Ghost Patrol: A History of the Long Range Desert Group, 1940–1945

by Sadler, John

  This first foray was a relatively modest affair and yielded no practical gains aside from very useful experience. Supply, the lifeblood of desert raiders, was paramount. A series of major and ancillary dumps were established along all main axes leading south and west from the Delta. One of the most important of these was that at Ain Dalla on the edge of the Sand Sea. When Bill Kennedy Shaw arrived there in his small convoy of 6-tonners, he found the place pretty much as he’d last seen it a decade earlier with Bagnold: There were the same stunted palms, the same rickety wooden hut where we had stored our spare petrol in 1930, and the same pipe tapping the warm spring water half-way down the slope.32 Even their original tyre tracks were still clearly visible.

  It wasn’t just the sweet water that was welcome. Ain Dalla was the LRPs’ back door into Libya. Any patrol motoring south from Cairo could be sure of eyes tracking their every move. Once beyond the ancient, looming bulk of the pyramids and over the shoulder of Gebel Khashab, the raiders disappeared, were swallowed up. Ain Dalla was not just the staging point for crossing into Libya, it was the junction of roads to Kufra and Uweinat, these approaches handily screened by belts of sand sea the Italians considered impenetrable.

  These were not offensive operations; enemy territory lay westwards. Mundane as these runs were, they formed a first rate training ground. Large stocks of ammunition, medical supplies, foodstuffs and, above all, petrol, were cached. It was time to move westwards onto enemy ground, over the wide, lunar waste of the Great Sand Sea, so nobly described by Bill Kennedy Shaw: There is nothing like these sand seas anywhere else in the world. Take an area the size of Ireland and cover it with sand. Go on pouring sand on to it till it is two, three or four hundred feet deep. Then, with a giant’s rake score the sand into ridges and valleys running north-north-west and south-south-east, and with the ridges, at their highest, five hundred feet from trough to crest.33

  By day this is an inferno, parched, scoured and scorched; when evening falls, as swiftly as a cloak, the dying, iridescent light shows a scene of desolate, unearthly beauty. God had not sculpted the desert to facilitate vehicular traffic. Crossing was a grinding attrition of exertion, sweat and thirst, unendingly harsh on men and vehicles alike.

  Ralph Bagnold was, of course, an old hand at this with over a decade of desert travel behind him: If one was bogged down, the nose of the car would tip right forward, axle deep in the sand. The problem was to get it out. Going round the junk shops in the slums of Cairo we found these heavy metal channels which had originally been used in the First World War for roofing dugouts. They were about five feet long and you could carry one under each arm, just. You scooped the sand away from the back wheels and pushed the channel under the wheel. Directly it gripped the car would be shoved forward and hopefully you’d get out of the soft patch on to harder ground.34

  For the LRP to cover those 150 miles from Ain Dalla in the east to Big Cairn (erected by Clayton in 1932), astride the Libyan border in the west, involved two full days of constant purgatory. Once across, a supply line and advanced landing strip could be established and, from this nodal point, patrols could venture forth. Kennedy Shaw, driving those heavy 6-tonner Marmon-Harrington trucks, was kept gainfully employed ferrying fuel and gear across the Great Sand Sea.35

  The desert was a unique and harsh environment. Yet many who rode out with LRP/LRDG patrols were intensely moved by its qualities, the harsh, primeval purity. Though now largely denuded of humanity, the raiders were constantly reminded that man had once lived here: Ten thousand years ago the climate was kinder, there was more rain and men lived in what is now desert, hunting ostrich and antelope and keeping milk cattle. Often we found traces of them – paintings and engravings on the rocks and stone implements at their camping places. There must have been many places which we passed through on LRDG journeys where no man had been for five thousand years.36

  On 5th September three LRP patrols set out from Cairo, just ahead of the major Italian offensive in the north which would kick-start the desert war. Marshal Graziani didn’t advance further that Sidi Barrani, more of a Sitzkrieg. There remained the fear he might try and be more adventurous in the south, as Bagnold had originally warned. LRP was tasked to check the lie of the land, ascertain enemy intentions, hopefully netting some prisoners and generally beat up any targets of opportunity that might cross their sights.

