by Anuj Dhar
For the Indian leadership the Bose mystery truly began on 29 August 1945 in New Delhi. The first spotting of Bose after his death was reported not by a gullible Indian but an American journalist embedded with the US army. Alfred Wagg, a stringer for the Chicago Tribune, rudely interrupted a press conference of Jawaharlal Nehru. He claimed Bose was “alive and seen in Saigon four days ago”.
On September 1, London’s Sunday Observer picked up Wagg’s claim and added that the Japanese report was “not believed in British and American military circles”. Wagg would repeat his claim to many top Indian leaders, Gandhi downwards. On September 11 in Jhansi, Nehru himself told a gathering that he did not believe in Bose’s reported death: “Yes, I have received a number of reports which have raised in me grave doubts and I disbelieve the authenticity of the news.” [28]
From late 1945 to early 1946, Mahatma Gandhi was chief promoter of the Bose mystery. “If someone shows me ashes even then I will not believe that Subhas is not alive,” he told jailed associates of Bose on 30 December 1945. His January 1946 statement made headlines world over. The New York Times on January 6 reported “Gandhi as declaring in a speech that he believed Subhas Chandra Bose was still alive and awaiting a propitious time to reappear”.
All this had a ripple effect and, from villagers in India’s remote corners to the expats in Southeast Asia, all took a fancy to the idea that Bose was “in hiding” and would “come to India as the free President of a free country”.
Bose’s family swung from despair to hope. Sarat, his elder brother and closest associate in politics, shook off early sense of devastation. He undertook a tour of Europe and learnt that the Allies had thrown discredit on the Taipei crash. “I am led to believe that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose is alive,” he briefed the United Press in July 1946. “The story of the plane crash connected with his death is a myth.”
Was it? At the official level—and in complete secrecy—multilayered, overlapping inquiries into Subhas Bose’s death were carried out, right up to the time Sarat spoke. Setting the ball rolling was the Intelligence Assault Unit of SEATIC—the signal-based South East Asia Translation and Interrogation Centre (SEATIC) under Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command. Then followed the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the US army. South East Asia Command’s SACSEA Commission No 1—whose mandate was to lay hands on enemy Japanese—too pitched in. Several officers of the Intelligence Bureau dissected the all-source intelligence.
And when Rahman and others were brought to India, they were interrogated by the CSDIC, Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, a division of the War Office that ran interrogation centres around the world. All inputs were regularly fed to the Combined Section at the Military Intelligence Directorate in the GHQ, India. That’s not all. All the while, GSQ(i), psychological warfare section of India Command; American military intelligence service G-2 and the concerned governments were also kept in the loop.
Behind the confusing abbreviations were faceless officers. Leading the pack was Combined Section head and IB Deputy Director W McK Wright. He was assisted by fellow IB Deputy Director WNP Jenkin. Other prominent names were of top Bengal cop and IB Assistant Director Phillip Finney, who led the field inquiries in Bangkok in tandem with Assistant Director WFM Davies, who went to Saigon. Under them were a couple of Indians. Only one was senior and trusted enough to work with them on equal terms: “Rai Bahadur” Bakshi Badrinath of the Intelligence Bureau.
GD Anderson headed the CSDIC, India. From CSDIC’s “S Section” in Southeast Asia was reporting Major Hugh Toye—who would go on to write Bose’s first proper, almost laudatory, biography in the 1950s. In Japan, Lt Col John Figges was the point man. He was a staff officer attached to Lt Gen Gairdner, the British representative at General Douglas MacArthur’s HQ in Tokyo.
Soon after the Domei announcement, the South East Asia and India Command HQ of Admiral Mountbatten communicated to the General HQ for the Allied Powers in Tokyo that the “GHQ India is vitally interested in obtaining confirmation of the reported death of Subhas Chandra Bose”. On 30 August 1945, the office of Allied Land Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, told the Japanese government that “it would be appreciated if inquiries could be made as to the veracity of the report.” GHQ India also wanted Rahman to “be flown to India for interrogation”. The Japanese government by mid-September had sent a bare to the bone “interim report based on information so far available”. It contained a date and time-wise chart of Bose’s last movements and a short, grossly insufficient account of his death.
