Ghost Patrol: A History of the Long Range Desert Group, 1940–1945

by Sadler, John

  This was the LRDG artillery train, and their cumbersome truck proved unpopular with the Rhodesians. Macks were far from ideal for the desert, very heavy and much more so when acting as portee.26 At one point they’d also had the use of a single light tank, totally unsuitable for patrol work as Lloyd Owen rather caustically observed.27 Both the original howitzer and its 25-pounder successor remained truck-mounted. The force was ordered to scout an area east of El Agheila; to beat up the old fort at El Gtafia, shoot up whatever presented itself on the Jedabia-El Agheila road, and lastly, to recce the ground south and west of Jedabia.

  The ramshackle post at Gtafia was surrounded and assaulted on 16th December. The 25-pounder soon proved its worth. Blitz, with Jim acting as his signaller, went forward to recce the target, leaving the portee hidden in dead ground. Contact was by field telephone. Blitz estimated the range and then gave the order to fire. Bill and the gun crew blasted the fort with fourteen rounds. The enemy fled and the place was thoroughly slighted.28 Despite this resounding success, the artillery section was a relatively short-lived addition, as LRDG soon ran out of forts to bombard.

  Another excursion with an SAS detachment followed four days later. This time the commandos were aiming for the airstrip at Jedabia. At last, here was a target with no shortage of trade, and thirty-seven aircraft were destroyed. No casualties had been sustained in either of these actions but two troopers, Corporal Ashby and Private Riggs, were killed in a ‘blue on blue’ incident at the Wadi el Faregh on 22nd December, strafed by RAF Blenheims, a bitter blow.29

  Snapping at Rommel’s Heels

  Just before Christmas, on 21st December, Prendergast received fresh orders direct from the top. The various patrols detached with Reid and Marriott now reverted to Group HQ, and LRDG was instructed to step up offensive patrolling. The group was to report on terrain in Tripolitania (the western portion of Libya, Cyrenaica being the eastern), and conduct more road watch inland and on the coast, paying particular attention to the enemy’s defences there. Eighth Army also wanted to know which posts were garrisoned by Germans as opposed to Italians.30

  Evidence from captured enemy papers clearly showed the LRDG attacks were having an effect. They might snap like terriers but the magnified roar was leonine, as Axis officers believed their numbers to be far greater than in reality and were directing more and more resources to protect their logistics: These early raids by Stirling’s men, with the LRDG providing the method of transport, had an immense effect on Rommel’s actions at a time when the Eighth Army was forging ahead. Already his Italian allies were none too certain of how much they wanted to be involved at all….31

  General Ritchie was convinced the enemy was exhausted and that, once he’d consolidated in Cyrenaica, he could advance into Tripolitania and finish the job. As events would prove, this was a trifle over-optimistic. However, this halcyon period did offer a chance to harness the aggression of Leclerc and his Free French, who were chomping at the bit. LRDG was tasked to take radio gear and weapons down to Zouar where the French had assembled a mobile column. This was small, a couple of infantry companies, some artillery pieces and a few obsolete planes. Leclerc’s force would act under Eighth Army’s orders and strike northwards, avoiding Vichy-held territories.

  Leclerc was to move on 9th January 1942, but Rommel had other plans and by the 21st of the month was counter-attacking, rapidly re-taking Jedabia and Benghazi. Holliman with S1 took SAS parashots, as Kennedy Shaw described them at the time, for another crack at airstrips at Sirte and Wadi Tamet on 24th December. A very Merry Christmas greeting from British Special forces saw another twenty-seven planes go up in flames at Wadi Tamet, but the raid on Sirte had to be abandoned when the attackers were rumbled by sentries. Nobody was hit or captured and the patrol skilfully evaded the pursuit.32

  On Christmas day itself, no one was taking holidays that year, as Lieutenant Morris guided two more SAS teams, aiming to hit the landing grounds near ‘Marble Arch’. Morris had fifteen men from LRDG and ten from SAS. The first group was taken to a point six miles from the aerodrome, the rest ferried closer to Nofilia. This second team, led by Jock Lewes, was collected from the dropping off point on 30th December. As the combined patrol drove nearer Marble Arch they were set upon by a lone Messerschmitt 110. This first strafing run inflicted no damage but more Axis planes followed. Stukas this time, and though the vehicles had been camouflaged, the enemy scored several hits and Jock Lewes was killed, a very great loss to the SAS. As the morning wore on, trucks were knocked out one by one. Morris managed to extricate one driveable vehicle and rally survivors, but nine LRDG and one SAS were left in the confusion.

