Edward I

by Michael Prestwich

  The war naturally reduced the volume of trade considerably. The effects of the inevitable insecurity of wartime were magnified, not only by this new duty, known as the maltolt, but also by the English policy of using the wool trade as a diplomatic weapon, canalizing it first of all to Dordrecht and then to Malines. Although trade declined, revenues from the customs rose sharply with the increase in the duties. Unfortunately the accounts are not quite complete — those from Southampton have not survived — but estimating on the basis of the proportion of trade from that port after 1298, the total customs revenue from 1294 until the end of September 1297 appears to have been about £116,000, or rather more than the yield of the lay subsidies in the same period.[708]

  The government did not completely abandon its initial plan of profiting from English trade by itself acquiring wool in England and selling it abroad. Not all the wool arrested in 1294 was returned to its owners. That belonging to merchants suspected of trading with France was held by the crown, as was that belonging to the Italian firm of the Riccardi, which had failed to meet its obligations and gone bankrupt. In December 1294, 277 sacks of their wool were exported by the wool fleet sent to Dordrecht under the command of Laurence of Ludlow and Roger of Lincoln. But the fleet was wrecked, and Laurence drowned, though enough was salvaged for the royal agent in the Low Countries to be able to enter profits of over £1,000 in his accounts. In the next two years some 500 sacks of Riccardi wool were sold abroad.[709]

  The policy of profiting from the wool trade by imposing heavy duties rather than by taking forced loans in wool was not reversed until 1297. In April a seizure was ordered, the original intention apparently being to take only the goods of foreign merchants, but the scope of the instructions was extended by the Exchequer, probably without the knowledge of the king. The measure was not effective. In the political climate of the time, the government was losing control at a local level. A new seizure was ordered at the end of July, with the stated purpose of producing revenue for the payment of the foreign allies: 30,000 marks for the king of Germany and 25,000 for the duke of Brabant. In addition, 20,000 marks was needed to cover the cost of taking the army to Flanders. It was calculated that 8,000 sacks would provide enough in sales to meet this demand.[710] But nothing like this quantity was collected. Letters patent promising payment to those whose wool was taken show that only about 525 sacks were collected by nine of the fourteen commissions set up for the purpose.[711] The accounts of royal agents at Yarmouth, Hull, Boston and Southampton detail some 1,470 sacks received from the two prises of the year. There were some other agents, for example at Newcastle, so it is not possible to know exactly how much wool was taken, but clearly the measures did not come near to the expectations of the government in their execution.[712]

  The government’s attempt to profit directly from the wool trade did not prove very successful. Total receipts from the sales of wool in the Low Countries were probably about £25,000,[713] less than a quarter of the income from the heavy customs duties. Politically both policies proved extremely unpopular. Not only were important constitutional issues involved in the way in which they had been put into effect, but wool prices were also severely affected. The opposition in 1297 claimed that the duty raised by the maltolt amounted to one-fifth of the value of all the land in England. Though this was obviously an overstatement, it was clearly felt that the effect of the measure was not to pass the duty on to the consumers in Flanders to be paid by them in the form of higher prices, but that the merchants were forcing the producers to accept lower prices. Calculations to test this view are difficult, for the weights used to measure wool varied in different parts of the country, and the quality of the produce was not consistent. However, the examples collected by Thorold Rogers show that in the years 1294-6 prices were lower than in any previous period for which figures are available, and that this depression was not paralleled until the years after the Black Death.[714] Even though prices were recovering in 1297, the average of £5 a sack paid for the wool taken in the July prise was at least £1 less than it would have been in a normal year.[715] The leaders of the opposition were obviously right to stress the burden that Edward I’s taxation of trade imposed on the country.

  As a result of the constitutional crisis of 1297 the maltolt was lifted on 24 November, and replaced by the old scale of duties, each sack of wool being charged at half a mark. The immediate effect on the volume of exports was not startling, and in 1301-2 the war between Philip IV and the Flemings caused them to fall almost to the level of 1296. Though they later recovered to a point comparable with that of the years before 1294,[716] the rise in exports was by no means sufficient to bring the receipts from the customs anywhere near the amount that had been attained when the 40s. duty was in force. From Michaelmas 1297 until Michaelmas 1303 only about £53,000 was paid over to the officials at the ports.[717] It is hardly surprising that in 1303, with the need to pay for a new campaign in Scotland, the government should have held negotiations with the foreign merchants which resulted in the imposition of an extra duty of 3s. 4d. on each sack of wool they exported.[718] The introduction of this New Custom was the last change in the structure of the customs duties in Edward I’s reign. From Michaelmas 1303 until the end of the reign, customs receipts totalled over 72,000, an average of about £18,000 a year, the rise being partly due to the new duty and partly to the increased volume of trade.[719]

