Ghost Patrol: A History of the Long Range Desert Group, 1940–1945

by Sadler, John

  The Final Curtain

  Peace? Peace. I hate the word…34

  What to do with warriors when there’s no war? LRDG was a cutting-edge fighting unit; it had never had a peacetime role. The post war expansion of Special Forces operations is discussed in the next and final chapter, but in May 1945 there seemed no need. As early as July 1944, foreseeing the end of the conflict in Europe, Lloyd Owen had made out a case for deploying LRDG to the Far East. Bob Laycock, by now Chief of Combined Operations, was minded to agree. The government of Rhodesia was prepared to allow its soldiers to remain with the colours, and the men were genuinely enthusiastic to see the job through.

  On 16th June, Allied Forces HQ intimated to Lloyd Owen that the WO, in its infinite Olympian wisdom, concurred, and that a fresh round of training was to be undertaken. Barely a week later, the WO changed its mind and disbanded the LRDG: Five years and fourteen days after its formation in Cairo, the Long Range Desert Group ended its active career. I believe that its days in the desert have made some mark in military history.35

  This typically modest claim turned out to be something of an understatement.

  Notes

  1 http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/resistance_movement_in_yugoslavi.htm, retrieved 3rd March 2015.

  2 Ibid.

  3 Lloyd Owen, p. 159.

  4 Ibid., pp. 160–161.

  5 Ibid.

  6 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/croatia/8529443/Croatian-island-of-Vis-remembers-World-War-Two-role.html – retrieved 3rd March 2015.

  7 Lloyd Owen, p. 161.

  8 Ibid., p. 162.

  9 Ibid., pp. 163–165.

  10 Ibid., p. 166.

  11 Mostar was famous for its beautiful sixteenth-century bridge, later destroyed in the civil wars of the 1990s.

  12 Lloyd Owen p. 166.

  13 Ibid., p. 167.

  14 Ibid., p. 168.

  15 Fitzroy Hew Royle Maclean (1911–1996) was a celebrated author, traveler, soldier and MP, one of the very few who during the course of the war rose from private to brigadier. He is best remembered for his remarkable memoir, Eastern Approaches, and may have been one of those who inspired fellow Scot Ian Fleming to create James Bond.

  16 Lloyd Owen, p. 169.

  17 Ibid., p. 170.

  18 Ibid.

  19 Ibid., p. 172.

  20 Ibid., pp. 174–175.

  21 Ibid.

  22 Ibid., p. 176.

  23 Ibid., p. 211.

  24 Ibid., p. 212.

  25 Ibid.

  26 Ibid., pp. 213–214.

  27 Ibid., p. 215.

  28 Ibid., p. 216.

  29 Ibid., p. 222.

  30 Ibid., p. 223.

  31 Ibid., p. 224.

  32 Ibid., p. 227.

  33 Ibid., pp. 227–228.

  34 Shakespeare, Romeo & Juliet (Act one, scene 1, Tybalt).

  35 Ibid., p. 229.

  CHAPTER 10

  Ghost Patrols, 1945–2015

  Are you ready, paratrooper? Said the sergeant looking up,

  The paratrooper feebly answered, the dispatcher hooked him up.

  But when he hit the atmosphere his chute became unstuck.

  And he ain’t gonna jump no more…

  (Chorus)

  Glory, glory, what a horrible way to die!

  Glory, glory, paratrooper.

  Glory, glory, what a horrible way to die!

  And he ain’t gonna jump no more.

  —Sung to the tune of John Brown’s Body1

  Special Forces: operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/ or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies, and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

  —US Department of Defense (author’s emphasis)2

  ‘No broad conventional force requirement’ – for the purposes of this chapter I am working on an assumed definition of Special Forces based on the LRDG precedent. I am discounting larger commando-style or paratrooper formations. During the early stages of the war commandos were used for raiding, with mixed results, but like some of their Axis counterparts ended up being employed in the line as heavy infantry. Britain still fields both Marine Commandos and the Parachute Regiment. These are elite forces with a record second to none. but I do not include them within my particular definition of ‘Special Forces’.