  This produced another LRDG epic as the men walked for 200 exhausting, cold and hungry miles to reach British lines; only the sole SAS trooper dropped out because his feet were in a terrible state. It took them eight days to cover the ground and they heralded in 1942 with a mouthful of water each while they watched ‘the RAF paying their respects to the Luftwaffe at what we thought was Marble Arch aerodrome as the flares were very bright…. At dawn the next day they saw some fires ‘and we reasoned that where there was fire there was wogs and where there were wogs there was water and perhaps food.33 Whether men were wearing boots or the less substantial Chaplis, none of the available footwear stood up to the rigours of a desert march. Corporal Garvin’s ad hoc solution was a slice of woollen greatcoat on one foot and a scrap of canvas cover from a Lewis gun on the other.

  Lloyd Owen with Y2 was ranging over central Tripolitania in the dying days of 1941, while Timpson, leading G2, beat up the highway between Hon and Misurata. On 7th January, Jake Easonsmith took R1 to waylay traffic on the Zella–Hon road. The ground the patrol traversed was made up of powdery limestone, or ‘fesh-fesh’, tricky at best and it proved impossible to conceal vehicle tracks. They were attacked by aircraft, followed by ground forces but managed successfully to avoid both and get back unscathed. Captain Frank Simms with Y1 had been temporarily attached to 13 Corps as guide and liaison, as Eighth Army was moving towards Antelat and Marble Arch. On a recce towards Marada, Simms was captured and Lloyd Owen took over. Rommel then trumped everybody by attacking at Msus.

  On the surface, it appeared that the ‘Crusader’ battles had resulted in a significant victory for Eighth Army. This was largely illusory as the thinning of British dispositions left the gains in Cyrenaica, so dearly won, again at hazard. Auchinleck was proceeding to plan ‘Acrobat’ – a further attack upon the remaining Axis hold on Tripolitania. Strung out in winter quarters, the army had few fixed defences and penny packet garrisons, a doleful lack of concentration. 7th Armoured Division had been withdrawn for a much needed refit, and 1st Armoured, which lacked its fellow tankers’ battlefield experience, was put in to plug the gap. Supply lines were tenuous and inadequate, plus there remained the problem of Malta. Eighth Army required the island fortress still in British hands to continue the fight, but to protect Malta it was necessary to maintain forward aerodromes in Cyrenaica.

  Rommel had also noted these deficiencies, and a subtle shift in the balance of resources provided him with an opportunity, one which he, as arch-opportunist, was not about to ignore. On 12th January his senior intelligence officer, Major F.W. von Mellenthin, predicted that for the next fortnight the Axis forces would be slightly stronger than the British immediately opposed to them.

  On 21st January, the Desert Fox threw two strong columns into an attack, one advancing along the coast road, the other swinging in a flanking arc, north of Wadi el Faregh. Caught off guard and dispersed, British units began to fall back. General Ritchie was, at this time, far to the rear in Cairo and disposed to regard these moves as nothing more than a raid or reconnaissance in force. He and Auchinleck did not detect the tremors of disquiet that commanders on the ground were experiencing. Early cables suggested the situation might be ripe for a strong riposte.

  It has been said of military matters that ‘too often the capacity to advance is identified with the desirability of advancing�
�. Never was this truer than in the Desert War, and the reality was that Rommel had seized and was maintaining the initiative. By the 24th the ‘Auk’ was sending signals in an altogether more sober tone. Rommel was still advancing, his own supply difficulties notwithstanding.

  When one German officer had the nerve to point out that fuel stocks were critical he received the curt advice: well go and get it from the British. Within a day there were plans to evacuate Benghazi, producing a rather plaintive cry from Whitehall, …why should they all be off so quickly? Both Ritchie and Auchinleck flew to the front but the local commanders, their instincts more finely tuned, were preparing for withdrawal. 4th Indian Division was pulling out from Benghazi as 1st Armoured prepared to regroup near Mechili.

