The Great War

by Peter Hart

  Company Sergeant Major John Handley, 1/6th King’s Liverpool Regiment

  As Handley pushed on across a near-featureless wilderness pounded by the constant shellfire he was soon lost.

  I had to find Jasper Farm and set up the Company headquarters. On the map it was shown as halfway down a central communication trench. Going down the first connecting trench I failed to find it, so came back to the German front line and went down the next one. As trenches they were difficult to discern, for our bombardment had almost erased them. It was a case of plodding through shell holes and round small earth mounds. Skirting one mound I came into full view of Jasper Farm. It was a huge mound of bare concrete with gun slits – a pillbox. Stark and bare, it looked grotesque, our bombardments having blown away the earth which concealed it. I was surprised and even more so when I saw six Germans lined up in front of it. They immediately put their hands up in surrender. Pointing my useless rifle at them, I released an arm to wave them forward in the direction of the British lines. On reaching the old German front line I handed them over to one of my sergeants for escorting back to captivity.27

  Company Sergeant Major John Handley, 1/6th King’s Liverpool Regiment

  The condition of these stunned German troops should not have been a surprise. Even the concrete walls and roof of a blockhouse could not protect them from the British bombardment.

  The fire increased to an intensity that was simply beyond our power to comprehend. Our blockhouse and a nearby mortar battery received more than a thousand large calibre shells. The earth trembled, the air shimmered. My pillbox heaved and rocked as though it was going to collapse. Almost by a miracle it received no direct hits. Everyone who dared to go out was wounded. At 6.00 am there was a gas alarm. I went outside and watched as a cloud of gas 10 metres thick drifted slowly by. The entire pillbox stank of it. I had every tiny gap wedged up with wet cloths. At 7.00 am the firing reached a peak of intensity. It was simply ghastly. The men in the outer room were wounded or died of gas poisoning. The small reserve of gas masks was exhausted because many men needed replacements for masks which had been shot through. The enemy followed up behind the gas cloud.28

  Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr von Forstner, 164th Infantry Regiment

  The task ahead of the assaulting divisions got more and more difficult in the Gheluvelt Plateau sector, which stretched from the Westhoek Ridge to the Shrewsbury Forest. On Westhoek Ridge they had some considerable initial success and captured the village before being halted by German machine guns. But the troops facing Sanctuary Wood had an almost impossible task. In the dreadful ground conditions they soon lost touch with their creeping barrage and were thus exposed to the unsuppressed fire of the German garrison. In addition, the masses of German batteries concealed behind the Gheluvelt Plateau had not been dealt with and their shells tore the advancing battalions to shreds. The tanks which were meant to help overcome the opposition were not only vulnerable to the artillery but most were very soon bogged down in the glutinous mud, unable to liaise properly with the infantry around them. Of the forty-eight tanks in this sector, all but one either broke down or were destroyed. Clapham Junction, where seventeen tanks were wrecked, became known as the ‘tank graveyard’. They had done little to help the infantry. Although the advance managed to over-run the German front line positions, it was brought up sharply by the German second line stretching across Gheluvelt Plateau.

  At this stage, the overall advantage may have seemed to be with the French and British troops. But the German tactics were based on counterattacks and they had fresh divisions ready for action safely positioned in the folds of ground behind the Gheluvelt Plateau and Passchendaele Ridge. The German barrage opened up in the early afternoon and soon their infantry were swarming forward across the ridges and pushing forward on the British gains at St Julien and in the Steenbeek Valley. Driving in at the flanks, the Germans forced back the increasingly exhausted British troops.

