The Last Days of Socrates

by Plato

  152. made tall by something short: There is the assumption here that where X and Y are opposites, something possessing the property Y could not be the cause of anything coming to have the property X. The assumption would be typical of Greek medicine: if the doctor wants to bring about a moister or warmer body he does not give it dry, very cold nourishment, for that will make it drier and colder still. Plato assumes that the principle has a wider application; for another relevant passage see Theaetetus d199, where it seems absurd that one’s knowledge can make one ignorant.

  153. If anyone should question: There is a problem in the text at this point. The verb translated ‘hold fast to’ is repeated from above. Various emendations are proposed. ‘Refuse to answer’ suggests that this should have been the verb for asking a question, with the addition of a preposition.

  154. more basic hypothesis: Literally ‘higher’ hypothesis; it is difficult to explain the phrase without reference to the hierarchy of ‘hypotheses’ leading up to the Idea of the Good as ‘unhypothesized principle’ in Republic 6, 510–11. Plato also speaks of a hypothetical method which he has taken over from the mathematicians at Meno 86c–87b, another passage which ought hopefully to be related to this present one. That passage used the term ‘hypothesis’ for a condition which if it obtained would make something else to be so. Here Socrates has been suggesting that any given property (F) will be true of x if there is an F-ness which x participates in. If the truth of the ‘hypothesis’ were questioned, one would have to produce another condition which, if it applied, would make the original hypothesis true. Thus ‘hypothesis’ is being used for a logical reason (a sufficient condition), as opposed to the mechanical reasons and motivational reasons that have been earlier discussed.

  155. one of these masters of contradictions: One thinks naturally of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in Plato’s Euthydemus, as well as the persons accused at 90c of abusing argument. The error described, however, is not a known technique of such sophists.

  156. Forms: Ideas; the terminology is deliberately varied.

  157. an accurate reflection of the facts: This claim is generally regarded as excessive. It would, however, be perfectly justified if Socrates were here employing a quasi-Protagorean theory of sensation, whereby the various non-essential predicates of a thing are not strictly embodied ‘in’ a thing at all, but result rather from the way the perceiver views that thing (and in some cases in relation to what he views it), only coming to be ‘in’ it as a result of that interaction between viewer and object, as at Theaetetus 156.

  158. “in”: I have enclosed the preposition in inverted commas because its significance has been a matter of controversy. While it is clear that Plato is referring to a quality as it is associated with humans, etc., ‘in’ is the standard way of referring to a property which belongs to something, and it may not have any metaphysical significance. Hence whether Plato is operating with three metaphysical levels, so that he has not only tall things and a transcendent Idea of Tallness but also tallness immanent in us, is not entirely clear. Above all it is not clear whether ‘tallness in us’ implies more than the tallness that human beings envisage as being in us.

  159. earlier in the discussion: See the Argument from Opposites, beginning at 70a.

  160. the opposite itself: Plato does not here mean the Idea of the Opposite, but the Idea of any quality which has another quality opposite to it.

  161. Nature: By ‘that which is in Nature’ Plato again means the Idea. Similar language is also found in Republic 10 (b597–a598) and the Cratylus (a389–d). The expression ought to remind one of how far Plato intends his theory to offer an alternative to Presocratic physics. The Ideas are somehow more ‘natural’ than particulars in so far as they always follow their own nature.

  162. the qualities themselves… names: The theory that particulars derive their name from the Idea. This relates to Simmias ‘coming to be described as’ small or large (102c) and to 78e, and is a regular part of Platonic theory. Of course Plato does not attempt to say that (e.g.) white things are ‘white’ in the same way as the Idea of White is ‘white’.

  163. the same as snow and fire: There has been considerable debate here as to whether Plato is now talking about Ideas of Snow and Fire, immanent forms, or just the fire and snow with which we are all familiar. In the absence of any trace of language which might identify them as Ideas, it is best to assume that Plato was content to have us think of ordinary fire and snow. The reason why ordinary snow must never be hot is that it must be accompanied by the immanent form ‘cold’ (thus participating in the Idea of Cold), not because it is itself immanent in some subject.

