Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking
Page 33
Information on law enforcement authorities’ plans and activities are monitored by the traffickers and smugglers and their collaborators and accomplices, and this information is exchanged within and among the networks using these technologies. If the law enforcement authorities are a threat, the smugglers or traffickers will communicate this among themselves. They are very well organised, know where to move, and what routes to take; they use mobile phones and GPS to monitor where to walk or drive.
ICTs enable the exchange of information within and between networks of traffickers and smugglers to identify safe routes and a secure time for unhindered operations. ICTs are also used to monitor, track, and report movements of unprotected refugees to criminal networks, which increases their vulnerability to abduction, hostage taking, and extortion. It is common for smugglers and traffickers to conspire and communicate with other criminal groups and individuals to intercept the people being smuggled, while feigning innocence. By pretending innocence, they attempt to avoid the loss of potential future customers for their smuggling business. This is a typical example of the reality of smuggling at the beginning of what turned into a trafficking journey:
I was smuggled together with 23 people from Shagarab refugee camp in Sudan to Khartoum. The trip was in relays; the smugglers changed hands. The second day we had to arrive in Khartoum at 5:00 am. In Khartoum we had to be hosted temporarily with an Eritrean trafficking agent who was part of the network. At the same time, he, the driver and his colleague were communicating simultaneously both with the man in Khartoum and with the police. There was a meeting point arranged at one petrol station. The traffickers arranged it so that we and the police arrived at the same time at the petrol station [where] we were threatened and looted by the police of all our properties. This was not by accident but purposely set up. The traffickers were trying to hide this from us, but since I spoke Arabic, I understood the conversations. They made up a whole story to make us believe that we were accidentally looted by the police. They arranged it to get free passage, but they did not want to get a bad reputation amongst us, as we would talk to other people and they would lose their market.32
ICTs were used extensively in the Sudan-Sinai routes for Sinai trafficking,33 and are more recently being used in the Sudan-Libya smuggling and trafficking routes and operations.34 One criminal group will use ICTs to locate, monitor, and track refugees being smuggled or trafficked by other criminal groups, and may attack the convoys and capture the refugees.
ICTs are also used to co-ordinate the collection of ransoms by victims, as well as their transfer to the traffickers. Without ICTs, there is no way for the families and friends of the victim to be notified of the victim’s predicament, raise the money demanded by the captors, and transfer the money. The ransom money is sent to the designated account or person using mobile money transfers or the Internet. In many instances, young Eritreans make their plans and execute them counting on the fact that ICT-facilitated global financial support will be available if needed. In the case of Eritrean refugees, they generally arrange with smugglers to leave Eritrea without informing their family members in the diaspora, on whom they will later depend for money to survive.35 This is because phones and the Internet are heavily monitored by the Eritrean intelligence, and phone communication between Ethiopia and Eritrea was not possible until recently (Viber has changed this).
In addition, young people often enter into no-fee deals with smugglers and traffickers to escape from Eritrea and do not inform their parents of their intention to leave. Once an unaccompanied minor has been brought to an unfamiliar place where they are separated from their family, they are forced to phone their family or friends to beg for ransom.36 The family or friends have no choice but to intervene at this stage to save the victim’s life. ICTs are exacerbating the power imbalance. Those who already have capabilities (in the sense put forward by Sen) see these capabilities exponentially growing through these technologies.37 Those with fewer capabilities see their capabilities grow through ICT, but proportionally less so. The gap between the groups with higher and lower capabilities widens through the uncontrolled technological innovation that ICT offers. While ICTs support the refugees on their journey, they also (and even more so) support the well-equipped trafficking organisations.
The ICT tipping point
The emergence of human trafficking for ransom in 2009 raises the question of which technological changes led to the ‘tipping point’ at which ICTs became a disruptive enabler of the commoditisation of human beings.38 Although further research is required, it is suggested that it was at this point when the technology in various parts of the world ‘evolved’ to provide an enabling environment for the development of ICT-enabled human trafficking for ransom. Such an enabling environment emerged simultaneously, but independently, in the Sinai, Malaysia/Thailand, and Mexico. The common element in this new form of trafficking is the extensive use of ICTs for the mediation of ransoms. The question is how this tipping point may have escalated the emergence of this form of human trafficking in 2009 in these three locations.
Expanding communication networks
Data on the roll-out of communication networks and on communication flows is scarce in the peripheral areas where human trafficking for ransom emerged. Nevertheless, it is clear that various trends converged in 2009 to enable ICT-based trafficking for ransom. Some important elements that may explain the emergence of the tipping point include network availability, exponential user value growth, and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) driving down user costs, as well as the development of mobile money platforms. Other components that may have contributed to the tipping point are the increase in number of mobile telephone towers, increased availability of (low cost) mobile phones, the relatively affordable call rates, and international roaming agreements. These components are mediated by the evolution and standardisation of technologies and regulations, and international harmonisation of allocations of frequencies (spectrum allocation), the radio bands that support ICTs. The focus of ICT operators on emerging markets grew after the growth of users stalled in the so-called developed world.39
Relevant indicators of the tipping point are: the moment when most Internet searches came through mobile phones;40 the moment when volumes of mobile data surpassed volumes of voice calling services;41 the availability and use of mobile money platforms; and the percentage of smart phones operational on mobile networks. It is argued that the combined impact of these parallel developments facilitated the emergence of ICT-enabled trafficking in 2009.