  By nightfall the results were somewhat mixed. On the left the French and their neighbouring British divisions had succeeded in over-running two German defensive systems which included both the Pilckem and Bellewaarde Ridges. On the right, on the Gheluvelt Plateau, progress had been far more limited, although even here they had taken the German first line. But the cost had been very high, with the British and French suffering losses of about 33,500. German casualties seem to have been around 30,000, of which 6,000 were prisoners. Gough’s willingness to try to maximise gains on the first day had, as some had warned before the battle, rendered his troops vulnerable to German counter-attacks through having over-stretched themselves and run beyond the cover that their artillery could provide. Haig may have practised a form of contingency planning, but it is also true that the outcome of the first day’s fighting was at the lower end of the spectrum of what was acceptable. Furthermore, the heavy casualties, particularly in the Gheluvelt Plateau sector, meant that British options were significantly reduced. Certainly, it was now clear that any thoughts of swiftly breasting the main Passchendaele Ridge were fanciful. Indeed, the biggest obstacle to British progress was left largely unscathed – the Gheluvelt Plateau was still an inviolable fortress. It would be a long, hard slog; another battle of attrition.

  Yet there was another serious unforeseen problem. On the first day of the battle it had begun to rain. This would not have been particularly untoward, but the rain poured down for most of August – indeed, there were only three dry days in the whole month. In an area where the drainage was already suspect, on a battlefield where millions of shells had ripped apart the drains and broken down the banks of streams to flood great swathes of the landscape, there now fell more than double the average monthly rainfall. In these circumstances, moving the guns and millions of shells forward became a horrendous task; finding suitable gun positions was near impossible; and, worst of all, the bad weather prevented the RFC from flying the photographic and artillery observation patrols essential to make the best use of the guns. The attack was supposed to continue on 2 August, but it proved impossible. The situation demanded a speedy exploitation before the Germans could bring forward their reserves and strengthen their defences, but there were other tactical considerations.

  We know from experience, however, that in these subsidiary operations, hurried preparations and the use of part-worn troops are generally the cause of failure, and that failure involves waste of valuable time and personnel. In this particular case we want to make absolutely certain of the artillery preparation, which will require very careful control and accurate shooting and one or two more days of good flying weather prior to the attack. To ensure success, which is all-important at this stage, the corps ought really to attack with three fresh divisions.29

  Brigadier General John Davidson, General Headquarters, BEF

  Gough cancelled the planned assault. His hand may have been forced, but the delay gave the Germans more time to prepare their defences – and they did not waste it. There would be many similar situations in August 1917.

  The Germans recognised the key importance of the Gheluvelt Plateau and concentrated the bulk of their batteries on its reverse slopes. In contrast, the British guns were spread more evenly along the whole front, thus allowing the Germans to establish an artillery superiority just where it most mattered. The Germans also used their massive experience of attritional battles to good effect. They opened a heavy continuous barrage on the British divisions in front of the Gheluvelt Plateau, with the effect of putting them through the ‘mincing machine’. The British assault divisions were already weakened and the relentless barrage forced Gough to relieve them earlier than he would have wished with troops originally intended for the second stage of the offensive. But now these troops were exposed to endless shellfire and they, too, were gradually degraded as they waited for the weather to let up and give them the chance to attack. When the battle resumed, the fresh divisions were themselves battle-worn and the artillery barrage still inadequate. A pattern of desperate, unimaginative assaults, cr
ushing German counter-attacks and an overwhelming sense of despair began to afflict the British campaign in Flanders. Like his men, Gough was floundering, hamstrung by factors beyond his control, but also by his own failure to concentrate his resources on the Gheluvelt Plateau. The gains were minimal, the casualties high, in near-futile assaults launched on 10 August, 16 August and 22 August.

  The state of the ground was by this time frightful. The labour of bringing up supplies and ammunition, of moving or firing the guns, which often sunk up to their axles, was a fearful strain on the officers and men, even during the daily task of maintaining the battle front. When it came to the advance of infantry for an attack, across the water-logged shell holes, movement was so slow and so fatiguing that only the shortest advances could be contemplated. In consequence I informed the Commander in Chief that tactical success was not possible, or would be too costly, under such conditions, and advised that the attack should be abandoned. I had many talks with Haig during these days and repeated this opinion frequently, but he told me that the attack must be continued.30

  Lieutenant General Sir Hubert Gough, Headquarters, Fifth Army

  Gough had failed to grasp that the offensive could not be just called off; the real necessity was for him to concentrate his forces and overcome these very considerable obstacles.