It would seem that the Japanese government did not have much to say; or given the exigencies of the time, it was not in a position to do so. In any case, the British were out to make their own inquiries.
In fact, before the Japanese government report reached Delhi, a Military Intelligence note of September 14 from the South East Asia Command had analysed the “reactions to Bose’s death and the INA problem”. It noted—just as Bose had foreseen—that the nationalist Press in India had “risen in defence of the INA”. The news of Bose’s death had been “received in most quarters in India with sympathy”. But in Bengal it was “generally believed that Bose has gone underground to reappear at the correct psychological moment”. Alfred Wagg’s claim quite obviously had created a flutter among the leaders. “Political circles in the province have been greatly interested in the recent news item which alleged that Bose had been seen alive in Saigon after the aircraft accident.” [29]
In his first report sent from Bangkok on 5 October 1945, Finney threw light on several aspects, including the likely place Bose could have escaped to. “The general opinion among Indians here is that Bose is not dead but has probably managed to evade Japanese control and has made his way to some place occupied by the Russians.”
However, Finney’s two informants ruled this out, insisting that Bose died while on his way to Tokyo. General Isoda, who by that time had given a statement to the British, took the same position. One informant, who had seen Bose off at Bangkok airport, told Finney that the Indian leader “did not confide in anyone what his intentions were”. Finney was unwilling to believe the informant on this point:
It is more than likely that the informant is deliberately concealing this information. He does however say that he thought Bose was on his way to Tokyo to discuss final arrangements for an attempt on his part to get permission to go to Manchuria where he could contact the Russians. This informant says that Bose had been trying to persuade the Japs to allow him to go to Moscow since October ’44, when he told them that they had no chance of invading India through Burma, and that accordingly he would prefer to try another road to Delhi via Moscow. [30]
Finney referred to another circumstance which contradicted the line taken by the Japanese and Rahman that Bose was going to Tokyo to discuss surrender and was to return to Singapore. “Bose took with him four iron boxes of gold. The weight of each is not known, but was probably in the region of 50 lbs. Bose and his staff took a formal farewell of everybody, and indicated that they were not likely to come back to this part of the world.”
Finney also found Isoda’s presence around this time suspicious. “At the time Bose arrived in Saigon, General Isoda was also there, and this fact may be significant if there was any plan on the part of the Hikari Kikan to allow Bose to escape, and to publish a false story regarding his death. This would have been the ideal place for Isoda to put into operation any such plan.” [31]
Enclosed with Finney’s first report was a record of the translated text of secret telegrams exchanged between Isoda’s Hikari Kikan in Bangkok and the Southern Army in Saigon. Their originals had been found on September 24 “in their proper place” by the Intelligence Assault Unit (IAU) of the 7th Division of Allied Land Forces in Burma. These were the only Japanese records referring to Bose’s flight to Tokyo and the subsequent air crash.
Lt D Mithaell of IAU interrogated a Hikari Kikan major to understand their true import, but the Japanese officer “knew no more t
han was given out in the Domei report”. He had seen “neither the photographs nor other proofs of the accident” mentioned in the telegrams. As per one telegram, they were taken to Tokyo by Colonel Tada. Mithaell’s conclusion was that the “proof, if any, might be in Saigon”. [32]
Finney felt suspicious about the telegrams as well. “If they are part of a colossal and well-executed deception manoeuvre, this file of telegrams, along with numerous other documents, must have been purposely left where the British would find them.” In conclusion, Finney felt that “although at this stage one cannot rule out the possibility of Bose being still alive, and of these telegrams being a part of deception plan regarding himself, (particularly in view of his previous intentions of escaping to Russia), the general impression from the study of these documents and the talk with Isoda and my informant is that Bose did actually die as stated”.