  The prosperity of the English wool trade in the final years of the reign assisted royal finances in another way. Much foreign silver was brought into the country by the merchants, and in accordance with the law was coined into sterling. The government naturally made a profit on such operations, receiving between May 1304 and the king’s death £6,932. This was not the only period of the reign that saw the crown benefiting from coinage operations. In 1279 a full-scale recoinage was begun, a measure inspired by the poor state of the currency. In the first two years of the new coinage, receipts from the mints totalled £35,788, while the wardrobe accounts for the five years from 1279 show that £36,875 was paid to that department out of the profits of the recoinage. But during the years of greatest financial need, those of the war with France, receipts from this source were at a negligible level. In contrast, from 1295 Philip IV in France was making huge sums by the expedient of debasing the coinage, to such an extent that the livre tournois had halved in value on the exchange rate with sterling. There is no evidence to suggest that Edward ever contemplated following the French example: there was a strong tradition of maintaining the standard of the currency in England, and Philip attracted much adverse criticism for his action. But one motive for the English recoinage of 1279 must have been the pressing need for funds to pay for the Welsh war.[720]

  The main source of profit from the monetary reform of 1279 was the mints. But as the activities of coin clippers were chiefly blamed for the poor state of the coinage, the recoinage was accompanied by a vigorous judicial campaign against those suspected of this offence, now threatened for the first time with capital punishment. The great majority of those accused were Jews, and the commission to the justices was amplified to take cognizance of other offences associated with the Jews, notably blasphemy. The proceedings appear to have been extremely biased, and it was not long before this became clear to the government and they were halted. Nevertheless some Jews were executed, and much property forfeited to the crown.[721] In 1279-80 the Wardrobe received £1,356 from this source.[722]

  The Jews did not only suffer from judicial persecution: they were also liable to arbitrary taxation. The royal right to tallage the Jews had been extremely valuable in the past, and before his accession Edward had personally profited from it, as when his father had granted him a tallage of 6,000 marks, of which 4,000 was paid, for the financing of his crusade.[723] But by Edward’s reign the extortions of the past had reduced Jewish resources to a fraction of what they had once been. The Exchequer hoped to raise 25,000 marks from a tallage imposed in 1273, but the figure proved grossly optimistic.
More realistic were those of £1,000 in 1276 and 3,000 marks in 1278. Following the persecutions of 1279 the Jews had a respite from taxation until 1287, when a new tallage was imposed and the impossibly high figure of 20,000 marks was demanded. Not more than £4,000 seems actually to have been raised. Clearly, the continued presence of the Jews in England did not promise great financial advantage to the crown. That their expulsion might yield profits was suggested by the king’s experience in Gascony. In 1289 the Gascon Jews were expelled, the motive being quite blatantly the acquisition of their assets by a king hard pressed to raise the funds needed to obtain the release of his cousin, Charles of Salerno, from captivity. In England in 1290 Edward justified his decision to treat the English Jews similarly by reference to their evasion of the Statute of the Jewry of 1275. However, the financial motive for the expulsion was quite clear. Not only did the crown acquire Jewish assets, but also the grants of taxation in 1290 were made in gratitude for the royal action, as the chroniclers stated at the time and the government admitted later.[724]

  It would be wrong to view the expulsion of the Jews solely in financial terms. Edward’s hostility to them was revealed as early as 1269 in the Provisio Judaismi which limited the way in which debts might be contracted with Jews.[725] It seems very probable that the decision to make blasphemy by Jews a capital offence was the king’s own decision, a reflection of his Christian piety.[726] Not only did the Statute of 1275 prohibit usury, it also compelled Jews of either sex above the age of seven to wear a distinguishing badge, a more extreme measure than those in force on the continent.[727] But the king’s attitude was probably less harsh than that of some of those influential with him. In 1275 all Jews were expelled from the lands of the queen mother,[728] and it is interesting that one chronicler attributed the action of 1290 to her influence.[729] When it was proposed in the council that Henry de Winton, a converted Jew, be given powers to investigate coin clipping, Thomas de Cantilupe, bishop of Hereford, protested hysterically that he would have power over Christians. Thomas threatened his resignation from the council, and the plan was accordingly dropped. On another occasion he dismissed a Jewish plea that he cease from persecuting them, demanding that they accept the Christian faith.[730] Such attitudes must have contributed to the decision to expel the Jews. In addition, of course, the expulsion would be popular with the landlords who were indebted to Jewish moneylenders.

  The financial exigencies of the period immediately following Edward’s return from Gascony were not, for once, the result of war, but of the obligations that the king had entered into to obtain the release of Charles of Salerno from captivity in Aragon. In October 1288 Edward paid 23,000 marks to Alfonso of Aragon, and entered into liabilities totalling 80,000 marks, which fortunately he was not called on to pay, as Charles and Alphonso made peace in 1271, and Edward’s obligations were cancelled.[731] Edward’s need for funds on his return to England was therefore considerable, and in addition to being a cause of the expulsion of the Jews and the official reason for the grant of the lay and clerical subsidies, his financial problems must also have been behind the decision to profit extensively from the trials of the justices instituted at this time.