  In the end Haig had to intervene. The failure of the attacks on 22 August caused a review of the campaign. One thing stood out: further progress was almost impossible without the reduction of the series of German lines and interlinked fortifications chained across the Gheluvelt Plateau. If the ‘thruster’ Gough and his Fifth Army were incapable of doing this, then Haig was quite prepared to go back to Plumer, who had so recently demonstrated his mastery of ‘bite and hold’ tactics at Messines. But Plumer needed time to prepare, so Gough and the Fifth Army would have to struggle on into September. This led to a further series of small-scale actions which achieved no worthwhile objective and repeated many of the mistakes of the middle section of the Somme fighting. Yet for all the British confusion the German Army was also suffering. For the Germans the improvements in British offensive tactics were nothing short of ominous.

  In spite of all the concrete protection they seemed more or less powerless under the enormous weight of the enemy’s artillery. At some points they no longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local commanders, had hoped for. The enemy had managed to adapt himself to our method of employing counter-attack divisions. There were no more attacks with unlimited objectives, such as General Nivelle had made in the Aisne–Champagne Battle. He was ready for our counter-attacks and prepared for them by exercising restraint in exploitation of success. In other directions, of course, this suited us very well. I myself was being put to a terrible strain. The state of affairs in the West appeared to prevent the execution of our plans elsewhere. Our wastage had been so high as to cause grave misgivings, and had exceeded all expectation.31

  General Erich Ludendorff, General Headquarters

  Up until this point in the war the French had always been the real danger to the Germans. Now it was the British.

  On 29 August Plumer presented his plans for the capture of the Gheluvelt Plateau to Haig. This was a strictly limited offensive; a ‘bite and hold’ par excellence. A massed artillery force was lined up of 1,295 guns, of which 575 were the vital medium or heavy artillery that could destroy the German pillboxes and blockhouses. It would require millions of shells, but here again progress was being made as Decauville light railways were installed to help carry the shells at least part of the way to the guns. But the Battle of Menin Road on 20 September was not just a mechanistic artillery battle; it would also reflect the considerable advances being made in infantry tactics. Rigid lines were all but useless against a pillbox based defence and a great deal more flexibility was inculcated into the troops. In a gradual accepting of the necessity for new tactics, they were following on from the French.

  The waves of attack which have hitherto been used, do not give sufficient flexibility, nor are platoons and sections sufficiently under the control of their leaders to deal with sudden opposition likely to be encountered under the new conditions. The leading wave, in one or two lines should be extended to force the enemy to disclose his positions, the remainder in small groups or file ready to deal with unexpected machine guns or parties of the enemy. It must be impressed on all subordinate leaders that rapidity of action is of paramount importance, and that any delay in assaulting these points adds to the seriousness of the situation and increases the difficulties of dealing with it. Known machine gun emplacements and defended points are dealt with by parties previously told off for the duty. Careful study of the ground and aeroplane photographs will go a long way towards increasing the ‘known’ and giving all leaders a clear idea of the points from which opposition may be expected. The rear waves must keep closed up until across No Man’s Land, and gradually gain the distance, after this officers must be trained to ensure this is done.32

  Brigadier Charles Harrington, Headquarters, Second Army

  The Second Army would advance in four bounds of about 1,500 yards, each followed by a six-day lull to allow for the preparation of the next step. Alongside it, the Fifth Army would use the same methodology to capture the protruding St Julien Spur and London Ridge. Then, and only then, would an attack be launched on the main Passchendaele Ridge. The overall plan was simple: each attack would aim to seize the German forward defensive zone, then swiftly consolidate, thereby effectively inviting German counter-attacks against well-prepared infantry backed up by massed machine guns and the full strength of the artillery. Plumer also proved to be a lucky general; September saw the onset of dry, sunny weather and the ground began to dry out. This was a great advantage to the Royal Artillery.