Mobile phones in East Africa
Towards the end of the 1990s, mobile phones were introduced in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, with Eritrea lagging behind, introducing mobile phones services in 2004.42 In Eritrea, with the sole operator Eritel, access to sim cards was entirely controlled and only accessible for certain groups of people; whereas in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya, sim cards could be obtained without registration. In Ethiopia, registration was required to possess a sim card. In Uganda, Sudan, and Kenya registration has since become compulsory. In Egypt, registration to possess and use a sim card became a requirement in 2016. In late 2011, Egypt’s mobile penetration surpassed 100%, which is the point at which the number of active sim cards equalled the population of the country.43
Cross-border communication is also facilitated by mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs): “[a]n MVNO leases wireless capacity (in effect, purchases ‘minutes’) from a third-party mobile network operator (MNO) at wholesale prices and resells it to consumers at reduced retail prices under its own business brand”.44 The development of MVNOs is seen as the next step in engendering competition and market growth in developing markets.45 Depending on the national regulatory and technical environment, MVNOs exist in many shapes and forms. With an intensively communicating diaspora, supporting family members and friends through mobile money,46 several MVNOs focus on ethnic marketing and compete on calling rates for specific regions and user groups, including refugees and mig
rants with little money (e.g., between Europe and northern Africa), while others facilitate international network roaming.47 MVNOs have facilitated the lowering of communication costs and subsequent growth of international communications to and from areas that were previously considered high cost/low volume markets or simply ‘unattractive’.
Examples of MVNOs are Lebara and Lycamobile, which offer sim cards without registration and give users anonymity. Lebara was established in 2001 and Lycamobile in 2006 by Sri Lankan businessmen. Lebara advertises directly to its audience: “We make it much easier for migrant communities to stay connected to family and friends back home”. Philipp Roehl, CEO of beach-SIM, a cheap international mobile network based in Berlin, said: “[t]he smartphone is the most important companion of the refugees […] A capable mobile internet connection is key to call home via WhatsApp, Viber or Skype”.48 Communicating via over-the-top (OTT) services like Viber, WhatsApp, and Skype change high-cost voice calls to cost-effective data streams, encouraging people to communicate frequently and for longer durations, connecting the lowest-income communities globally.49
Each cumulative growth of the enabling environment and telecommunication facilities in the ICT (eco)system led to the tipping point in the use of ICTs for trafficking for ransoms. The transformational nature of ICTs is especially felt in areas where no communication facilities existed previously. In remote areas of Eritrea, there are no fixed telephone services available. The introduction of ICTs (such as mobile networks and the Internet) has been particularly disruptive in these areas because they have dislodged the non-connected status of these remote communities, which are now able to connect globally. ICTs have enabled both refugee communities and trafficking networks; more powerful participants have been able to better exploit these new ICTs in order to control the situation and the business models, including of trafficking.
New social groups linked through ICTs
Telecommunication networks create new social groups. Linear growth in telecommunication networks has resulted in the exponential growth of their social value.50 In Western markets, the roll-out of new ICTs generally takes a long time to reach market penetration of about 10% (the early adopters phase). After that point, the penetration and use shoots up, becoming large enough to begin to rapidly influence all sectors in a significant and productive way. The surge from around 10% to penetration of over 50% of the potential market takes place at an accelerated pace. After this upswing, penetration growth slows again.
New social groups being connected through ICTs impacts on the communication between the members of the groups. The question is whether this capability strengthened or weakened the groups.
ICTs and collective trauma
The inhumane and horrific character of trafficking for ransom has impacted heavily on the victims. The trauma was communicated by ICTs to the other members of families and communities and deeply affected them. The ICTs facilitated the individual trauma to transform into a collective trauma. This in turn has impacted negatively on the vulnerability of the migrants and refugees.
Collective trauma is the impact of an experience, which becomes a keystone in a group’s narrative, set of beliefs, and identity, both for the current generation and across generations. Collective trauma involves a socially constructed process with an impact on the past and future identity of the group and its individual members. The impact on the narrative and on the identity of the group can be present even when individual members do not have (or no longer have) signs of physical or psychological damage. Unlike individual trauma, which can be experienced by a small percentage of people, with most recovering within a given period of time, collective trauma does not refer to symptoms of traumatic stress but is an outcome that includes the response to the traumatic event as well as the way it is constructed into the beliefs, decisions, behaviours, and narratives of the collective.51
Human trafficking is a devastating experience for the victims and their families and friends. It results in the severe traumatisation of affected communities. Through ICTs, the impact of the trauma inflicted on victims of trafficking can transcend space and time, with calls from torture camps recorded and played on social media and through satellite radio broadcasts to the diaspora. In this way, the trauma impacts on almost every member of the community (at home and in the diaspora).