  The LRDG came into being as a solution to a clearly perceived strategic problem, and as an opportunity for British arms to practise a peripheral, indirect role. In 1945 LRDG was disbanded, but the problems besetting the post-war world and the retreat from Empire threw up a whole raft of tactical challenges for which Special Forces offered an obvious remedy. Senior officers tend not to like irregulars. They’re too much like loose cannon, disregard orders and hierarchies, tend to operate beyond effective control, and exhibit a tendency to siphon off the most able and daring men from regular formations. The prevailing staff college view was that the costs and risks far outweighed the dividends.

  Ralph Bagnold and the LRDG, and David Stirling with the SAS had at least to a degree changed that. They had shown what highly trained and motivated raiders with the right tools and equipment could achieve. Nothing beats an endorsement from Rommel himself! As NATO settled into the largely passive routine of the Cold War, with the prospect of a major interstate Armageddon looming daily, there appeared to be little requirement for Special Forces. The Cold War was a kind of dry run of the Western Front, both sides dug in and facing each other, but otherwise little or no movement.

  Warfare, post 1945, has tended to be a very different business. For half a century, industrial armies faced each other across the North German Plain, each driven by fear of the other. Both possessed vast arsenals of nuclear weapons which assured that neither side could possibly win – it was ‘mutually assured destruction’ or, very aptly, “MAD” for short. At the same time, Britain experienced the retreat from Empire sparking asymmetric conflicts across the globe, such as in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and Borneo. Simultaneously there was scope for expeditionary warfare in Korea, Suez, the Falklands, the two Gulf Wars and Afghanistan, with thirty years of domestic counter-insurgency in Northern Ireland.

  It is remarkable to think senior commanders after 1945 envisaged a continuation of Industrial warfare without the need for Special Forces. Today, we tend to view our Special Forces as the front line is asymmetric conflict:

  the period 1946–1991 could well be defined as one of an overarching confrontation … maintained by industrial structures, containing non-industrial conflicts, the parallel wars. It is within these conflicts that we see the first signs of the new paradigm, especially in the nature and objectives of the opponents, and in the constant adaptation of the existing means – the industrial military machines – to non industrial conflicts…. It was the beginning of a trend we live with to this day.3

  Whilst the nature of the threat and the need for Special Forces’ role has changed, in part at least, many of the core concepts underlying the creation of LRDG still hold good. Bagnold raised his force to perform a specific task in a very particular environment. Success in one sector, as LRDG discovered, did not guarantee a repeat elsewhere. LRDG was intended for deep penetration, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. Much of this work, the dreaded ‘road watch’, was far from glamorous but vital in terms of overall strategic and tactical planning. ‘Beating up’ the enemy wa
s a secondary function, giving plenty of adrenalin rush but often stirring up the hornets’ nest, so compromising the primary role.

  David Stirling had no qualms about riling the foe. That was the primary function of SAS – raiding enemy targets and creating massive havoc. The results were considerable, and the boost to battered Allied morale an important bonus, but sometimes the grim reaper approach made the work of LRDG more difficult.

  It is axiomatic therefore that the formation and role of LRDG shows that defining the role of Special Forces in the theatre from the outset is crucial. The ‘KISS’ principle (‘keep it simple, stupid’) is not to be overlooked. Expansive combined commando-type operations such as Operation Agreement ended in disaster. This is a lesson which subsequent planners, say of grandiose Operation Eagle Claw, the 1980 attempt by the US to rescue hostages in Iran, failed to heed. That one also foundered, creating both a military and PR catastrophe.

  It was the experience and success of LRDG that signposted some important features for successor Special Forces. Suitably built or modified vehicles, designed for heavy load carrying, rugged, reliable and not overly sophisticated, are essential. The failure of Axis forces to grasp this partly explains their own failures. A plethora of automatic weapons delivering a hail of fire way beyond the normal firepower of so small a group is frequently decisive in the vital opening seconds of the fight. Early fire supremacy not only kills enemy, it hastens their urge to disengage. It can also persuade them that they’re facing a far superior force. Workable communications are a must. The tragedy of Arnhem in 1944 clearly shows just how horribly wrong things can go when the communications fail.

