Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  When the Hunter section made contact with the callsign, they received a very crisp and concise description of the target, so much so that they were able to visually identify the exact section of bush thirty seconds (slant-range about four nautical miles) from target. As the lead Hunter commenced its attack, the TF callsign was instructed to pass correction on leader’s strike to the second Hunter. When the first 30mm cannon shells exploded, the TF called the correction, “Drop 50—Right 20.” Ginger Baldwin then fired his cannons on the correction and received the call, “On target!” whereupon he released two flechette dispensers at the end of his cannon run.

  Back in COMOPS I was perplexed to learn that flechettes had been dropped in Mozambique—something we were not supposed to do by our self-imposed ruling. However, because Ginger Baldwin had set out for an internal target with flechettes, and because Air HQ imposed no restriction for the external scene, he did not hesitate to use them.

  Although this happened to be a genuine mistake it resulted in Rhodesia’s singlemost devastating air action against ZANLA. But I only learned this after the war had ended. From ZANLA’s top brass I learned that they feared the ‘Racist South African nail bombs’ more than the other South African weapons. They were in fact talking about Flechette, Alpha, Golf, and Mini—golf systems. Since we had not used flechettes externally, other than one pair of dispensers dropped at Tembue and the pair delivered by Ginger Baldwin, I thought ZANLA was talking about flechette successes inside Rhodesia. “No,” they said. “We know about some comrades nailed inside Zimbabwe, but it was the death of our twenty-six top commanders at Revue that made us fear these weapons most.”

  The whole situation came about because of ZANLA’s growing concern over the Pfumo re Vanhu auxiliaries who had become a serious hindrance to their operations in most sectors. Josiah Tongogara decided there was only one way to find out exactly what was happening. He sent twenty-six senior commanders to Rhodesia to investigate the matter and return with detailed reports and recommendations—but none of them even made it into the country!

  As the TF callsign had said, Mozambican villagers were feeding these commanders preparatory to their night entry into the Burma Valley. Once through this valley they intended to disperse to undertake independent analyses of the widespread auxiliary threat.

  They did not count on Ginger Baldwin’s 9,000 flechettes, which eliminated every one of their numbers together with the unfortunate Mozambican women who were feeding them. The description given of this strike intrigued me. The body of the leader bore twenty-six flechette wounds and the least number of hits seen on any commander’s body was six. What shook the ZANLA HQ team investigating this incident was the fact that every single feeding pot and plate had been holed by not less than one dart.

  If only we had known about this success six months earlier we might have used more flechettes externally; but not a single radio FRELIMO intercept exposed ZANLA’s grievous loss!

  ZIPRA’s NSO

  ELLIOTT SIBANDA, THE ZIPRA MAN captured by Selous Scouts in Botswana, had undergone successful stomach surgery before revealing the existence and location of ZIPRA’s Department of National Security and Order (NSO). This fancy name was for ZIPRA’s central intelligence organisation that was structured and controlled by Moscow’s KGB. Commanding NSO was Nkomo’s number-two man Dumiso Dabengwa (the ‘Black Russian’), who was reputed to be a KGB colonel.

  The SAS was given the task of taking out the NSO, situated in a suburb of Lusaka southeast of the city centre. Planning commenced immediately to meet the following requirements:

  1. Capture Dumiso Dabengwa, his deputy Victor Mlambo and the counter-intelligence officer Gordon Butshe.

  2. Capture all radio and cipher equipment.

  3. Capture all documents and

  4. Destroy everything else.

  The SAS planners were acutely aware that their return to Lusaka so soon after the attacks on Nkomo’s house and Liberation Centre was fraught with perils. The Zambian Army and Air Force were expected to be alert and better prepared and ZIPRA would surely be fully primed to repel attacks at every one of its many facilities in and around Lusaka. Surprise alone was the key. The biggest question was, “What if the unidentified mole in Rhodesia lets the cat out of the bag?” So many ideas were explored on how to get to target secretly and safely. Consideration was given to many modes of transport such as a furniture removal pantechnicon with motorbikes aboard, railway wagons, hijacked cars, maybe Sabres again, parachuting in and so on. However, CO SAS, Lieutenant-Colonel Garth Barrett, who would command the operation, discarded these in favour of going in and coming out in our newly acquired Cheetah helicopters. Consequently, Squadron Leader Ted Lunt, OC 8 Squadron, was brought into the planning to assess the feasibility of doing this.

