The Last Days of Socrates

by Plato

  31. Meletus: Meletus’s connection with the poets is unclear; it may be that we should associate him with the figure mentioned by Aristophanes at Frogs 1302.

  32. Anytus: Anytus was a prominent politician under the revived democracy, and is represented as being prejudiced against sophists and the like at Meno 89c–95a.

  33. Lycon on behalf of the orators: We know little about Lycon, but later tradition continued to connect him with the orators.

  34. in the short time that I have: See note 6, above. Note that there is an implied criticism of Athenian court procedure here.

  35. ‘Socrates is guilty… by the State’: This is not word for word. The corruption charge has here been put first, though it followed the atheism charges in the actual affidavit: see Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.1, and Diogenes Laertius 2.40 (from Favorinus).

  36. has never given the slightest attention: Terminology translated ‘give attention’ here and elsewhere in the cross-examination puns crudely on Meletus’s name, whose root (mele-) suggests somebody who cares or pays attention to something.

  37. the members of the Assembly: Note that the Assembly was open to all adult male citizens; Socrates himself could have attended. He had in fact been a member of the Council, whose membership numbered 500. Meletus’s assent, which is no doubt given so that he should seem to be a committed supporter of democratic ideals and institutions, thus takes an unreasonably optimistic view of the numbers able to improve young men.

  38. unintentionally: It is a common Socratic theme that ‘nobody errs willingly’, i.e. that all crimes are committed as a result of some ignorance. But to found an argument on his own somewhat paradoxical doctrine (how can a court accept that nobody willingly commits a crime?) is a dangerous tactic.

  39. you deliberately avoided my company in the past: Compare Anytus’s fanatical avoidance of sophists at Meno 91c.

  40. you disbelieve in gods altogether: Meletus is in a quandary: he may very well be aware that there was a wealth of sophistic arguments designed to show that anything one believed could not be false or non-existent (see Euthydemus c283 ff.), but what his charge means is that Socrates does not believe in any god which can be credited as such, though he does introduce divinities of his own imagining, which accordingly do not exist. The jury would feel considerable sympathy for Meletus, knowing very well what was meant, as presumably Socrates did too. Rather than admit Socrates believes in gods and be forced to admit that there exist gods in which Socrates believes, he opts to defend the position that Socrates has no belief in any god.

  41. that the sun and moon are gods: A leading question, since the sun and moon, though often involved in myth and cult, are hardly typical ‘gods’ in the Greek anthropomorphic mould, nor are they gods associated specially with Athens. Socrates is inviting Meletus to make the error of attributing Anaxagorean theories to him (see note 42, below).

  42. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Anaxagoras, a generation older than Socrates, is reputed to have been banished from Athens at some time, probably c. 450 BC, in part because of his seemingly irreligious doctrines which gave physical rather than divine explanations of many features of the universe. Socrates was often associated in antiquity with Anaxagoras’s pupil Archelaus. He believed that the sun was a huge incandescendent stone, the moon similar but not ablaze, since it was illuminated by the sun. See H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (6th edn., Berlin 1951–2), 59A42.

  43. in the orchestra: Normally an area within a Greek theatre used for the chorus’s dances during a performance. It might have been used for other purposes at times. However, we are told that such a name was also given to an area within the agora at Athens, which might seem a more likely location for trading in books.

  44. supernatural beings: Daemones, a less specific term than ‘gods’, often used of some supernatural power which is unidentified by the speaker or not recognized by Greeks as a god in the normal sense, but nevertheless able to be applied to the gods.

  45. Do we not hold… of gods?: This might have an appearance of orthodoxy, but in fact the term daemon, translated ‘supernatural being’, can be used for a host of mysterious powers (fate, fortune, dead souls, etc.).

  46. As for your prospect… possibility: Socrates finishes with a rhetorical flourish, but with a sentence whose complexity and opacity can only contribute to an impression of deviousness.

  47. more rhetorical at first: Note the shock tactic of 28a, the anonymous objection at 28b, the favourable comparison of oneself with others at 28c–d, and the mention of military service at 28e.