The power of ICTs to remotely control and influence the emotions, attitudes, and behaviours of people is enormous and unprecedented. The hostage takers effectively exploit this element to their advantage. Family members, relatives, and friends of the victims are made to communicate with the victims while they are being tortured. The crying and pleas for help over the phone emanating from those tortured emotionally traumatises those who hear them.
Material loss is a central element of collective trauma. It relates to the type of loss resulting from the traumatic event. Even the best-case scenario in the Sinai trafficking cases leads to enormous financial loss of the ransom paid. These incidences often involved whole global communities linked through ICTs, mobilising their collective resources for ransom payments.
The other type of loss from human trafficking for ransom is ‘ambiguous loss’, which refers to the physical absence, yet psychological presence, of a person who has disappeared and it is not known whether that person is alive or dead.52 The uncertainty makes ambiguous loss the most distressing of all losses. The Facebook Page, ‘Missing Eritreans’, features hundreds of Eritreans who are missing under a wide range of circumstances. Eritrean social media outlets are often replete with posters of missing persons and appeals for information. The search can go on for years without certainty or official verification of loss; no death certificate, no funeral, and certainly no body to bury. When a significant proportion of a community is affected by loss (including ambiguous loss), it becomes a collective loss and evokes collective pain, collective anxiety, depression, and guilt, which have implications for how the community copes with problems.53 Ultimately, the multi-layered loss entailed in situations such as trafficking for ransom leads to damaged identity and loss of belief, impairing people’s perceptions of themselves and the world, with the pain lingering for years and impacting on cognition and behaviour, as well as the sense of collective/national worth or trust in others.54 The loss of capability as a result of the unresolved uncertainty further exacerbates the vulnerability of the affected group.
The use of ICTs by traffickers, as well as by desperate families trying to mobilise finances, and equally desperate activists trying to raise awareness using radio and social media, has exposed communities to traumatic events, which turn into collective trauma and which impact negatively on the community.
Conclusion
This chapter introduces a new form of human trafficking. The new modus operandi is called human trafficking for ransom, previously referred to as Sinai trafficking, where it was first described in detail. Human trafficking for ransom involves the abduction, sale, torture, sexual violation, and killing of men, women, and children for the purpose of extortion – the profit-making purpose of this form of trafficking.55 Such horrific new forms of trafficking in persons emerged simultaneously in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, targeting the most vulnerable migrants and refugees.
The question is why this new form of trafficking emerged around the same time on the three continents. Looking at 2009 as a starting point for human trafficking for ransom, this chapter identifies ICTs as a key component of the new modus operandi. ICTs are indispensable to the new form of trafficking, and technological developments have enabled their wider use by both trafficking organisations and refugee and migrant communities.
The question arises as to how the introduction of ICTs enabled the emergence of this new form of trafficking. ICTs enable the payment and collection of ransom. ICTs also provide the possibility for communicating intelligence, logistical arrangements, and negotiations of routes for smuggling and trafficking. ICTs further turn individual trauma into collective trauma, exacerbating the vulnera
bility of the victims and their families and communities. As such, the use of ICTs not only enabled this new form of trafficking, it also completely changed the effect on the environment in which the trafficking takes place.
What is the explanation for the emergence of this new form of brutal trafficking in persons? Amartya Sen identified capabilities as a crucial component of what he refers to as “the materials of justice”.56 A widening of the gap between those with many and those with few capabilities may emerge if capabilities are exacerbated through new technologies that are introduced without any guidance. This is what seems to have happened. The victims of trafficking for ransom made use of ICTs. Their gain by using those technologies, however, was trumped by those in much more advantageous positions. The trafficking networks found a new, extremely profitable trade by exploiting the new technologies to facilitate the sale of human beings.
Notes
1 We are grateful to Susan Sellars-Shestra, who edited this chapter.
2 Van Reisen, M. and Rijken, C., “Sinai Trafficking: Origin and Definition of a New Form of Human Trafficking” (2015) 3(1) Cogitatio 113–124.
3 Warnier, J.-P., Inside and Outside: Surfaces and Containers, in Tilley, C. et al. (eds.), Handbook of Material Culture (London: Sage, 2006), pp. 186–196; Warnier, J.-P., The Pot-King: The Body and Technologies of Power (Boston, MA: Brill, 2007); Nyamnjoh, F.B. and Shoro, K., “Language, Mobility, African Writers and Pan-Africanism” (2009) 4(1) African Communication Research; Van Stam, G., Framing ICT Access in Rural Africa (Presentation at 11th Prato CIRN Conference, 13–15 October 2014, Prato, Italy); Van Reisen, M. and Gerrima, Z., “The Order of Things. Changing Identities in Eritrea Through ICTs”, in Mawere, M. and Marongwe, N. (eds.), Politics, Violence, Politics and Conflict Management in Africa: Envisioning Transformation, Peace and Unity in the Twenty-First Century (Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2016), pp. 367–399.