  Running a Canberra photo-recce of the NSO target was discounted, as this would warn the enemy of an impending action. Instead, old survey photographs were dug up which showed NSO buildings and surrounds to be just as Elliott Sibanda remembered them. So, despite Brian Robinson’s concerns, there was no alternative but to use them for planning. The photographs showed a house and two office blocks surrounded by a security wall with a road running past the front gate. Unoccupied plots surrounded the rear and sides and, according to Elliott Sibanda, Dumiso Dabengwa and his men actually lived in the house and should be there when the attack went in.

  Johnny Green (second from left) seen here when the first Cheetah was rolled out of the refurbishment hangar. Squadron Leader Ted Lunt is 6th from left. Note Strela screening and turned up exhaust.

  Ted Lunt, who would lead the Cheetah formation, was satisfied that there was plenty of space to land the four helicopters allocated for deployment and recovery of the force. His main concerns centred on fuel endurance, night navigation for a dawn attack, and air defences that included MiG jets and British Rapier missiles. The Director-General Operations at Air HQ was Air Commodore Norman Walsh who, unlike his predecessors, involved himself deeply in the detailed planning, would be flying in the Command Dakota with Wing Commander Peter McLurg and SAS Major Graham Wilson.

  By this time the Cheetahs had been stripped down to their last components and painstakingly rebuilt by a team of 8 Squadron technicians under Warrant Officer Johnny Green. To repeat what has already been said—considering that they had no technical manuals for this difficult task, it says much for dedication, ingenuity and technical expertise that all seven helicopters had been standardised and that all of Ted Lunt’s pilots were trained and ready.

  Preparations for the operation, codenamed ‘Carpet’, included full-scale rehearsals using old buildings on an isolated farm west of Salisbury. Although the Cheetahs partook in these rehearsals, this could not prepare the pilots for formation without the aid of navigation lights and flying low level in very dark conditions. This they had to manage when the time came in the early hours of 26 June 1979. Included with the SAS assault and defence parties was Elliott Sibanda. Elliott’s job, using a loud-hailer, was to call upon the men inside the NSO to surrender themselves to the troops. He would then identify whoever responded.

  Ted Lunt and his pilots did a great job of navigating their way from Makuti in Rhodesia to a point well to the northeast of Lusaka where they then flew west before turning south for the run to target. A diversionary attack by Hunters against FC camp, now reduced to a small ZIPRA contingent, was planned to occur a little after first light when the helicopters would be approaching that location from the north. The purpose of this attack was twofold. Firstly it was intended to draw any armed reaction to the northeast of the capital and away from the NSO in the south. Secondly, Rhodesian helicopters seen flying south from that location would appear to have come from the attack on FC camp, thereby obscuring their true mission.

  Navigating the route did not work out perfectly. Probably due to an incorrect wind forecast, Ted had flown further north than planned and map-reading was almost impossible as he struggled to establish his exact position in marginal light. Because
of his uncertainty, Ted asked Norman Walsh to put in the Hunter attack on FC camp on time, in the hopes the Golf bomb flashes would give him a position fix. Norman politely disallowed this, preferring Ted to be at the right point before the Hunters attacked.

  The formation was running late, which was just as serious for the ground force as it was for helicopter fuel states. Norman Walsh and Graham Wilson were actually considering cancelling the operation when Ted positively identified his position. A quick assessment was made and the go-ahead was given, even though the troops would be landing twenty minutes behind schedule. The Hunters did their trick and the helicopters, now seriously low on fuel, passed FC heading for the NSO.