  48. the son of Thetis: Achilles, hero of the Iliad, from which Socrates now gives a paraphrase of 18.94–106.

  49. ‘Next after Hector is thy fate prepared’: Iliad 18.96.

  50. Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium: The three campaigns at which Socrates is known to have served as a hoplite (foot soldier). The fighting around Potidaea in 432 BC, just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, was intense, and Socrates’ friends are surprised to see him back (Charmides b153); he saved Alcibiades there, and again showed great gallantry at Delium in the disaster of 424 BC (Symposium d220). Plato does not refer elsewhere to Socrates fighting at Amphipolis. A battle at Amphipolis, like Potidaea a Thracian settlement, took place in 422 BC, but Burnet doubts whether an elderly Socrates could have served in a small select force then. Fighting also took place there in 437 BC.

  51. stop philosophizing: Note that this is not a real option for the court – the notion is introduced so that Socrates can make his priorities clear.

  52. I do not believe… worse: A radical idea, unlikely to convince the jury, and likely to be taken as a gesture of defiance. Socrates sometimes believes that the only significant way of helping or harming a man is to give or take away knowledge (Euthydemus b292, Protagoras b345). As we see from the Phaedo (97c), Socrates believes in a rationally governed universe, in which evil will not triumph over good.

  53. such as you often hear in the courts: It was normal for a defendant to insert a catalogue of his own and his family’s services to the city.

  54. our tribe Antiochis was presiding: Members of each tribe were selected for duty by lot, and each tribe took its turn to serve as presidents (or prytaneis) for one month. At this time they had a great deal of extra executive power.

  55. lost in the naval engagement: The Athenians fought a sea-battle at Arginusae in 406 BC, where victory was marred by the failure (owing to a storm) to recover the bodies. It was decided illegally to try all the generals responsible for this calamity (only eight in fact, of whom two were not present, having fled Athens) by a single vote.

  56. the Round Chamber: The Tholos, where the Thirty had their headquarters, but which was generally used by the prytaneis.

  57. the attention: There may once again be a play on the name of Meletus here; it has been argued that Socrates may be alluding to the fact that Meletus had himself taken part in the arrest of Leon; see H. Blumenthal, Philologus 117 (1973), pp. 169–78, and J. J. Kearney, Classical Quarterly 30 (1980), pp. 296–8. See also note 58, below.

  58. the other four… arrested Leon: It is interesting that one of their names was Meletus (Andocides, On the Mysteries 94), a man who took part in the prosecution of Andocides for religious crimes. Scholars have often thought that this Meletus could not possibly have been the prosecutor of Socrates, but see previous note.

  59. duty upon man: The effect of this passage is to liken Socrates to the soothsayers, who were held in very little honour during the Peloponnesian War, being satirized mercilessly in comedy, and suffering from a mood of general scepticism as to the efficacy of trying to keep the gods on one’s side. Compare the treatment Euthyphro had experienced (Euthyphro 3b–c).

  60. Crito: The interlocutor in Crito.

  61. Aeschines: A prominent Socratic who wrote dialogues of which significant fragments remain. See T. J. Saunders (ed.), Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues (Penguin, 1987).

  62. The son of Demodocus; his brother was T
heages: Demodocus and Theages appear in Plato’s (?) Theages.

  63. Adimantus: Prominent in the Republic, along with Plato’s other brother Glaucon.

  64. Apollodorus: Narrator of the Symposium; he also appears in the Phaedo.

  65. “from an oak or from a rock”: Homer, Odyssey 19.163; implying that one has all the usual human connections.

  66. three of them: Lamprocles, Sophroniscus and Menexenus.

  67. whom their fellow-citizens choose… positions: J. Burnet (Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito (Oxford, 1924), p. 147) finds here a reference to the practice of prokrisis, or selection prior to lot, but it is difficult to be sure that the language is technical.

  68. impious: i.e. a crime against the gods, as contravening an oath.

  69. thirty votes: If the number of the jury was the reputed 500 or 501 and 30 is not a round figure, then the vote was 280 to 220 or 221.

