The Black Prince

by David Green

  In the main, however, these were relatively quiet years for the prince, spent at court and at his numerous residences in and around the capital. The most significant of these were Kennington, Wallingford and Berkhamsted, which was the favoured country retreat. The palace at Kennington, in Lambeth, was located across the river from Westminster and extensive work was undertaken there between 1342 and 1363. The property consisted of a hall standing on an undercroft alongside a large building called the Prince’s Chamber, which contained the main living apartments. There was also a separate kitchen. The prince’s mason, Nicholas Ailington, carried out early renovations and improvements. The garden walls were built by the celebrated architect, Henry Yevele, who entered the prince’s service in c.1356 and probably through this came to the king’s attention. He worked on the castles of Queenborough and Rochester as well as the Black Prince’s chantry in Canterbury Cathedral and the cloisters and south transept there, as well as the first cell and the cloister of the London Charterhouse. He also designed John of Gaunt’s chantry for Old St Paul’s and began the rebuilding of the nave of Westminster Abbey.61

  ‘Diplomacy’: Home and Abroad

  The years from the Black Death until the prince’s first independent command in 1355 saw him increasingly involved in matters of state, and also witnessed the evolution of his household and administration. There is no evidence to show he was closely involved with the daily business of government, but he was present on a number of significant occasions in court and at parliament. His administration in Cornwall, and particularly in Chester and Wales, began to flex its muscles.

  At the end of October 1354, the prince with other dignitaries including the earls of Warwick and Stafford, Bartholomew Burghersh, and John Beauchamp were present at Westminster when the king appointed Lancaster and Arundel as his ambassadors to the Avignon. They were sent to confirm the terms and stipulations that had been made with the French at Guînes. The most significant of these was that Edward III should have in perpetuity and in full and free sovereignty (as an alod) the duchy of Gascony, in recompense for the crown of France. In addition, he was to have the duchy of Normandy and the county of Ponthieu as well as Angers and Anjou, Poitiers and Poitou, Le Mans and Maine, Tours and Touraine, Angoulême and Angoumois, Cahors and Quercy, Limoges and Limousin, and all the other lands, castles and towns acquired in the course of the war. Edward also made it clear that he expected to take possession of any additional lands if they should be found to have been, at any time, part of the demesne of the kings of England. The ambassadors were to complete the process by 1 April.

  In the event, the treaty of Guînes was a failure and the unwillingness of the French to ratify its terms provided the springboard for the prince’s grande chevauchée and the blueprint for subsequent negotiations and agreements, namely the putative treaties of London (1358/9) and Brétigny-Calais (1360).62

  Far from the capital, the Janus-faced character of the prince’s administration was becoming apparent. In Cornwall and elsewhere, very considerable steps were taken to alleviate the worst financial consequences of the plague. However, in Cheshire and Wales the vicarious presence of a prince eager to assert his authority and increase his demesne income brought him into conflict with his tenants and his neighbours.

  In 1353, Cheshire was marked by crime and disorder, which encouraged one of the prince’s two visits to the earldom. The administration of the palatinate was the responsibility of the justiciar and chamberlain of Chester, at this time offices held by Roger Hopwell (after the death of Sir Thomas Ferrers on or about 10 August) and John Brunham, junior, respectively. The prince’s visit was not occasioned by a rebellion but was ‘in response to the express grievances of many of the people of Cheshire’. A general eyre was held to enquire into a wide range of crimes and abuses, and a fine of 5,000 marks payable over four years was agreed in return for the prince suspending the action for thirty years. However, the prince’s justices did hold a great many sessions of trailbaston, probably in excess of 130 cases in about three weeks. Alongside these judicial investigations, there was a major overhaul of government in which the lieutenant-justiciar, the county sheriff, the constable of Chester castle and all the serjeants of the peace lost their offices. It was at this point that John Delves, one of the prince’s key officials, came to prominence as the new lieutenant-justice of north Wales and Chester. The 1353 episode was a serious attempt to quell disorder and raise revenue, and it reflected a serious breakdown in relations between the most powerful members of Cheshire society and those beneath them. It was not terribly effective and the prince and his council were called on to return in 1358. It was not a problem that was resolved and led to further problems during Richard II’s reign.63

