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Positional Option Trading (Wiley Trading)

Page 21

by Euan Sinclair

are shown in Figure 9.16.

  From the figures the higher volatility of the subaccount method is

  largely due to the positive upside. Summary statistics are shown in

  Table 9.4.

  Using a percentage-based trailing stop retains many good features

  of the aggressiveness of the Kelly criterion. It does better both on

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  average and in the extreme cases. The great results are those that

  start well and continue well, never being affected by the stop. And

  when the stop does come into play, the trailing stop idea protects

  capital nearly as well as the other two, more conservative,

  methods. Trading according to full Kelly on a percentage-based

  subaccount seems to be the best idea no matter what criteria are

  considered.

  FIGURE 9.15 The distribution of the final account after 10,000

  simulations of a GBM where μ=0.05 and σ=0.3 when only trading

  a subaccount that begins at $43.70 at full Kelly.

  FIGURE 9.16 The distribution of the final account after 10,000

  simulations of a GBM where μ = 0.05 and σ = 0.3 when only trading a subaccount of 43.7% of the total at full Kelly.

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  TABLE 9.4 A Comparison of Trading at Quarter Kelly and Trading Full Kelly in Subaccounts

  Statistic

  Quarte Subaccount with

  Subaccount

  r Kelly

  Fixed Maximum with Trailing %

  Loss

  Loss

  Average

  $101.70

  $102.20

  $117.13

  Minimum

  $78.30

  $68.75

  $69.36

  Maximum

  $129.50

  $187.60

  $305.60

  10th

  percentile

  $91.70

  $86.30

  $89.30

  90th

  percentile

  $111.10

  $120.90

  $153.40

  Average

  maximum

  9%

  12%

  12%

  drawdown

  Maximum

  drawdown

  26%

  38%

  30%

  Conclusion

  The Kelly criterion is only optimal in the sense that it maximizes

  growth. There are many other things a trader could be interested

  in maximizing. However, using a modified Kelly scheme that

  explicitly includes higher-order moments in the return stream,

  sampling errors and drawdown control is a consistent, sensible

  method that is vastly preferable to either an ad-hoc strategy or one

  that is based on mistaken ideas.

  Summary

  Adjust the Kelly ratio to account for skew. Trade negatively

  (positively) skewed strategies and instruments smaller (larger)

  than suggested by the standard Kelly criterion approximation.

  Quantify the uncertainty in the estimate of the Kelly ratio.

  Scale the raw ratio to give a prespecified chance of it being

  non-negative.

  Split the trading account into an untraded percentage and a

  traded percentage. Apply full Kelly to the risky part of the

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  portfolio.

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  CHAPTER 10

  Meta Risks

  Most discussion of the risks related to options focuses on market

  risks. Obviously, it is important to mitigate these risks, but they

  can be mitigated. They are entirely under the control of the trader.

  If a trader blows up because of a market move, it is due to either

  ignorance or overconfidence.

  There is a far more dangerous type of risk. These are risks from

  outside the market. Options don't exist in a vacuum. They are

  traded as part of an economic system that contains moral, legal,

  and governmental risks. These are the risks that are hardest to

  anticipate, but it is still important to learn as much as possible

  about them and to take any precautions we can.

  Currency Risk

  All traders will have currency risk. You can't execute stock and

  option trades with anything other than fiat currency. Even if we

  ignore exchange rate risk (because your currency of determination

  might be the currency of the trades), fiat currency is risky due to

  inflation. For example, Zimbabwe has had a stock exchange since

  1993. In the same period the inflation rate has reached up to 98%

  a day. It is respectable if a trader averages 0.1% a day. No one is

  good enough to keep up with hyperinflation.

  The worst examples of historical inflation have been in war zones

  or places experiencing massive political instability: Greece in

  1944, Hungary in 1946, Yugoslavia in 1994, Germany in 1923,

  China in 1949, and Venezuela in 2018. It would be simple to write,

  “Avoid living in such situations.” But this is generally much easier

  said than done. A lot of people would love to have left these places

  but didn't have the means to do so. And even in the very stable

  country of New Zealand, the inflation rate reached 17% during the

  1970s. It is tempting to think that these periods are confined to the

  past but that seems very unlikely. Inflation cannot generally be

  avoided. The only thing traders can do is be aware of it, and when

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  active trading isn't producing real returns stop and invest in

  something else.

  FIGURE 10.1 The price of Bitcoin in USD in 2018.

