Back at COMOPS we thought everything was running to plan. But as night fell, we learned that the SAS Barragem force and most of the RLI mine-laying teams were being recovered to the Admin. Base. This struck us as very strange indeed because they should have been on their tasks until at least the end of D-Day plus 1.
The reason for the withdrawals came as a real shock. General Walls had decided to change direction and attack Mapai. We could not understand our commander’s thinking. All along it had been agreed that conventionally defended Mapai was too strong a target to take on directly; hence the inclusion of Selous Scouts during initial planning. A prolonged period of softening and harassment had been considered of paramount importance to demoralise and weaken the defenders. But now a small force of just 200 men, mentally unprepared and armed only with light infantry weapons, was under orders to attack a much, much larger fresh force that was alert, dug-in and armed with vastly superior weapons.
The Air Force, having at most eight available Hunters and five Canberras, could not possibly hold a cab-rank to provide the ground troops with ‘on call’ heavy support. Most of the time the aircraft would be out of the area—a frightening thought indeed. There was absolutely nothing we could do about this in COMOPS other than hope and pray that General Walls knew something that we did not.
As it happened our mutually expressed fears were well founded. The nightmare that followed next day started off with the downing of a SAAF Puma well short of Mapai itself. An RPG rocket exploded behind Captain P.D. Velleman instantly killing him and his crewmen, Lieutenant N.D. Osborne and Sergeant D.W.M. Retief. There was no hope for the twelve Rhodesian soldiers aboard as the helicopter smashed through trees and broke up in a line of flaming wreckage.
The only casualty I knew well was the Army engineer Captain Charlie Small whom I had worked with on projects of mutual interest to Air Force and Army. Before his death he had played a big part in preparing the SAS for the intense bridge demolition work yet to come.
Hunters and Canberras struck and re-struck Mapai before ground forces, now depleted by 6%, landed near the target. From the outset it was clear that FRELIMO was too well established to simply pack up and run. Close-quarter contacts in the face of intense enemy fire from every conceivable type and calibre of weapon proved the Rhodesian troops’ abilities to cope with heavy enemy fire, but the target was just too large and complicated to be quickly overrun by such a small force armed only with light infantry weapons.
The intensity of anti-aircraft fire directed at attacking jets amazed even the most battle-hardened soldiers. Equally amazing, and extremely discomforting, was that these heavy weapons were turned against the troops whenever the jets were not around.
General Walls soon realised that Mapai could not be taken without committing the troops to a long period of sleepless close-quarter combat—possibly another three days. However, the inevitability of unacceptably heavy Rhodesian casualties forced him to decide on a withdrawal—not a pleasant situation for Rhodesia’s top general. Just another command cock-up in the endless list of failures by senior British generals! By nightfall the Mapai force was back in Rhodesia. The next day, remaining RLI mine-laying teams were collected and the Admin. Base was wrapped up.
Op Uric had fallen short of its primary aim of denying FRELIMO and ZANLA easy access through Gaza. One reason for this was that the road bridge over the irrigation barrage had not been rendered totally unusable because the engineers who built it had laid greater quantities of steel reinforcing than was revealed in the design plans. Had the SAS remained on target, as originally planned, they would have finished the job. The second reason was that the Hunters, wholly occupied in supporting the ground force at Mapai, had not been given opportunity to destroy vehicles trapped between the downed bridges.
This was the first occasion the RSF had failed to overrun the enemy. It was an issue that dampened spirits even more than knowing that our Government was about to face difficult times in their talks, commencing 10 September, with the devious Brits and our communist enemies. Neither ZAPU nor ZANU were any happier because they too utterly distrusted the British Government—not that this gave any comfort to us.