  164. Oddness: Following what seems to be a physical example, we now come to a mathematical one, as if it made no difference to Plato what sorts of thing are able to have these essential properties and so resist the opposite properties.Insome ways this isanadvantage because it excuses him from first discussing in great detail what sort of thing the soul in particular is. The number three, however, is here treated rather as an immanent form, able to belong to (e.g.) three pencils and requiring them to participate in the Idea ‘Odd’.

  165. while it is still three: One might profitably consider what happens to the ‘three’inthree pencils when a fourth pencilis added to make them even in number. Clearly we cannot have a case of three any longer.

  166. approach: The term translated ‘approach’ suggests also hostility, as if the approach were that of an advancing enemy. Note that the term ‘Forms’ is now, and in some cases hereafter, unlikely to apply specifically to the transcendent Platonic Idea, which is fixed and immobile. It is the heat in something which would approach the cold in something else.

  167. they are things which compel… opposite: There is uncertainty here. One might also translate ‘which are compelled by whatever gets a hold on them… ’. Translation here is often thought to be crucial for the interpretation of the whole passage, and as I translate it there is thought to be an implication that these things, in so far as they get a hold on others, must be Ideas themselves. I think it would be truer to say that they must be either Ideas or immanent forms, and there is a strong weighting towards the latter: wherever an immanent form ‘fire’ or ‘three’ enters upon a block of wood or a family of geese, then there will be hot wood (excluding ‘cold’) or three geese (excluding ‘even’).

  168. the character: A third word (morphe) for a ‘Form’ or ‘Idea’ now appears, though we seem now to be focusing on the immanent presence of the Idea.

  169. Un-dying: This does not yet mean immortal, but ‘unable to receive death or the state of being dead’.

  170. we are told: Socrates reverts once again to ‘Orphic’ tales of the after-life.

  171. the office of escorting souls from this world to the other: This was one of the traditional roles of Hermes, though it would be uncharacteristic of Plato to be concerned with the name.

  172. the ceremonies and observances of this world: Plato often gives myth-like material an aetiological role, making it explain features here in the life that is familiar to us. The translation ‘ceremonies’ is uncertain; most manuscripts have the unnecessarily specific ‘sacrifices’.

  173. so I’m led to believe: Myth-like material is frequently treated by Plato as a matter of belief rather than knowledge; cf. Gorgias a524, Republic c621. Note that although it is here implied that Socrates has been convinced by somebody, Simmias’s response shows that the reader is not intended to find this theory at all familiar.

  174. Glaucus: Not to be identified with certainty, but references to the skill of Glaucus were proverbial, and variously explained in antiquity.

  175. sufficient to support it: Socrates’ response to the Presocratic theories satirized at 99b–c.

  176. the river Phasis: On the east side of the Black Sea, and the eastern boundary of the world as known to the Greeks.

  177. the pillars of Hercules: The Strait of Gibraltar at the western end of the Mediterranean.

  178. if
his nature were strong enough to keep looking: As eyes are not able to withstand watching the eclipsing sun (99d–e), so only the philosophic mind is thought of as able to withstand the intellectual light of the upper regions.

  179. there is nothing worth mentioning that grows there: Plato is probably thinking of the absence of flowering and fruiting plants, not of a lack of vegetation generally.

  180. a story: A mythos, or ‘myth’; however, the Greek term is not quite as technical as its English equivalent. That Socrates feels that the ‘story’ is only now beginning indicates a slight difference in status between the preliminary description of the earth (based perhaps on Socrates’ conviction of how things ought to be if the world is organized for the best) and the more fanciful details which are to follow.

  181. made of twelve pieces of skin: Balls made in the shape of a regular dodecahedron, with twelve surfaces each of which is a regular pentagon. Plato’s Demiurge used this shape for the cosmos as a whole at Timaeus c55.

  182. round the air, as we live round the sea: The ‘humans’ referred to here live in a ‘golden age’ type of environment; another way in which Plato’s ‘myth’ draws on typical themes of Greek mythology.

  183. face to face: i.e. they do not rely on the mediacy of a priest, priestess or seer for information about the future, nor upon dreams rather than waking visions.

  184. as they really are: Knowledge of the heavenly bodies was seen in early Greek philosophy as the pinnacle of human cognitive effort. Hence it is a fitting climax here.

