Boxes containing twelve filled, sealed and ready-to-use mini-flares and a box of sealed matches were issued to Army and Police with simple instructions on how to lay them out on a 1,000-metre runway. For the most part their introduction into the field made night landings at remote airfields simpler and safer. However, there were two incidents that raised serious questions about some ground forces’ understanding of air operations and their ability to interpret the simplest of instructions. The first was when I was called out late one night to casevac an SAP man from Sipolilo to Salisbury. We were told that the man had suffered a heart attack and was in such a bad state that he had to be taken to Salisbury urgently.
When I arrived over Sipolilo, the runway flare line was so short it appeared as if I was flying at 30,000 feet, when in fact I was only 1,500 feet above ground. The callsign on the ground had great difficulty speaking understandable English and I could not understand his fast-spoken Afrikaans. Eventually I was able to understand that all the flares had been incorrectly laid between two 100-metre markers instead of one flare on each of the ten 100-metre markers along one side of the runway. After a while the flares were relayed correctly and I made a normal landing. But when I taxiied to waiting vehicles, I was greeted with the sight of the ‘heart attack’ victim walking briskly and unaided to the aircraft.
The second incident ended in tragedy near the end of my tour with 4 Squadron. During the night of 17 December 1974, Brian Murdoch was called to uplift two Army casualties from Mushumbi Pools airstrip in the Zambezi Valley. The callsign concerned were either unaware of the mini-flares they were carrying as standard equipment or were too lazy to find them. Whatever the case, they used vehicles to mark the runway.
Brian landed on the wet muddy strip, then turned around and taxiied back to the vehicle over which he had passed on landing. The vehicle that had been at the far end of the runway had, for some reason, been right next to the Trojan during the loading of the casevac. When Brian was ready to take off, this vehicle repositioned but, through ignorance, the driver did not go all the way to the end of the runway. He stopped some 300 metres short of the runway’s end next to a large puddle of water “to make sure the pilot missed it.”
In the wet conditions that prevailed, a Trojan needed the full length of Mushumbi Pools runway but Brian had no way of knowing the ignorant driver had shortened this. It can only be guessed that Brian was forced to heave the aircraft into the air too early by yanking down full flap; but he did not achieve sufficient height to prevent his nose wheel from striking the vehicle. The low-powered engine was hard-pressed to propel the bulky Trojan at the best of times, but full flap and impact with the vehicle placed Brian, flying on instruments, in a no-win situation. The aircraft was observed to change course to the right before crashing into a riverbed where Brian, Corporal Parker and Lance-Corporal Povey died instantly. Had the callsign used the mini-flares, which we later established they had, this wasteful tragedy would not have occurred.
Improving tactics
TEN MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS DEATH, I had instructed Brian Murdoch along with Chris Weinmann on internal and external recce. From this time on I progressively worked through all the squadron pilots, which was both necessary and frustrating. It became clear that only one in fifteen pilots had any hope of succeeding in visual recce work because it required stamina and patience for lengthy flights and, above all, an earnest desire to locate CTs. Too many pilots were quite happy to sit back at base waiting in comfort for calls to action. Such calls came in response to CT actions from RSF men in observation posts on hilltops, from recce pilots and more and more from Selous Scouts pseudo operators, though at the time these were being attributed to normal ops because few people knew of Selous Scouts’ secret penetration into terrorist networks. However, this changed when deployments of pseudo groups was made by helicopters because this brought helicopter crews into direct contact with the pseudo terrorists and exposed their ops areas. To retain the highest degree of secrecy possible, Selous Scouts ‘forts’ were built at Air Force FAFs. From the high security walls of forts, the pseudos were driven in closed vehicles to the end of a runway or a suitable secure area close by for helicopter uplift to their operational area drop-off points.
It was during recce training with Chris and Brian that we located a ‘live CT camp’, which led to a successful follow-up operation. This was on 15 February when the three of us split up to strike with three fixed-wing aircraft ahead of helicopters bringing in RLI ground troops.
