to a country exhausted by the demands he had made on it for the French war, he immediately began to plan a major campaign in Scotland. The army he assembled was one of the largest of the reign, and the administrative efforts that went into its creation were rewarded with success. At Falkirk the Scots under Wallace were so soundly defeated that it was not until Bannockburn in 1314 that they willingly risked a large army in battle with the English host once again.

  Notable as the victory of Falkirk was, it did not win the war for Edward. The English only had effective control of the areas where they held castles, and had no foothold north of Stirling. Even that castle was lost to the enemy in 1299. The next major English campaign took place in 1300. An impressive army mustered at Carlisle and marched into Galloway. But, because of the enemy’s tactics of withdrawing and refusing battle, little more was achieved than the capture of Caerlaverock castle. The following year Edward adopted a more ambitious plan. One army, under the king himself, mustered at Berwick and advanced across Scotland towards the Clyde, while another army, nominally commanded by the prince of Wales, advanced from Carlisle round the coast of Galloway. The aim was clearly to effect a pincer movement, but the two forces failed to meet and again the enemy refused battle. The chief English achievement was the capture of Bothwell castle, with the aid of an elaborate wooden tower, which took almost two months to construct, and was carried on thirty carts on the two-day journey from Glasgow.[32]

  In spite of a comparative lack of success on these campaigns of 1300 and 1301, the English hold on southern Scotland was increasing through the possession of important groups of castles. Jedburgh, Selkirk and Roxburgh commanded an important Border region; the southern shore of the Firth of Forth could be dominated from the castles of Dirleton, Edinburgh and Linlithgow. Stirling was held by the English until 1299. In the south-west the crown held two important castles, Dumfries and Lochmaben, which commanded the entry into Scotland from Carlisle and in addition served as centres to control Nithsdale and Annandale. The increased security of the English position in Scotland at the end of the 1301 campaign was demonstrated by the fact that the king remained in the north for the winter, staying at Linlithgow. Lack of unity among the Scotch leaders assisted the English cause, and in 1302 the patriotic side was deserted by the important figure of Robert Bruce, earl of Carrick and future king of Scotland. Victory for Edward seemed to be in sight.

  The year 1303 began with two successes for the Scots. Selkirk castle was captured, and in a skirmish at Roslin Ralph Manton, an important royal official, was killed. In the summer a large English army marched north. Once more the Scots refused to give battle, but their delaying tactics were not as successful as in earlier years, and Edward was able, for the first time since 1298, to take the step he regarded as essential for the conquest of Scotland of moving his army across the Firth of Forth. He went as far north as Elgin. For the second time he wintered in Scotland, and in May 1304 the task of besieging Stirling was begun. This was the last really important castle held by the Scots, and once the garrison yielded, Scotland was unable to offer serious resistance. The capture of William Wallace in 1305 was the culmination of the English triumph.

  The settlement reached in 1305 created effective English rule in southern Scotland, while the north was left in the hands of apparently obedient Scotch magnates. As in the case of Wales, Edward found the legal system of the conquered country unacceptable, and a commission was set up under the royal lieutenant, John of Brittany, to reform the laws and customs of Scotland. Though surprisingly conciliatory in some ways, this settlement did not last long. The story of the murder of John Comyn by Robert Bruce in the church at Dumfries, and of Bruce’s subsequent seizure of the throne in 1306, is well known. The English were completely unprepared for such a move, and the castle garrisons that formed the occupation force were wholly inadequate for dealing with the situation. But forces were quickly raised, and before the main English army under the king’s eldest son had mustered, Aymer de Valence defeated Bruce at the battle of Methven near Perth. Less than three months after his coronation the king of Scotland became a hunted fugitive.

