Opting for a sea approach to a beach that had been well known to holidaymakers during Portuguese times, the SAS used inflatable rubber dinghies, powered by silent motors to avoid having to move through populated areas. Twice the team arrived at Mugabe’s house around midnight but on both occasions it was vacant, despite the fact that the agent had watched Mugabe arrive home a few hours earlier. This made it blatantly clear that someone ‘in the know’ in Salisbury had tipped off Robert Mugabe in time for him to get away to safety.
Both times the disappointed SAS team left the house untouched and returned silently to their hidden dinghies. The next day ZANLA and FRELIMO security personnel were observed to check out the rooms and garden before Mugabe himself returned home.
Though substantially annoyed by this, the SAS and COMOPS staff could not help being impressed by the fact that, unlike Nkomo, Mugabe had taken the trouble to get his entire household and security personnel to safety. We were also impressed by the fact that FRELIMO had not been called to ambush the house, obviously to safeguard their mole in Salisbury.
Having established modus operandi, thought was given to paying a third visit; this time to plant high explosives in the roof of Mugabe’s house that apparently had not previously been checked by security guards. The existence of these explosives would be withheld from CIO until the agent advised that Mugabe had re-entered his home when they would be activated by a highflying Canberra. This might have worked, had other priorities not overtaken SAS.
ZIPRA loses war holdings
ALEX VUSA, THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER from ZIPRA’s NSO, told of a large build-up of arms and equipment at a location west of Lusaka. He had not been to this location himself but during his regular visits to JZ training camp he had noticed many large ZIPRA vehicles, all heavily laden, moving westward past JZ camp. He believed there had to be a storage site in the countryside close by because, after a short time, specific laden vehicles that had passed him earlier were seen to be heading back towards Lusaka empty.
We already knew that flights were coming in from Angola at night to deliver large amounts of ZIPRA equipment—but why at night? Why was ZIPRA not using Zambia’s National Stores in accordance with Zambian Government instructions? Putting two and two together, it became obvious that Nkomo was not only intent on hiding his build-up from us; he was also hiding it from the Zambian Government.
The location of JZ camp was known, so a Canberra recce was flown over the area that Vusa had indicated. Photographs showing multiple tracks covering a huge area in which plies of equipment lay stacked under bush cover immediately confirmed Vusa’s story. There could be no doubt that these were ZIPRA’s main stores for its invasion plan.
There was urgent need to get troops to this location as the possibility existed that ZIPRA might move everything to a new site, particularly with NSO records and Alex Vusa in Rhodesian hands. Again the task fell to the SAS. At the very time that we had planned for the now-abandoned strike against the Chongoene Hotel in Xai Xai, Operation Chicory was launched.
Cheetahs carrying men and demolition equipment.
On 1 July five Cheetahs, carrying a force of fifty men laden with demolition equipment, lifted off from Bumi Hills.
Being a Sunday, ZIPRA’s defending force was expected to be pretty relaxed and probably reduced in strength. Religion had little to do with this. In southern Africa it was almost standard practice for Sunday to be a time for visiting, resting and drinking. Nevertheless, we decided that an opening airstrike was essential to soften defences and create distraction whilst Cheetahs landed the SAS force.
Considering there was so much high explosive on the ground, I remember being somewhat concerned for the safety of the Canberras if Air HQ chose to make a low-level attack with Alpha bombs. With Norman Walsh overseeing the air plan this was simply not something to be worrying about and the strikes went in without problems. Five Cheetahs landed the troops during Hunter re-strikes then turned back for Bumi.
The shortest day of the year had only just passed so nightfall was quick in coming; not that this limited the SAS. By the time the Cheetahs came in to collect them in fading light, everything had either been destroyed or was rigged for destruction.
