Dead will Arise

by Peires, Jeff

  The notion that the Cattle-Killing originated in a plot by the Xhosa chiefs to bring about war was not an unreasonable one for a colonial official to hold during the early days of the movement. All were aware that the prophecies of Mlanjeni barely six years previously had triggered the Eighth Frontier War, that Sarhili was sending messages to Sandile, Mhala and the other chiefs, and that a frenzy of religious excitement was sweeping through Xhosaland. It was known that Nongqawuse had predicted the imminent destruction of the white man, and that there was some talk of recouping cattle from the settlers if the prophecies failed. It seemed logical that starving people would rob and even kill to get food. Small wonder that every colonial administrator from the authoritarian Maclean to the sympathetic Brownlee initially suspected that the prophecies were put about by the chiefs to foment war. Grey was informed accordingly, and he made every effort from promises to threats to stop the people going ahead with the destruction of their cattle and corn.

  From the beginning, however, there were clear signals that the Cattle-Killing was the result of a sincere belief, and, as the movement progressed, these signals grew louder and louder. It became increasingly obvious, for instance, that many of the initial reports of warlike behaviour were exaggerated, that the ordinary believers were not especially hostile towards the whites, and, above all, that starvation and destruction were wreaking such havoc among the Xhosa that they were incapable of fighting or doing anything at all. As late as September 1856, Grey could still write:

  The most vigilant exertions on the part of the authorities in British Kaffraria have failed to elicit any proofs of combination for evil purposes amongst the chiefs, whilst conclusive proof has been obtained of the entire erroneousness of several reports of an unfavourable nature.4

  Even later, in December 1856, Chief Commissioner Maclean was still writing that the Cattle-Killing was ‘too suicidal for a mere political move’.5 It was only after the Great Disappointment that Grey asked Maclean to write up the proofs of the ‘chiefs’ plot’.6 By that time, the failure of the movement had become apparent and all disturbances had been put down. Whatever the truth of the ‘chiefs’ plot’ theory, whatever the chiefs may or may not have intended, it was incontestably true that the crisis was over and that not one chief had actually done anything that could be interpreted as an attack on the settlers or the Colony. As Sarhili said, ‘He has offended in destroying his own. He has not thrown an assegaai at the Governor.’7

  But Grey was unable to leave it at that. It may well be that he was genuinely paranoid. It may well be that he had good cause to be suspicious of Sarhili, who had rejected his official warning, and of Moshoeshoe, who had sent him a lying message.8 But throughout Grey’s career, conspiracy theory had always served to advance his measures and cut down resistance to his goals. We have already seen how he scapegoated Te Rauparaha in New Zealand to put an end to the Maori war, and how he used the rumoured ‘Fingo alliance’ of 1854 to extort £40 000 a year from the British government. Sarhili’s Xhosaland was the key to the annexation of the transKei. Moshoeshoe’s Lesotho was the key to the annexation of the Orange Free State. The exile of tens of thousands of Xhosa would make space for the white settlers whom Grey had always wanted to place in British Kaffraria. Grey was not interested in saving the starving Xhosa from the consequences of their actions, or in helping them to rebuild their shattered lives and homesteads. Rather, he intended to strike them when they were down, annihilate their nationhood and their way of life, and disperse them in the Colony as labourers while he gave away their land to white farmers. The Cattle-Killing presented the Governor with a unique opportunity to advance on all these fronts, and Grey was not about to let it slip away. His pursuit of the ‘chiefs’ plot’ was not, therefore, an act of retributive justice – it was an integral part of his future policy.

