Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  Nevertheless, on 22 September, the first use of a Dakota in support of Fireforce was made possible because all the SAS were para-trained. The ground action was controlled from a K-Car by Major Brian Robinson who, because of his eighteen paratroopers, had more than double the number of troops that would normally have been available to a four-G-Car Fireforce.

  In another SAS Fireforce action on 10 October, Brian Robinson was flying with Flight Lieutenant Ken Law in a KCar. They were fortunate to have Cocky Benecke supporting in a Lynx. Cocky found a group of CTs hiding under bush 1,500 metres away from where troops had been deployed. This initiated actions with other CT groups scattered about in the same vicinity. The Dakota flying in support of Fireforce was called upon to drop its load of twenty SAS paratroopers, which was a task made easy because the KCar was able to mark the drop-line with the first of our newly developed smoke markers. Happily Cocky Benecke was the first pilot to be armed with boosted 37mm rockets that gave spectacular returns. Between himself in his Lynx and Sergeant Merber firing the K-Car’s cannon, they accounted for fourteen CTs.

  Whilst they were still in the Repulse area, the SAS were used for a pre-planned attack on a ZANLA staging camp known as Mavue Base, which was just over the border inside Mozambique and a little south of the wide slow-flowing Sabi River. Again Brian Robinson was in K-Car, this time with Mike Borlace who was leading another K-Car, and five helicopter troopers.

  The OC SAS seemed to be present in a number of Air Force ‘firsts’. This time it was the first live Alpha bomb attack by three Canberras. The operation did not go too well for many reasons, the greater of which was that the Canberras missed their assigned targets because the Hunters responsible for marking for the bombers had misidentified the base centres. Mike Borlace in his ASR said that, this had been a great pity because, having seen an Alpha bomb attack for the first time, the CTs, who were in both bases in great numbers, would have suffered high casualties had the strikes been on target.

  Three Dakotas dropping SAS troops west, south and east of the target from 500 feet were all observed to have airburst explosions around them. In their descent to ground, the paratroopers experienced plenty of ground fire and airbursts. Because there were ground explosions preceding the airbursts, it was assumed that ZANLA had employed their TNT and stick grenade ‘air ambush’ system.

  Brave and accurate boosted rocket and Frantan attacks by Air Lieutenants Clive Ward and Mike Delport flying Lynx took care of troublesome anti-aircraft fire. The SAS conducted a sweep through the target but apart from capturing large quantities of equipment that had not been destroyed during Hunter re-strikes; they found only thirty-two CTs dead. From an SAS point of view, this was less than they were used to achieving in Tete with a handful of four-man callsigns.

  Shortly after this action, increased infiltrations down the old Tete routes into the Hurricane area forced the SAS back to the style of operations that suited them best. They returned to the Tete Province of Mozambique south of the Zambezi to take on both FRELIMO and ZANLA. Air involvement in support of SAS operations remained low-key until 1977.

  SAS hit-and-run tactics had been developed to such a degree that the small four-man offensive units had, themselves, become the elusive terrorists within Mozambique. They had learned how to keep out of trouble whilst meting out hell and destruction in no small measure. Apart from the odd casevac, helicopters only flew in to recover four-man patrols to Rhodesia. Dakotas were used in HALO (High Altitude Low Opening) deployment of two or more sticks from high altitude necessitating the use of oxygen until the free-fallers actually left the aircraft. HALO deployments were usually made just after sunset, and on the whole seemed to go unnoticed. Dakotas were also used occasionally at night to resupply the ground units.

  The SAS were so successful that ZANLA and FRELIMO were forced to abandon forward bases and move right back to the FRELIMO main base town, Tete. Undeterred by the fact that the enemy had moved so far from the Rhodesian border, the SAS worked on the fact that ZANLA would have to cover the increased distances to the Rhodesian border by vehicle, and this offered new possibilities.