To root out the doubts coming in the way of accepting the finality of Bose’s death in Taiwan, Finney suggested a line of action involving tracing of Hikari records in Saigon as well as the photographs and remains of Bose, finding both Tada and Rahman and re-examining Isoda. He ended his report with an advice which was most sensible at that time. Continuing rumours of Bose being alive were further boosting the morale of everyone who wanted the end of the Raj.
Considerable time is being spent on these inquiries, and it is therefore requested that any conclusive information, one way or the other, should be circulated as soon as possible. [33]
There is evidence that thereafter Finney told fellow IB officials that the death news was probably true. And all the while inputs contrary to the Japanese claim kept coming.
On 8 October 1945 the GHQ received a letter from John Figges in Tokyo. The colonel enclosed what was the first report on the examination of Habibur Rahman, carried out by CIC officer Lt Carl Grob in Tokyo. Rahman reiterated to the CIC that he had “accompanied Bose on a proposed trip to Tokyo, Japan, to negotiate with the Japanese government as to the disposition of the Indian National Army” but the plane they were travelling in “crashed at the end of the airfield”. Figges observed that overall details given in CIC’s September 25 report tallied with those provided by the Japanese government earlier. “But unfortunately the evidence cannot be regarded as conclusive,” [34] Figges noted, since the Japanese version was more or less based on Rahman’s statement.
On October 10 Finney despatched to the IB and the Combined Section a report that WFM Davies had sent to him from Saigon three days earlier. Davies reported largely on the basis of what some unnamed local Indians and Japanese air force officer Capt Yoshida had told him. The Indians could only confirm that Bose had arrived and left Saigon on August 17. Yoshida disclosed that the “records of aircraft arrivals and departures have been destroyed”. He could, however, confirm that Bose, Shidei and others had flown to Tokyo on that day. Davis’s conclusion was that “the ultimate confirmation will be available only in Formosa or beyond”. [35]
On October 10 only, Bakshi Badrinath was told to join Finney’s team in Bangkok. His personal diary shows that on October 14 he met Finney in Bangkok. Also touching base with him there were Davis and inspectors Nagina Singh, Pritam Singh and HK Roy. The next day Finney gave Badrinath a low-down on the case. According to the diary, Badrinath, for a start, interrogated Bose’s confidential secretary Major Bhaskaran Menon from October 17 onwards.
Two days later the IB in Delhi received an extract from Menon’s interrogation report. Menon had stated in it that on August 17 morning “Bose called the members of his personal staff and made some small presents to them. He was deeply moved and was in tears all the time”. Menon confirmed a previous report that “four iron boxes containing golden ornaments were brought from Rangoon and these were taken along by Mr Bose when he left”. [36]
On November 6, SACSEA Commission No 1 circulated a most incisive report based on information provided by the officers at the Japanese Army HQ at Saigon. While the officers believed the death news, they did not have any doubts that he had for long been working on a Plan B in the event of Japan's defeat:
Bose wanted to go to Manchuria from where he thought he would be able to get in touch with the Russian forces and obtain necessary admission independently. It was in view of this that SC Bose had left Singapore on August 16. [37]
The report noted that the belief in Bose’s death was “growing stronger” though no substantial proof “by way of details or documentary evidence”could be obtained from Southern Army HQ. Therefore, the commission’s investigations were on to locate and interrogate Tada, cross check Rahman’s statement and find pictures which would “probably furnish best proof” of Bose’s death.
A day before he left Bangkok for Kolkata, Finney blew the lid off the centerpiece of the official Japanese version. He was able to locate a person who had attended the secret meeting between Bose, Rahman, Isoda, Tada and others in Bangkok on August 16. Contrary to what Rahman and others had claimed, interpreter Kinji Watanabe told Finney on November 12 that he heard Isoda and others talk about Bose’s escape:
They were discussing how to get Mr Bose to his destination. It was generally understood that he was to get to the Russians, probably to Manchuria. …With regard to Bose’s going to Russia, it was an understood thing in the embassy and in the Hikari Kikan.... [38]
In his written statement, Watanabe provided further details about Bose’s post-war plans:
From the very beginning Bose’s standpoint was very clear: He was ever ready to accept any assistance from any nation if only it desired India to be independent. No doubt he wished to get nearer to Soviet Russia after the telling blow was inflicted upon Japan and his troops, which made him almost give up hope to advance into India from Burma. [39]
He wrote that “Bose was quite sure that in the not-distant future there would be differences between Britain and Russia and that by taking advantages of this opportunity India could proceed further in the independence movement”.