  When Edward landed in England in August 1289 he was greeted by the widespread complaints of his subjects directed against the corruption and injustice of the administration. An investigating commission was set up, and the result was a purge of the judicial bench. Some lesser men were also tried, but unlike the inquisitions of 1298, proceedings were largely directed against men of high standing in the legal hierarchy. The Chief Justice of Common Pleas, Thomas de Weyland, was forced into exile after he had attempted to flee from the king’s wrath. But once the initial outburst had passed, Edward ‘turned his attention rather to the monetary profits to be got from the business than to the demands of abstract justice’. Ralph Hengham, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, was fined 8,000 marks, of which he paid at least £4,303 6s. 8d. The total received in fines from the ten chief offenders came to £15,591 13s. 4d.,[732] and in addition the royal coffers received the substantial sum of £12,666 17s. 7d. found in Adam Stratton’s house on his arrest.[733] The way in which the king allowed the guilty men to buy their freedom did not meet with the approval of the chroniclers,[734] and it seems probable that the long list given by the author of the Mirror of Justices of judges allegedly executed by King Alfred was a deliberate attempt to show up Edward’s surprisingly lenient treatment.[735]

  The administration had made great efforts under Edward to raise the money required by his policies. But although an impressive competence was displayed by the Exchequer and the subordinate officials such as tax collectors, the crown was never in a comfortable financial position. In particular, there were rarely adequate reserves of cash to meet the demands of the campaigns. Some means had to be found of providing funds when they were most needed, and the only solution was to develop a system of credit finance.

  IX. Credit Finance

  There is no doubt that Edward I was very well aware of the importance of being adequately supplied with funds. No real budgeting was done, however, and without this it is inconceivable that any very careful consideration of the financial implications of policies could be made. There is no evidence of a proper balancing of probable expenditure against probable income. In 1284 the Exchequer did produce an estimate of revenue, but this was a result of the reorganization of the department consequent upon the Statute of Rhuddlan, and was not related to any likely costs that the government might incur.[736] In 1296 expenditure was estimated when the king demanded 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry for his campaign in Scotland, and it was correctly calculated that £5,000 a week would be needed to pay such a force. No attempt was made to explain how so huge a sum was to be raised, however: the Exchequer was merely ordered to take no vacations, to cease crown building operations, and to see to collecting as much as they could from taxes, customs duties, and any other convenient sources.[737] A few years later, in 1301, a desperate plea to the Exchequer for funds was accompanied by a detailed estimate of expenditure, which was at the rate of £751 14s. 4d. a week. But in reply, the Exchequer was unable to match this precision with any estimate of future income. It knew how much of the tax of a fifteenth had been assigned away in advance, but could not state how much in all the tax was likely to raise. All it could do was to put a stop to any future assignment and direct all available funds to Scotland in the hope that they might prove sufficient.[738]

  Even if realistic budgets had been produced, it is very unlikely that Edward would have allowed his plans to be altered substantially by such considerations: he was too obstinate a man. The best example of his determination to carry out his intentions in the face of extreme financial difficulties is that of the Flanders campaign of 1297. The king was resolute that this should take place, justifying it in his propaganda in terms of national necessity and of his obligations to his allies. The council expressed its alarm that he was setting out with totally inadequate funds,[739] but this did not deter him, any more than did the fact that the country was on the verge of civil war.

  The obvious solution to the financial difficulties resulting from such situations was to borrow money. The normal machinery was simply not flexible enough to cope with the sudden increases in demand for cash that Edward’s campaigns created. By the late thirteenth century the mechanisms of credit finance were familiar in England. In Henry III’s reign loans to the crown were more and more dominated by Italian merchants. At least £54,000 was borrowed in Italy for the Sicilian adventure,[740] and on his crusade Edward became heavily indebted to the merchants of Lucca, who claimed to have advanced over £23,000. In addition, Robert Burnell in England received £7,687 from the same source.[741] It is hardly surprising to find that it was the firm of the Riccardi of Lucca who played the leading part in advancing money to the crown in the years up to 1294.

  The reason for the prominence of the Italian merchants as a source of loans was simple: they had extensive resources, and
had all the financial expertise of the highly developed Italian economy behind them. It was the prospects of the profits of the wool trade that first attracted them to England, and all the companies that advanced money to the crown were also fully engaged in trade. Documents drawn up by the Exchequer at the time of the wool seizure of 1294 provide ample indication of their activities.[742] Dealings in wool were often closely related to banking. A typical arrangement was that made in 1287 between the abbot of Meaux and the Riccardi, by which the merchants advanced 220 marks, and were to be repaid with sixty sacks of wool, to be handed over between 1290 and 1294.[743] In some instances the Italians appear as pure bankers. Roger Bigod owed the Riccardi over £1,000, and had to grant them two Irish manors in repayment.[744] Documents probably drawn up in 1294 show that one small firm, the Betti of Lucca, was owed £3,312, mostly by laymen. A note suggests that the Riccardi had debts due to them totalling £20,007, excluding the sums owed them by the crown.[745] The rich deposited their gains with the Italian bankers. The appropriation of Walter Langton’s assets by the crown after his fall in 1307 revealed that the Ballardi owed him £2,120, and the Frescobaldi at least 1,000 marks and 2,000 florins.[746] In 1297 Edward seized 2,000 marks that the bishop of Winchester had deposited with the Spini.[747]