By April 1974 Selous Scouts were coming to grips with ZANLA groups but too many of their successes were wasted because so many follow-up operations were mishandled; usually the consequence of inappropriate force levels to contain CT groups that bomb-shelled outwards to escape through large gaps between thinly spread troops.
It was only in June that helicopters became regularly grouped in sufficient numbers with the RLI Commandos who soon learned how to conduct the ‘vertical envelopment’ (surrounding) operations that capitalised on Selous Scout calls. As already mentioned, the combined reaction force became known as a Fire Force. This subject is covered later.
Cordon Sanitaire
DURING 1973 A VERY EXPENSIVE undertaking codenamed ‘Operation Overload’ was put into effect in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land. This was to place over 60,000 tribesmen in Protected Villages. The PVs system equated to the Portuguese aldeamentos that we had considered such a joke in earlier times. However thinking had changed, because Chiweshe TTL was perfectly situated as a base area from which to launch attacks against white farmers. This was because the TTL happened to be long, narrow and totally surrounded by the European farming areas of Centenary, Mt Darwin, Bindura, Glendale and Umvukwes. Tribesmen were placed in the fortified villages where they were protected and fed with the intention of denying terrorists access to food and people comforts. At the same time, an even more expensive undertaking was ongoing along the northeastern border.
In an endeavour to stem incursions across the border, a cordon sanitaire was built. It comprised a narrow minefield bounded by a double fence-line. Starting at Mukumbura, this arrangement extended eastwards along the borderline for about 400 kilometres. The cordon sanitaire concept, copied from Israel, was not only enormously expensive it was a complete ‘waste of rations’. The non-operational people who had promoted it as an effective defensive barrier were deeply criticised, and with good reason.
Every soldier knew that no military obstacle is worth a damn unless its entire length can be covered by effective fire. Some 3,000 men in 1,500 towers would have been needed to meet the need but, because this was impossible, electronic warning devices were used to compensate for the lack of manpower. But these warning systems were seldom successful because wild animals and the elements triggered too many alarm signals. When genuine CT-induced alarms were received, mostly at night, they invariably came from positions that were too far for forces to reach before the CTs had moved away into the safety of the bush.
CTs soon found a way through the Cordon Sanitaire. They simple dug a trench under the first fence then crawled along a line taken by a lead man who probed and lifted anti-personnel mines as he moved cautiously forward. A second trench under the next fence got everyone safely through the barrier. No electronic warnings occurred when this was done so a whole group of CTs could easily transit the Cordon Sanitaire before first light and be far away by the time a daylight patrol detected the breach. Many groups crossed the Cordon Sanitaire in this way both coming in and going out. No trench was used twice for fear of Rhodesian booby traps. Some crossings failed and one of these sticks in my mind.
A CT had his leg blown off just below the knee by an anti-personnel mine during an attempted crossing from Mozambique into Rhodesia. His companions, ignoring his pleas for help, high-tailed back into Mozambique leaving the stricken man to his fate. The fellow lay in the minefield all night and was only found by a routine patrol at about 10 o’clock next morning. A helicopter was called for, but it was impossible in the meanwhile for the Territorial soldiers to enter the minefield to administer first aid.
In spite of enormous blood loss, severe shock and a long cold lonely night, the CT was still conscious and able to communicate with the soldiers whilst awaiting rescue. There was then considerable danger for the Air Force technician who was lowered to the injured man by hoist, but he was placed in the small crater made by the mine that had blown the CT’s leg away. Without moving his feet the technician secured the CT, then both were lifted into the safety of the helicopter cabin and flown straight to the Selous Scouts ‘fort’ at Mtoko.
In the small hospital within the fort, the attending doctor put the CT on blood and saline drips then attended to the stump of his shattered leg. He expressed amazement that the CT had survived so long but had no doubt he would regain strength quickly. I was at Mtoko at the time and was taken into the fort to see this CT during his first evening in hospital. He was propped up in bed with blood and saline lines to both arms. His colour was a pasty grey, his face was drawn and his eyes half-closed.