The ground force had enjoyed an exciting time with rockets zooming out of large fires with huge bangs and pressure waves emanating from ground through which the fast-moving line had passed. The destruction of weapons, explosives, vehicles, tents, bulk fuel, boats and so on was right up SAS’s street. As they flew back towards Kariba, they were able to look back with satisfaction as timed charges continued to set off massive explosions that lit up the clouds and bush for miles around.
This was another very bad day for ZIPRA—their invasion plan was doomed. They had not only lost all they had been hiding from the Zambian authorities, they were red-faced by Rhodesia’s exposure of their underhandedness.
Political turmoil
IT WAS VERY FRUSTRATING TO be tied to COMOPS where I lost close contact with the goings-on in Air HQ, the messes, the squadrons and FAFs. Air Strike Reports were seldom seen; not that these were withheld in any way. I could have gone up to Air HQ to read them but the tempo of work in COMOPS prevented me from doing so.
By now almost all young pilots and technicians were unknown to me. I knew they were out there performing fantastic work, but reading daily Sitreps (Situation Reports) from the JOCs failed to put names and faces to actions and incidents. Planning, reviewing, listening to operational debriefs and tasking new ones was all very well, even exciting, but one always saw the same people attending planning and debriefing sessions. All were familiar personalities from happier days in the field though few were blue jobs. This really niggled me giving emphasis to a grim sense of being separated from my own force.
Being mid-winter, the Fireforces were rattling up great successes against ZANLA which, when added to the mayhem being meted out to ZIPRA, should have put smiles on our faces; but political issues tended to darken the long hours and weekends in COMOPS.
In early June, US President Jimmy Carter, contrary to British Government’s perceived intentions, ruled against the lifting of sanctions by the USA. Then in early August, Margaret Thatcher dashed all hopes of granting Zimbabwe-Rhodesia recognition when, at the Commonwealth conference held in the Mulungushi Hall in Lusaka, she reneged on her earlier promises. She moved instead for an all-party conference to be held in London.
What was particularly galling to Rhodesians was the fact that Maggie had been pressurised into this by the Australian prime minister who, considering his own country’s record in dealing with ethnic folk, had absolutely no right to go against our wish to retain responsible government. Rhodesia’s constitution sought to bring the black folk into government in a controlled and progressive manner. There was certainly nothing racist as with Australia’s approach to colour. One only needs to consider that component of the Australian Constitution, which reads, “... make laws for people of any race for whom it is necessary to make special laws”.
This was another overt move to push Rhodesians towards the communist take-over we were still thoroughly determined to prevent. Neville Chamberlain’s failed policy of appeasement in his dealings with Hitler was forgotten after Winston Churchill returned British political drive back to one of strength. However, once Churchill and the British Empire had gone, Britain became embroiled in misguided guilt for her colonial past thereby weakening her ability to counter fascism and communism. Retaining favour with Africa’s corrupt and ineffective dictators had become more important to British politicians than supporting a country intent on holding to a western-styled democratic government, without sacrificing efficiency and self-sufficiency.
To add to these concerns, Sithole was not acting in unison with Government and James Chikerema withdrew his support from Muzorewa’s ruling party. It was not as if we did not expect to see infighting and incompetence in the new government order because all along we knew that relinquishing control too early would not work; but circumstances h
ad made this the only option to attracting Western approval and circumvention of the Marxist alternative.
By now the title appended to the increasing exodus of whites seeking safer pastures changed from ‘chicken run’ to ‘owl run’ because many considered it the wise thing to do. Yet, for most white Rhodesians, the desire to remain in God’s own country remained strong. Like everyone else in COMOPS I had one aim in mind. This was to support the government in power, weak though it was, and work flat-out to destroy the enemies that sought to remove it.
The saying that every dark cloud has a silver lining was applicable to these times. South Africa was embroiled in what became known as ‘The Information Scandal’. I do not remember the details but know that it forced a change in national leadership. Vorster was out of the driving seat and P.W. Botha took the wheel. With this change came a marked improvement in political attitudes towards Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the inflow of goods returned to normal.
