Ghost Patrol: A History of the Long Range Desert Group, 1940–1945

by Sadler, John

  Teddy Mitford and his two patrols of A Squadron were working for General Neame and based at Jalo. By this point the Germans had occupied Marada, some 80 miles south of El Agheila. Mitford’s job was to watch and learn. Crichton-Stuart with fifty percent of G Patrol strength was detailed to have a good close look at Marada Oasis. In the event, there was very little to report. The calm was deceptive; on the night of 6/7th April the Guards discovered the enemy was very close indeed and fuel stocks were alarmingly low.

  Crichton-Stuart had decided to make a dash for Jarabub, over 200 miles east. With only 54 gallons of petrol left, there would only be enough for one vehicle. This had to be the wireless truck of course and the rest were abandoned. Much of the kit was salvaged as the grossly overloaded vehicle struggled across the desert. A hard and fairly fraught march ensued, enlivened when the Jarabub garrison began shooting at these wild desert figures. However, all were got in safely.32

  Meanwhile, Teddy Mitford, with the bulk of A Squadron, was moving inland from the Gulf of Sirte, heading towards Msus, a place Western Desert Force – latterly Eighth Army – might later care to forget, scene of the infamous ‘Msus Stakes’. There were some alarms and it was obvious the enemy was in the general vicinity. A recce along the Trigh-el-Abd showed little signs of life but, on 6th April, Mitford’s Patrols had to be deployed in a conventional role to assist the army in seeing off an Italian attack on Mekili.

  Next day and there was more fighting, though this time the opposition was clearly Germanic. On 8th April the Allies were driven out of the Mekili position. Mitford was also obliged to fall back towards Jarabub. For once a sandstorm arrived at just the right moment to assist in LRDG’s escape. During the retreat, an enemy column was beaten up and the whole force, Mitford’s and Crichton-Stuart’s detachments, were safely re-united at Jarabub by 10th April.

  Nearly all that is. Trooper (‘Titch’) Cave had been left behind in Mekili, waiting for his truck to be repaired at the IAOC depot there. He missed the action but found himself, along with 1,500 Allied soldiers, as a POW. Like many others, he was dumped in a makeshift camp at Derna, neglected and abused by his Italian captors, whose attitude was in marked contrast to that of the far more civil Germans. He decided to remove himself from these uncongenial lodgings. On the night of 21st April, he and an Aussie escaper made a run for it, slipping past their guards and several MG nests. Trooper Cave experienced a series of fraught adventures as he with a small band of other escapees sought to dodge Axis patrols, short of water, food & footwear.

  Their objective was Tobruk, many miles distant but still in Allied hands. Cave experienced a whole myriad of dangers; hunted, permanently hungry, at one point near delirious from drinking foul water. It was almost at the end of May when he finally reached a friendly position, and three days later he was in Alexandria. Less than a week after that, he had rejoined Y Patrol at Siwa.33

  By 1st July General Wavell had been replaced by General Auchinleck (‘the Auk’), a commander much respected by his troops but, like his predecessor, under constant badgering from Churchill to produce dramatic gains. The pressure was understandable. Britain’s hoped for allies in the USA were getting disappointing reports from their man on the spot (whose codes the Italians had already cracked). The Auk would not be rushed, much to the PM’s irritation, but Churchill for all his great genius had little real idea of the difficulties of warfare in the Western Desert.

  As A Squadron had lost so many vehicles in the retreat to Jarabub, Guy Prendergast carried out a temporary re-organisation at Siwa, splitting the unit into two small patrols, one under Crichton-Stuart, the other led by Lieutenant Gibbs. In mid April, the former took his team out in an attempt to recover the vehicles he’d had to abandon. None could be found except for the patrol car which was suffering from busted suspension and of little value to anyone. It seemed the enemy must have netted everything salvageable.34 The Germans, particularly, were very good at re-cycling.

  Road Watch

  From 18th–24th April G Patrol kept watch on the Gardaba Track, over fifty miles west of Jarabub. The mission was to take note of any enemy activity coming from Aujila or Jalo, now in Axis hands. Road Watch was to become an activity LRDG would soon come to know, not necessarily with affection. Keeping tabs on enemy movement was an essential function of intelligence gathering; precisely what LRDG had been set up to do. It was also dangerous, tedious, exhausting and uncomfortable. Nobody would ever want to make a movie about road watch.