The international press inferred that a ceasefire followed by all-party elections in ‘Zimbabwe’ would be the outcome of the talks. Such ceasefire and political preparations for ‘one man one vote’ elections were envisaged for early 1980. Nkomo was in a worse position than Mugabe if such elections were to take place so early. ZAPU was sitting high and dry because Rhodesian forces had rendered all hope of an effective ZIPRA invasion impossible, whereas ZANU was well placed with thousands of ZANLA CTs in the country and many more immediately available to flood across the border.
In London, ZAPU and ZANU presented themselves as the ‘Patriotic Front’. This apparent coming together of bitter enemies may have impressed the British and the OAU but it certainly did not fool Rhodesians. We knew only too well that ZAPU and ZANU would be at each other’s throats the moment the conference ended, no matter the outcome. Nevertheless, more to counter ZANLA than to challenge the Muzorewa Government, it was obvious to us that ZIPRA urgently needed to get as many trained men into the country as possible to prepare the ground for the envisaged election.
With all fronts likely to explode in our faces, it was clear that we were in for a massive increase in the intensity of over-border operations. Knowing that events in and around Rhodesia would influence the political standing of opposing parties at Lancaster House, we needed to indulge in operations that would strengthen the hand of Prime Minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa and his delegation. To do this meant taking no-holds barred actions in both Mozambique and Zambia.
Enhancing MNR’s image
THE MNR CONTINUED TO BE a vitally important force for the eventual overthrow of the FRELIMO Government. For the moment however, we needed to direct their activities to impose limits on ZANLA by severely affecting Mozambique’s infrastructure. This had to be done in a manner that would continue to improve the MNR standing with the civilian population at the greatest possible cost to the Mozambique Government.
Two specific targets were chosen. The first was the vital telecommunications relay centre east of Beira known as the Troposcatter and the second was Beira itself. The Beira mission will be covered shortly, but the importance of destroying the Troposcatter needs to be understood. Essentially it was to improve our intelligence-gathering capability. Most sensitive communications on the FRELIMO political and military networks relied on the highly sophisticated coding equipment of the Troposcatter, but this prevented us from eavesdropping on all enemy communications. With the advert of MNR, it was logical to destroy the facility and force FRELIMO to rely entirely on the HF networks we were already monitoring successfully.
Extra SAS men were flown in to meet up with the MNR liaison team and, together with an MNR force, they made a successful attack on the Troposcatter station two days after the Lancaster House talks started.
Attacking this target on the top of Monte Xilvuo right next to the main Beira to Chimoio road was no easy matter. However, drawn by the sound of the fighting and explosions that carried for miles from this elevated but successful attack, FRELIMO moved tanks and hundreds of infantry in an endeavour to cut off and destroy the mixed SAS-MNR force.
Whereas the range of our Cheetah helicopters allowed for the timely long-range recovery of most of the force, three men were left behind. Without a radio they had become separated during a firefight through one of the FRELIMO ambush points. For two days Cheetahs and Lynx searched for these men in the hopes that they were still alive and free.
Heavy anti-aircraft fire helped aircrew identify the positions of the pursuing FRELIMO forces and this gave proof that the lost men were still alive; but hours of searching failed to find them. Fortuitously the crew of the last Lynx to fly search at the end of the second day spotted the hard-pressed men’s heliograph and wood-smoke signals, resulting in rescue. Only six days later the SAS and MNR were on the move again,
this time to Beira.
Tony and me at Beira, as youngsters.
Here I divert to give one of the reasons the SAS-MNR force was visiting Beira.
As youngsters, my brother Tony and I occasionally went by train to Beira to visit my godfather and his wife, Alan and Sheila Martin. Alan was managing director of the Beira Boating Company and had at his disposal a fleet of launches and barges. My deep love of ships was developed in Beira docks where Tony and I had free access to the launches and boarded many ships. One point Alan made clear to us was that although Beira appeared to be a good harbour it was not a natural one because the entire Pungwe/Buzi estuary was extremely shallow. Because of this, the two dredgers we saw working daily were absolutely essential to keep the channel, specially cut for large ships, free of the sand and silt that relentlessly flowed in from the Buzi.