  As the NSO came into view, everyone saw that there was a new building there, but otherwise the layout was correct. However there were more defence positions than expected, these having been established after the raid on Nkomo’s house. Whilst the Cheetah pilots concentrated on landing in their pre-planned positions, they had to put up with closing-range fire from ZIPRA and very noisy return fire from SAS troops in the cabins behind them.

  As soon as the troops deplaned, the helicopters lifted off and headed south. Ted located an isolated dambo only eight minutes flying time from target and set his formation down in a box pattern with machine-guns facing out in an all-round defence posture. Engines were run down but the motors were left at idling rpm as precaution against potential starting problems. Fuel was transferred to main tanks from drums the helicopters had carried to this point. Being much lighter now than when they left Rhodesia, the helicopters were set to carry higher loads from NSO than they had delivered there. Out on the cold dambo, the helicopters waited patiently for Norman Walsh’s call to return to target.

  Unbeknown to the helicopter crews, things had not gone according to plan at NSO. Some of the explosive charges intended to blow access holes through the outer security wall had failed to function causing delay in the assault on buildings. All resistance had been overcome by the time the assault force commander, Captain Martin Pearse, threw in a delayed-action bunker bomb to blow down a wall to gain access to the guard room. He had moved around the corner of the building, where he should have been completely safe from the explosion, but the quality of the building was so poor that the wall behind which Martin was sheltering collapsed on him. The death of this truly superb and much revered officer stunned everyone, though it did not prevent them from continuing to work with typical SAS efficiency.

  Upon their recall to target, the helicopter crews were greeted with the sight of flattened buildings and huge piles of bags filled with NSO paperwork. These bags and all the men they had brought to Lusaka were quickly loaded together with one protesting prisoner who claimed to be an innocent local visiting a friend.

  Because of the early-morning delay, fuel remained a problem but there was just sufficient to get all the machines back to Rhodesian soil. A reserve Cheetah waiting at Makuti brought forward a whole load of drummed fuel to link up with the formation that waited on the ground close to the south bank of the Zambezi River. Once refuelled the force returned to base.

  The nine participating pilots. From left: Brian Gordon, Justin Varkivisser, Guy Dixon, Siggy Seegmuller, Dave Bourhill, Steve Kesby, Vic Wightman (OC 1 Squadron), Ginger Baldwin, Tony Oakley.

  Hunter formation passing over Thornhill Air Base upon its return to base.

  The helicopters were still refuelling near the Zambezi when nine Hunters made a formation fly-past over the parade that marked the opening of Parliament for the first black Government. We had not yet received replacement Hunters and had only nine, four of which had been seen over Lusaka that morning.

  The precision flypast was widely publicised with supporting photographs which, when added to reports of the morning strikes in Zambia, caused quite a stir since it was thought that we might have more Hunters in service than the nine the West had on record. Outsiders could not guess that 100% serviceability was possible in a fighter squadron lambasted by sanctions. This is because they had no idea of the astounding capabilities and dedication of Rhodesian Air Force technicians.

  The SAS failed to capture any of the ZIPRA men they had hoped to find because none was present at NSO. Following the attack on Nkomo’s house, all had taken the precaution of sleeping elsewhere. I will deal with Dumiso Dabengwa’s account of this matter later. In the meanwhile, Elliott Sibanda blew the cover of the prisoner, who continued to claim he had been a local visitor. He was in fact a high-ranking Russian-trained ZIPRA intelligence officer by the name of Alex Vusa. His capture substantially reduced SAS disappointment at missing the three big fish because Vusa’s information led them straight into their next big hit.

  The SAS were also disappointed that, because of the lateness of their arrival at target and the poor building standards, they had been unable to locate a bunker in which ZIPRA was reported to hold its most important files and a safe containing a large quantity of American dollars. But, because of the rubble from destroyed walls, discovery of the bunker’s entrance coincided with Lieutenant-Colonel Barrett’s order to withdraw. Fortunately, however, a master index of files amongst the recovered documents showed that the SAS had collected all but a handful of NSO’s material.