  Swift as a terrier, Rommel, alerted by wireless intercepts, planned a double-headed thrust. One pincer swept along the coast road whilst the second, the Fox in the lead, pushed over higher ground to sweep around and come upon the port from the southeast. A dummy lunge toward Mechili was intended to fool Ritchie and succeeded. He dispatched his armour, leaving Benghazi exposed. Von Mellenthin, commenting on the effectiveness of the panzer tactics and the speed of the British withdrawals, observed scathingly: the pursuit attained a speed of fifteen miles an hour and the British fled madly over the desert in one of the most extraordinary routs of the war.

  For LRDG the enemy’s lightning advance meant abandoning Jalo and returning to Siwa. So swift was the movement that Captain Carr with an entire supply unit, fourteen men and seven vehicles, was captured in a job lot when he rolled into Msus. He had no radio and so couldn’t be warned. As ever, LRDG was soon fighting back. On 17th January, Hunter had ferried another SAS team, led by Stirling himself, to raid Bouerat el Hsun. Despite a number of difficulties, mechanical problems and the attentions of enemy aircraft, the raid achieved its purpose and extended to more mayhem on the coast road. On the road home, they ran into an ambush but shot their way clear without loss.34

  Constant patrolling and the relentless grind of desert travel had taken its toll on the trucks, and by the start of February a number of patrols had returned to Cairo for re-fitting where the worn out Fords were replaced by 30-cwt Chevrolets. New automatic weapons, including more .50 calibre Vickers, Vickers ‘K’ Lewis guns and the effective 22-mm Breda were issued. At the same time a further structural re-organisation took place. LRDG would now have its HQ, with a squadron of six patrols under hand, whilst a mobile or ‘detachable’ squadron of four patrols could be used as a flying column or columns as needed. An RAOC repair section plus signals team were attached to HQ. Eighth Army was now standing on the Gazala Line and Rommel had clawed back significant tracts of Cyrenaica. The Prime Minister was not amused.

  For LRDG, this meant a shift back to road watch. Intelligence was vital. Rommel had caught Auchinleck completely unprepared, and the resulting rout or ‘Msus Stakes’ as labelled by the wags, was indeed something of an embarrassment. The Germans, at this stage, were still rather better than their opponents at recovering and repairing their damaged tanks and tucks. They proved equally proficient at recycling British abandoned stock. Many spare parts had been harvested from earlier retreats in France, Greece and Crete as well as the Desert.

  When G2 under Timpson left Siwa on 9th February, Hasledon was with him. The patrol split into two teams for the road watch. Hasledon noticed how many enemy trucks were ours, recovered, repaired, re-branded and generally showing less wear than Axis equivalents. Most were heading east and the patrol managed to scoop up some British stragglers left behind in the race for safety. Quite a few others were on the move, seeking to regain Allied lines. On the whole, local Arabs were both loyal and helpful; however, any opportunity to plunder their Italian occupiers was always welcome!35

  Y2 recce’d ground northeast of Jedabia early in February but the featureless terrain made concealment tricky. They passed many abandoned British vehicles, most plundered by or being repaired by the Italians. On 25th February John Olivey took S2 back to watching the main Benghazi–Tripoli highway. This dreary routine went on for weeks, and numerous patrols were involved.

  The favoured spot hadn’t shifted from that chosen the year before, around thirty-five miles west of El Agheila and five miles east of Marble Arch: Bill Kennedy Shaw recently sent me [David Lloyd Owen] the original sketch which he drew for the navigator of the first patrol to do this work. It records the position of the spot where the vehicles were concealed…. It also gives details of the best line of approach and the time of day that he recommends.36 As Lloyd Owen trenchantly observed, this was typical of the meticulous recording and briefing by LRDG. Their appearance from the still and all-encompassing dark might have been what frightened the enemy, but it was such intensive attention to detail that made these eruptions work.