  Cryptocurrencies have their own problems. Although they are not

  subject to the inflationary spending of a government, they are

  exceptionally volatile. In 2018, Bitcoin had a low of $3,190 and a

  high of $17,700 (Figure 10.1). Average annualized volatility was

  68%. Typically, major currencies have cross-rate volatilities in the

  single digits. For example, in 2018 the volatility of euro/USD was

  7%. And the volatility of USD/yen was 6%.

  And although cryptocurrency exchanges are regulated as

  businesses in their country of incorporation, they are not run with

  the same degree of care and oversight that we can expect from a

  traditional exchange. A good example of this occurred in 2018

  when the owner of the Canadian exchange QuadrigaCX died. He

  was the only person who knew the passwords to the exchange's

  cold storage. As of February 2019, customers were unable to

  access US$190 million.

  Also, no significant exchange will let you pay for anything in

  Bitcoin. Almost no one will. Bitcoin fails as a currency both

  because it is far more volatile than what you will be buying with it

  and because it is not a widely accepted medium of exchange. As of

  January 2019, the total value of all the Bitcoin in the world was

  US$64 billion. In comparison the total amount of USD was 16

  trillion. To become a legitimate currency Bitcoin (and

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  cryptocurrencies in general) would need to both vastly increase in

  value and vastly drop in volatility.

  Finally, many financial institutions want nothing to do with any

  cryptocurrencies. Quoting a senior banker in the clearing division

  of a major US bank, “If you have anything to do with crypto, this

  conversation is over.” Part of this reluctance is due to the current

  uncertainty of the regulatory
environment. Some more is because

  banks are looking to develop private versions of the blockchain.

  Finally, although it seems that the blockchain could eventually

  help KYC (“know your customer”) due diligence, banks are

  currently more worried that the verifiability of each transaction in

  the blockchain can directly tie them to criminal activity.

  Lessons

  Currency risk is unavoidable but can be diversified.

  Cryptocurrencies are speculative instruments and not currency

  in the normal sense.

  Theft and Fraud

  Thieves steal things that are worth money. And, as nothing is

  more clearly worth money than money itself, the financial

  industry provides good targets for thieves, con artists, and

  hucksters. It is impossible to be completely protected from this

  risk. Everyone who trades or invests will rely on other people.

  Even those who execute their own trades on an exchange will still

  have risk associated with their custodian and clearinghouse.

  The good news is that most criminals and fraudsters are not

  masterminds. Many simply rely on the fact that if they are

  charming, no one will do the necessary due diligence.

  The first thing is to look at the people involved. Everything a fund

  does is because of the people running it. You are not investing in a

  fund. You are investing with people. It is important to know who

  the managers are, their backgrounds, their experiences, their

  levels of involvement, and the amount, both professionally and

  financially they have invested. Do they have criminal convictions?

  Have they been censured by regulatory bodies (leaving aside floor

  traders being fined by the exchange for a fight over a spot or

  something)? Do they treat your money even more respectfully

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  than they treat their own? For that matter, do they have a

  significant amount of their net worth invested in the fund? Do

  only one or two people in the fund have access to the account

  statements? Often you can get a lot of insight about a person's

  character just by asking around. The trading world is a small place

  and someone with a dubious reputation quickly becomes known

  (even if this isn't discussed on the record).

  Any legitimate organization will be pleased an investor asks these

  things. For the manager, it is both understandable and makes

  dealing with the customer easier. It is always better to be in

  business with sensible people.

  Further, any legitimate fund should have a third-party

  administrator. This is a separate firm that has access to bank

  statements and brokerage reports. They verify positions and

  returns and generate the monthly reports sent to clients. Don't

  accept an excuse such as, “We are just a startup and can't afford a

  third-party administrator.” It is non-negotiable. Had Bernie

  Madoff's victims insisted on the oversight of an independent body,

  they would have immediately discovered that Madoff had done no

  trades and held no positions.

  More generally, a lot of financial disasters can be traced back to

  the victims not knowing about their inventory and hence their

  risk. Many of the catastrophic and infamous derivatives losses

  have been caused when an institution or investor did not know

  what their position was.

  Example One: Baring's Bank

  Baring's bank was the second oldest merchant bank in the world.

  It was founded in 1762 by Sir Francis Baring. In 1990, Nick Leeson

  was employed in the Singapore branch of Baring's. He was

  authorized to act as a floor broker and to arb the Nikkei futures

  between the Singapore and Osaka exchanges. All brokers have an

  “error account.” Any trades that are in some way mistakes get put

  into the error account. This is meant to be for accounting

  purposes. As soon as the error is found the broker is supposed to

  exit the trade by liquidating the position. Leeson had a small error

  that led to a position of 20 Nikkei futures. Leeson changed the

  account number so the head office didn't see reports and began to

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  trade in the account to recoup a loss of £20,000, eventually

  accumulating a large position in short Nikkei straddles.