  Evidence was the least of Grey’s problems. There were so many rumours and reports chasing each other around the Eastern Frontier, so many Xhosa and Mfengu ready to furnish satisfactory information at the hint of a bribe, so many statements forthcoming from the victims of Gawler’s police, that it was easy for an experienced author of misleading dispatches like Grey to pick what he wanted and leave the rest. Later in this chapter and again in Chapter 8, the reader will be given detailed instances of deliberate and cynical falsification of evidence by Grey and his subordinates. Here one brief illustration will suffice. On 8 December 1856, Maclean took a statement from a ‘trustworthy native’ to the effect that Sarhili had privately informed him that the purpose of the Cattle-Killing was to bring about a war. Even Maclean dismissed this statement at the time, because the informant was a Thembu Christian, who habitually wore European clothes, and he knew that Sarhili would never trust such a man. And yet, later on, when they needed the ‘evidence’, both Maclean and Grey laid considerable emphasis on this information without ever mentioning the reservations which had led them to reject it in the first place.9

  1 GH 8/49 J Maclean-G Grey, 30 Oct. 1856; GH 23/27 G Grey-H Labouchere, 6 June 1857.

  2 GH 8/30 Information communicated to the Chief Commissioner, 8 Dec. 1856; R Rawson-Lieut. Governor, 25 Aug. 1857, quoted in Grahamstown Journal, 8 Sept. 1857; BK 373 J Maclean-W Liddle, 18 Aug. 1856.

  3 Peires (1985).

  4 GH 23/26 G.Grey-H Labouchere, 20 Sept. 1856.

  5 GH 8/30 Information communicated to the Chief Commissioner, 8 Dec. 1856, minute by Maclean.

  6 Maclean wrote two very lengthy dispatches (bristling with enclosures), dated 20 and 27 March 1857, to be found in BK 373. The former, which dealt with Moshoeshoe’s alleged involvement, was published in Imperial Blue Book 2352 of 1857, pp.72-84.

  7 GH 20/2/1 H Waters-G Grey, 5 Nov. 1857.

  8 Imperial Blue Book 2352 of 1857, J Maclean-G Grey, 20 March 1857. It is unlikely that Moshoeshoe had any motive in lying to Grey about his know­ledge of the Cattle-Killing beyond the understandable if misguided object of not wanting to antagonise so powerful an enemy. For further discussion on the role of Moshoeshoe, see Chapter 4/1 and Peires (1985), pp.257-8.

  9 GH 8/30 Information communicated to the Chief Commissioner, 8 Dec. 1856; BK 373 J Maclean-G Grey, 27 March 1857; GH 20/2/1 ‘Kreli’s conduct’, undated MS in Grey’s handwriting.

  2. TRANSPORTATION

  The instrument which Grey employed to carry his plans for British Kaffraria into effect was his proclamation of 3 March 1857, issued shortly after his arrival on the Frontier to take charge of the crisis which had developed in the wake of the Great Disappointment.

  His Excellency the High Commissioner hereby acquaints the [Xhosa] chiefs that acts of robbery by armed men have been recently committed … His Excellency feels that it is necessary at once to check proceedings which … are unpardonable, as labour is provided for all industrious, well-disposed persons, who may be in a state of destitution.

  He has therefore directed that four [Xhosa], who were caught this morning in the Crown Reserve, in circumstances which leave no room for doubt that they were thieves, shall be forthwith transported; and he notifies generally, that all persons caught attempting to commit or having committed, robberies with arms in their hands, will, when convicted with such offence, be punished with DEATH.

  He also warns the chiefs that all [Xhosa] found robbing in the Colony or elsewhere will be fired upon, if it is found impossible to capture them. His Excellency therefore urges upon the chiefs the necessity of warning those people of the danger they will incur if they become marauders.1

  Such a proclamation was not unreasonable given the disorder of the times, and even its harshest provisions – transportation for petty theft, and the right of the private individual to kill in defence of property – might be regarded as justifiable in the circumstances, if the proclamation had been accompanied by a vigorous attempt to protect the endangered unbelievers and if it had been superseded at the
earliest opportunity by a law defining in greater detail the degree of gravity of specific offences. The phrase ‘attempting to commit robberies … with arms in their hands’ was broad enough to embrace almost anyone carrying a stick outside of his normal residential area.