Operation Uric
FOR THE MOMENT ZIPRA WAS hobbled but ZANLA, with ever-mounting assistance from FRELIMO, was increasingly active in the south. Terrorist numbers in the Op Repulse area had grown to the point where over 50% of ZANLA’s deployed force, estimated at 11,000, was in that area in early August 1979. In a show of support to the Muzorewa Government, South Africa committed a Fireforce comprising Puma helicopters, Dakotas and troops to the south of the country. Fielding as many fighting troops as all of our Fireforces put together, there were great hopes that this force would make great inroads against ZANLA and FRELIMO, but it was not to be. As we had come to know only too well, the flat lands of the region rendered intelligence of the type needed to bring Fireforces into contact almost impossible.
At the same time an impending multi-party conference in London was making world headlines; but President Machel of Mozambique saw some danger to ZANU’s position if the talks took place. He turned his full attention therefore to assisting ZANLA push for an early outright military victory. To achieve this meant cutting Rhodesia’s road and rail links to South Africa and countering ZIPRA’s limited encroachment into southern Matabeleland.
More radio-equipped FRELIMO forces were added to those that had been operating inside Rhodesia for some time and some elements had even penetrated into ZIPRA areas. Externally, FRELIMO forces deployed along the well—established communication lines through Gaza Province from the coast to the Rhodesian border were now given instructions to strengthen their bases and give maximum support to ZANLA. By mid-August ZANLA was receiving overt assistance to the extent that they had become fully integrated with FRELIMO in their bases, defences, and transport systems. With over 15,000 trained CTs poised to move through Gaza, the dangers to Rhodesia were escalating rapidly.
This situation meant that any actions we took in Gaza would involve deliberate confrontation with FRELIMO, which until now had been avoided wherever possible. Now, however, the FRELIMO Government’s undiluted involvement with Mugabe’s ZANU party brought about a substantial change in political thinking. Major economic targets, which had hitherto been safeguarded by ‘political considerations’, no longer enjoyed such protection. This was all possible because of new thinking by the black government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and changed attitudes within the SA Government.
In COMOPS there was little to ponder on how to stem the impending flood. Norman Walsh’s operational plans, shelved for ‘political reasons’ in 1977, had to be put into urgent effect. They involved in-depth destruction of road and rail communications, specifically bridges, and first priority was given to Gaza Province.
Whereas the railway had already been put out of commission by the Scouts and SAS in numerous short-duration operations, FRELIMO had not been neutralised—quite the opposite. They had in fact acquired considerable combat experience and determination in countering RSF forays against their ZANLA brothers. They had also put together sufficient road transport to fully compensate for the loss of rail transport.
In particular, FRELIMO had been given so much breathing space between operations that they had been able, with considerable assistance from Russian advisors, to build up a formidable military base at Mapai incorporating heavy ground and counter-air defence networks. In addition they had installed defensive positions around all strategic and economic key-points. All in all this made a job that might have been a cakewalk two years earlier complicated and extremely dangerous.
The first phase in this operation was to cut the transport line running from the Aldeia da Barragem road-rail bridge that formed part of the Limpopo River irrigation system all the way northwestward to our border. It involved cutting the huge Barragem bridge plus four lesser ones, mining main and secondary roads and destroying all transport north of the Limpopo. Equal in importance to destroying ground communications was the destruction of Mapai itself. This was considered essential to drive FRELIMO out of Gaza and force ZANLA into adopting the safer northern routes through Mozambique that would channel them through hilly terrain best suited to Selous Scouts and Fireforce operations.
There was some division in COMOPS thinking concerning operational priorities and actions to be taken in Operation Uric. Together with Brigadier Peter Rich and Brian Robinson, I saw Mapai as the key target around which to focus all other operations. Air Commodore Walsh supported this line of thinking, though he had no direct say in the ground planning.