  The information gleaned from the captured documents not only confirmed all of Elliott Sibanda’s facts, it expanded on them. Of importance too were lists of names of individuals and a host of overseas organisations supplying ZIPRA with intelligence on Rhodesian affairs. Details of this information were not immediately made known to COMOPS staff because other agencies would be following up on them. Alex Vusa’s verbal information was our priority concern!

  Xai Xai

  UNRELATED TO VUSA’S INFORMATION, A very real opportunity to kill both Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe presented itself when we learned that these two leaders and their party hierarchy would be meeting in the Chongoene Hotel in the coastal village of Xai Xai.

  On 22 June Maputo sent this message to Xai Xai: “Do all the preparations in Chongoene Hotel in order to receive the participants to the conference of the five Patriotic Front and representatives of ZANU foreseen for next July.” Three days later, Zambian Air Force HQ informed Lusaka International Airport that, “ZAF transport to route Lusaka-Beira (refuel)— Maputo to stop over for seven days—return Lusaka. Aircraft to convey Nkomo plus party of ten leaving Lusaka 280400 June 1979.”

  Rhodesian operations against ZIPRA in Zambia may have prompted this meeting. Additionally, or alternatively, the new British Government or Frontline presidents may have insisted on ZANU and ZAPU coming together. Whatever the case we recognised that, potentially, we had a great opportunity target on our hands, though there were important issues to take into account.

  The meeting at Chongoene Hotel was likely to commence on Saturday 30 June or 1 July but because ZANU and ZAPU seldom saw eye to eye, there was always the possibility that one party would walk out on the other. With six days apparently set aside for the meeting, Sunday 1 July was selected as the best time to strike.

  Hurriedly we took aerial photographs of the hotel and managed to get detailed plans of its two-storeyed layout and construction. Six Hunters dropping Golf bombs and four Canberras each delivering four 1,000-pound high-explosive bombs from relatively low level were considered more than sufficient to destroy the entire hotel and everyone in it. The big question on our minds was, “Who is everyone?” Who besides ZAPU and ZANU might be at the conference?

  The heads of state for Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania seemed likely participants as they all had a vested interest in seeing ZAPU and ZANU settle their differences so their operations might at last be co-ordinated to mutual advantage.

  We did not think the death of Samora Machel would rock the political boat too much. But the death of Kenneth Kaunda or Julius Nyerere, heads of British Commonwealth countries, by an overt Rhodesian Air Force strike would seriously upset Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party when there seemed to be an improvement in attitude towards Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. />
  The intelligence people made every effort to establish what these leaders were planning for 1 July, and to pick up on any clues concerning members of the OAU. The only positive information gleaned showed that President Seretse Khama of Botswana was to open a two-day conference in Arusha for Front-line States’ foreign ministers and overseas development representatives of major donor nations.

  Nyerere should have been attending a mini-summit in Khartoum during 24 and 25 June to discuss Western Sahara issues, after which he was to meet with the Nigerian leader, Olesgun Obasanjo—probably in Nigeria. At short notice, he cancelled this trip and sent a representative instead. No reason for this change of plan could be established, but the timing was suspiciously close to the Xai Xai meeting and Kaunda’s movements could not be established at all; so, we had no alternative but to turn away from the opportunity.

  Nevertheless, plans to assassinate Mugabe and Nkomo remained COMOPS priorities.

  Attempts to assassinate Robert Mugabe

  WE KNEW THE LOCATION OF Robert Mugabe’s home on Avenida Dona Maria Segunda in the once-plush suburb of Maputo and a CIO undercover agent had been watching this house for some time, studying Mugabe’s movements and habits. Unlike Nkomo, Mugabe’s routines were easy to monitor and were highly predictable. So a small SAS team was assigned to take on the task of assassinating the ZANU President.