I saw him again the following evening and could not believe this was the same man. Although still on drips he was sitting up in bed shirtless because the weather was hot. The man’s shiny black skin enhanced his muscular upper body. The grey was gone and his face was full of smiles. Few, if any, white men could have survived such an ordeal, let alone recovered so rapidly.
The CT had already been ‘turned’ in this short time but, because of ZANLA’s propaganda, he had some doubts for his safety in Selous Scouts hands. So he offered to take the Scouts to the base in Mozambique from which he and his group had come. When asked how he would do this he said he was fit enough to hop all the way.
Odds and sods
IN SOME AVIATION MAGAZINE I read of someone using a fixed-wing aircraft to rescue a man from the ground whilst airborne. I was intrigued by the technique described and attempted to do it myself. The idea was to let out a long length of rope from the rear cabin (about 500 feet of rope), with a suitable dead weight at its end, then turn steeply towards the rope’s end in the manner of a dog chasing its own tail. By holding the turn, the majority of the rope was supposed to descend with its end section hanging vertically downwards. With correct handling of turn and height it was reported that the weighted end of the rope could be positioned over any selected spot. This allowed a man on the ground to take hold of a slip harness, fit it under his shoulders, remove the weight and await uplift.
Once the man was secure in the harness, the pilot simply had to increase power, still in the turn, to lift him clear of the ground before rolling out into straight and level flight. Thereafter the man at the end of the rope could be placed back on the ground in another location in similar manner to his uplift. Alternatively, he could be hauled up into the aircraft.
My trial might have succeeded had the Trojan been able to sustain a very tight turn but this proved impossible because of that aircraft’s power limitation, so the experiment was dropped.
In one of the Hunters hangars at Thornhill a tractor used for towing aircraft to and from the flight lines refused to start one very cold morning. One of the technicians decided he had the solution. He placed a ‘little bit’ of Avpin in the carburettor to get the engine running. When subjected to pressure, Avpin combusted spontaneously giving off the high volumes of gas that powered the Hunter’s Avpin starter-motor turbines. But Avpin was certainly not suited to containment because its gas generating potential was awesome. It took just one turn of the tractor’s starter motor for the ‘little bit’ of Avpin to blow the tractor engine’s head clean off the engine block and through the high roof of the hangar.
In the self-same hangar another hole was made in the roof, but in this incident the circumstances where far from amusing. Armourer Mike Ongers was standing on the Hunter ejector seat he was servicing when the ejector cartridge fired. The seat itself went through the roof but Mike impacted the roof and was thrown back through overhead lights before dropping onto the concrete floor of the hangar. His injuries committed him to a wheelchair for life.
On 4 Squadron the technicians were getting very upset with my Squadron Warrant Officer, Spike Owens. They complained that their WO was nicking their costly tools thereby forcing them to take special precaution whenever Spike was around.
Spike Owens had come to Rhodesia from the RAF many years before and was well known for his huge collection of vehicle parts and home appliances which he claimed he had bought at bargain prices wi
th the intention of re-selling them for profit. His collection included every tool imaginable. Where he got all these things from I cannot say but Spike was always able to produce spare parts and items that were hard to find.
I was very fond of Spike. He was always bright and helpful and I was especially thankful for his resourcefulness when it came to keeping our aircraft flying. Any suggestion that he might have ‘inadvertently’ picked up so and so’s tools was met with vehement denial. I could not pin him down but remained pretty sceptical. Nevertheless the unfortunate nickname given him by Henry Jarvie stuck. ‘WOBOTOC’ stood for Warrant Officer Bill Owens Thieving Old C....