  Teddy Mitford, with Bill Kennedy Shaw, was to check out a couple of landing strips on the Jalo-Kufra route. They dealt with fuel reserves there before bumping a small Italian convoy a couple of days later. Only two trucks, swiftly cowed by a burst from a Lewis gun, and LRP had its first haul of captives, including a goat! A modest if satisfying encounter, yet this single rattle of fire persuaded the Italians they had to escort their convoys in future, a significant diversion of resources.37 LRP activity would never open gaping wounds in the enemy’s flanks but could create persistent ulcers, draining out precious reserves, taking away from offensive capacity further north.

  Neither of the other patrols met any enemy but accomplished much useful intelligence gathering. By the end of the month all three were safely back in Cairo. General Wavell was still ready to be impressed. An important benefit conferred by these early patrols was in myth-busting. Most of the staff in Cairo and most of Middle East Command shunned the deep desert to the same fearful extent as their Axis adversaries. Bagnold was demonstrating that the Allied forces could trump the enemy by learning to operate effectively in all conditions.

  To us now this seems an obvious role for Special Forces; however, at the time it was something of an epiphany. Bagnold’s patrols had covered 1,300 miles completely self-contained. They had impressed everyone, and even the most doubtful of their critics had begun to see what possibilities there were if the exposed southern flank – which was thought to be quite impenetrable – could be used with impunity by the LRDG.38

  Success brought expansion and the unit was increased in size to two full squadrons, each of three patrols, with a HQ section and a lieutenant-colonelcy for Bagnold. General Freyberg was making increasingly loud noises for the return of his Kiwis though Wavell was able to persuade him to grant an extension while new volunteers, primarily from Rhodesian and British units, were being trained up. Having tested the crust of the Italian defences in the south and detected no appetite for offensive action, LRP could continue to make life uncomfortable for these nervous frontier outposts. The year 1940 had been a very bad one for the Allies but at least, as the autumn drew towards winter, the British were attacking somewhere, if on a very small scale.

  The replacement scheme which had received War Office approval on 25th October had provided for six new patrols to be formed, one from each of the Guards, South Rhodesians, Highlanders, Yeomanry, Rifles and Home Counties Regiments. This was rather ambitious at the time as the whole theatre suffered from a chronic lack of both good officers and men. Regiments were understandably loath to part with their bravest and best for what many regarded as a maverick and madcap formation.39

  Bagnold, again in October, found he had competition from the brilliant if unorthodox Orde Wingate, later famous for the formation of the Chindits. Wingate wanted an all-arms, mechanized raiding force far larger than the LRP, virtually at divisional strength. This was plainly impractical, and Wingate had no real appreciation of the distances and ground involved. Bagnold, who understood both, countered with a watered-down proposal suggesting a gradual build up of all-arms capability. The prevailing shortages of men and materiel and the dearth of desert-worthy vehicles doomed Wingate’s scheme. By the time these shortages had been, to a degree at least, overcome, LRP/LRDG had more than proved itself as the ideal solution.40

  During the last week of October the LRP launched another sortie. The objectives were:

  To harass the enemy by mining the Uweinat-Kufra-Jedabia track.

  To gain intelligence of enemy strength and movement in this area.

  To recover and utilise the two lorries captured earlier (these had been le
ft hidden).41

  T Patrol, led by Clayton, moved out from Cairo on 23rd October; mine laying its primary function. The raiders passed via Ain Dalla, over the surreal reaches of the Sand Sea to Big Cairn where Clayton levelled an ad hoc airstrip. No. 26 (Bomber Transport) Squadron was detailed to carry out re-supply. Next, they drove towards Jalo, 260 miles northwest, and by 30th October were planting mines along the roadway. On 1st November, after only token resistance, Clayton easily subdued the fort at Aujila whose garrison fled at the first burst. In all, the patrol covered 2,140 miles in 15 days.42

  T and R patrols with HQ and N troops were equally active. Italian stores together with a Savoia-Machetti S.79 (a three-engine, medium bomber) were destroyed. Though enemy aircraft did make an appearance, no casualties or damage were sustained. These raids were textbook examples of what the LRP had been raised for.

  Results were not overly dramatic, as these were pinpricks rather than body blows, but the cumulative effect was telling: enemy communications were disrupted and his transport damaged or destroyed, but the main value was psychological. After so many bruising defeats, the Allies were taking the initiative and getting the better of the enemy. The Italians suffered a consequential slump in morale. Nowhere was too remote to escape the raiders’ intention. All movement was fraught. This was not a defeated army, a tottering empire. Britain still had teeth.