  70. one fifth of the votes: Socrates is mocking Meletus still. The total of votes cast against Socrates was less than three fifths, and he divides the number by three, attributing just over ninety votes to each speaker.

  71. free dining in the Prytaneum:As provided for victors at the Olympic and perhaps other games, and for certain representatives of eminent families, etc. Socrates is clearly being most provocative in proposing a considerable State honour as his punishment.

  72. penalty: Socrates’ belief that nobody does wrong willingly does not elsewhere lead to the view that nobody deserves to be punished: indeed Gorgias 474–81 argues that it is better for a man who has erred to submit to punishment.

  73. whichever Eleven hold office: A reference to the eleven magistrates in charge of prisons, etc.

  74. very likely accept the suggestion: This is confirmed by the Crito (52c), and the accusers would almost certainly have been satisfied with it.

  75. you’ll think I’m pulling your leg: i.e. they will think Socrates is using his ‘irony’: I have tried to translate in such a way as to suggest both evasion and playfulness.

  76. a hundred drachmae: Said by Xenophon (Oeconomicus 2.3) to have been about a fifth of his entire property.

  77. you can rely upon these gentlemen for its payment: The fine proposed is finally a large one, but the jury now know that he will not be bearing the brunt of it himself. What kind of punishment will it be?

  78. a lack of effrontery and impudence: How paradoxical this would have sounded to a jury who had no doubt felt Socrates to be the most impudent offender they had come across and the least willing to bow to the authority of the court.

  79. Gentlemen of the jury: One should remember during this section that the dikasts were both jury and judges, so a true juryman will also be a true judge, judging truly.

  80. as we are told: It is generally assumed that Socrates has Orphic and/or Pythagorean ideas in mind here; the belief in some kind of after-life was of course common, but the more orthodox Greek view made this a dismal half-life which could not be welcomed. One may compare ideas on the after-life which emerge in the Phaedo. Gorgias a493–d certainly has an Orphic/Pythagorean myth of the after-life in mind; Meno 81a–b thinks of a specific type of person as holding relevant beliefs in the after-life, though it is to be emphasized that their views also allow for the return of souls to this world. No such provision is made in the Apology.

  81. the Great King himself: The King of Persia was seen by the Greeks as a paradigm of worldly happiness.

  82. Minos and Rhadamanthys and Aeacus: A traditional triad of just men who were rewarded with the role of underworld judges, and who feature in the myth of judgement at the end of the Gorgias (c523 ff.). There is an implication that Socrates will find much in common with these traditionally just figures!

  83. Triptolemus: An agricultural divinity, associated with the cult of Demeter and Kore. He may take the place of Minos in Athenian representations of the underworld judges, for Minoan Crete had been considered an unjust enemy of Athens.

  84. Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer: Musaeus and Orpheus were seen as the supreme bards of the Orphic religion; Hesiod and Homer were of course the two supremely influential Greek epic poets, who also had considerable influence on the shape of religious beliefs. Note the somewhat immodest assumption that Socrates will readily be able to mix with the great figures who shaped Greek religion.

  85. Palamedes and Ajax the son of Telamon: Both in a sense victims of the wily Odysseus. Palamedes was supposed to have been tried and executed on false treason charges (a story from the Cypria), while Ajax committed suicide after losing the ‘trial’ for the arms of Achilles. Socrates is now succeeding in comparing himself with two heroes of the Trojan War period!

  86. the leader of that great host against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus: Agamemnon (Greek leader in the Trojan War, who had to sacrifice his daughter in order to sail), Odysseus (famed for worldly cunning) and Sisyphus (a Corinthian king famed for unscrupulous cleverness, and subsequently doomed to eternal punishment in Hades) were all figures in whom Socrates might expect to find character defects and unsound moral reasoning.

  Crito

  1. I come here so often: Crito, like other friends of Socrates, had been visiting him regularly in prison. Though the death sentence was normally carried out without delay, the annual sea-mission to Delos to celebrate the victory of Theseus over the Minotaur and Minoan Crete had left on the day before Socrates’ trial. No execution could take place until the ship returned, giving Socrates plenty of time to escape if he desired – a perfectly normal occurrence. Undoubtedly discussions about the desirability of escape would have taken place. P Köln 205 (Kölner Papyri, Opladen) preserves fragments of another writer’s dialogue on this same issue.

