by Anuj Dhar
McK Wright found it intriguing that Shidei should have been travelling to Manchuria when the crash happened. “In view of reports…that Bose himself was going to the Russians was this coincidence or intention?” he asked and recommended that Isoda should be “severely re-interrogated” now that Watanabe had confirmed that Bose too was Manchuria-bound.
As on that date, McK Wright determined that “our examination so far only permits us to say that, unless there was a very cleverly contrived and executed deception plot involving a very few of the highest Japanese officials, Bose is almost certainly dead. Any assistance you can give in clearing up the remaining element of doubt would be greatly appreciated”. [48] As an afterthought, McK Wright wrote another letter on February 19 itself to Young about Bose’s Russian connection.
Such information as we have on record about this seems to establish that Bose was definitely interested in the possibility of transferring himself, and perhaps even some of the personnel of his movement, to territory under Russian control, with the collapse of the Japanese in the Far East. …Our belief is that this motive lay behind his last journey, during which he is reported to have been killed. The question arises, of course, as to whether there is any evidence of reciprocated Russian interest in Bose and his movement. About this we so far know nothing. [49]
McK Wright named the persons who could prove to be “fruitful sources” on further interrogation. Like NG Swami and Bhaskaran Menon, and “though possibly more difficult to arrange…Field Marshal Terauchi, his chief of staff, senior officers of the Hikari Kikan and officials of the foreign ministry". [50]
“So far as the Russian angle is concerned I am afraid I can offer you nothing,” Young wrote back on 1 March 1946. Enumerating the numerous suspicions SACSEA on its part had about the veracity of the air crash story, Young concluded that
if it is a deception plan it is one which has been extremely carefully and ingeniously organised. All evidence available to us to the efficiency of the Japanese intelligence organisations indicate that their efforts are comparatively amateurish.... In conclusion it can be said definitely that Bose left Saigon and probably that there was a plane crash at the take-off in Taihoku. It is possible that Bose escaped from the crash unhurt and either hid in Formosa on his own initiative or was hidden by local authorities…. [51]
Young thought that the only “worthwhile move” which could be made to crack the mystery was “to get hold of Tada”.
At the same time he shared intelligence with Young, McK Wright spoke to Anderson over the phone. On 19 February 1946 Anderson was formally intimated that there were “discrepancies in the various accounts” of Bose’s death which he could help clear up “by strict interrogation of those sources available to you”. [52]
Nine days later Anderson and McK Wright received an eye-opener of a report from Toye. It contained a piece of information which in one swoop falsified the statements of all those whom Bose confided in during his last known days.
Despite severe interrogations, Isoda, Rahman, Gulzara, Pritam, Hasan, Thivy and Chatterji had so far either feigned ignorance about Bose’s future plans or claimed he was heading to Tokyo to talk of surrender. Anand Mohan Sahay broke the ranks to talk freely and laid bare Bose’s intentions. Sahay sang before the S Section that Bose had raised the issue of his transfer to Russia with the Japanese foreign minister in late 1944 and that it was confirmed to him by Bose personally and also by Isoda. Sahay compromised his colleagues by telling the section that when Hasan, Ayer, Gulzara and Pritam met him at Hanoi on August 20, “they told him that Bose was bound for Manchuria”. Toye drew the obvious inference:
At all events, the story told by Habib ur Rahman (B1269) in CSDIC 2 Sec Report 1156 that Bose was merely going to arrange a separate surrender for the INA and that he would have returned to Singapore, may be categorically rejected, and it may be accepted that B1269 himself probably knows the truth. [53]
On February 27 Badrinath informed McK Wright that he had “barely started the re-interrogation” of Rahman when he was asked to take care of the trouble arising out of the RIN Naval Mutiny in Mumbai. He suggested that JK Bhonsle be “specially interrogated...to discover from him the truth regarding the meeting in Bangkok”. [54] This was conveyed to Anderson by McK Wright through his March 9 letter dealing with what he now termed as the "alleged" death of Bose.