  Similarly in Wales, the government of the principality had become increasingly efficient throughout the prince’s tenure of office. The previous administration had been characterised by absenteeism, pluralism, extortion and economic decline. Changes throughout the mid-fourteenth century to increase revenue and the prince’s authority made the administration more productive and competent. These changes resulted in objections from the marcher lords who, as they had the pretensions of Edward I in the 1290s and the younger Despenser in the 1320s, now closed ranks against the Black Prince. Edward III took steps to separate the factions and made clear the division and independence of the Marches and the principality in the 1354 statute, which stated that Marcher lands were held directly of the king.64

  The prince’s activities in the March have been held as indicative of his attitudes and actions elsewhere. His direct involvement is questionable and policy there may have been determined and implemented by his administrators. Certainly, the prince should be held accountable for the actions of those acting in his name, but it may not have been a policy which he was prosecuting deliberately. The relatively new presence of an active and undoubtedly forceful administration in Cheshire, Flintshire and Wales, where previously there had been something of a power vacuum, was bound to come into contact and conflict with a number of vested interests. That the prince might have handled a number of these incidents more diplomatically, for example concerning the lordship of Gower, is not in doubt, whether it can be directly attributable to his avarice and rapacity is more questionable. Nonetheless, given the political atmosphere which was created in the March, it might be said that the king was taking a chance when he gave his son his first independent command in an even more politically sensitive arena, the duchy of Gascony.

  4

  Gascony (1355–56)

  1355: The Grande Chevauchée

  As in 1346, it was an appeal for military assistance that led to an English expedition in France. In January 1355, members of the Gascon nobility, including the captal de Buch and the Lords of Lesparre and Mussidan, present at the birth of Edward III’s son, Thomas, expressed their concern at the attacks of the count of Armagnac whose lands became the principal target of the first raid. Armagnac had been appointed King Jean’s lieutenant in Languedoc in November 1352. Two months later he began hostilities with the siege of Saint-Antonin, and by the end of May 1354 Armagnac was only 27 leagues from Bordeaux on the banks of the River Lot.1 The resumption of Anglo-French hostilities had, in spite of this, become very likely after the failure of the French to ratify the treaty of Guînes and the breakdown of negotiations at Avignon.2

  The prince and his father agreed an indenture specifying his conditions of service and appointment as the king’s lieutenant on 10 June 1355, which post-dated many of the preparations for the campaign. These included the purveyance of hurdles (used for separating horses when onboard ship) to be sent to Plymouth, by the sheriff of Devon, from Wales. On 27 May, Thomas Hoggeshawe, lieutenant of John Beauchamp, the admiral of the fleet west of the Thames, had been appointed acting admiral of the prince’s fleet, and John Deyncourt, sub-admiral of the northern fleet, was also involved. General orders were sent out in April;3 Henry Keverell was paid for the purchase of gear for the prince’s ship, items were del
ivered to John le Clerk and his fellows, the keepers of the Christophre, and on 16 July, ships from Bayonne were ‘arrested’ in various ports,4 having been previously used to transport Lancaster’s troops to Normandy.5 Safe conducts were issued to the prince’s men between 8 June and 6 September. It seems that preparations were undertaken with the intention that the expeditionary force should arrive in France very soon after the expiration of the truce on 24 June. In the event, contrary winds and perhaps delays in securing sufficient numbers of ships prevented their departure until 9 September. During the delay at Plymouth, the prince stayed at Plympton priory and concerned himself with affairs concerning the duchy of Cornwall. Advance groups were sent over prior to the arrival of the prince and the main fleet. On 1 July 1355, Tiderick van Dale, usher of the prince’s chamber, was paid £20 on going abroad with Bartholomew Burghersh, the younger. He received a tun of wine and ten quarters of wheat at Plymouth prior to the muster.6 Stephen Cosington and William the Chaplain were also sent to prepare the archbishop’s palace at Bordeaux for the arrival of the prince who stayed there, whilst not on campaign, until his return to England in 1357. The main fleet sailed on 8/9 September and arrived in Bordeaux eight days later at the height of the vendage. The earls of Warwick, Suffolk and their retinues embarked and sailed from Southampton. On 21 September, the prince spoke before the citizens of Bordeaux; his appointment as the king’s lieutenant in Gascony was pronounced and his father’s letters read out before the leading figures of the duchy in the cathedral of St Andrew.7

  As in 1346, the campaign was preceded by an attempt to divide French forces. Lancaster was again involved, raiding from Gascony as he had in 1345, and on this occasion he attacked Normandy with Charles of Navarre, while the prince rode from Gascony, leading an expeditionary force of 800 men-at-arms and 1,400 archers. Among his commanding officers were the earls of Suffolk, Oxford and Warwick, Sir John Chandos, Sir Reginald Cobham and Sir James Audley. The advance cost of the expedition, war wages and regards was some £19,500, with shipping another £3,300. In the year from September 1355, over £55,000 was spent on the prince’s military operation in Gascony.8

  No attempts at secrecy preceded the attack which the prince led in 1355. Hostilities had already broken out between Armagnac and the Gascons, and the raid from Bordeaux was to be merely one element in a wider operation. French forces would be divided if they tried to deal with the prince, Lancaster and the king simultaneously.