FAC errors and successes
CHRIS WEINMANN COMMENCED VISUAL RECCE in Mozambique on his own on 16 February 1974. Two days later he called for jet action on a large camp he had found just north of the River Daque fairly close to the Rhodesian border. This base had definitely not existed ten days earlier when Chris, Brian and I had been together on recce training. He chose to fly to Salisbury to brief Canberra and Hunter crews for a strike that for some reason or other did not involve FAC marking. Bill Buckle provided photographs taken for mapping purposes during the dry conditions of winter and, on these, Chris marked the extremities of the area to be struck from the target picture he had in his mind. The target of approximately 700 metres in length and 600 metres wide appeared to be a combined FRELIMO and ZANLA base.
An attack plan was formulated in which four Canberras, flown by Squadron Leader Randy Du Rand, Ian Donaldson, Mike Delport and Prop Geldenhuys would employ ‘lead-bomb technique’ to deliver two loads of nine 500-pound bombs and two loads of ninety-six 28-pound fragmentation bombs. The Canberras would be followed by four Hunters, flown by Don Northcroft, Ginger Baldwin, Rick Culpan and Jim Stagman firing 30mm cannon on the periphery of the target with re-strikes to fill in any obvious gaps that appeared within the Canberra bomb patterns.
Lead-bomb technique involved the lead bomber passing to his No 2 an aiming correction if his first bomb was not spot-on its intended strike point. I strongly opposed this method of bombing live terrorist camps because the delay between each stick of bombs gave terrorists way too much time to run clear of target. Lead-bomb technique was only suited to fixed targets such as ammunition dumps, fuel storage farms and buildings.
Nevertheless the bombs on this attack exploded on their planned positions despite the cloud base being lower than expected. This had forced navigators Doug Pasea, Bernie Vaughan, Bill Stevens and Bill Airey to make last-minute setting corrections to bombsights late in the attack run. The Hunters patterned as planned.
According to Randy du Rand’s Air Strike Report, he struck at 1259:50B with last Hunter clearing at 1303B. This meant it had taken three minutes and ten seconds to place down all weapons, which was at least two and a half minutes too long. If Hunters had led this attack, the four Canberras could have been much closer to each other and the re-strike by Hunters could have finalised the attack in less than forty-five seconds.
To add to this unsatisfactory situation, Chris realised too late that the target was displaced 200 metres north-eastward of the position he had marked on the photographs. This meant that only two-thirds of the strike was inside the actual base. The reason for Chris’s error lay in the considerable difference between the dark-green bush lines, as they appeared to him in the month of February, and the leafless trees and bush line as it appeared on photographs taken in winter. FAC marking would have eliminated the error and Chris was wiser for his mistakes.
Three days later I also made a mistake by agreeing to fly with Hugh Slatter in a Vampire T11 to mark a target for Hunters and Canberras. Aerial photos of a camp I reported had been taken from a Canberra flying at 40,000 feet the day before but it was agreed that the target lay in such flat, featureless ground that the jets would have no chance of locating it on an unmarked first-run attack. Air HQ was always keen to try new approaches in operations and had decided that I should lead the attack in a jet instead of my puddle-jumping Trojan. Having not flown in a jet aircraft for over ten years, the speed at which ground was being covered and the height at which we flew compressed the terrain I knew so well from 2,000 feet into unfamiliar perspective.
In the long dive to the target, Hugh adjusted his aiming according to my instructions and pressed the firing button for a salvo of four 60-pound squash-head rockets, but they failed to fire! Only then did I realise we had aimed at the far end of the terrorist base and not at its centre, so I transmitted an immediate correction “Drop 500”. Fortunately Rob Gaunt, having assessed where the failed rockets would have landed, picked up the correction and fired. Hugh was pulling up steeply and turning out right to allow me to look over my shoulder to see Rob’s strike to pass further correction to Rich Culpan, Chris Dixon and Ginger Baldwin.
I had completely forgotten how to handle 6G, which locked my head awkwardly forcing me to roll my eyes hard up and right to spot the strike just before experiencing ‘grey out’. Fortunately the lead 30mm cannon strike was just where it needed to be but I could not lift my hand to the radio transmitter button on the throttle to say this. Hugh had to relay my G-stressed and awkwardly spoken words, “On target”.