  To circumvent the problem of working too far to the north of the border and too close to Tete town, the SAS decided to turn things around by using the newly formed Lake Cabora Bassa as a safe haven. Canoes were to become their means of transport, thereby turning the direction of attack southwards. Villages that used to be on the banks of the Zambezi River had disappeared under water and most of the population had moved miles away. No one was living in the ground beyond the lake’s southern shoreline but ZANLA and FRELIMO were committed to using the few roadways that ran through remote countryside some distance farther south.

  Only three four-man callsigns were used and they played merry havoc against an enemy that could not understand where their problems were coming from. Whereas the men in the canoes, nicknamed ‘Cockleshell Heroes’, gained most of their ammunition resupply from captured equipment and had plenty of water when not too far from the lake during their offensive forays. On the lake they needed regular resupply, which came in by Dakota at night.

  I managed to tag along on one of these midnight flights. Together with spares, some canoe components and ration packs to be para-dropped were hampers of fresh hot food and other perishable delicacies prepared at SAS’s Kabrit Barracks just before we climbed aboard the Dakota. For me, this was a great change from project work and I had not been airborne at night since the Lynx ferry twelve months earlier.

  Flight Lieutenant Bob d’Hotmann was the skipper with Flight Lieutenant Bruce Collocott as his second ‘dicky. I was standing between and behind the pilots watching proceedings with interest whilst squeezed against an SAS officer who I think might have been Scotty McCormack. Initially Bob could not raise the callsign whose position was on a tiny island fairly close to the southern shoreline almost due north of Nova Mague. The night was clear and very black. Even though the lake was vaguely illuminated by starlight it was insufficient to pick out any island, even from our height of only 500 feet.

  Then we spotted a flashing strobe light that stood out so clearly from the air it seemed impossible that the SAS position would not be compromised. Scotty said it was OK because the strobe would be so positioned that nobody on the shoreline would see it. We had turned towards the strobe when the callsign came up loud and clear. Because the aircraft was heading directly for the strobe, all that needed to be said from the ground controller was “Red light on.... Green light on”. The pannier was launched into the night; and that was that! The callsign confirmed that he had received resupply, thanked Bob and bid him farewell.

  The descent to the lake had been a long one at low power. Bob had been at pains to ease on the power very gently as he approached his run-in height so that nobody on the ground would detect any change in engine note that might give away the SAS position. Having completed the drop, Bob held heading and height for at least ten kilometres and even then he powered up very slowly, allowing the Dak to drift gently upwards, again to avoid drawing attention. We were miles past the Cockleshell Heroes before turning for Salisbury.

  Canberras join Fireforce

  SEVEN DAYS AFTER FIRST USE of Alpha bombs in Mozambique, Randy du Rand and his navigator, Flight Lieutenant Terry Bennett, got airborne from Buffalo Range in support of the Repulse Fireforce. This came about because Randy was keen to gain operational experience with the new weapon system and I needed plenty of feedback on bomblets’ performance. The idea of deploying a Canberra to Repulse was greeted with enthusiasm by Tol Janeke because it had become abundantly clear that, as expected, ZANLA’s main thrust was coming through the Gaza Province of Mozambique.

  Under guidance from a K-Car, a cluster of fifty Alpha bombs was delivered and all landed in the base from which eight CTs had moved immediately upon hearing the approaching KCar. Squadron Leader Graham Cronshaw in the K-Car and the Army callsign who had called for Fireforce reported being thoroughly shaken by the sight and sound of the Alpha strike, even though
it was only one sixth of a full load.

  The Army callsign swept through the CT base and confirmed shrapnel had saturated it. Although the bombs had killed no CTs, who were a short distance away, the effect of the strike so unnerved the eight members of this group that they surrendered without a shot being fired. Randy remained the heavy arm of Fireforce for a while and was able to prove the Canberra’s ability to bring quick and accurate strikes to bear wherever they were needed, because K-Cars could place down reference markers with their new smoke grenades. Having satisfied himself, Randy rotated each of his squadron crews to Op Repulse to gain experience.