  The army left Bordeaux by 5 October, its strength augmented by the forces of the Gascon nobility, at least a further 4,000 men, bringing the total number to between 6,000 and 8,000 troops.9 It marched south and a little east before heading almost due east on reaching Plaissance, thereafter the raid continued to the Mediterranean coast and Narbonne. The return to Bordeaux followed a not dissimilar path, widening the band of destruction to encompass Limoux, Boulbonne and Gimont.

  Near Arouille, following usual practice, the army divided into three columns in order to march on a broad front. Anglo-Gascon casualties were low throughout 1355, John Lord Lisle being a notable exception, falling at Estang. Lisle had first seen service in 1339 and had served in Gascony in the early 1340s in addition to serving with Derby and at Crécy. A founder member of the Order of the Garter, he was also involved at Winchelsea and such service may have aided in his appointment as sheriff of Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire and governor of Cambridge castle.10

  Promotions were a regular feature of the 1355 campaign, although there was no ceremony comparable to that held at La Hougue in 1346. Richard Stafford was made a banneret at Bassoues on 19 October and a number of new knights were dubbed including William Stratton, the prince’s tailor, and Tideric van Dale, usher of the prince’s chamber, on 12 November. After marching south for a hundred miles, the army swung east, crossed the River Gers, which marked Armagnac’s eastern border, and approached the count’s headquarters at Toulouse. At this stage, the larger towns tended to be avoided and those less well defended were pillaged and burned. This was not a siege train but a swiftly moving raid of devastation. The army forded the Garonne to the south and then the Ariège. This was a highly audacious move, indeed

  an unthinkable idea to those who knew the area, and one which does not seem to have occurred to Armagnac … [who] … was confident that the Anglo-Gascons would not be able to penetrate into Languedoc beyond Toulouse.11

  Armagnac was not drawn out and the army arrived at Carcassonne on 2 November. The city attempted to bribe the prince with 250,000 gold écus. It was not accepted and the bourg (the outer town) was burned, although no attempt was made on the heavily defended cité (the fortified, administrative centre). Narbonne, which they reached on 8 November, provided even less resistance, and although the citadel similarly held out, the town was virtually uninhabited and undefended when the prince arrived. Edward stayed in the Carmelite convent while the rest of the town was looted, albeit while suffering attack and bombardment from the cité. They withdrew on 10 November, pursued by furious troops and townsmen.12

  Two French armies began to converge on the prince at this point from Toulouse and Limoges, led by Armagnac and Jacques de Bourbon respectively. The Marshal Clermont also brought troops from north of the Dordogne and further support was expected from the Dauphin until he was diverted to Picardy. The prince marched north crossing the Aude at Aubian and when approached, the French fell back. Armagnac’s policy was that of Philip VI’s before Crécy, and with better reason, because of Crécy. He aimed therefore to defend the principal river crossings, towns and fortified sites. Prior to leaving Narbonne, the prince received letters from the pope who was fearful of the intentions of an army not far from Avignon. The messengers were not received courteously, and after a considerable wait were told to address their concerns to the king.

  The march back was determined by the proximity of Armagnac and Bourbon, and the prince’s motivation is uncertain. Was he seeking battle or seeking to avoid it? Edward rode towards Béziers before turning west, perhaps in the face of French reinforcements, towards Armagnac. The prince was certainly expecting a battle even if not trying to engineer one, but Armagnac continued to withdraw. The prince followed him as far as Carcassonne and then headed towards the comparative safety of the lands of the count of Foix. 15 November marked an iconic moment in the raid and indeed the whole chevauchée strategy; Edward and his commanders spent the day at the Dominican house at Prouille, it being Sunday, while the rest of the army burned four towns in twelve hours.

