Edward IV

by Charles Ross

  Reactions in England were coloured not only by outraged national pride but also by resentment that so much public money had been spent to produce such an inglorious outcome. That Edward feared the hostility of his subjects is shown by his failure to make public much of the Treaty of Picquigny, especially the undertakings for mutual aid which he had exchanged with Louis, though news of both the French pension and the marriage alliance found its way into contemporary English chronicles.1 Rumours were rife on the Continent about the dangers which awaited Edward on his return home. Duke Charles was confidently predicting revolution when the English learnt what had happened. It was even said that Edward dared not let his brothers reach home before him, ‘as he feared some disturbance, especially as the duke of Clarence, on a previous occasion, aspired to make himself king’. The Milanese ambassador at the Burgundian court, Panicharolla, reported that the people of England were extremely irritated at the accord, ‘cowardly as it is, because they paid large sums of money without any result’.2

  In practice, these predictions proved to be wide of the mark, so far as may be judged from the meagre English sources of the time. Certainly, there was no outburst of resentment beyond Edward’s capacity to suppress. The Croyland Chronicler reports criticisms of the peace with France, and that disturbances following on the disbandment of the army forced Edward to make a judicial progress through Hampshire and Wiltshire in November and December 1475. He also expressed the opinion that it was as well that Edward acted speedily and vigorously to put an end to ‘this commencement of mischief’, for otherwise

  the number of people complaining of the unfair management of the resources of the kingdom, in consequence of such quantities of treasure being abstracted from the coffers of everyone and uselessly consumed, would have increased to such a degree that no one could have said whose head, among the king’s advisers, was in safety; and the more especially those, who, induced by friendship for the French king or by his presents, had persuaded the king to make the peace previously mentioned.3

  There was enough resentment on this issue of waste of taxpayers’ money for Edward to feel compelled to remit the three-quarters of the fifteenth and tenth due for collection at Martinmas. With Louis’s cash in his pocket, and more to come, he could afford this gesture of pacification. But it is unlikely that he made any profit out of the war-taxation, as some continental critics suggested, and even more unlikely that (as Commynes believed) the hope of reserving to himself large sums from the proceeds of the taxes had been a major reason for his abandoning the campaign.1

  If Edward had failed to realize his proffered schemes of foreign conquest, he could at least claim that the settlement of 1475 brought substantial advantages for his countrymen. The implementation of the commercial agreement at Picquigny, and the removal of all the irksome and expensive restrictions on English trade with France, brought considerable benefits to English merchants and producers, especially those of the south-west, and made a contribution to the commercial prosperity of Edward’s later years no less important than the treaties with the Burgundians and the Hansards.2

  Indirectly, Englishmen also benefited from Edward’s French pension, which helped to make him largely independent of parliamentary taxation for the rest of the reign. Louis XI was at pains to ensure that the pensions to Edward and his councillors were promptly and regularly paid, despite the fact that they represented a heavy annual charge of 56,000 crowns – for he had not, in fact, bought peace with the English for the price of a few venison pies and consignments of wine.3 The royal revenue was further augmented by the somewhat cynical bargain between the two kings over the person of Queen Margaret of Anjou. Whether or not the question of her ransom was discussed at Picquigny we do not know, but arrangements were soon put in hand for her release from captivity. In September 1475, Sir Thomas Montgomery was sent to France to discuss terms. Edward was to surrender all rights over her, and transfer them to Louis in return for a ransom of 50,000 crowns (£10,000), of which sum the first 10,000 should be paid when Margaret was handed over, and the rest in annual instalments. She was also to agree to renounce formally all tide to the Crown of England, to her dower lands, and any other claims she might have against Edward. The transfer was completed at Rouen on 22 January 1476, after she had signed the necessary instruments of renunciation. But the unfortunate queen had merely exchanged one captor for another, and to obtain her liberty she had to give up all claims to the Angevin inheritance of her father, King Réné of Anjou, and her mother, Isabella of Lorraine. For the last six years of her life – she died on 25 August 1482 – she was wholly dependent on the modest pension paid her by the king of France.1