Following this experience, thought was given to converting recce pilots onto Hunters so that future strikes need not involve FAC and would ensure that recce pilots could switch between ‘puddle-jumpers’ and jets without the problems I had just encountered. For Chris Weinmann this would have been a simple matter because he had recently come from Hunters. I was really keen to fly these lovely aircraft but, very reluctantly, came to the conclusion that the advantages to be gained were outweighed by the cost of training and the time it would take to position at Thornhill or New Sarum for each airstrike.
The Air Staff had been under directive from Air Marshal Mick McLaren to try every tactic possible to improve airstrike versatility and accuracy. To this end, and unknown to me, photographic reconnaissance (PR) had been flown on Mozambican targets that Chris and I had reported but not committed to airstrike.
Repeated PR had been conducted to watch for obvious changes on those targets best suited to first-run jet-strikes. Then Flight Lieutenant Bill Buckle and his Photo Reconnaissance Interpreter (PRI) team at New Sarum selected a target set in heavy bush on the east bank of a dry river where a distinctive bend with visible water made identification certain. I was called to New Sarum to look at the photographs. The PRIs were happy when I agreed the camp was much larger than when I found it two months earlier. Bill briefed the jet crews at 9 o’clock on the morning of 23 February, just two days after the attack I had led with Hugh Slatter. It went in at 1228B and worked out exactly as planned.
During March I led two successful ops against terrorists inside Rhodesia. Externally I picked up a small base near Mukumbura in which fifteen head of cattle were penned at its centre. Being so close to the border, it was decided to attack this base with Hunters at first light the following day and follow up immediately with RLI heli-borne troops. The plan was for helicopters and myself to fly from Centenary to Mukumbura where the troops would be waiting for first light lift-of.
At Centenary I was doing my pre-flight inspection with the aid of a torch when I found a yellow bone-dome hanging from the pitot-head under the port wing of my Trojan. It belonged to Flight Sergeant Ray Cox who was one of the technicians on the flight line at the time. I called him over and asked him to remove his bone-dome, then continued with my inspection.
The helicopters were lifting off as I taxiied out to the runway. Late in my take-off run I found I had to apply a great deal of right rudder to counter a strong yawing force to the left. By this time it was too late to abort take-off. Once airborne I saw the helicopter lights winking away ahead of me and continued my climb, still with heavy pressure on the right rudder to maintain balanced flight. I told the lead helicopter pilot I was experiencing some difficulty but said I would establish the cause when we reached Mukumbura.
We crossed over the escarpment as t
he first rays of dawn lit up the horizon on our right side. By this time my left foot was over my right foot to help maintain pressure on the right rudder pedal. I turned to look at the rotating beacons of the helicopters flying below and to my left when, with horror, I saw somebody hanging upside-down on my left wing wearing a bone-dome with its visor closed. It took a moment or two to realise there was no actual body involved; it was Ray Cox’s yellow helmet hanging on the pitot head by its chinstrap.
Foolishly I told the lead helicopter pilot the cause of my flight control problem. I could have saved myself the ribbing that came my way had I simply kept quiet and pulled ahead to land and remove the bone-dome at Mukumbura before the helicopter boys arrived.
When I marked for the Hunters, I was happy to see that the cattle-pen was empty. Helicopters were on the ground within thirty-five seconds of the lead strike and the troops were already moving in during re-strike. Unfortunately the CTs must have heard the helicopters before the noise cover of the Trojan became effective because fresh tracks of running terrorists were located going south-east towards another base I had located but discounted.
Cattle tracks heading north were aerial-tracked for no more than three kilometres were I found fifty-five head of cattle. These were rounded up by the troops and driven back into Rhodesia because, having been stolen from those few unfortunate Mozambican locals who still lived in the area, they constituted an immediate source of CT food.
Fear of landing in enemy territory
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 52