On March 21 Anderson apprised McK Wright of the results obtained by interrogator Major Hyat Khan. Still “not anxious to provide further information” on his previous stand that Bose had “left for Tokyo” on August 17, Bhonsle eventually conceded that the Bangkok meeting was about “how to get Bose to his destination”. [55]
...it was Bose’s intention to try to find his way into Russia. Bose was certain that once the Russians agreed to take him, they would give him all the necessary protection. He also thought that in the event of an Anglo-American split with Russia, which he definitely foresaw, he might be of some service to the Russians and thus further the cause of his own country. [56]
Hyat Khan noted after the interrogation that Bhonsle “gave the impression that he—and some others—had some idea of Bose’s plans in Russia, but refused to commit himself”.
He evaded all questions relevant to this subject, merely saying that “if Bose’s exact plans were known by his trusted henchmen, none of the latter would ever reveal them now”. [57]
This was enough for Anderson to deduce and convey to McK Wright that as Rahman was present at the Bangkok meeting “it is obvious that he must know as much, if not more, about Bose’s plans”. And since Rahman was continuing to make “bland denials of any such knowledge…a final attempt will now be made to extract the truth from him”. [58] This attempt was made by Hyat Khan. On receipt of his report on March 25, Anderson wrote to McK Wright that Rahman had still “adhered to his earlier attitude of ingenuous denial”. [59]
Rahman repeated that during the Bangkok meeting “the main subject under discussion was the separate surrender of the PGAH [Provisional Government of Azad Hind] and INA”. He admitted that during the meeting, “they discussed the possibility of his transfer to Russia, but thought that in view of the strained Russo/Japanese relations the Japanese government/army were not in a position to negotiate with Russia”. [60]
Rahman described as “purely hearsay” the claims of others that “after the INA withdrawal from Burma, the members of the PGAH and some other senior INA officers had discussed at Bangkok the possibility of approaching Russia for assistance in order to prolong their struggle”. He said he was “himself not present at any such talk” and that Bose “confided in him in so far as matters relating to the armed forces were concerned, but that he (Bose) did not discuss his political plans” with him.
Hyat did not take Rahman’s word for it. He reckoned in his hand written report—available in the National Archives in New Delhi—that even if Rahman “was in the know of Bose’s plans, he would not disclose them. His manner is not very convincing. He talks in a secretive way even if no one is about”. [61]
Anderson emphasised in his 25 March 1946 letter to McK Wright that Rahman’s “equanimity could only be shaken if positive facts could be adduced to disprove his account of Bose’s death at Taihoku” and wondered if the proofs—hospital records that he had earlier specified—“have been obtained from local sources or inquiry at Taihoku”. [62]
Hyat’s report on Rahman prompted the IB to raise a series of questions. On 2 April 1946, Jenkin listed out 19 of them to Anderson and sought a re-interrogation.
Some eight months after the reported air crash, the inquiry into Bose’s fate seemed to be leading up a blind alley. In the early months of 1946, Sir Norman Smith, the IB Director, visited London and “mentioned the receipt from various places in India of information to the effect that Subhas Bose was alive in Russia”. Some circumstantial evidence was forthcoming and consequently Smith was “not more than 90% sure that Subhas is dead”. He was made aware of and recognised the possibility that the Russians
were themselves “circulating the story for reasons of their own”. [63]
But that possibility had been precluded by the officers in India. Finney and others sat down for a meeting on 9 April 1946 to ponder over the intelligence pooled in from several independent sources in the last few months. Helping the discussion was a three-page note from the Combined Section summarising the case so far. It noted at the very start that it was “clear that Bose and his staff were trying to make a getaway to Russia” and that “Habibur Rahman, Pritam Singh, Gulzara Singh and Hasan have all…appear to have lied, or withheld their knowledge, about the reasons for the journey which was being made”. Inputs received by the intelligence organisations from Congressman revealed that Gandhi’s claim about Bose being alive was not based on his “inner voice” as he had said, but “a secret information which he has received”. [64]
The note highlighted—just as Anderson had done earlier—the need for carrying out “the fullest investigation” in Taiwan because “such investigations as have been carried out at Taihoku and elsewhere do not appear to have been as thorough as could be wished”. [65] Puzzling information coming from outside was also making it difficult to accept the air crash theory.