Many years later in less happy circumstances at COMOPS, I raised the matter with Brian Robinson who immediately saw the dredgers as key to putting an end to Beira’s shipping. Now, on the night of 18 September 1979, the SAS-MNR had the two dredgers, Matola and Pungue, as two of their specified targets.
To avoid walking through miles of highly populated ground around Beira, the force was dropped off for a night approach to Beira docks. Coming in from the sea in quiet motor-driven inflatable dinghies, they sailed up the wide estuary of the rivers Pungwe and Buzi, heading for the dredgers and a dark landing point near the docks.
Subsurface limpets and other explosive devices sank both dredgers. At the same time the sea gates of Beira’s only dry dock were wrecked, rendering that facility unusable. Whilst the dredgers and dry dock were being rigged for destruction, two other forces were busy on separate tasks. The larger of the two forces aimed to enter the town of Beira to destroy the central telephone exchange and break into Beira’s prison to release all its political prisoners. The other force aimed to destroy ZANLA’s war matériel stored in a dockside warehouse.
Unfortunately, intelligence concerning the telephone exchange security arrangements and civilian activities within the town and around the prison proved to be badly understated. Beira was alive with hundreds of people and FRELIMO had become so concerned about MNR activity, that they had substantially increased guarding levels on all likely MNR targets, including the telephone exchange. Although the force dressed in FRELIMO uniform reached both targets, the SAS commander was forced to move his men into hiding to think things through whilst awaiting an abatement of the unexpectedly high civilian activity. But then a suspicious civilian spotted the luckless team and reported its presence to FRELIMO who sent a patrol to investigate.
Following the death of some of these unfortunate investigators, the SAS-MNR force made a running retreat to the waiting dinghies distributing MNR pamphlets as they went. During the retreat, the demolition team assigned to blow up ZANLA stores was ordered to abandon its task. Notwithstanding failure to release prisoners, destroy the exchange or blow up ZANLA holdings, the main objectives of the operation were achieved. The dredgers had been sunk, the dry dock was out of commission and FRELIMO’s fear of the MNR had been heightened.
The use of fixed wing and helicopters during the Troposcatter operation exposed Rhodesia’s direct involvement with the MNR. Although we had hoped to avoid this it turned out to be an advantage. This was because FRELIMO concerns about the MNR forced President Machel to realise that either the war with Rhodesia had to end or ZANLA had to get out of Mozambique to save his country’s economy from total destruction. But in COMOPS we planned to do just that. Operation ‘Manacle’ was the elaborate plan for SAS and RLI demolition teams to destroy every worthwhile bridge between Maputo and the Zambezi River.
Air Force jet support was to be given throughout against FRELIMO forces guarding all the bridges. These were then to be secured by SAS-MNR protection teams before demolition parties and their explosives were para-dropped directly onto target. After destroying each bridge, helicopters would recover the demolition teams to Rhodesia to prepare for their next targets. At the same time helicopters would move the SAS- MNR securing teams to their next assigned bridges.
Whilst these plans were being finalised, other external operations in both Zambia and Mozambique were underway.
Search for New Chimoio
FOR MANY MONTHS AN ONGOING operation, codenamed Bouncer, sought to ambush likely roads used by ZANLA’s top commanders. Ideally we hoped to capture or at least kill Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo. However, in spite of many Bouncer deployments by SAS and Selous Scouts, all attempts failed though many high-ranking CTs were killed in the process.
In late September an SAS-MNR team was flown to an unpopulated start position for a twofold task. One was to locate ZANLA’s elusive ‘New Chimoio’ base, which captured CTs implied had moved well away from the Chimoio and Vanduzi Circle areas. They claimed it was now well established and much closer to Rhodesia on the west side of the main Vanduzi to Tete road. Since Tongogara and Nhongo were reported to be living in the base, the team’s second task was to make yet another Bouncer attempt on them.