  Undertaking what amounts to a traffic census is about as unglamorous as it ever gets. As time went by, LRDG patrols would become far more skilled in identifying and recording details of Axis traffic, noting types of vehicles, troop movements, armoured as opposed to soft skin, the nature of convoys and amount of stores etc. This was far more detailed information than even the best aerial reconnaissance could hope to pull off. Patrols were not to know, since none of them or any of their officers were in the charmed loop of ULTRA Intelligence (see Appendix 7), that their work was in some ways deemed less valuable than ULTRA, but it was very useful nonetheless. As they became more skilled, LRDG observers learned to compile a veritable encyclopaedia of data on enemy traffic.

  Every detachment would (once the process became more standardised late in 1941, early 1942), be watching for say a fortnight. The patrol would approach via an RV some way back from the target highway. They would then be guided into the camp ground by the outgoing watchers. This was carefully concealed and fully camouflaged; tyre tracks and all incriminating signs were swept away. As the handover progressed, the first brace of observers plus another man from the incoming patrol were led down to the hidden OP. Both the outgoing host and spare patrolman returned to camp, the new boys now knew their way around.

  Each pair of observers worked for twenty-four hours. They’d be woken very early before first light, fortified with tea, then they’d tab the mile and a half or more down to the OP, relieve the last shift and set up – all before dawn. The OP would be a shallow trough, well screened with just enough room for the two observers with their kit. For the whole stint they would lie prone with only minimal movement possible. They might be, say, three hundred yards from the road itself, observing with the use of glasses, through a narrow aperture in the hide.

  The work was unimaginably boring and extremely uncomfortable, like being inside a pressure cooker in midday sun, a fridge by dark. Scarcely any movement was possible, blown sand and insects a constant irritation, with the ever present possibility of discovery, if not by the Axis then by wandering Bedouin whose loyalties couldn’t be relied on. For those immured in the bivvy, life was equally uncomfortable. Movement was again almost impossible by day and long hours in a stifling blanket of heat and flies had to be endured.35

  After G Patrol was withdrawn from road watch on 25th April, following a terrific sandstorm, Lieutenant Gibbs took over and remained watching till 11th May, by which time quite a few men were laid out with heat exhaustion. Road watch was gruelling, nerve-wracking and sapping. On the coastal battlefield, a limited Allied riposte had recovered Sollum, and Crichton-Stuart was detailed to work with the 11th Hussars (the ‘Cherry-pickers’ of Light Brigade fame). On 14th May as the LRDG reached the RV at Sheferzen, they abruptly discovered that the column approaching was very far from being friendly.

  An unequal if mercifully short fire-fight ensued, followed by a high speed chase. High by desert standards, as Crichton-Stuart dryly observed – it was found that a really frightened truck could get up to 50 miles an hour.36 The hunt was kept up for 30 miles but aside from two trucks lost and one guardsman wounded, there were no other casualties. At the time Crichton-Stuart thought it might have been our own 11th Hussars doing the shooting but subsequent reports confirmed these attackers had indeed been from the enemy. For a while G Patrol was immured on mundane duties at Siwa; attrition of vehicles had been considerable and more men were now laid low with malaria.

  In early June the depleted Squadron was re-organised into three patr
ols, G, Y & H, each made up of six trucks. Most active patrolling was undertaken by Y & H whilst G was recovering. Equipment and vehicles had both taken a pounding and repairs were difficult. Colonel Bagnold had been pressuring HQ to make more systematic and structured use of LRDG. Part of the new brief would be to act as a ‘taxi-service’ for agents being infiltrated into Cyrenaica. Patrols would also find out as much as possible about the ground south of the Jebel-el-Akhdar, the hills which rose just inland between Bomba and Barce.