  Both the king and his subjects benefited substantially from the peaceful outcome of his French adventure. Its satisfactory if somewhat inglorious conclusion should not, however, be seen as any great tribute to Edward’s statesmanship. He had fully intended to mount a major military attack upon France, and, with Burgundian aid, to extract considerable territorial concessions from her king. Even if he did not seriously seek to make himself king of France, the defence of any continental conquests would surely have involved him in years of expensive warfare, as English experience under Edward III and Henry VI had proved. The days when England, even in alliance with Burgundy, could seriously challenge the most powerful and wealthy state in Europe were long since past. But only the unexpected failure of Burgundy to cooperate effectively in Edward’s plans enabled him to extricate himself sensibly and profitably. Peace with France, and the avoidance of expensive foreign entanglements, was achieved largely through good fortune rather than good judgement. Moreover, as the events of the next few years were to show, there was a price to be paid for the benefits won at Picquigny. Edward’s desire to retain his French pension and the French marriage planned for his daughter severely limited his freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre after 1475. They purchased English acquiescence in the partial dismemberment of the Burgundian state by Louis of France.

  1 A very different interpretation from that which follows has recently been advanced by J. R. Lander, ‘The Hundred Years War and Edward IV’s Campaign in France’, in Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government, ed. A. J. Slavin, 70–100. Lander argues (p. 81) that the campaign of 1475 should be seen ‘not as a revival of the genuinely aggressive policies of Henry V, but as … a somewhat defensive reaction to the development of Anglo-Burgundian-French relationships over the past two decades’. My reasons for differing from this view will appear generally below, but see especially pp. 211–14, 223–4.

  2 Literae Cantuarienses, ed. J. B. Sheppard (Rolls Series, 1889), III, 277, 279 – the official address on the king’s behalf to the parliament of 1472.

  1 Commynes, I, 139, says Charles and Edward disliked each other in 1471, and CSP, Milan, I, 161, speaks of Edward being ‘ill-content with the savage treatment’ he had received from the duke. According to Commynes, Edward and his council also became ‘unnecessarily worked up’ about reports that Charles planned to marry his daughter Mary to Louis’s brother, Charles (op. cit., 221–5). For these negotiations, see Scofield, II, 15–17, 24–5; Calmette and Perinelle, Louis XI et l’Angleterre, 146–9.

  2 B. A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, François II, Duc de Bretagne, et l’Angleterre, 155–7. Francis had sent money to Edward in exile, and in 1475 Edward was at pains to include Brittany in the treaty; see below, p. 233.

  3 Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, op. cit., 166–9; Scofield, II, 19–20; Calmette and Perinelle, 148.

  4 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 737–40; Scofield, II, 33–4; CPR, 1467–77, 339–40 356. For Charles’s offer, Calmette and Perinelle, 152–4, and also for evidence that the 3,000 archers were actually sent to Burgundy, supported by Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, 171. Cf. Vaughan, Charles the Bold, 83.

  1 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 760; Morice, Mémoires de Bretagne, III, 246–9 (for text of treaty); Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, 172–3.

  2 For a contemporary account of his visit, see ‘The Record of Bluemantle Pursuivant�
�, in Kingsford, English Historical Literature, 380–8.

  3 State Papers, Henry VIII, VI, pt v, 1–8 (instructions to English embassy, January 1473).

  4 Lander, ‘The Hundred Years War and Edward IV’s 1475 Campaign in France’, 70–7.

  1 Literae Cantuarienses, 274–85; and for 1463 and 1468, below, pp. 348–9.

  2 Cf. Lander, op. cit., for a different view.

  3 CPR, 1467–77, 363; Scofield, II, 40–1; Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, op. cit., 174–5.

  1 State Papers, Henry VIII, VI, pt v, 1–8; Scofield, II, 46–9.

  1 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 778; Scofield, II, 64–5.

  2 For Charles’s imperial schemes, see J. Bartier, Charles le Téméraire, 150–203; J. Calmette and E. Deprez, Les Premières Grandes Puissances (Histoire du Moyen Age, ed. G. Glotz, VII, pt 2), 89–100; Kendall, Louis XI, 254–73. The most recent and valuable discussion of his eastern policies, and of his diffusion of aims, is now to be found in Vaughan, op. cit., chapters 8–9.

  3 Scofield, II, 91–4. In February 1474 Charles agreed to a truce with France which was extended to last until 1 May 1475.

  1 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 804–14; Scofield, II, 95–6.

  2 E.g., Calmette and Perinelle, 161, 164, 168, and see further below, pp. 223–4.

  3 For the strength of the Burgundian army, J. Bartier, op. cit., 173 ff.; Vaughan, op. cit., 197–227.

  4 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 817–19 (indenture 20 August 1474 with Sir Richard Tunstall).