Every air action involving expenditure of weapons necessitated the submission to Air HQ of an Air Strike Report. ASRs tended to be very matter-of-fact in style so they failed to convey any sense of excitement and fear, nor tell of the hard sweat and toil of troops on the ground.
The ASR raised for this specific operation is used to illustrate the composition and handwritten contents of ASRs. Excluded from this and all other ASRs in this book are the accompanying technical details and weapon expenditure schedules. The exact words recorded in manuscript by officers in the field and up the chain of command in Air HQ, are reproduced without regard to grammatical errors.
PILOTS REPORT
1. As a result of 4 Squadron’s visual recce training a number of terrorist bases and suspected bases were located. A terrorist base a US 468605 appeared to be occupied at 151415B. Lt Col Southey and Flt Lt Bennie were briefed on the situation at 1500 at which time it was decided that immediate action should be taken.
2. Five helicopters were on hand as well as the recce Trojan that was armed. Two Provosts were called for and flown by pilots Weinmann and Murdoch who were familiar with the target lay out.
3. The Trojan was flown by OC 4 Squadron at 2000’ agl and 200 yds ahead of the two Provosts. The five helicopters with assault and stop troops followed immediately behind the Provosts. Take off and lift off occurred as planned at 151615B.
4. All weapons were placed on target points selected at the pre strike briefing.
5. Due to a shortage of ground troops, ground to the north of the river which formed the northern barrier to terr escape was covered by OC 4 Sqn and east of the camp was patrolled by Air Lt Law and Air Lt Thorne.
6. Air strike must have severely disrupted the terrorists because the assault troops made contact 4 minutes after strike. At this time it is known that 8 ters were killed and equipment has fallen into troops’ hands.
7. Reason for success of this exercise was undoubtedly Lt Col Southey’s faith in air recce and his willingness to strike without delay. Army/ Air force co-operation could not have been better.
(Signed) Squadron Leader P.J.H. Petter-Bowyer
Comments by OPS CDR., OCFW, Sqn Cdr
1. a. Trojan 3234 was holed by one bullet. Whether this was during the recce phase or during the attack is not known.
b. The success of this operation goes to prove that recce can be extremely valuable and thought should be given to the greater use of this role in our present situation; the advantage being that up-to- date information can be gained and if the reaction to this intelligence is swift, results will be achieved.
c. If the use of air recce (visual) is increased with the view to using this type of quick reaction tactic, ground forces will have to be made available, on a prompt force basis, at either Centenary or Mt. Darwin or both. If this was done, the type of attacks planned for 19th, 20th Feb 74 could have been handled in a similar way using jet effort as the air strike medium. Therefore, the attack would have been on the date the targets were located instead of a week later.
(Signed) Squadron Leader H.G. Griffiths
2. (1) No requirement for GAC or FLOT.
(2) I fully agree with the comments 1 b. above but our ability to meet this requirement is not possible at the present time on a continuous basis. No 4 Squadron has a major problem in training recce pilots and no sooner do they build up to a good standard when postings intervene and thus back to square one. As Ops Cmdr I would dearly love to have a good recce pilot of the calibre of Sqn Ldr P
etter-Bowyer on permanent attachment at FAF 3 but the way I see it at the present time it is not possible, but we must work to this aim. The proof lies in the fact that during the period in which Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer was training Weinmann and Murdoch, the info gained led to this Air Strike plus 4 other major ter strikes, 3 of which were on occupied camps.
3) Para 1 c. refers. Ground troops within Rhodesia are available for prompt force type actions and this is how the follow up to this strike was made possible. In respect of the strikes carried out on 21, 22 and 23 and 24, these were all in Mozambique and required regrouping of ground forces. It is appreciated that it has been agreed that jet ops need not be followed up by immediate ground ops but in this respect it was agreed to do so in order to gather intelligence. In three out of four cases intelligence was gained to the benefit of the over-all operation. The delay in mounting attacks does not appear to affect the results.