  The response of the English king to the news of Bruce’s revolt was, not surprisingly, vindictive. Edward’s merciless attitude may well have assisted in the rapid growth of enthusiasm for the cause that Bruce represented. The Scotch king spent the winter of 1306-1307 in hiding. However, when he re-emerged early in the year it became clear that the tide was turning against the English. Methven was avenged at Loudoun Hill, where Valence was defeated. The earl of Gloucester was defeated three days later. In July Edward I himself advanced from Lanercost priory, where he had spent the winter in ill-health, but before he had even reached the border he died at Burgh-by-Sands. Deprived of his forceful personality the English were incapable of continuing the struggle with the same determination that they had shown up to 1307. If seven years were to pass before the Scotch triumph at Bannockburn, the English cause was doomed long before that disastrous engagement.

  The events of the wars of Edward’s reign are familiar to historians, but while a narrative account demonstrates the extent of the king’s military concerns, it can do little more than hint at many of the problems which faced a government involved in campaigns of such frequency and magnitude. The methods used to mobilize the resources of the country for war on the scale that was required have not been fully examined, nor have the political consequences of the decisions that were taken been fully investigated.

  The first problem that needs to be examined is that of the composition of the armies. The knights of the royal household played a very important part in Edward I’s armies, and it is also necessary to look at the way in which the magnates with their retinues were summoned to perform cavalry service. The infantry forces were organized on a quite different system from the cavalry, and the method by which local communities met the demands of the government for men needs scrutiny as well as the pay rolls of the armies that were kept once the men had mustered. Examination of the composition of the military forces leads to the question of wages and victualling. The country had to bear far more than the burden of supplying the manpower for the campaigns, for in most cases the government had the responsibility of paying the men’s wages, and had to ensure that they were provided with sufficient food. The armies could not simply live off the land, so supplies had to be collected in England and sent to the campaigning areas. This task was one of the most considerable of those facing the administration in this period, involving as it did the central government, the sheriffs and their officials, together with special victuallers appointed to take charge of the supplies when they reached their destination. The navy had an important part to play in transporting men and supplies as well as assisting in the defence of the realm when there was a threat of invasion from France.

  The costs of war were very considerable, and perhaps the most difficult problem the government had to face was that of finding sufficient money to meet them. There was no chance of increasing the ordinary revenue of the crown to meet the demand for funds. Taxation was the obvious answer. The laity could be taxed by means of grants of subsidies assessed on the basis of valuations of moveable property. The crown also had a right to the traditional feudal aids. Customs duties provided a means by which the considerable profits of English trade could be tapped by the government. Taxation of the clergy could be achieved either by approaching the English church for grants, or by reaching agreement with the papacy for a division of the spoils of papal taxes. But taxation alone was not enough. The main government department responsible for financing the wars, the Wardrobe, was constantly incurring expenditure far in excess of its receipts, particularly in the later stag
es of the reign. In order to meet its obligations the government was forced to borrow money, notably from Italian merchants. But even with the aid of such expedients, the crown’s debts by the end of the reign were substantial.

  The political repercussions of Edward I’s wars were extremely wide-ranging. The backing of the magnates was essential if military success was to be achieved, and the techniques of persuasion and compulsion that were employed by the crown to obtain this must be examined. The needs of war had a considerable influence on Edward’s attitude to the legal franchises of the baronial class, and they had their effect on some of the legal reforms of the reign. It was not until the period of the French war that the demands made by the king on the country aroused really extensive criticism, but by 1297 the calls for military service, the succession of direct taxes, the heavy customs duties and the seizures of wool and food supplies led to a major constitutional crisis with the opposition being led by the Marshal and Constable. The solution of the crisis, the reissue of Magna Carta and the Forest Charter, together with some additional concessions, was not adequate, and subsequent years saw continuing political argument. The connection of the French war with the crisis of 1297 is very evident, though the political effects of the campaigns in Scotland are less so. Did the policies of Edward I help to stave off the crisis that broke out so swiftly on the accession of Edward II by diverting the attention of the magnates towards a popular war, or did the measures needed to keep the war going create an intolerable situation in England? Did the single-minded concentration of Edward I’s government on war in the last years of the reign mean that Edward II received an impossible legacy from his father?