In December a report said that the Governor of the Afghan province of Khost had been informed by the Russian Ambassador in Kabul that there were many Congress refugees in Moscow and Bose was included in their number. There is little reason for such persons to bring Bose into fabricated stories. The view that Russian officials are disclosing or alleging that Bose is in Moscow is supplied in a report received from Tehran. This states that Moradoff, the Russian Vice Consul-General, disclosed in March that Bose was in Russia. [66]
Summing up, the note said that “Taihoku, Congress and Russian representatives in Tehran and Kabul are the most important objectives in this case as it stands now”. [67]
The outcome of the April 9 meeting attended by Finney and certain Wagstaffe is not known. The file which contained the related papers is not available and was probably destroyed—but what comes through clear is that the case was far from closed. On April 10, Anderson informed Jenkin about the outcome of Habibur Rahman’s re-interrogation. It had been carried out by Capt Habibullah Malik, who personally briefed Jenkin about Rahman’s response and his “reactions to further interrogation etc.”. [68] Malik had observed in his report that “throughout the protracted questioning, resentment was visible from B1269’s face and he made no bones about it”. [69]
The results obtained are far from satisfactory and do not take us much further from the original position. Habibur-Rahman has shown little cooperation during the course of this re-interrogation and when in answer to his attitude of ingenuous denials under the cloak of forgetfulness and the undue advantage that he appeared to be taking of his stuttering habit, his interrogator put him a direct question whether he was prepared to allow himself to be taken to Taihoku and point out all relevant places, he thought for moment and then replied in the negative with a retort saying: “I have volunteered all the information that was in my possession…. I have satisfied Mr Gandhi, who came to see me the other day, that SC Bose is dead and reiterate whatever I have stated already in Tokyo and at CSDIC.” [70]
Gandhi had by that time gone public with his revised stand. Writing in Harijian in April 1946, he appealed to “everyone to forget what I have said and …reconcile themselves to the fact that Netaji has left us”.
I had nothing but my instinct to tell me that Netaji was alive. No reliance can be placed on such unsupported feeling. On the other hand, there is strong evidence to counteract the feeling. The British government is party to that evidence. Capt Habibur Rahman has said, he was present at the time of Netaji’s death and has brought back his charred wrist watch. [71]
The British were obviously not convinced. On May 16 the South East Asia Command directed Col Figges in Tokyo to make a fresh inquiry. At the same time, and in an apparent coordinated move, Lt Col Hannessy, the head of Military Intelligence in Bombay, raised the issue with William Donovan, the American Consulate General. Hannessy, who had met Badrinath in March, told Donovan that in August 1945 he was himself in a Taipei prison camp, “which overlooked the airfield where Bose’s plane is reported to have crashed”. He said that “Bose must have been treated in a hospital by some physician; that if he died there must be people who had first-hand knowledge of his death and that there might conceivably be some record of his death; and that further, in the event of his death, there must be person alive today who had some knowledge of his cremation”. [72]
Donovan obliged Hannessy by writing to the State Department. “If the Department could furnish any information on this subject, it would be most helpful to this Consulate General in its contacts with British Military Intelligence at Bombay. Positive proof of some kind that Bose is dead would be most interesting,” [73] his telegram of 23 May 1946 stated. The State Department conferred with the War Department in the Pentagon and in June 1946 reverted to the Consulate: “A search of our files in the Intelligence Division reveals that there is no direct evidence that Subhas Chandra Bose was killed in an airplane crash at Taihoko [sic], Formosa, despite the public statements of the Japanese to that effect. Nor is there any evidence available to the Intelligence Division which would indicate that Bose is still alive.” [74]
The Department advised that the British Military Intelligence should approach G-2, the intelligence agency under Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Tokyo, for further information. It is not known whether the British intelligence sought any details from G-2. What is known, thanks to declassified records, is that by July 25 Colonel Figges was ready with his report. This time he had managed to examine two survivors of the crash—Nonogaki and Arai; three Taiwan army officials who had some personal knowledge of the events and most importantly Sub Lt Dr Toyoshi Tsuruta. To Figges their accounts appear to have tallied “both in substance and detail at all points where the knowledge of the subjects could have been deemed to be based on common experience”. [75]
Nonogaki recalled the air crash and that out of 15 passengers in all, three engineers, a wireless operator, Takizawa and Shidei died instantly. Dr Tsuruta said he supervised Bose’s treatment after he was brought to the hospital at 3pm, but despite his best efforts he passed away around 7pm. Later that evening, Tsuruta, Rahman and Lt Col Shibuya Masanori of the Taiwan Army HQ and another officer discussed “the possibility of embalming the body and taking it on to Tokyo” but Tsuruta “expressed doubts about his ability to ensure preservation in the extreme heat”.