  When the guns opened up at 05.40 on 20 September it seemed to dwarf all preceding barrages.

  Just look at our artillery. Just look at it, at those countless flashes. See how they stab at the darkness from their hiding places, not in dozens but in hundreds, and yet these are only the heavies, the lighter guns are well up and we cannot see them. See the red glares that light up the country for miles where a Hun shell has landed amongst some cordite. The whole place seems ablaze as far as the eye can see: flash after flash some singly, some in groups when a battery fires together, but isn’t it all beyond description, beyond belief, even beyond imagination? Feel the terrific vibration and the jolting and hear the ear splitting, nerve-racking noise of it all. It is not a bit of use trying to talk, or even shout because bellow as you like no one can hear you.33

  Lieutenant Cyril Lawrence, 1st Field Company, AIF

  When the infantry advanced they were able to sweep forward exactly as planned, over-running the German forward zone to a depth of just under a mile. There were still painful rebuffs, strongpoints that did not fall, localised disasters, but overall the painstaking preparations paid off. Indeed, it was not the ground taken that made the Battle of Menin Road such a remarkable achievement; it was the successful final capture of objectives that had cost literally thousands of lives in futile assaults in the previous month. Then the British troops stopped, consolidated and awaited the German response. The infantry had done well, but in truth it was the massed fire of the British field artillery, all still well within range, that provided the most formidable opponent in destroying the German counter-attack divisions. Even so, the Germans knew what they were doing on a battlefield, they too could deploy massed artillery and casualties were heavy on both sides. Indeed, even in success the British casualties totalled 21,000.

  Overall, Haig was delighted and looked forward to the incremental capture of the whole Passchendaele Ridge. He even began to consider a possible break through to the Belgian coast and the Roulers railhead. This optimism has been greeted with a considerable degree of derision in retrospect, but it was certainly Haig’s responsibility to plan for any contingency including the possibility of amphibious combined landing operations or a cavalr
y exploitation. In truth, here was a case of ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’. The point is, surely, that Haig did not know what was going to happen next, but he had the duty to prepare for any eventuality.

  After the requisite six days the next step was the Battle of Polygon Wood launched on 26 September. Although a spoiling attack by the Germans intended to disrupt preparations had some minor success, the British were still able to make an advance of some 1,000–1,250 yards on a front of 8,500 yards, although again the vicious fighting led to heavy casualties totalling some 15,500. By this time the German High Command had worked out what Plumer was doing. But how would they respond to these gradualist tactics?

  The depth of the penetration was limited so as to secure immunity from our counter-attacks, and the latter were then broken up by the massed fire of artillery. After each attack I discussed the tactical experiences with General von Kuhl and Colonel von Loszberg, sometimes at the front, sometimes on the telephone. This time I again went to the front in order to talk over the same questions with officers who had taken part in the fighting. Our defensive tactics had to be developed further, somehow or other. We were all agreed on that. The only thing was, it was so infinitely difficult to hit on the right remedy.34

  General Erich Ludendorff, General Headquarters

  All the Germans could do in the short term was to strengthen the front line zone with more troops and machine guns and to delay their counterattacks until they could organise them properly with the appropriate artillery support.

  Meanwhile Plumer, encouraged by Haig, who hoped that the Germans might be about to crack, ordered the next Second Army assault on the Broodseinde Ridge, Zonnebeke Spur and Gravenstafel Spur, while the Fifth Army moved on Poelcappelle. Again he was aiming for just 1,500 yards, but the artillery arrangements were juggled. The preliminary bombardment would concentrate solely on the pillboxes and counter-battery work before a final hurricane bombardment crashed out at the Zero Hour of 06.00 on 4 October. The assault on Broodseinde Ridge was carried out in the main by the I and II Australian Corps. The German front line had been reinforced but no matter how many German troops were there it made little difference to their ability to defend themselves in this kind of earth-shattering bombardment. The Battle of Broodseinde Ridge proved another British triumph, despite a further 20,600 casualties.