  185. wherever there are hollow regions: There now begins an account of the underworld designed to harmonize both with Socrates’ ‘geography’ and with empirical observations concerning things underground, particularly concerning volcanic activity, tides, and underground rivers. Again Socrates is demonstrating his interest in matters of importance for the Presocratics, though approaching them from a different angle.

  186. deepest chasm: Iliad 8.14. Tartarus is mentioned at line 481.

  187. Oceanus: The mythical river encircling the world.

  188. Acheron: Acheron, Cocytus and Pyriphlegethon are all mythical underworld rivers. So is Styx, which here becomes a lake.

  189. Our sea: The Mediterranean.

  190. Such is the nature of these things: The basic geography ofSocrates’ world has now been described. We pass on to the journey through it of various kinds of disembodied soul.

  191. from whence they emerge no more: There seems to be some inconsistency between this and the Argument from Opposites; the latter demands that all souls which leave this earthly state should eventually return, whereas incurable criminals, and people of excep tional holiness too, will not do so.

  192. to enchant ourselves with: A reference to the confidence-inspiring ‘enchantment’ process of 78a.

  193. the magistrates’ orders: The orders of the Eleven, whose servant the officer was.

  194. bull-like: See the introduction to Phaedo, pp. 100–101.

  195. Apollodorus: See 59a above and Apology 34a.

  196. we ought to offer a cock to Asclepias: The significance of these words has been much discussed. As Asclepius is god of healing, it ought to suggest that Socrates’ soul has been healed; also there may be a hint of criticism of Pythagoreans such as Simmias and Cebes, who normally reject all maltreatment of animals as their souls may be one’s own ancestors: but Socrates might claim that one is injuring only the body.