  But far from relaxing the harsher provisions when the crisis was over, and far from introducing amendments to protect the innocent or to mitigate the responsibility of the starving, the colonial government applied the proclamation more severely and on a broader front as time went on. Its ulterior purpose was not to protect property and to punish theft but to force as many Xhosa as possible to leave British Kaffraria. Of the 32 Xhosa transported in the first four weeks after the proclamation, 18 were not actually accused of anything worse than travelling without passes ‘under suspicious circumstances’.2 And yet, at the very same time that the colonial government was so busily employed rooting unauthorised Xhosa out of the frontier districts, it was deliberately failing to come to the assistance of the embattled unbelievers within British Kaffraria whose very lives were in constant danger.

  The news of the proclamation spread rapidly among those Xhosa contemplating entering the Colony without a pass. The sea voyage, even more than the punishment at the other end of it, was looked upon ‘with almost as much dread as death itself’. Magistrate Reeve reported with satisfaction ‘that a feeling of FEAR and RESPECT towards the Government is evidently obtaining’ in Kama’s district, while the King William’s Town Gazette, equally pleased, remarked that transportion was ‘the order of the day’.3

  Implementation was not, however, without its problems. Transportation was unknown in southern Africa, and it had recently (1852) been abolished in Australia. Grey had received no permission from London, and the Cape Parliament had already voiced disquiet over the ‘possibility of the undue exercise of arbitrary power’. Maclean was most anxious to guard against ‘any objection which may check or interfere with what is really necessary’ by giving his measures a veneer of legal responsibility.4 He therefore commissioned Henry Barrington, the Attorney General of British Kaffraria, to devise judicial procedures which would do ‘what is really necessary’ without compromising his government in the eyes of the outside world. Barrington’s response shows just how well he understood his brief.

  As to the [Xhosa] prisoners it is my opinion that a return will be called for by and bye showing all sorts of things.

  And you and the Governor will have to defend the sentences and explain the whys and wherefores to the English Parliament which I think can only be done by showing that each case was fully considered and sentence justified by being in accordance with the spirit of English criminal law or of some special law made by His Excellency to meet the difficulty of the position here.5

  The ‘special law’ which Barrington had in mind was one designed to cope with the alleged untruthfulness of the Xhosa nation.

  No one who has studied the wild [Xhosa] properly can persuade himself that there is any form of oath or anything else that will bind the conscience of such a one.6

  Under such circumstances, the magistrate was forced to assume the role of a policeman and ‘pump out’ (Barrington’s phrase) the truth from the Xhosa before the trial even began. The purpose of the court was not therefore to discover whether the accused was guilty or not, but simply to demonstrate the fact of his guilt. The problem, Barrington realised, was that if standard English procedures were observed, it would prove next to impossible to obtain enough sworn evidence to secure a conviction. A regular court following regular procedures might well be forced to acquit the accused, a possibility which Barrington was determined to forestall.

  I do not see that the Chief Commissioner ought to let off a rogue upon a technicality except where life is concerned and not always then perhaps, things are not settled enough for that – If I were sitting in a regular court I should be obliged to do so [acquit on a technicality].

  Barrington’s task was to create some form of judicial procedure which would dispose of Xhosa trespassers in the shortest possible time with the least possible danger of acquittal. His official response to Maclean rationalises but does not disguise the arbitrary nature of the courts he is proposing.

  Considering the circumstances of British Kaffraria, a country peopled as yet by uncivilised heathen tribes who therefore are unable to comprehend our laws and usages. Also the dangerous state the country is now in and the necessity of putting down crime quickly and effectively … It seems expedient and not unjust to omit the forms usual among the civilised people of Europe in criminal cases and trials and to proceed in the simplest and most natural manner. The supreme power should be satisfied of the guilt of the prisoners and the punishment ordained should be sharp and severe.

