Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  It was Flight Lieutenant Ricky Culpan who was very disappointed by Mirage III air-to-air gunnery results. Ricky was not content to accept that such a sophisticated aircraft could be equipped with an air-to-air aiming system that gave excellent pilots very poor results. To cut a long story short, I understand that he came to the conclusion that an essential component of information was missing and had to be introduced into the software of the gunsight’s computer system. This was the precise angle between the gun-line and the airflow that, in the case of this delta-wing fighter, varied more than in conventional fighter designs. The actual airflow angle had to be provided by an externally mounted vane.

  How Ricky got through the ‘red-tape’ at SAAF HQ I do not know, but permission appears to have been given to fit this sensor vane on a Mirage III airframe and link it to the sighting computer. An acquaintance of Ricky’s, who I was told was a fundi in computer software, upgraded the gunsight’s computer programme by integrating the sensor vane’s input. This resulted in a manyfold improvement in air-to-air gunnery results.

  By recording this story I hope one day to receive confirmation of it because it places my one-time neighbour in Thornhill Married Quarters, Ricky Culpan, on a higher level of imagination and determination than I thought he possessed.

  Diverse personalities and

  different situations

  BY MID-1976 ALL THE FIREFORCES were engaged daily in a variety of actions against ZANLA. Some actions were very successful and others drew blanks. There were so many individuals involved, and the actions so widespread and diverse in nature, that it is impossible to give a chronological sequence of events or provide a concise picture of the happenings in each area. By this time ZANLA had extended operations from the northeast all the way down the eastern side of Rhodesia to the South African border.

  I have taken a very small sample of events during 1976 in each area and have focused on three individuals having different ranks and operational functions. One was a commander on the ground, one flew helicopters and one flew Lynx.

  My selected individuals are Tol Janeke, Mike Borlace and Cocky Benecke. The first two individuals might not have been first choice for many but almost every Rhodesian serviceman would have selected Cocky.

  All helicopter aircrew were top-line operators; too many to mention personally. However, one pilot’s name kept coming to the fore and would remain there for some time. Many of the helicopter technician-gunners loved to fly with him whilst others considered him too bloody dangerous. Nevertheless, Flight Lieutenant Mike Borlace, who has already featured in other actions described in this book, recorded his seventh ASR as K-Car pilot in the Op Thrasher area at the beginning of June. His gunner was Sergeant Henry Jarvie, a clown when occasion permitted, who was deadly serious in his duties.

  Due to the decision to have two Fireforces, one at Grand Reef and the other at Chipinga, Mike had only two troopers carrying eight soldiers, plus a supporting Lynx. He was called upon to take on a group of CTs reported to be resting by a small stream. The soldiers were inexperienced in Fireforce operations and did not have their own officer airborne; not that this mattered because K-Car pilots had so often proven that their abilities were equal to the best of RLI commanders.

  Air Lieutenant Chris Dickinson (M8 Black Lead) had Sergeant Phil Tubbs as his gunner. Air Lieutenant Atkinson (V8 Black 2) and his gunner Sergeant Griffen, were both OpPolo men. Air Sub-Lieutenant Ray Bolton (M4) flew the Lynx. In his ASR Mike used # in lieu of the usual c/s and # Sparrow 1 was a tracker callsign.

  Mike’s ASR reads:

  As there was no airborne army commander, Black section & Stops 1 & 2 were briefed by K-Car pilot on the basis of the information received from the informant. It appeared from a study of the map that there were two likely escape routes from the indicated area; accordingly it was decided to run in low-level along the Mupudzi River and into the target area from the NNW, Black 2 being briefed to deploy # Stop 1 in the areas VP504545 and Black Lead in the area VP507533 with no further direction from K-Car.

  We ran in as briefed with K-Car two minutes ahead of Black section pulling up to orbit the target area at 1508B. On our second orbit we observed in the area VP508537 a group estimated as 20 terrorists, armed and dressed in a semi-uniform garb generally blue or black trousers & a green top shirt.

  Sgt Jarvie was visual with the target(s) & was briefed to fire at targets of his own choosing. Very accurate fire was brought to bear and the ters were seen to start moving around at high speed in great confusion.