  Jake Easonsmith led H Patrol on an agent-ferrying mission, departing on 9th June. Having deposited his human cargo, he kept an eye on a section of the Bardia-Tobruk highway. A suitably unsuspecting Axis convoy was heavily attacked. A number of vehicles were put out of action and Easonsmith returned to the scene of carnage on foot that evening to account for a few more. On 14th June, H patrol successfully rescued Pilot Officer Pompey whose Hurricane had been shot down at Bir Bidihi, a couple of miles south of the Trig-el-Abd track.37

  H Patrol had a very busy month. Their next task was to ferry more agents and have a look around Mekili to ascertain if any significant convoy traffic was passing through the place, east to west. The recce went largely undisturbed except that one man died and another was wounded while they investigated a shot up Bedford truck. No damaged vehicle in the desert could be inspected with impunity. The unwary were apt to be suddenly taken off by a well concealed booby trap.38 Jake Easonsmith led H Patrol on another taxi run at the start of July and recce’d the Trigh-el-Abd again; this was noticeably quiet.

  Michael Crichton-Stuart had been ill with malaria and G Patrol had, temporarily, been commanded by Lieutenant Hay, a Coldstreamer. By 26th July Crichton-Stuart was back in the driving seat and took out a patrol – this time with a US observer, Major David Lair. He had a look at Jarabub airfield and located some enemy fuel dumps, destroying about 2,000 gallons of fuel and 500 of oil.39 He was out again toward the end of July, his troopers battling a fearsome Khamseen. Both he and Lieutenant Gibbs were struck down with fresh bouts of malaria. To date, G Patrol had lost one guardsman KIA, a second had died of wounds, and three others had been wounded.40 Y Patrol under Jake Easonsmith was equally busy throughout late July and early August, taxiing ‘spooks’ and sniffing out potential airstrips around Bir Hacheim.

  Siwa

  Though LRDG HQ was now firmly dug in, at and around Kufra, the enemy showed no interest, Bagnold had drawn up a full plan for all round defence, looking at axes of attack, but this remained theoretical. Success, however, had spurred strategic thinking towards beefing up Allied raiding capacity. Wingate’s rather grandiose and impractical scheme still had its attractions. The more realistic approach of duplicating LRDG in other sectors, deeper into Africa and across the sea in Syria (held by Vichy and distinctly not Allied-friendly), was being actively considered.

  From a command and control point of view, leaving Bagnold immured in deep desert was self-defeating. He couldn’t really control his far-flung patrols or advise on wider strategy. Guy Prendergast, promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, held the magic wand of a pilot’s licence, and the sturdy WACOs would give him the wings he needed. Bagnold was thus ‘moved upstairs’ to the special section of the Operations Staff back in Cairo to pursue the wider goal of recruiting new units.

  In practice this was far easier said than done. LRDG was successful precisely because its founding fathers, Bagnold himself, Clayton and Bill Kennedy Shaw were old desert hands. This was a very small pool and there were few others. Vehicles, kit and the right breed of men were also in short supply. Prendergast was given the redoubtable Major Eric Wilson VC as 2I/C. The Major had in fact been awarded a posthumous medal after the fighting in Somaliland; happily he was in fact a prisoner!41 On 24th September, Eighth Army came into being, commanded by Sir Alan Cunningham, who also assumed control of LRDG. The proposal to form further units disappeared back onto the shelf, though the Indian Long Range Squadron (“ILRS”) was formed during that winter.42

  Guy Prendergast was an ideal choice. General Wavell had remarked that the most important quality in a senior commander was what the French might call le sense du practicable – we’d call it common sense. This core element revolves around an understanding of ground, movement and supply. Knowledge of strategy and tactics is secondary because without a sound logistical base, rooted in familiarity with the ground, no tactics, however brilliant, will ever have a chance to work. Prendergast could leave much of the day-to-day jobs to his patrol commanders. His priority was to ensure there was fuel in the tanks and tins in the cupboard. At this he excelled.43

  By 10th July orders had come for the garrisoning of Kufra and its environs to be taken over by the Sudan Defence Force (“SDF”), and whilst LRDG continued to use the Oasis as a base, its role reverted fully to long range reconnaissance. Prendergast had a pretty broad brief – he was to monitor enemy activity around Zella, Marada and Jalo; survey potential routes across the Sirte desert, between Kufra and the Fezzan; and to investigate the hills of the Haruj.44 To help draw better maps of these largely blank areas, two surveyors, Lieutenants Lazarus and Wright, were dispatched to Kufra. Between them they achieved remarkable results. Ken Lazarus would have a very active career with LRDG.