  During November a ZANLA base in Mozambique close to the border was positively identified by Canberra photo-recce. An operation similar the one at Mavue was planned but, due to good features around the target, three Canberras led the strike for maximum surprise. They made the attack from 500 feet at a release speed of 300 knots. The strike went in just before the arrival of the heli-borne and para force and all the bombs landed on target as planned. Instead of arriving over a subdued enemy however, the helicopters faced a hornet’s nest of alert and angry ZANLA firing many small arms and heavy AA guns.

  Following some brave action to silence the AA guns, particularly by Mike Borlace, troops eventually overran the base and found the reason for the Canberra’s failure to provide any subduing effect. All but two of the Alpha bombs had broken through a crust of sand and buried in thick wet clay before exploding harmlessly below the surface. The whole target area was covered with black bomblet craters. Two bomblets that struck trees caused the airbursts that accounted for only the three ZANLA killed in the airstrike.

  There was deep consternation at Air HQ and within my project team. We had not foreseen this problem, which was entirely my own fault. I knew how similar ground conditions in the Zambezi Valley had presented the Army with serious vehicle movement difficulties. Following heavy rains, such as had occurred in the area of this target, the softened sand crust above damp clay yielded without warning. When this occurred, vehicles sank to their axles and other vehicles attempting to pull out a stricken one usually ended up in the same mess.

  Although I should have foreseen the problem earlier, I was certain that the correct combination of delivery height and speed would prevent further failures, no matter the nature of surface. So we immediately set about finding a test location close to Salisbury where sufficient clay, hard ground and water existed in close proximity to each other. The place we selected was a small dam at Inkomo Range. We used concrete Alpha bomblets, knowing that live ones would perform better.

  Randy du Rand and Terry Bennett flew the same attack profile they used on the failed attack and dropped a cluster of fifty concrete Alpha bombs. They were bang on target and those that struck dry ground recovered into flight normally. All the bomblets that landed on water and most that landed on sand-covered clay disappeared below the surface. Those few that struck sand over clay yet found their way up to the surface were coated with a thick layer of gluey black muck.

  The next delivery was made from 400 feet at a ground release speed of 300 knots, giving marginally improved results. Delivery height was then stepped down to 300 feet, again at 300 knots. Most of the bomblets bounced back into flight from mud and water, though some of the units that landed in mud were so thickly coated that their recovery was way too low and sluggish. Three runs were then made at 300 feet at 350 knots. All bombs bounced into flight though the ones from clay did not rise as high as from water and normal ground.

  From then on 300 feet was the preferred attack height at an attack speed of 350 knots, which still provided adequate separation between detonating bomblets and the aircraft. However, the increased attack speed presented a major problem in terms of airframe fatigue factoring. Fortunately the Canberra could accelerate from 280 knots to 350 knots very rapidly, which minimised the time spent at attack speed. Nevertheless the high fatigue factor applied for this speed converted three minutes to something in the order of one hour of expended airframe life.

  Inevitably with so many bomblets being dropped, there were some unexploded units (UXBs). A total failure rate of around 3% was either caused by technical problems or by bomblets passing through vegetation that progressively decelerated them to such an extent that they failed to realise the 100G-impact force needed to activate pistols. All bomblets were painted red to simplify UXB collection and soldiers had been advised that they were perfectly safe to handle and transport. So it was with some alarm that they learned of a UXB that had killed two African children and wounded another.

  I immediately went to the scene of the tragedy and noticed that the bomblet in question had exploded on a solid flat section of granite with large boulders around it. Near the point of explosion, I saw red paint marks at different places on the flat rock and came to the conclusion that the children had been throwing the bomblet from the boulders above.

  The surviving little boy in hospital confirmed this. He was lucky because, being fearful of his friends’ attempts to break the ‘ball’ open, he had watched from a distance as the others climbed small boulders to throw the bomblet onto the flat rock. His friends could not crack the unit open so they went up onto the highest rock. The bomblet pistol received the necessary G load and bang went their lives.