  The group broke into two parts, the majority breaking along the river line to the south & a smaller group along the river line to the NNW.

  I instructed Black section to engage the northern group & continued engaging the main group with K-Car. Sgt. Jarvie was bringing very accurate fire to bear & several characters were being knocked down.

  # Stop 2 were warned that business was coming their way & when they were visual with the ters were able to bring fire to bear that caused the ters to go to ground. As things were stabilising I sent Black 2 for reinforcing sticks & Black Lead for ammunition. Conversation with # Stop 2 resulted in them marking a target for K-Car. A further series of brief but final contacts ensued.

  # Stop 2 were reinforced with # Stop 3 & # Stop 4 were deployed in the area VP 504525. # Stop 1 was instructed to start sweeping south towards the original contact area. They soon encountered ters who were trying to ease their way northwards & a brief contact ensued before K-Car became visual with the ters & engaged them which resulted in a couple more characters falling down.

  At this stage K-Car was out of ammunition, but M4, previously requested, was running into the area.

  Before moving # Stops 2,3 & 4, I wanted a couple of areas softened & directed M4 in a series of strikes, using Frantan in two South to North attacks onto a bush area in the river line at VP506534, a Sneb rocket attack East to West into bush area in the river line at VP505533 and a Sneb rocket attack North to south into bush area in the river line at VP505532.

  Airborne control was handed over to Black Lead whilst K-Car departed to refuel & rearm.

  At 1710B, before K-Car returned, Black 2 was directed to recover bodies adjacent to # Stop 1’s position at VP505539 and was shot at by ters who were also adjacent, resulting in a gunshot wound to the gunner & extensive damage to the aircraft which exited the area to our refuelling point nearby from where it will be recovered by road. As Black Lead had the picture of the scene airborne control of M4 was left to him to direct two Frantan strikes delivered south to North on the area VP 505539 before K-Car resumed airborne control. Before the strikes were delivered, # Stop 1 had been removed to a safe position & FLOT indicated to M4 by orange smoke.

  As conditions were now becoming fairly dark M4 was dispatched home, a quick ammunition supply for the ground troops was arranged, # Stops 1,2,3, & 4 were joined up in the area VP 506538 & told to arrange ambush positions, & # Sparrow 1 were deployed in the original contact area & told to ambush there for the night. Sweeping operations will commence at first light tomorrow.

  Please note that trying to operate a ‘fire force’ of two troopers is probably going to cause severe casualties to security forces before long.

  Thirteen CTs were killed in this action, two of which were accounted for by the ground troops. Had there been more soldiers available to Borlace in the opening minutes the CTs would have fared even worse than they did. Notice that Mike said CTs were wearing “a green top shirt”. Under that would have been more shirts to facilitate change of visual appearance and identification.

  This photo of Mike Borlace was taken at his investiture for the Silver Cross of Rhodesia, awarded him for bravery in a number of actions.

  A week later, Mike Borlace, flying K-Car with Henry Jarvie, ran into heavy fire. This occurred in an action that was so close to the Mozambican border that at times the Fireforce, and a pair of Hunters which came to assist, had fire brought to bear on them by FRELIMO forces firing from a store across the border.
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  Part of Mike’s ASR reads, We came under substantial automatic small arms fire which unfortunately smashed the sight glass of the 20mm cannon. K-Car pilot was visual with the ters who were running towards thick bush to the East. Without sighting information it was difficult for the gunner to bring the gun to bear, but several accurate bursts were delivered and one ter was seen to drop and stay down.

  Wing Commander Roy Morris, as OC Air Detatchment Thrasher, revealed what Mike did not record in his pilot’s report. Part of Roy’s report reads, Flt Lt Borlace’s performance is to be commended. Although wounded in the left leg above the knee, at the very beginning of this action, he continued in the K-Car and directed Lynx and Hunter strikes with a great deal of efficiency. His dedication to duty is unquestionably praiseworthy. It took OC Air Det. Thrasher to finally go to RUDA and extricate Flt. Lt. Borlace from the damaged K-Car and organised Air Lt. Dickinson to take command.