  On January 17, 1995, a major earthquake hit Kobe and, over the

  next four days, the Nikkei dropped 16%, making the short

  straddles enormous losers. Leeson started to make even bigger

  trades trying to recoup losses. This didn't work. He lost £827

  million (the equivalent of about US$2.5 billion in 2018). On

  February 23, he absconded to Malaysia and sent a confession note

  (consisting only of “I'm sorry”) to London at the same time.

  Barings was insolvent and was eventually sold to ING for one

  pound.

  Lessons

  Never let a trader or fund be both a trader and a risk manager.

  A trader shouldn't have the ability to create accounts.

  Don't invest in products or strategies that you don't

  understand. The London office believed Leeson's falsified

  profit numbers while someone familiar with the Nikkei arb

  would know that the reported numbers were impossible.

  Example Two: Yasumo Hamanaka, aka “Mr.

  Copper”

  In 1995 (a big year for rogue traders) the head copper trader at

  Sumitomo bank, Yasumo Hamanaka, lost about US$1.8 billion

  (roughly $3 billion in 2018 terms). Over a period of about 10

  years, he accumulated about 5% of the world's copper, owning

  both the actual metal and the futures. Five percent of a commodity

  might not seem excessive, but copper is illiquid and has relatively

  low turnover. Using his large futures position, Hamanaka kept the

  price artificially high. As well as making his position look

  profitable, this enabled him to earn inflated commissions on

  physical copper trades, in which commission is calculated as a

  percentage of the price (which is in itself ridiculous, because

  brokers do no more work to sell something for $100 than they do

  when it is $50).

  Other traders speculated that Sumitomo was manipulating the

  price, but that is weak evidence as traders are generally paranoid

  and think every price is being manipulated. No one could confirm

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  suspicions because the London Metal Exchange had no position

  limits and didn't publish open interest statistics.

  In 1995, the price of copper dropped as Chinese mining increased.

  This new supply had a greater effect than Hamanaka could

  counter, and liquidating his huge position only added to the price

  decline. He was removed from his copper trading job and

  Sumitomo liquidated the position.

  Sumitomo claimed they were totally ignorant of the positions.

  Although they had to keep pumping huge sums of money to

  collateralize the trade, ignorance is still possible (as we saw in the

  Baring's case, treasury and management don't always understand

  the positions they have). They said Mr. Hamanaka hid trade

  confirmations. He was later convicted of forgery. Nonetheless,

  Sumitomo was either complicit, ignorant, or negligent.
r />   Lessons

  Treasury and management need to be aware of how much

  margin it takes to hold a position.

  Beware of instruments that have limited liquidity or

  transparency.

  Ask, “Is it reasonable for a trader to make this much money

  trading this product?” If you can't answer this, you shouldn't

  invest.

  Example Three: Bernie Madoff

  Bernie Madoff was a very well-respected figure in the investing

  world. The son of a plumber (later a stockbroker), he was

  genuinely a self-made man. His early jobs included lifeguard and a

  sprinkler installer. In 1960 Madoff founded a penny-stock

  brokerage, which eventually grew into Bernard L. Madoff

  Investment Securities. He became known as an ethical,

  philanthropic businessman. He was the chairman of the NASD

  board of directors and advised the SEC.

  His business had two divisions. There was a broker-dealer and

  there was a money management firm. In 2008, it was discovered

  that the money management division was running a $50 billion

  Ponzi scheme in which Madoff paid redemptions from new

  investor deposits rather than any investment returns.

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  Madoff claimed consistent returns of 12% a year in all market

  conditions. Given that from 1950 to 2007, the S&P 500 averaged

  only about 9% a year, his fund found it easy to raise money.

  Unfortunately, the S&P 500 dropped over 38% in 2008. Many

  people asked for their money, and there were no inflows to cover

  the withdrawals.

  (There were rumors that some of these reported returns were due

  to the investment division front-running client orders from the

  brokerage. Some investors thought they were the smart insiders in

  the scam. If this is true, it suggests the phrase, “You can't cheat an

  honest man.”)

  Madoff's story was that he employed a split strike conversion

  (more commonly called a collar) in which he was long stock, short

  calls, and long puts. The fact that he told people about his strategy

  should have shut him down earlier. If you tell people what you are

  doing, they can more easily see if your returns are plausible.

  Although it is possible for a good trader to beat a strategy

  benchmark, the benchmark will still give a good baseline.

  And it didn't even take an enormous amount of work to see that

 

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