The SAS, RLI and Army Engineers were earmarked for the destruction of bridges and mining of roads, so we recommended that a strong Selous Scouts vehicle-borne force with Air Force jet support should move on Mapai at least three days ahead of these actions. The object was not to attack Mapai directly but to subject it to siege and harassment to soften up and hem in the garrison force. We knew this force relied heavily on daily supplies of road-transported water, a commodity that was very scarce in that arid area. So denial of water would be the Scouts’ prime objective.
The planning sessions became somewhat heated and were incomplete when Op Uric was launched prematurely. This became necessary when an agreed date for the commencement of an all-parties conference at Lancaster House in London was suddenly thrust upon us. It was less than two weeks away.
Mapai comprised the old railway town in bottom right-hand corner and the large base area nearby. The nearest available water can be seen in the shallow pan at top left side.
Because of the political time factor, General Walls hurriedly ruled out Mapai, as he believed destruction of communications had to take first priority and, if successful, this would effectively force Mapai’s collapse. He also wanted to ensure that all air support would be available to the SAS, RLI and Engineers operations.
On D-Day minus one, 1 September 1979, fuel, explosives, ammunition and most participating troops were parachuted into the forward Admin Base located in remote ground 200 kilometres inside Gaza. Then, on D-Day, a heavy guti (low cloud with heavy drizzle) came down, forcing a postponement. Luckily the miserable weather only lasted one day instead of the usual three days.
Mapai knew something was afoot and sent out many armed patrols to seek out the Rhodesian forces they knew were active somewhere to their east. They had no idea how many Rhodesian soldiers were there or what their mission was.
On D-Day, now 3 September, a helicopter force comprising SAAF Pumas (thanks to the South African Government favouring Prime Minister Muzorewa) with five Cheetahs and twenty-four G-Cars left Rhodesia at first light. They all had full fuel tanks to avoid having to refuel at the Admin Base before uplifting troops to their assigned targets. Whereas all the Rhodesians were functioning under the codename Operation Uric, the SAAF participation was titled Operation Bootlace. This was to reduce the risk of being accused by the international community of joint involvement with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
The helicopters were still approaching the Admin Base when a FRELIMO patrol comprising twenty-four men happened upon the base. In a sharp exchange twenty-two FRELIMO lay dead. Another was captured wounded but one managed to escape.
What with the delay due to
weather, Lancaster House talks only seven days away and discovery of the Admin Base, General Walls was in a bit of a quandary. He was flying in the Command Dakota with Air Commodore Walsh and staff. Time had become more critical and some operational adjustments had to be made on the run.
SAS made up the largest component of the ground force and were flown to the huge Aldeia da Barragem target just 150 kilometres northwest of Maputo. They landed under cover of Hunter strikes against the main FRELIMO defences. Thereafter, the SAS fought through the surviving elements of the enemy force, capturing a couple of heavy anti-aircraft guns that they later put to good use. One SAS soldier was wounded during multiple encounters and a Cheetah was called forward from a secondary refuelling point just six minutes’ flying time to the north of target.
As Flight Lieutenant Dick Paxton approached for the casevac he was inadvertently routed over a FRELIMO strong point and suffered a direct hit from a missile that exploded on the main rotor gearbox. In the ensuing uncontrolled crash, technician Aircraftsman Alexander Wesson was killed outright. Dick was injured but was extremely lucky to be dragged from the wreckage by a very brave SAS Sergeant, Flash Smythe, before burning fuel engulfed and consumed the Cheetah.
By late afternoon, the SAS had completed the difficult and stressful task of setting up the charges on the road and rail bridges. Charges had also been set on at least one of the four irrigation canals’ sluice gates. Having detonated these charges, the SAS team was to hold its position until next day to confirm that both bridges were wrecked before their planned extraction.
Surprisingly, the forces at the other four bridges had been unopposed. They completed their work, confirmed their bridges destroyed, knocked hell out of all enemy transport in their immediate areas, and then flew back to the Admin Base—as intended. RLI mine-laying teams worked throughout the day along main and secondary routes.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 89