  2. he is under some small obligation to me: It seems that Crito had been tipping the jailer.

  3. the boat which ends my reprieve when it arrives: See note 1 above; also Phaedo 58a–c.

  4. Sunium: The nearest point of Attica to Delos, about thirty miles south-east of Athens.

  5. thou shalt come: Homer, Iliad 9.363, slightly altered; the line implied that Achilles was going home to Phthia, and its use here suggests that Socrates is returning to his real home.

  6. The most sensible people: Epieikestatoi: the term used is suggestive of those who have a degree of superiority, and since it is often opposed to the qualities of the masses (e.g. in Aristotle and Thucydides), it can suggest a willingness to criticize popular politics and beliefs.

  7. power for doing good: Compare Politicus a303 on the weakness of democracy as an agency for good or for evil.

  8. They cannot make a man wise or foolish: The doctrine that knowledge is the only real good, and ignorance the only real evil. See note 52 to Apology, above.

  9. Simmias… and Cebes: These two will be the principal interlocutors in the Phaedo.

  10. all this disgrace for you and us to bear: Crito is observing, in a non-technical manner, that their interests and the moral course are in agreement. It is a well-known Socratic theme that one’s interests always coincide with morality – thus what is bad for one coincides with what is morally dishonourable (cf. 49b).

  11. my ‘friends’: A striking personification of argument (logos), anticipating the striking personification of the Laws later.

  12. the arguments which I used to expound in the past: Already we have the picture of a Socrates who adheres to certain tenets (or at the very least hammers certain themes), who stands in contrast to the ‘Socrates’ familiar from the aporetic dialogues. However, the tenets are for himself, not necessarily something to be imposed on others; the reader should judge from what follows how far Socrates’ tenets accord with expectations derived from other dialogues which have been read.

  13. reverting to your point about people’s opinions: It is true they do ‘revert’ – to an issue which seemed to have been adequately if briefly tackled before (44c–d).

  14. wrong: The view that all people’s opinions are equally correct is not supposed to be ridiculous, but is indeed asso
ciated with Protagoras at (e.g.) Theaetetus b152.

  15. whether it will remain the same: The notion that arguments are not once and for all conclusive, but have to be repeated and tested in a variety of situations throughout life, seems typical of Socrates, as evidenced particularly by the discussion with Callicles in the Gorgias (d481 ff.).

  16. you are not likely to have your judgement upset by this impending calamity: This seems a strange lapse on the author’s part, for there had been great initial care to contrast Socrates’ coolness with Crito’s agitation.

  17. that part of us… unjust: Socrates has in mind that entity normally translated as ‘soul’ (as Republic b609 ff. shows), but there is a curious reluctance to use the usual word here.

  18. the expert in justice and injustice: Again a striking personification.

  19. ‘the people have the power to put us to death’: Such sentiments have occurred less explicitly at 44d; they are also typical of Callicles in the Gorgias (e.g. b486–c).

  20. would bring them back to life if they could: The democracy was notorious for changing its mind after the imposition of a death sentence. One example is the change of heart after the illegal trial of the generals after Arginusae (Apology 32b); another famous case is the changed decision over the Mytileneans in Book 3.36 ff. of Thucydides.

  21. equal indifference to reason: It is clear from 54a that Socrates does not regard the bringing-up of sons as a matter of indifference; perhaps also, from 45a, that he does not regard expense as such.

  22. there is no difference… injustice: Plato’s theory of punishment tends to regard just punishments as being for the good of the person punished, e.g. Gorgias d476 ff.; punishment is never rightly undertaken for the purpose of revenge, Protagoras b342. Compare also Republic b332–a336: the good man does not harm his enemy.

  23. I know that there are… decision: This seems unusually pessimistic for Socrates; his elenchus assumes some glimmer of the correct moral principles in all of us, and he is not shy of tackling a Callicles or a Thrasymachus. Does the Socrates of the Crito preach only to the semi-converted?