  The prince met Gaston Fébus, count of Foix, on 17 November at Boulbonne, and some agreement was reached. Gaston’s lands were to be spared any attack and some of his troops were involved in the campaign the following year. The route back to Gascony was difficult and treacherous, taken perhaps in an attempt to avoid Armagnac, although if the count tried to engage Edward it was not until he crossed the Ariège. There was some fierce but limited skirmishing and the army re-entered the duchy on 28 November and reached La Réole on 2 December.13

  The chevauchées of 1355–6, like those that preceded the encounter at Crécy, struck at the military and personal reputation of the French monarch and nobility and seriously affected royal tax revenue. It was deliberately destructive, extremely brutal, yet also methodical and sophisticated. After the conclusion of the first raid, Sir John Wingfield, the prince’s business manager, wrote to the bishop of Winchester. His letter, often quoted, shows great concern with determining the exact value to the French crown of the areas overrun in 1355 and thus the extent of the economic damage they had caused.14

  For the countryside and towns which have been destroyed in this raid produced more revenue for the king of France in aid of his wars than half his kingdom; as I could prove from authentic documents found in various towns in the tax collectors’ houses.15

  The experiences of 1346 were to be highly influential in the campaigns that followed. The 1355 expedition was an archetypal chevauchée and proved to be a remarkable tactical and logistical achievement. The
prince marched from Bordeaux to the Mediterranean coast and back, fighting only a few minor skirmishes and causing a vast amount of damage. French defensive preparations were generally ineffective and over 500 villages were burned, it was ‘une catastrophe sans précedent’.16 The only exceptions to the destruction were to be religious buildings and the lands of the count of Foix. While officially neutral, Gaston Fébus assisted the prince: ‘non seulement il assura son ravitaillement, mais encore il permit aux Béarnais de s’engager dans le corps expeditionnaire.’17

  Armagnac’s failure to respond to the prince’s army is very peculiar considering the extent of the destruction and the possible prizes should he win a battle. Hewitt argues that ‘It is most probable that he had a secret understanding with the English’,18 but there seems to be little evidence to support this view and far more to suggest he was a loyal Valois subject. In any case, pitched battles were often avoided. The association of the prince with the count of Foix must have given Armagnac pause for thought. Furthermore, there are no accurate figures concerning the forces that he had at his disposal and he may have been greatly outnumbered.19

  During the winter of 1355–6, the troops were billeted along the northern march. Warwick remained at La Réole, Salisbury went to Saint-Foy, Suffolk to Saint-Emilion. The prince, with Chandos and Audley, marched to Libourne. Three weeks passed before any further action was taken.20

  As with many campaigns during the war, regular communications were sent back to England for purposes of propaganda and public consumption at a variety of levels. Personal letters also exist. The 1355–6 expedition was no different, and such documents are extremely valuable, providing a great deal of information about the period between the grande chevauchée and the raid that would lead to a battlefield outside Poitiers.21 The church tended to be the conduit for news, and prior to departure in 1355 the prince had visited Westminster to pray for success in the forthcoming expedition. Two letters were later written at Bordeaux on 23 and 25 December 1355 to William Edington, bishop of Winchester, from the prince and John Wingfield.22 Edington was the head of the prince’s council in England, and communications sent initially to the prince’s officials might then be more widely circulated. Richard Stafford and William Burton carried them to England. Requests for prayers were also made regularly. The Friars Preachers, Friars Minor, Carmelites and Austin friars, the city of London and its bishop, were contacted with this demand. In this vein, on his return from Poitiers, the prince gave thanks for his victory at Canterbury. Wingfield wrote at Libourne on 22 January, probably to Stafford, who had returned to England for reinforcements and supplies, and related what had taken place after his departure.23 Three letters recounted the events of the second raid and the battle of Poitiers. That of 25 June 1356, sent to the bishop of Hereford, was brief and requested prayers and masses. On 20 October, Roger Cotesford, one of the prince’s bachelors, took another letter to the bishop of Worcester. The most important missive was carried by Nigel Loryng to the mayor, aldermen and commonality of London and was probably also intended for distribution outside the capital.24 Other members of the retinue who wrote home also passed information. Bartholomew Burghersh penned communications to John Beauchamp, and Henry Peverel corresponded with the prior of Winchester. The prince also wrote to the prior naming all those killed or captured at Poitiers. News was also passed by papal envoys, via the wine trade, and the sub-admirals Deyncourt and Hoggeshawe who returned with some of the ships that had taken the army to Gascony.25