  Index

  Acheron 192–3, 250

  Achilles 54, 219, 222, 231

  Adimantus 61

  Aeacus 69

  Aeschines xiii, xxxv, 36, 61, 118, 228

  Aeschylus 187

  Aesop 119, 120

  Agamemnon 222

  Ajax 222

  Alcibiades xxvii, xxxi, 219

  Alcmaeon xxix, 244

  Alexamenos xxxv

  Allen, R. E. 78, 90, 225

  Ameipsias xxviii, xxxvii

  Amphipolis 54, 219

  Anaxagoras xxix, xxx, 51–2, 112, 136, 170–74, 218, 234, 243, 244, 245

  Anaximenes 244

  Andocides xxxv, 207–8, 220

  Antisthenes xix, 118, 202, 204, 228

  Anytus xxxi, 40, 47, 55–7, 61, 64, 208, 213, 219

  Apollo xxv–xxvi, 43–6, 53, 117, 119, 155, 207, 216, 229

  Apollodorus 61, 66, 118, 198, 228

  Archelaus xxix, xxx, 219, 243

  Archon, King 9, 207

  Arginusae 220, 224

  Argives 161, 241

  Aristippus 118

  Ariston 61

  Aristophanes xxviii–xxix, 41–2, 207, 208, 209, 214, 215, 216, 217, 233, 245

  Aristophanes of Byzantium xxxv

  Aristotle xxxv, 157

  Asclepius 198, 251

  Athens xxxiv–xxxv, 90–96, 100, 116, 173, 208, 213–14, 219, 225, 226

  Atlas 174

  Bedu-Addo, J. T. 238

  Bluck, R. S. 236

  Blumenthal, H. 220

  Boeotia 173

  Bostock, D. 89–90, 102, 108, 114, 236, 237, 240, 243, 245

  Brickhouse, Thomas C. 36, 38

  Burger, R. 114

  Burnet, J. 219, 220, 231

  Cadmus 169, 243

  Callias 42, 215

  Cebes 82, Phaedo passim

  Chaerephon xxviii–xxix, 43–4, 216

  Charicles 217

  Charmides xxvii, xxxi, 36–7

  Cocytus 193, 250

  Connus xxviii

  Cratylus 232

  Crete 93, 100, 116, 222, 227

  Critias xxvii, xxxi, 36–7, 77, 227

  Crito 61, 66, 73–96, 118, 195–9, 228

  Critobulus 61, 66, 118

  Ctesippus 118, 228

  Daedalus 5, 23, 29, 210–11

  Damon xxviii

  Delium 54, 218

  Delos 116–17, 222

  Demeter 222

  Democritus 110

  Demodocus 61, 220

  Diogenes of Apollonia xxix–xxx

  Diogenes Laertius xiii, xxxv, 208, 216, 217

  Dionysus 232

  Dover xxxvii

  Echecrates Phaedo passim

  Egypt 239–40

  Empedocles xxix, 109, 244

  Endymion 136, 234

  Epicharmus 230

  Epigenes 61, 118, 228

  Eryximachus xxxi

  Euclides 118, 228

  Eudoxus 108

  Euripus 163

  Evenus 43, 119–20, 215

  Gallop, D. 229, 231, 238, 240

  Gill, C. 104

  Glaucus 188, 249

  Gorgias 42, 215

  Hackforth, R. 237, 239, 242

  Hades 96, Phaedo passim, 227

  Harmonia 169, 243

  Haslam, M. xiii–xiv

  Hector 54

  Hephaestus 18, 211–12

  Hera 18, 211–12

  Heracles 161, 188–9, 216–17, 241

  Heraclitus xxix, 210, 234, 241, 242, 244

  Hermes 249

  Herodotus 239, 241

  Hesiod 69, 209, 210, 222

  Hippias 42, 215

  Homer 62, 69, 106, 169, 210–11, 213, 217, 219, 222, 223, 243, 250

  Iolaus 161, 241

  Isocrates xxxvi, 202, 215–16

  Isthmus 93, 226

  Kahn, C. H. 77

  Kearney, J. J. 220

  Kraut, R. 225, 226

  Kronos 18, 209, 210

  Ledger, G. 38, 78

  Leon of Salamis 59

  Leucippus 110

  Lyceum 9

  Lycon xxxi, 47, 64, 213, 217

  Lysias 215

  Maximus Tyrius 36

  Megara 93, 118, 173, 228

  Meletus xxxi, 9–13, 25, 30, 35–6, 37, 41–2, 47–54, 57–8, 61, 63–5, 209, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 221

  Menexenus 118, 228

  Minos 69, 222

  Minotaur 100–101, 222

  Morgan, M. xxxiv–xxxv

  Musaeus 69, 222

  Myrto 228

  Naxos 12, 208


  Oceanus 192

  Odysseus 70, 168, 222

  Orphics 69, 104, 113, 221–2, 229, 233, 249

  Palamedes 222

  Panathenaea 14

  Parmenides 230

  Patroclus 54, 231

  Penelope 101

  Phaedo Phaedo passim, 100

  Phaedondas 118

  Phaedrus xxxi

  Phasis 188

  Philolaus 121

  Phlius 109, 113

  Plato 66, 118, and passim

  Charmides xx, xxvii, 4–5, 6, 7, 8, 219

  Cratylus xxxvii, 207, 215, 229, 240, 248

  Critias xii

  Euthydemus xv, xix, xxi, xxxvi, xxxvii, 3, 77, 207, 218, 219, 228, 232, 247

  Gorgias xv–xvi, 3, 74–5, 186, 202–3, 206, 210, 211, 221, 224, 227, 229, 230, 249

  Hippias Major xxxvi, xxxvii, 4–5, 203

  Hippias Minor xxi

  Laches xx, xxviii, 4–5, 6, 7

  Lysis xx, xxxvi, 4, 207, 228

  Menexemus xii, 34, 228

  Meno xx, xxxv, 5, 7–8, 106, 110–12, 145–6, 202–3, 208, 212, 213, 217, 218, 221–2, 230, 232, 233, 235, 238, 247

  Parmenides xiv, xxxvii, 204, 246

  Phaedrus xii, xiv, 34, 110, 215, 216, 217

  Philebus 114

  Politicus xxxv, xxxvi, 3, 223

  Protagoras xiii, xxi, xxvii, xxxii, xxxvii, 3–4, 208, 212, 224, 229

  Republic xi, xiv, xv, xxviii, xxxv, 4–5, 7, 78, 105, 114, 186, 209, 217, 220, 224, 225, 232, 238, 241, 242–3, 245, 247, 248, 249

  Sophist xxxv, xxxvi, 3

  Symposium xii, xiii, xxi, xxvii, xxxvi, xxxvii, 207, 219, 220, 226, 231