  The ‘simplest and most natural manner’, ‘expedient and not unjust’ of administering law and order was to establish special courts composed exclusively of special magistrates and military officers. Prisoners were allowed in theory to call and cross-examine witnesses and to make statements, but they were denied any legal representation or legal advice from anyone familiar with ‘civilised’ notions of justice. Wives could be called on to give evidence against their husbands because, according to Barrington, ‘Marriage is a Christian or a legal institution. Amongst the [Xhosa] it does not exist.’7 The court passed judgement, but sentencing was left in the hands of the Governor and the Chief Commissioner. One result of this was that many prisoners were transported without ever hearing their sentences, or being told how many years’ hard labour they were expected to serve.8

  The range of offences dealt with by these summary courts was even broader than that indicated in Grey’s proclamation, which had only referred to thieves ‘with arms in their hands’. Maclean acknowledged this but maintained that the ‘spirit and intention’ of the proclamation justified him in sentencing even unarmed potential thieves to transportation. English law did not define the plucking of standing corn as ‘larceny’, but Maclean thought it ‘should be considered, even when committed by unarmed men, as a crime of some magnitude’.9 Finally, Maclean thought it necessary to bring robberies and trespasses committed outside British Kaffraria under the jurisdiction of its special courts. He was quite open about the reason for this. ‘By the ordinary law of the Colony,’ he wrote, ‘[such offences as the theft of corn from unfenced gardens] cannot be punished in the summary or severe manner which the general safety of the country demands.’10 He invoked one of Governor Cathcart’s old proclamations from the War of Mlanjeni which placed the frontier districts under martial law. All Xhosa found without passes in the Colony, whether residents of British Kaffraria or not, were to be sent into British Kaffraria to face the special courts. Even Barrington was a little disturbed about the legal aspects of this – Cathcart’s proclamation had referred specifically to ‘rebels’ and said nothing about thieves – but he acquiesced like a good subordinate.11

  Despite the severity of the penalties involved, many Xhosa were prepared to risk defying the law. There was no work for them inside British Kaffraria. Indeed, two of the four men mentioned in the initial proclamation had applied unsuccessfully for employment on the public works a few days before they were caught in the Crown Reserve.12 A full discussion of the sort of employment on offer must be deferred to Chapter 8, but it is sufficient to mention here that the conditions under which ‘industrious and well-disposed persons’ were expected to sign labour contracts were such that they amounted to transportation in any case. Only by foraging in secret for food could most Xhosa hope to maintain a foothold in their home areas.

  A few cases from the early days of the special court will illustrate the sort of ‘crimes’ being punished and the sort of sentences these ‘criminals’ received.13 Tiligana, for instance, was one of a party of Xhosa who tried to steal maize from the gardens at Peelton mission. The Peelton people fired on them and they all ran away, offering no resistance. Tiligana was unarmed when he was captured but he
admitted – presumably after the examining magistrate had ‘pumped’ the ‘truth’ out of him – that he had been carrying a spear. He was found guilty of armed robbery and transported for seven years. Yobogana and Lumka borrowed a horse in order to search for some cattle they had sent to Thembuland. On their way back, they were accused of riding a stolen horse, and they were transported for three years. No one ever claimed the ‘stolen’ horse and it was eventually sold off by public auction. Vuso was arrested when a party of police passing his homestead noticed a newly dug hole marked with blood. Vuso admitted that he had shared in a meal of stolen cattle though he had not stolen anything himself. He was transported for three years. Nojihle and four companions were arrested after six or seven maize cobs were found at his homestead. Nojihle was sentenced to ten years, though his companions got off because they were only visitors. Maclean described the feasting group as a ‘large armed and organised marauding party’ and regretted the acquittals.

  Other cases could be quoted, but enough have already been cited to show the way in which Grey’s proclamation was used, not against aggressive mounted marauders but against hungry and pitiful individuals attempting only to keep themselves alive until the next harvest. By mid-January 1858, 359 Xhosa men and women had been transported in this manner.14 The Frontier Armed and Mounted Police drove back 200 hungry Xhosa, attempting to cross the Keiskamma to get at the prickly pears on the other side. Other Xhosa were forcibly ejected from Mfengu locations where they had been hospitably received and fed in exchange for rendering domestic services. Police staged regular raids on Xhosa living among the Mfengu in the Crown Reserve, often extorting bribes under threat of transportation. After transportation was brought to an end, starving Xhosa caught in the Crown Reserve without a pass were put to work on the East London harbour, chained together in heavy irons to prevent any possible escape. Those who infringed prison discipline were flogged on their shoulders, faces and stomachs by white convicts ‘who appear[ed] to take a savage delight in it’.15