  1 For a detailed survey of these negotiations, see Scofield, II, 63, 67–84.

  2 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 793–803; Hanserecesse, II, 7, 341–353.

  3 Power and Postan, Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century, 137–8.

  4 Scofield, II, 53–4.

  1 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 820–34; Scofield, II, 62–3, 101–4; and below, pp. 278–9.

  2 C. H. Clough, ‘Relations between the English and Urbino Courts, 1474–1508’, Studies in the Renaissance, xiv (1967), 202–18; Scofield, I, 369, 401–2 (for Naples).

  3 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 834–6.

  1 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 841–2; XII, 2–3; CPR, 1467–77,480. For Peninsular neutrality, Calmette and Perinelle, 173–5.

  2 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 775.

  3 Commynes, ed. Lenglet, III, 457 (St Pol’s confession); ed. de Mandrot, I, 283 n.; Calmette and Perinelle, I, 179.

  4 CPR, 1647–77, 542, 551–2; Scofield, II, 99–101, 124; Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, op. cit., 190–4; Calmette and Perinelle, 177.

  5 Below, pp. 342–3.

  1 RP, VI, 4–8. For a useful analysis of the financial measures of the 1472–5 parliament, see H. L. Gray, ‘The First Benevolence’, in Facts and Factors in Economic History Presented to J. F. Gay, ed. A. E. Cole, A. L. Dunham and N. S. B. Gras, 90–113.

  2 RP, VI, 39–41; Gray, op. cit., 103.

  1 RP VI, 113–19.

  2 Jacob, The Fifteenth Century (Oxford History of England), 204.

  3 PL, V, 178 (26 March 1473).

  4 Ramsay, Lancaster and York, II, 401, 463.

  1 CSP, Milan, I, 193–4 (letter from London, 17 March 1475).

  2 GC, 223; Gray, op. cit., 90–9. Much of the work was done by special commissioners each answering for one or two counties; the amounts paid in by fifteen of these receivers are preserved, but eleven are missing.

  3 Gray, op. cit., 105; Rymer, Foedera, XI, 844–8, and for the artillery and naval preparations, below, pp. 218–20.

  4 RP, VI, 121, 151.

  1 RP, VI, 149–53.

  2 CSP, Milan, I, 197–8 (Thomas de Portinari writing from Bruges, 28 June). See also Commynes, II, 27, for similar remarks.

  3 CPR, 1467–77, 515–16, 526–7, 529, 537; Scofield, II, 106, 118; Calmette and Perinelle, 167 n. 3.

  1 CPR, 1467–77, 493–6, 515, 525–6; Rymer, Foedera, XI, 839, 843–4, 850–1; XII, 4–5; Calmette and Perinelle, 346–7; and for the king’s ships, Richmond, ‘English Naval Power in the Fifteenth Century’, 13–15.

  2 CPR, 1467–77, 543, 545.

  3 Ibid., 480, 511, 521; and for Edward’s policy towards piracy in general, see below, pp. 366–7.

  4 Rymer, Foedera, XII, 1; CPR, 1467–77, 527 (for Dinham’s appointment as admiral, 15 April); Scofield, II, 122; Calmette and Perinelle, 168 and n. Commynes, II, 30, gives an estimate of 500 flat-bottomed boats hired from Holland and Zeeland – probably an overestimation; but the exchequer paid out £663 to charter them (Calmette and Perinelle, 168 n. 4, citing Tellers’s Rolls).

  1 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 837–9; CCR, 1468–76, 376–7; Calmette and Perinelle, 358–61, for indenture of returned equipment, 29 September 1475.

  2 Rymer, Foedera, XI, 840–1; CPR, 1467–77, 474, 492; CSP, Milan, I, 201. An Italian visitor to London, writing on 17 March 1475, remarked on Edward’s personal interest in his ordnance: ibid., I, 194.

  3 Scofield, II, 119–20; Calmette and Perinelle, 184, 358–61.

  4 CPR, 1467–77, 495–6, 514, 524, 526; Rymer, Foedera, XI, 847–8; Scofield, II, 116.

  1 The fullest analysis of the available material is by Lander, ‘The Hundred Years War and Edward IV’s Campaign’, 91–3 and tables. See also F. P. Barnard, Edward IV’s French Expedition of 1475: the Leaders and their Badges (from College of Arms, MS. 2 M. 16). The host also included a large number of non-combatants. Edward IV himself told the Milanese ambassador to Burgundy that his force mustered almost 20,000 men (Calmette and Perinelle, 188 n. 1), a point overlooked by Lander.