Having walked through the night, the SAS-MNR team came upon an unmarked but well-used vehicle track that was in current use. Feeling certain that this led to the ZANLA base, which the team commander thought was still some distance off, the team moved into an elevated daytime hiding place. The intention was to observe the surrounds before setting up an ambush late in the afternoon in hopes that one or other of two Toyota Land Cruisers driven by Tongogara and Nhongo would pass their way.
Whilst in hiding the team was surprised by the high level of general activity around the area but then became very concerned when a large force of ZANLA passed along the vehicle track, quite obviously checking for mines and human tracks. Realising that this must have been prompted by the sound of the helicopters dropping them off the previous evening, the commander guessed the base must be much closer than expected. So, instead of going ahead with the ambush, the commander wisely decided to remain in hiding that night and send his MNR men out early next morning to have a chat with the locals. When the MNR returned, they reported that the base was very close by.
Having established this, the commander decided to go ahead with the ambush. The team did not have long to wait before two vehicles came their way. As they came into view, the ambushers saw that they were both Toyota Land Cruisers. These they took out in a slick action that killed all the occupants. Fires raging in both vehicles were so intense that it was impossible to get close to them. However, one SAS soldier reported glimpsing what he thought was a white man’s body in the flames. Later this was confirmed when radio intercepts revealed that three Russian advisors were amongst the fifteen-odd dead.
The team cleared the area only to find they had been so close to the enemy base that hundreds of ZANLA were closing in pursuit, so a call was made for hot extraction. Under continuous and heavy fire, the team managed to survive a long running-battle before being whipped away to safety by the Air Force.
Now that we had a fair idea of the base’s actual location, thought was given to photo-recce. Initially it was considered that if this was done, ZANLA would move because we had received vague information about ZANLA’s unique air warning system. Two tame baboons Jamie and Amie, having been subjected to many airstrikes, were said to be ultra-sensitive to the sound of jets. Apparently they gave early warning by screeching and leaping about long before ZANLA heard sound of the aircraft that so terrified these two animals. Even a high-flying Canberra passing quietly over a noisy camp might get the baboons excited.
It was decided, therefore, to put in another ground recce. The SAS were fully committed on other tasks, so the Selous Scouts deployed one of their oft-proven two-man recce teams. This time no helicopter was used and the team walked in from the border. Unfortunately, it was detected in the early stages of its passage through the base and was forced to call for hot extraction. By now, however, captured CT’s were indicating that the base was highly prepared with sophisticated heavy anti-air and ground def
ences specially sited by Russian advisors. The deaths of three Russians certainly gave weight to these reports. The captured CTs also said ZANLA felt too strong to be frightened off the present base position by the passage of any aircraft.
The rainy season had started early this year but a photo-recce flight was made immediately a gap appeared in the weather. Even though the JSPIS photo-interpreters had poor-quality photographs to work from, they immediately identified elaborate defences including many heavy-calibre gun positions and extensive trench works linking and surrounding each of at least four bases. Typical for this time of year, cloud cover masked much of the ground in which we believed there must be additional bases. They needed to be pinpointed and analysed but bad weather thwarted further attempts to photograph the area.
Fortunately, two high features at the northern end of a line of rugged mountains contained the bulk of the defences, and these had been exposed. Since there was need to get on with the job, planning for an operation codenamed ‘Miracle’ was formulated on the basis of what was known and a fair amount of reasoned guesswork on what could not be seen.
The SAS were preparing to go external against two large bridges in Zambia and another three in Mozambique, but this was not the only reason the Selous Scouts were earmarked for the job with RLI in support.
Operation Miracle
INTELLIGENCE INDICATED THAT ONLY ZANLA occupied the New Chimoio base and that FRELIMO had sent them far away from Chimoio town to prevent Mozambican civilians from becoming involved in future RSF raids. Captured men also indicated that if CTs were forced to leave the base, they would move towards Rhodesia because FRELIMO had forbidden them from going in any other direction.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 90