(4) In respect of this strike it can be considered a first class example of joint planning and what we hope for daily. However, this situation does not present itself often. The base camp was in fact just a resting place and Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer is to be congratulated on his powers of observation. The more I have to do with this man the more I am convinced that he has an inborn ability so far as visual recce is concerned which is unequalled in the Force. Added to which is his never failing enthusiasm and strong belief in the concept.
(5) Results of subsequent follow up Ops accounted for 8 terr and one AFJ killed. Sitreps 46/74 Para Alpha Two (2) and 47/74 Alpha Two (1) refer..
(Signed) Wing Commander P.D. Cooke
Comments by SO OPS
Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer has undoubtedly created an awareness in the force that visual recce pays dividends and this is being actively pursued.
We have been concentrating, possibly too much, on recce outside our borders. JOC commanders must make more use of recce, based on the intelligence picture, in their area of Ops. They have been advised. A strike well executed. Good initiative displayed. Well done strike team.
(Signed) Wing Commander W.H. Smith
Comments by DG OPS
The planning, concept and conduct of this operation gives great satisfaction. We pressed the possibilities of this type of operation for some time and I trust the successes recently achieved has proved the point. Jointry at its best. Our increased allocation of effort should ensure that the essence can be reaped as often as opportunities present themselves. The increased effort should also allow for greater air recce coverage.
(Signed) Air Commodore D.A. Bradshaw
Comments by C of S
a. Good effort on P-Bowyer’s part, specifically, and a good show by forces involved.
b. Without a doubt, we must make increasing use of air recce. (Signed) Air Vice Marshal F.W. Mussell
Comments by Commander
Noted and I concur with all the remarks. With the increased deployment we must press for exploitation of every possible opportunity. We have accepted increased flying effort so let us make full use of air recce. Good show all round.
(Signed) Air Marshal M.J. McLaren
Although this was a very small action compared to those to come, important issues were raised in the Air Strike Report. Firstly Harold Griffiths, supported by Peter Cooke, had added weight to calls by others and myself for a force that Griff refers to as ‘Prompt Force’. This, together with the Air HQ decision to put more aircraft in the field, led to the establishment of Fire Force shortly thereafter when the Army made RLI Commandos permanently available to an increasing number of deployed helicopters.
The delayed attacks that Harold Griffiths and Peter Cooke referred to were bases in Mozambique found by Mike Litson. Unfortunately this pilot was lost to 4 Squadron on posting to helicopters just when he was becoming a useful recce pilot. Brian Murdoch was not really cut out for the job, leaving Chris Weinmann and myself as the only functioning recce pilots who could seldom be spared for ops at the same time; so the greater use of recce expounded by everybody was fine in theory but impossible to implement. Hamie Dax was the only other recce pilot we could rely on but, being a busy farmer, his services were somewhat curtailed.
Selous Scouts
AT ABOUT THIS TIME I met Major Ron Reid-Daly at JOC Hurricane HQ in Bindura. He was on his way to visit his top secret Selous Scouts ‘safe house’ base and invited me to accompany him. I knew very little about Ron’s operation, still believing he was running a specialist tracker school.
We drove along a dirt road running along a rising valley south of Bindura. As we bumped along the old mine road Ron told me his work was very much an undercover operation which would rely heavily on Air Force support; hence his preparedness to expose me to what was going on at the temporary base we were visiting. The road led us to a previously abandoned mine house on a ridge way off the beaten track. Two marquee tents provided soldiers’ accommodation and an array of radio aerials rose from the ops room inside the old house.
Ron parked his car under the shade of a huge tree at the rear of the house where he was met by the scruffiest, most heavily bearded men I had ever seen off cinema screen. They seemed so out of place in the presence of their immaculately dressed CO. One of the men came over to me and greeted me in a manner that suggested he knew me well. Ron was amused by my puzzled look and helped me out by saying, “You remember Basil Moss don’t you?” Basil had lived only seven houses away from mine in the Married Quarters at Thornhill but I had not seen him for many months. It needed a closer look before I recognised the face behind the beard.