  Guy Prendergast was given responsibility for his own ‘turf’, which was bounded by a line drawn from El Agheila to Jikerra, then along the northern rim of the Sand Sea as far as the Egyptian border. Eighth Army would be responsible elsewhere, though Prendergast was given a watching and advisory brief beyond his geographical remit. As LRDG was relieved of the tiresome business of garrison duty at Kufra, some of its men, particularly those from overworked G and Y Patrols, could benefit from some much needed R & R. The troopers were exhausted and many had suffered malarial symptoms – the abundant fleshpots of Cairo would be a very welcome balm.

  Before July was out, T Patrol was active in the Sirte Desert. Prendergast was explicit in that their role was reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. Beating up the enemy, diverting as such actions were, had to be avoided. Prisoners could be taken if opportunities arose, but without giving the game away. Existing intelligence sources suggested the Italians were maintaining garrisons at Jalo, Marada, Tagrifet, Zella, Hon and Bou Njem.45

  On arrival, the patrol split into three detachments, one under Captain Ballantyne (with Wilson who was fluent in Italian), a second led by Lieutenant Ellingham (with Kennedy Shaw as navigator), and a final reserve section remaining at Bir Zelten. The two forward patrols roamed freely within the target zone, coming in sight of the sea and learned much about the topography. There was little sign of Axis presence other than an abandoned training camp, and the patrols returned safely to base. This was unspectacular but solid work, precisely what Bagnold had intended his creation to perform.

  During the first week of September, S Patrol, operating from Kufra, set out to recce the line of Jalo–Jedabia with a broad swath around. This would be for a conventional force so LRDG needed to check out the going for heavy transport and armour, identify viable landing sites and identify sources of water. The patrol split into two detachments to cover more ground. The enemy, aside from the odd stray aircraft, were absent. Natives appeared friendly and reported some Axis patrolling from Jalo.

  R Patrol was active in the Jebel-el-Akhdar sector during August. Again this was in part a taxi run to insert agents, to collect from a dead letter drop and to recce an area of dunes at Medwar Hassan. Though the agents failed to reappear, no enemy units were contacted. Towards the end of that month R Patrol was out again ranging west of Jarabub in search of possible landing strips. A round half dozen were roughly identified, though as the patrol had no theodolite, exact positions were impossible to determine. A marauding Italian plane fired a couple of half-hearted bursts at the patrol, happily inflicting no damage, and no other foe was sighted.

  As summer waned, both G & Y Patrols, ‘A’ Squadron were withdrawn to Cairo for R&R and a general makeover. The desert as ever exacted a high toll from men and vehicles. R Pa
trol stayed at Siwa with a further HQ section under Major Steele. This now became a new ‘A’ Squadron whilst the old was designated as ‘B’. T Patrol, at this point also in Cairo, formed part of the Siwa Squadron which reported directly to HQ Western Desert. Prendergast, from his fiefdom at Kufra, ran General HQ, S Patrol, the heavy supply section and the bulk of the signallers, less a sub-unit up at Siwa.46

  Bagnold was concerned that levels of necessary vehicle servicing and repair weren’t being carried out, and lobbied successfully for a separate mechanical unit, prised from the RAOC. His wish was granted and a suitable section was formed under Captain Ashdown. Heywood’s signallers were also re-organised as a separate entity with him commanding. The pair of WACO aircraft was still doing good, essential service. Both were feeling the strain of age and air miles, but it was the planes which allowed Prendergast to survey his far-flung dominions. Air routes were carefully plotted and regularly adhered to with emergency stores of fuel and supplies stashed at key intervals.

  Throughout the autumn on 1941, LRDG served two masters – patrols from Kufra under the hand of LRDG HQ and GHQ, and from Siwa reporting to HQ Western Desert Force. In September John Olivey took S Patrol with one 15-cwt and four 30-cwt trucks from Kufra up towards the coastal section west of El Agheila. His primary purpose was an extension of road watch, to gain intelligence on the volume and type of Axis traffic. This was all about stealth and guile, a true ghost patrol. He was to be neither seen nor heard. From 18th–25th September they kept watch from a small mound not far from the grandiose triumphal arch, a typically flamboyant piece of fascist mummery dubbed ‘Marble Arch’, if nothing else a handy landmark. As ever, road watch was laborious and infinitely tedious.