  The Free French

  One obvious potential connection was with the French garrisons in Chad. Not all Frenchmen had been prepared to side with Vichy and there was a clear possibility for joint action and the creation of a viable Free French force. In the course of a busy October, Ralph Bagnold had proposed a plan to occupy Kufra as a springboard for operations even further west. This would disrupt any notions the Italians themselves had of attacking Kano. The Northern Touaregs were their potential allies and by no means averse to a spot of pillaging.

  The settlement at Toummo on the borders of French West Africa and the Fezzan, had potential for a westward FOB. The Free French themselves ranging up from Chad could strike at Toummo but the region itself, the Tenere District, was nominally held by Vichy. ‘Baggers’ proposal was that British forces, the LRP, could operate in partnership with the Free French to disrupt and threaten the Italian outposts and deter them from any offensive action of their own. The British representative in West Africa, the Hon. Francis Rodd, was tasked to broker a meeting at Fort Lamy (in Chad).43

  Bagnold, never backward at grasping an initiative, travelled to Khartoum of Gordon fame to confer with Douglas Newbold, the British resident there. Newbold knew the provincial governor in Chad, M. Eboue, and felt that he, or at least the younger officers there, could be persuaded, though he could do nothing through official diplomatic channels. These were altogether too sensitive. Bagnold of course was not a diplomat and Newbold just happened to have a plane standing by!44

  Bagnold was not prone to hesitation, and on the 8th November flew to Fort Lamy where he was suddenly struck down by a savage bout of tropical fever. The official purposes of his mission were to contact Colonel Marchand, who commanded the Chadian garrison, and test the water for offensive spirit. Bagnold was to ascertain if the Free French would entertain a formal military mission from GHQ, ME. Crucially, from his own point of view, he was to find out if Marchand was interested in working with the LRP (officially the LRDG from 9th November), in beating up Italian outposts.45

  He was still laid up in bed as he received a delegation consisting of the governor himself and Lieutenant-Colonel d’Ornano, a beau sabreur straight from the pages of P.C. Wren. Ill as he was, Bagnold sensed this was a significant moment: I told him [d’Ornano] frankly exactly what I wanted – petrol, rations and water to be carried by camel through the Tibesti mountains to a point near the Libyan frontier, where we would rendezvous with them…. Then d’Ornano turned to the Governor and said ‘This is it. You must decide now – now’, he said, thumping the table. ‘I can’t hold my officers much longer….46

  This was an historic moment, ‘game on’ in the modern sense. The French would help, on the one condition that d’Ornano himself, a junior officer and NCO went in with the British raiders and the Free French flag flew alongside. Bagnold had no hesitation in accepting. A formal agreement was concluded and General de Gaulle, hearing of the initiative, had little choice but to agree, though he did send Major (later General) Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque (nom de guerre “Leclerc”) to assume overall command. Bagnold had already identified the Italian outpost at Murzuk as an objective. Too remote and inaccessible for LRDG from its base in Cairo but, with aid from Chad, the garrison there was now a prime target.

  Colonel Marchand was equally enthusiastic. The Free French were itching to have a crack at the enemy, who they generally despised as Hitler’s jackals. Moreover, bold, offensive action could, at this juncture, have a marked effect on waverers further west who might otherwise incline towards Vichy and the sour path of collaboration. These proud colonial warriors had seen their country crushed and humiliated, and the unthinkable – German jackboots resounding down the Champs-Elysees, and the historic railway carriage at Compiegne used to snort Hitler’s triumph, then hauled away to Germany as booty. Time was ripe for la revanche.

  Happily, the formidable General Freyberg, a man easily as brave as any lion and much decorated in the Great War who, one suspects, would have heartily approved of the LRDG, was turning a blind eye to the prolonged absence of his soldiers. New volunteers from the 3rd Coldstream and 2nd Scots Guards (collectively known as ‘G’ – for Guards Patrol) were forming. Their training was to be very much ‘on the job’ as, with Pat Clayton and his Kiwis, they left just after Christmas, on 27th December, for the planned raid on Murzuk.