The much awaited pictures taken by the Japanese at Taipei soon after the crash and Bose’s death arrived in New Delhi in the second half of November. Figges made no comment while forwarding them from Tokyo. Because none of the five pictures showed the clincher—Bose’s body. One showed Rahman sitting, bandaged, the other a shrouded corpse and the rest had shots of a mangled plane wreck in front of a hilltop.
On November 22 Saigon Control Commission, SEAC forwarded a “further report on the subject of SC Bose’s intentions and death”. The view from Saigon was that “there is still no proof of Bose's death though it is assumed”. [40] The enclosed report was based on the information provided by JK Bhonsle, who insisted that Bose had “left for Tokyo” on August 17.
In December, CSDIC (India) took custody of Rahman after he had been brought to Delhi by a US military plane on November 23. Throughout that month, Rahman was put through several rounds of interrogations. The outcome was CSDIC Section Report No 1156 of 31 December 1945. On 7 January 1946, Anderson wrote to the Combined Section, IB and others that “the facts of the crash at Taihoku as given in the CSDIC Report No 1156 are considered to establish beyond any doubt that SC Bose did in fact succumb to injuries and burns received in the crash”. [41]
Anderson was confident that Rahman was “sincere in his protestations” and suggested that “for the final and positive proof, a British investigation team would need to be sent up to Formosa from Saigon and Hanoi to examine the hospital records at Taihoku”. [42]
And just when it seemed that an end to the mystery was in sight, Anderson was forced to do a rethink.
Major Toye informed him on January 15 that Pritam, Gulzara, Hasan, Sahay, Thivy and Chatterji “have no positive information either on the death of or on the last intentions of Bose” but still called into question Rahman’s claim.
The choice of persons to accompany Bose is, however, we think, strange if Habib’s story be accepted that Bose was merely going to arrange a separate surrender. Bose first calls Chatterji and Swami to his side: these two are
held up and do not reach him. He then takes Gulzara and Pritam—both Kamkazi boys, Hassn, who knows more about his activities (1941-1944) than any man alive, Ayer, his main confidant and secretary on all Top Secret matters at any rate recently, Debnath, the man closest to him after Ayer and with more experience of political underground than any. Our question is “to what end this wealth of talent if Bose was only going on a routine INA job which Bhonsle or Kiani could have done just as well?” [43]
On 19 February McK Wright sent Major Courtenay Young of CICB, Intelligence Division, HQ, SACSEA in Singapore the first the analyses of the available evidence and leads by the Intelligence Bureau. “The result”, the IB deputy director opined, “is not entirely satisfactory for it reveals many discrepancies”. [44] He described as “unsatisfactory” Habibur Rahman’s CSDIC report due to “the multitude of discrepancies in account of the actual crash, as given first to CIC in Tokyo and later to CSDIC”. [45]
There indeed were irreconcilable details in Rahman’s versions. He told CIC that after the plane crashed, “he had no knowledge of how Bose escaped or was removed from the plane”.
He stated that upon alighting from the plane he noticed his own coat afire. He removed it immediately and then saw Bose lying by the plane with his clothing afire, whereupon Rahman went to the aid of Bose and removed his burning clothing. [46]
But to his CSDIC interrogators he said that the crash impact burst open the celluloid cover above the cockpit and “crawling through it” Bose “dropped to the ground”. Rahman said when he too crawled out, he noticed that his “clothes were not on fire” [47] and Bose was “standing” and trying to remove his clothes.