  Eighteen months had elapsed since I left 4 Squadron; yet only Cocky Benecke remained when Dag Jones took over command from Cyril White. Although he clearly deserved a posting to helicopters, as had occurred with all of his PTC colleagues, Cocky had been left on 4 Squadron because his unique talents were best suited to fixed-wing operations. Funnily enough Cocky was pleased with this. Because of the relatively low cost of flying light strike aircraft, Cocky felt he could pursue his talent and his desire for action just as far as his passion drove him. Again I say, “What a change in attitude from those days when I struggled to get him interested in recce.”

  The number of Fireforce successes directly attributable to 4 Squadron recce pilots, especially Cocky Benecke, was astounding. In spite of its limited strength in machines and operationally seasoned men, 4 Squadron was the most cost-effective military unit in Rhodesia. This statement in no way detracts from the undeniable potency of our squadrons, the SAS, Selous Scouts, RLI or any other unit. It simply conveys the undeniable fact that a small complement of pilots, ably supported by an equally small group of dedicated technicians, induced and participated effectively in more actions, pro rata, than any other Rhodesian unit.

  Cocky displayed his talents, courage and aggressiveness for the umpteenth time in a lone action in the Op Repulse area. This occurred just after Tol Janeke was posted there. On 2 August 1976, Cocky was sent to provide top cover to c/s 143 of H Coy 1RR, a Territorial Army tracker unit, that was following blood-spoor from a contact with CTs earlier in the day.

  Having established the position of the trackers and the direction in which the CTs were heading, Cocky commenced a recce forward of the troops over flat, featureless terrain. He soon found a group of people sitting under shade at the edge of a bushy patch that was set well away from local villages. It is unlikely that any other pilot would have seen them.

  He was asking the trackers what colour clothing the CTs had been wearing when he came under fire and saw two CTs break from the group. Cocky attacked immediately and took them both out with rockets. Fire continued so he turned and attacked the main group that was breaking up. Having expended all rockets, Cocky still had one CT in sight.

  Part of Cocky’s ASR reads, Owing to having no troops or aircraft to assist me, and my rockets were finished, I was not prepared to put my aircraft in a dangerous situation by attacking a lone ter who fired 4 standard magazines and one of tracer at me.

  Cocky was wise not to attack with Frantans as his aircraft was not fitted with machine-guns to give him covering fire, and there was no way of knowing if more CTs were still around. The fact that he could see, from height, precisely how many magazines of ammunition had been expended was yet another example of this man’s intriguing talent.

  I am convinced he was wounded and would not get too far. Had I had front guns to protect me, I would have been prepared to attack with Frantans.

  Apart from four CTs killed, five females, hidden in the bush too close to the CTs, also died when Cocky made his second rocket attack. The loss of civilian lives in these circumstances, though deeply regretted, was inevitable when CTs failed to send women away before initiating offensive action. Happily, there were many other occasions where women saved themselves by moving into the open so that soldiers and airmen could identify them by dress. But even in these situations care had to be taken to ensure that they were not being used by CTs as human shields.

  Continuing with Cocky for the moment. He was in the Hurricane area with me during my short stay at FAF 4. Whilst I was instructing Dag Jones, Cocky was also teaching recce to Bill Stevens. Day after day he had been leading successful Fireforce actions, one of which occurred so close to FAF 4 that it caused me, as acting OC FAF 4, to comment:

  a. Excellent work by Benecke who was still wide-awake to the need to cover ground, even with wheels down on approach for landing. He was returning from an instructional sortie in recce for Air Lt. Stevens.

  b. Of group strength 28-30 ters reported by Benecke only 3 were seen and contacted resulting in one killed and one captured wounded by K-Car fire. Though this was a disappointing score the close proximity of the action to FAF 4 assisted greatly in occupying the attention of the Prime Minister who was visiting JOC with the OCC.