  Yellow Submarine

  SELOUS SCOUTS WERE COMMITTED TO using noisy vehicles and experienced a variety of difficulties in their attempts to render the rail line from Maputo to the border town of Malvernia inoperable. Then, whilst they were working on this difficult task, they noticed that a yellow Alouette III came up the rail line from Maputo and turned northwards along the Cabora Bassa power-line. Radio intercepts on FRELIMO’s radio network soon established that this was a regular run for a Maputo-based engineer to inspect a section of the power-lines running from Cabora Bassa to South Africa. Intercepted messages also showed that all FRELIMO posts were told not to shoot at the yellow Alouette. Ron Reid-Daly approached Norman Walsh to see if Air HQ would consider painting one of our own Alouettes canary yellow so that rail and train destruction parties and recce teams could fly unchallenged directly to their selected targets. Norman sorted this out without delay and John Blythe-Wood flew the aircraft, nicknamed ‘Yellow Submarine’, from its secret covers at New Sarum for a night flight to the Selous Scouts forward HQ. The rail wreckers enjoyed a trouble-free period until FRELIMO finally tumbled to what was happening.

  Schulie

  CAPTAIN CHRIS SCHULENBURG, KNOWN AS Schulie, served with the RLI and SAS until he returned to his native South Africa when his contract with the Army expired. He was later invited by Ron Reid-Daly to re-join the Rhodesian forces for service with the Selous Scouts to exploit his special talent in ground reconnaissance conducted in the manner Schulie considered essential.

  Arising from his specialist recce work with the SAS, Schulie had been awarded the Silver Cross of Rhodesia for valour—but he could not buckle down to SAS four-man recce principles. Schulie wanted to conduct recce on his own, believing this to be safer and more efficient. Ron Reid-Daly was more amenable to this view than the SAS; though Ron insisted that one man, of Schulie’s own choosing, must always accompany him. Somewhat reluctantly Schulie agreed and conducted a number of successful two-man recce patrols. Initially he used a white soldier as his partner until he came to the conclusion that a black soldier was a more sensible option. The reconnaissance forays worked well enough and neither man suffered undue stress until things went badly wrong early in November 1976.

  Two recce teams were tasked to provide early warning of FRELIMO and CT movements for a Selous Scouts vehicleborne force. At an appropriate time these teams were to harass FRELIMO—a diversionary tactic. One team worked north of the Scouts force while Schulie and his partner worked to the south. Schulie and his black companion (Steven was the name I heard the helicopter crews use) had descended into Mozambique by HALO entry. They were in position when the vehicle-borne force was moving in to attack the ZANLA staging base at Jorge d
o Limpopo on the Maputo rail line to Rhodesia. When he judged the time was right, Schulie deliberately made his presence known to FRELIMO but, in so doing, he attracted much greater reaction than he expected. Using Claymore and other anti-personnel devices, Schulie inflicted serious casualties on his pursuers who became so angry that they re-doubled their efforts and force levels in a determined attempt to take out the troublesome Rhodesians running through the bush ahead of them.

  Schulie and Steven became separated during their running retreat under fire. Thanks to superb strength and fitness, Schulie managed to evade the large force that had no difficulty following his tracks in the soft dry sand of the region. By nightfall FRELIMO slowed to a crawl but no radio contact could be made with Schulie and Steven so Selous Scouts approached Air HQ for assistance. Late at night Schulie was barely able to give his position to the high-flying Canberra sent to find him because his radio batteries were almost flat. It was only then that Selous Scouts learned that Steven, who did not have a radio, was missing.

  I heard the story of Schulie’s hot extraction from the helicopter crew who rescued him. Although I cannot remember who they were, their story remains clear in my memory.

  The pick-up at first light occurred when the FRELIMO follow-up force was dangerously close to the open pan where Schulie said he would be waiting. Heavy fire was directed at the helicopter during entry and exit from the pick-up point. Once clear the pilot flew low over bush heading for the railway line. On reaching it he flew just far enough away to keep the railway in sight. Schulie was not too happy about this but the pilot refused to move away, which turned out to be very fortunate. Some distance on a man on the line was seen to be jumping up and down waving a white object over his head. When close enough, Schulie realised this was Steven. He was many miles from where Schulie had last seen him, yet there he was waving his map madly.