  G Patrol was commanded by Michael Crichton-Stuart with Martin Gibbs, a Coldstreamer, as 2 I/C. Bill Kennedy Shaw would be their navigator over the vast, bare distance they had to travel. In total, the force mustered 76 soldiers in 23 trucks.47 The attack on Murzuk was more than a raid. It would represent the first active cooperation between Western Desert Force and the Free French. Success could not only persuade waverers in Niger to throw in with the Allies, it would show the Italians conclusively that nowhere in the Fezzan was immune.

  Just beyond Cairo, they picked up the Senussi Liaison Officer with their guide, Sheikh ‘Abd el Galil Seir en Nasr, a legendary warrior with a long history of fighting the Italians. His was still a name to conjure with, a big man, sixty years or more which reminded me of pictures in the ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom’ and with one claw-like hand shot to pieces in some desert battle.48

  Even while action in the Fezzan was being planned, the LRDG, in the shape of R Patrol, led by Captain Steele, was prowling in the northern sector with Teddy Mitford, commanding W Patrol, operating further south towards Uweinat. The indispensible ‘B’ echelon trucks were busy building up supplies at the Ain Dalla dump. These were classic deep reconnaissance forays, livened by mine-laying. Mitford’s patrol was bombed and strafed on 29th November. Despite being stonked with over 300 small bombs, dispersion and evasion tactics proved highly successful. Undeterred, on 1st December, the patrol attacked Ain Dua.

  After a lively exchange of fire the small Italian garrison was hounded from its positions and fled to higher ground. Mitford himself went to ground when enemy planes appeared, but once they’d passed, laid into the survivors, blasting from both flanks. Though some enemy were killed, they could not be dislodged and the raiders made off in the gathering dusk.49 LRDG had suffered no casualties and the patrol returned safely to Cairo on 6th December.

  By early January the hounds were drawing close on the fleeing Italian armies. In the north, General O’Connor’s counter-offensive was achieving prodigies, Bardia had fallen. By the time the LRDG and Free French forces made their approach to contact, the British were some 1,500 miles south of their base! T and G Patrols had moved out from Cairo on 27th December, motoring through Ain Dalla and north of Taizerbo. Clayton had his RV with the Free French at Kayugi. He foun
d them to be as good as their word, supplies having being brought up by camel. Colonel d’Ornano was accompanied by Captain Jacques Massu, who would fight throughout the Second World War, reach the rank of general and earn some notoriety in Algeria. The Free French party numbered ten in all.

  By this time the LRDG had already covered 1,333 miles and, in the course of its marches had only seen three people, all natives with their camels and not the least bit interested. Whilst a lonely statistic, this at least suggested very strongly the enemy was unaware of their presence.50 On 11th January in the early afternoon Clayton’s force motored into Murzuk. All was calm, the enemy blissfully unaware. The local postmaster, complete with mailbag, was nabbed from his round and pressed into unwilling service as a guide. In the centre of the settlement the imposing fort, a true colonial relic, could not be successfully attacked without heavy weapons.

  G patrol kept the garrison occupied with harassing fire whilst the rest had a crack at the airfield. A considerable amount of damage was inflicted and one of the fort’s towers set alight, though an LRDG trooper, Sergeant C.D. Hewson, was killed and three more wounded in the exchange of fire. The Italian commander and his wife, who’d been out to lunch, came barrelling back in his staff car and ran into a hail of fire. Both were killed.51

  At the airfield the Kiwis shot up three light bombers and torched their hanger. The score or so Italians did put up some resistance and Clayton’s truck got stuck in a firefight with a resolute machine gun post. His Vickers jammed at the most embarrassing moment and gallant d’Ornano was killed. He did not live to witness the full success of the raid as the airfield defenders capitulated soon after.

  There was no point in lingering. Enemy aircraft could soon be on the prowl from their nearest base at Hon, some 250 miles away. Aside from the fort, all of the enemy facilities at Murzuk were destroyed and the raiders withdrew. Ten Italian soldiers were left dead with another fifteen wounded and two useful prisoners. The rest who’d surrendered were released as there was no transport available. They were fortunate as the LRDG’s Free French allies were all for putting them more permanently out of action!52 The victory, in the vast scale of the desert pendulum, was a small one, but it sent a clear message both to those wavering over the attraction of de Gaulle and to the Italians. Literally, nowhere was safe.