Flight Lieutenant Basil Moss, a fluent Shona linguist, had become bored with commanding the Thornhill’s General Service Unit. The GSU, mostly black servicemen commanded by white officers, provided airfield security services at Thornhill and New Sarum. Basil, a strong fit man of about forty years, needed something more challenging when there was so much action out in the countryside, but he could find no way of getting to the ‘sharp end’. Then an advertisement for Shona linguists led him to Special Branch HQ and thence to the pseudo operators, André Rabie and Stretch Franklin. The unfortunate loss of André had occurred about three months earlier.
Ron walked around the temporary Selous Scouts base with Stretch Franklin, Basil Moss and me in tow. Black men lay about in the marquee tents dressed in scruffy garb with flthy-looking hair. They each listened to portable radios that were all tuned to different channels and blasted out at maximum volume. Waving his hand across these men, Ron asked me if I could differentiate between the RAR soldiers and ‘turned terrorists’. I could not for they all looked the same. Nevertheless, I was astounded having never heard the term ‘turned terrorist’ before.
From the very beginning the Selous Scouts recognised the importance of having ‘turned ters’ within their pseudo groups. In so doing it was easier to gain the confidence of tribesmen who had known particular CTs before their capture. However, to gain maximum advantage, the period between capturing a genuine CT and having him in the field as a Selous Scout had to be very short—a week was considered too long. The Scouts found ‘turning’ CTs very easy. There was no need to bash heads or use threatening tactics. By nature black Rhodesians were gentle people until subjected to political misdirection as occurred with ZANLA cadre. By comparing the teachings of political commissars with reality and having being made aware that their lives were being risked for greedy politicians rather than for the people, captured CT opinions changed. Being cared for by the Scouts, rather than being shot out of hand as had been taught, made the transition from enemy to friend quick and easy.
The atmosphere, one of excitement, was very infectious. So closely had the successes of early pseudos operations been kept secret that it was wonderful to be taken into confidence and brought up to speed on what had happened and what was being planned. There was no doubt in my mind that Selous Scouts would soon be pre-empting action rather than us continuing to respond to terrorist activities or having to rely on visual recce and OP sightings. Tribesmen were the keys to C
T successes, so they had also to become the key to countering them.
Expanded pseudo operations had come at a critical time considering the rate at which ZANLA’s influence was spreading south and eastwards with ever-increasing numbers of CTs and LTTs. We were gaining in our successes but not sufficiently to contain, let alone reduce, ZANLA numbers.
The American military contended that in Viet Nam it was essential to have ten fighting soldiers to counter every insurgent in the field. For us this was a joke. We felt that a ratio of five to one would be adequate but this would soon be impossible considering Rhodesia’s financial and manpower constraints. At the height of our bush war a two-to-one ratio existed within the country whereas, outside of Rhodesia, we were always greatly outnumbered and 30:1 odds against us was not unusual.
The Army’s attempts to increase force levels by forming a second RAR battalion was disallowed by right-wing politicians who refused to accept black soldiers in numbers exceeding those of white regular and territorial soldiers combined. Any idea of using armed militiamen to protect tribesmen was also discounted for the same reason. So we were stuck with existing regular force levels and placed heavy reliance on the Territorial Army for effective levels in the field. Inevitably this placed formidable burdens on commerce and industry. However, manpower alone could not provide the successes we needed in a spreading bush war against an elusive enemy fighting for personal gains carelessly promised them by uncaring, greedy politicians; but these were promises in which they truly believed. Intelligence had to be the key to getting to grips with ZANLA. Reliance on historical facts gleaned from captured CTs had to be replaced by up-to-the-minute intelligence that could only be acquired by Selous Scouts pseudo operators. That intelligence was not long in coming.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 51