Towards midnight a hastily made coffin arrived from the headquarters of the Taiwan Army and the body was placed in the coffin and covered with a sheet. The following morning the coffin was taken away and Tsuruta understands that it was cremated although he was not an eyewitness of the process. The death certificate which was issued by Tsuruta showed death to be due to heart failure resulting from multiple burns and shock. [76]
Three months after Figges believed what he had been told, Dr Yoshimi made a statement contradicting his junior on some vital points. While being held up in a jail in Hong Kong, Yoshimi told Alfred Turner of the British military that he was in charge of Bose’s treatment, that it was he who had issued his death certificate. His version was that around 5pm the crash survivors were brought at the hospital and Bose died at about 11pm. Yoshimi said that he had been informed that the plane crash killed Shidei and two others who were “unable to escape and were burned with the plane”. He said Takizawa reached hospital alive and was under his care for a few days before he shifted him to another hospital where he died.
“For some unknown reason”, Bose’s body “could not be taken to Japan, and was to be sent to the crematorium for cremation,” Yoshimi added. “I therefore made out a death certificate, stating the cause of death to be extensive burning and shock.” [77]
The death certificate issued by either Yoshimi or Tsuruta would have filled in the most crucial slot in the puzzle and convinced the officers in Ind
ia, at least Anderson, that Habibur Rahman and other witnesses had, after all, told the truth. But both the doctors only talked of issuing the certificate; they did not produce it. Where was the elusive certificate?
Figges’ report stated that Aoyagi’s death at Taihoku’s Hokuto hospital on 29 September 1945 “from the effect of the injuries sustained in the air crash” was “finally established” as the “proof of death was furnished in the form of a death certificate signed by Medical Officer Koike Tetsuo of the Japanese army”. [78] If he had found one for Bose, he would have appended to his report, just as he attached a sketch drawn by Nonogaki showing the sitting arrangement of the passengers in the ill-fated Sally bomber.
Yet another effort to find the truth about the Taipei crash was made in the late 1940s. Some of the Japanese officers connected to it—Nonogaki, Hayashida, Shibuya and Kono—were questioned again at the behest of the British authorities. Lt-Colonel Shibuya later recalled having been “called by the British embassy once and also by the GHQ of the Occupation Forces once” some “three or four years after” the incident. Nonogaki said his statement, and that of Kono, was recorded at the British embassy at around 1950. “I was called through the Japanese foreign office. I got a letter from the foreign office and I went.” Hayashida said that in 1948 some ten persons including him were “examined by the Welfare Ministry authorities of the Japanese government”. Thereafter Hayashida was summoned by “the prefectural police in Fukuoka city...on the request of the American and British intelligence services”. [79]
With India becoming free in August 1947, the Bose mystery was put on the back-burner in the face of urgent and far bigger challenges. Migration of Habibur Rahman to Pakistan dealt a blow to all those who were hoping to extract more out of a man they thought was bound by oath to tell only as much Bose had told him to.