  2 Commynes, II, 27. Henry V’s largest army, in 1417, numbered some 10,000 fighting men (Jacob, The Fifteenth Century, 171).

  3 Of the twenty-six barons summoned to the 1472–5 parliament, five were already dead, and one (de la Warr) died soon after; Dacre and Dudley were members of the council in England; Audley was captain of the Breton force, and Dinham was at sea. Two eldest sons of peers (Dacre of the South and Grey of Wilton) also served. There are discrepancies between the lists of those who contracted to serve and those present with the king in France on 13 August 1475, e.g. the duke of Buckingham (Rymer, Foedera, XII, 14–15).

  4 Lander, op. cit., 94–5.

  1 Lander, 95. E.g. Sir Thomas Burgh, master of the horse, had 16 spears and 160 archers, and three other knights of the body had each 10 spears and 100 archers.

  2 Cf. Scofield, II, 120–1, for a different and unconvincing account of the reasons for this change of plan. It is very unlikely, as she believed, that Edward changed the rendezvous to Barham Downs on the advice of Duke Charles, for Charles wanted Edward to invade Normandy, not to land at Calais. With a great question-mark still hanging over Charles’s intentions and ability to help with the required forces, it became essential to land at the English-controlled port of Calais.

  3 CPR, 1467–77, 534–5; Scofield, II, 125–6; Bentley, Excerpta Historica, 366–79 (for the will; for its terms, see below, p. 417). He also made concessions to many of his chief supporters waiving his rights to wardship in the event of their deaths on active service (J. M. W. Bean, The Decline of English Feudalism, 1215–1540, 240–2).

  1 CC, 558; Commynes, II, 30–1; Jean de Roye, Journal, I, 334; Scofield, II, 130–1.

  2 Rymer, Foedera, XII, 7–11; CCR, 1468–76, 388–9; Halliwell, Letters of the King of England, I, 144; Scofield, II, 127–8.

  3 Commynes, II, 76, 241, 245–6, a view of Edward’s actions reproduced by some modern scholars, e.g. Calmette and Perinelle, 161; CSP, Milan, I, 178.

  4 CSP, Milan, I, 182–3; Calmette and Perinelle, 164.

  5 CSP, Milan, I, 194.

  6 Calmette and Perinelle, 168–73, and further below.

  1 Lander, op. cit., 100.

  2 Bartier, Charles le Téméraire, 167 ff.; Kendall, Louis XI, 262–73.

  3 Commynes, II, 8. Rymer, Foedera, XI, 791, prints a commission to Sir John Parr and William Sturgeon to muster a force of 13 men-at-arms and 1,000 archers for service with the duke.

  1 Commynes, II, 14–16, 17–19, 26–7; T. Basin, Histoire de Louis XI, ed. Samaran, II, 233 fr.; CSP, Milan, I, 19
5–6; Scofield, II, 122–4; Calmette and Perinelle, 180–1. Vaughan, op. cit., 344–5, has shown recently that the effects of the siege of Neuss for the Burgundian army have been exaggerated, and that Charles’s joining Edward with only his household men was part of a deliberate plan.

  2 Commynes, II, 76–7, who also suggests that Edward wanted to keep the war-taxes for himself. James III of Scotland told Louis XI that Edward would face rebellion if he gave up his expedition to France and disbanded the army (Scofield, II, 53–4).

  1 Commynes, II, 36–7.

  2 CC, 558.

  1 CSP, Milan, I, 196–7; Gingins la Sarraz, Dépêches, I, 154–60, 192–5; Calmette and Perinelle, 185–7.

  2 This account of the movements of the English army follows the reconstruction of Calmette and Perinelle, 187–90; cf. Scofield, II, 132–3,

  1 Some of these arguments are set forth in a memorandum sent by Edward to Duke Charles at Namur on 26 August (CSP, Milan, I, 202–4; Galmette and Perinelle, 356–8); others derive from the comments of the Milanese correspondents and Gommynes (II, 38–9, 76).

  2 Ibid., II, 28–9; Lander, op. cit., 97–8 (who, however, too readily dismisses the military experience of the English gained in their own civil wars).

  1 Commynes, II, 39–45, for a detailed account of all this.

  2 Rymer, Foedera, XII, 14–15. Buckingham was not present on this occasion, which confirms the entry against his retinue in Barnard, op. cit., Returned Home’. In view of his relations with Edward (below, p. 335), it would be interesting to know why.