  K-Car pilots recorded most ASRs covering actions in which Cocky was involved. His own ASRs were therefore those in which Fireforce was not involved. His thirtieth ASR reports the situations arising from actions of 17 August 1976 when he was tasked to provide top cover to an Army tracker callsign of 2 Independent Company that was following fresh tracks of a large group of CTs that had broken through the Cordon Sanitaire minefield. Cocky’s own callsign was H4 and Mike Delport, who was flying with him, was G4. His ASR reads:

  H4 had been tasked to assist c/s 71G who was on tracks of approximately 50. G4 was in the aircraft with me as I intended to demonstrate aerial tracking to him. As we were approaching the callsign, I thought I had heard shots going past the aircraft. I turned around and G4 said he saw two figures running in a NE direction. Tracer was observed passing very close to the aircraft and c/s 71G confirmed that he could hear heavy firing. We then observed large explosions on the ground. There also appeared to be several flak bursts exploding underneath the aircraft. We were at approximately 1,500 feet AGL and the bursts were about 500 feet below us. I called for Fireforce and passed on a sitrep about the explosions and apparent flak bursts.

  I then saw a ter running south down a path away from the explosions. I commenced a rocket attack on this ter. Heavy ground fire was experienced on numerous occasions but more so during this attack.

  I then saw about 15 ters moving through some trees and commenced an attack. The rockets were on target and as I commenced a pull out I heard a loud bang and felt a strike on my left thigh. I informed G4 who immediately took control of the aircraft whilst I inspected my thigh for damage.

  We discovered that we had no aileron control and were in a severe yaw and rolling. G4 righted the aircraft with the use of rudders and we commenced a slow climb.

  I then jettisoned the Frantans and the rocket carriers and carried out a quick inspection of the aircraft for damage.

  The ailerons were both observed to be stuck in the upright position.

  G4 commenced a slow yawed turn towards Salisbury whilst settling elevator trim and power settings.

  We informed Darwin of our predicament and intentions. A strong smell of fuel was experienced and we opened the DV panel and fed both motors from the starboard tank. At this stage we had full left trim and a fair amount of rudder to remain wings level. G4 had control of the aircraft so I left him to continue the flight.

  As we approached Salisbury I noticed a large amount of fuel on the floor and discovered the fuel leak to be right next to where I was sitting. I extracted the fire extinguisher and moved into the back seat so as to be able to direct the fire extinguisher onto the fuel in case of fire and rearranged loose articles in the rear of the cabin.

  A perfect landing, under the circumstances, was carried out by G4 and the motors were closed down immediately after touch do
wn together with mags and all electrics. We abandoned the aircraft as the fire-fighting crew arrived on the scene.

  Cocky was lucky to have only been badly bruised by a chuck of airframe debris from a heavy-calibre bullet strike, and Mike Delport did a great job in getting the aircraft back to Salisbury.

  Because of the long distance involved, Fireforce arrived a long time after Cocky and Mike had cleared target. Two trooper helicopters took hits that resulted in the death of Corporal Titlestad and continuous fire from a heavy machine-gun relentlessly followed the K-Car flown by Flight Lieutenant Terence Murphy (ex-British Marines helicopter pilot) but without scoring any hits. Due to fading light and some confusion caused by many widely spread enemy firing positions with troops in between, K-Car was reluctant to bring down any air attacks and the airborne commander, OC Support Commando RLI, had no choice but to issue orders for night ambushes.

  Although there were no proven kills, this operation happened to be very successful because the CTs lost everything but their personal weapons. The group of about fifty had come in with a large re-supply of equipment which included an STM heavy machine-gun, a type 56 recoilless rifle, RPG launchers with many rockets, TM46 landmines and piles of 7.62mm ammunition; all of which was added to Rhodesia’s growing supply of captured equipment.

  The reason for the ground explosions and apparent flak bursts that Cocky reported was explained by the discovery and capture of ‘air ambush’ (CT term) equipment. The CT group had come into Rhodesia with their new ‘air ambush’ weapon system that they had confidently rigged to protect their re-supply equipment against air attack. It consisted of many TNT charges planted in small holes in the ground with a stick grenade placed above each charge with its firing pin tethered to a ground peg. The TNT and stick grenade combinations were set in clusters, each cluster being linked by Cordtex to be fired simultaneously. Upon firing each cluster of TNT (the ground explosions Cocky reported) the stick grenades were propelled vertically to withdraw firing pins and detonated four seconds later at around 1,000 feet above ground (the suspected flak).