  As ever, the road drill didn’t vary and there was no shortage of trade. As before, Axis vehicles were often being towed to economise on fuel consumption, and by now the watchers were expert at identifying truck and troop types. Holliman, returning from his refit in Cairo, was sent to watch the roads running east out of Barce. This mission ran into numerous problems, not least of which was a flash flood which engulfed several parked up trucks. Only two vehicles made the return journey to Siwa.37 Dick Croucher also came back from Zouar, because Rommel’s rapid recovery and counter-strokes had effectively neutralised Leclerc’s plan to attack in the Fezzan.

  As both sides paused to draw breath in early March, Eighth Army sent out yet another set of commandments, directed both towards LRDG and their SAS brethren:

  Beating up the enemy wherever the chance should arise;

  Specifically targeting airstrips and lines of communication (“L of C”), forcing the enemy to spread his resources; to destroy enemy vehicles and armour, supply dumps and repair shops;

  Gathering intelligence generally;

  LRDG to focus primarily on reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, and to continue providing a taxi service for the SAS.

  David Stirling, though his SAS had a very close relationship with LRDG, did not always appreciate the need for reconnaissance over beat ups. For him, killing Germans was the priority. He was naturally impatient with long-term reconnaissance missions, which might inhibit the spectacular results that might be his if only the LRDG’s Road Watch wasn’t in the way.38 The approach was different but the sentiments remained the same. Both units did good service. Blowing things up was spectacular and satisfying, but long-term intelligence gathering was vital – pedestrian by comparison but essential. Demolition would always be the optional extra.

  GHQ’s memorandum parcelled up the areas to be attacked by differing formations. In the forward zones this would be the regulars, with Middle East Commandos in an intermediate zone and LRDG/ SAS operating further west.39 Throughout March and April, as the giant brawl on the coast bubbled, LRDG were again in the field with SAS raiding parties. Olivey with S2, ferrying David Stirling, was to hit landing strips at Berca and Benina and target vessels in the harbour at Benghazi. TI, under Morris, was to take SAS to the Slonta area and pick up commandos who were already active there. Olivey would later sweep up that SAS team. Holliman and S1 were to taxi another gang of SAS saboteurs south of Barce and get them back to Siwa after their mission.

  Holliman felt constrained to leave three trucks at Sidi Zamut, after he’d been warned enemy patrols were active. He took the team in with his remaining vehicles and dropped them without interference. Corporal Eastwood, in charge of the stay behind group, had moved to a new RV to avoid roving enemy aircraft. Holliman rejoined Eastwood on 21st March and the patrol was able to rescue two of the trucks lost to the flash flooding earlier. The SAS team was extracted after a successful foray. S2 with Stirling’s troopers caught up with Holliman on the 28th. The raids on Berca, Benghazi and Benina had, as ever, met with mixed fortunes. Stirling again found no trade at the Benina airstrip. Mayne, who seemed to have the magic touch, smashed fifteen planes at Berca.40

  The SAS leader was in demand so
was to be brought back straightaway from the combined RV at Chedu bu Maun. This left the second SAS team under Lieutenant Dodds to be recovered, a task that now fell to Dick Croucher and R2. Croucher’s patrol would also ferry in a commando team, commanded by a Major Glennie. It wasn’t until 8th April that Dodds and his squad were picked up and, like the Pied Piper, the SAS had attracted a tail of stragglers, detritus from the fighting, including half a dozen RAF personnel. Ferrying this lot back meant Croucher had to make a second run to collect Glennie and his commandos. There were rumours of enemy activity about, gleaned mainly from local Arabs, but no actual contacts occurred during these taxi operations.41

  Back on the Roads

  Eighth Army had reason to be pleased with these hit and run missions, aside from destroying materiel, they forced the enemy to disperse scarce resources. However, on 23rd April, St. George’s Day, LRDG was ordered to go back onto road watch. Of particular interest was the section of track between Mekili and Msus; the enemy was bringing much of his own warlike stores eastwards from Tripoli up to Benghazi.

  Prendergast was placed in charge of both western zones with two squadrons from Middle East Commando now coming under his command, along with a miscellaneous collection of informers and agents. Anyone else operating on his extended turf would also report to him. Clearly, this much wider responsibility was a testament to his and LRDG’s track record, but the absolute priority now was intelligence gathering rather than beat ups. Road watches were not to be compromised by attacking random targets of opportunity, however tempting.42