  Any military unit depends upon the calibre of men it attracts. It has always been clear that you can’t conscript Special Forces. They must, by definition, be volunteers. From those who come forward, only a small percentage will actually qualify. The current SAS selection is notoriously and rightly rigorous. None but the best will do. Bagnold established this principle from the outset, using the trusted cadre of those he’d explored alongside before the war. Those he recruited achieved prodigies. They were all ordinary men yet they were also magnificent men: resolute, resilient, courageous and bold.

  Just to survive in the conditions LRDG regularly found itself required each man to have a steel core, officers doubly so. Being on patrol, hundreds of miles behind enemy lines in the harshest environment on Earth, made huge demands. Physical fitness and stamina had to be matched by emotional strength and motivation. There was no chain of command, no relief ever in sight, no backup and often no re-supply. The patrol was its own army. It carried whatever it needed. It had to care for its own sick and wounded, with no chance of a scapegoat when things went wrong; ‘Corporals’ wars’ in army jargon. It is hardly any wonder that to the regular infantry, immured in their defensive ‘boxes’, harried relentlessly by the agility of the Desert Fox, these men appeared almost mythical – demi-gods drawn straight from the pages of Homer or Henty.

  None of this has changed. For Special Forces to be able to operate successfully, only the bravest and the best can pass the test. Each man knows he can rely totally on his comrade. Officers have to muck in, to listen to the specialists whose combined skills determine unit effectiveness. There is no room for passengers, and service in the field will quickly and cruelly expose those not up to the mark. From the Maccabees to Desert Storm, this hasn’t changed, nor ever will.

  End of Empire

  The sharp end of SAS operations was arduous and dangerous work. An operation would be for up to three months with re-supply by parachute every fourteen days, security permitting. Fresh meat and bread would be dropped and consumed the same day before the beasties got at it. It was not unusual for supply ‘chutes to ‘whistle in’ – plummet to earth without fully opening or become hung up in the trees or be otherwise inaccessible. These would invariably be the ones with the mail or rum ration onboard.4

  The Malayan Emergency was a twelve-year counter-insurgency campaign against Communist Terrorists (“CTs”). At the outset CTs were able to strike almost at will from superbly camouflaged jungle bases virtually impossible to detect. Part of the riposte was to re-form the SAS, which took the fight to the enemy, a major factor in their final defeat. Obviously, the Chindit experience was invaluable, and expert practitioners in the art of jungle warfare such as ‘Mad’ Mike Calvert were brought in to train recruits. Malaya established the enduring value of a Special Forces component, one which despite the nightmare terrain could penetrate into the heart of enemy-held areas and direct telling air strikes.

  From Changi the squadron moved to the jungle warfare school at Kota Tingi in Malaya. British and Australian instructors taught basic jungle tactics with assistance from a company of Gurkhas. This course ended with the squadron’s first operation, off the east coast of Southern Malaya. Landing from Navy MTBs, the squadron stormed ashore into flat, dense, sea-swamped jungle. Unfortunately nobody had considered the water supply (never usually a problem in jungle). Here the water was salty so we lived on coconut milk, a miserable experience…. 5

  During the long and vicious years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the SAS learned to function in a covert, urban/rural environment. In temperament this sectarian conflict was the very reverse of Krieg ohne Hass. When an SAS detachment very publicly stormed the Iranian Embassy in May 1980, bringing to an end a violent siege and hostage scenario, theirs became a household name. In the thirty-odd years since, this status has been elevated to the iconic. Writers like Chris Ryan and Andy MacNab, who took part in the epic failure of Bravo Two Zero during the first Gulf War, have together sold millions of books since.

  The killing of three Provisional Irish Republican Army (“PIRA”) terrorists on the rock of Gibraltar during Operation Flavius6 led to some disquiet. LRDG had only ever been called upon to fight in an honourable war, and took prisoners wherever possible. Shooting to kill is part of war but the lines are less clear-cut when facing terrorists or insurgents – ‘war among the people’ as General Smith would define it.

  The retreat from empire – protracted, complex and not infrequently bloody – offered the perfect training ground for Special Forces. Each conflict threw up different scenarios, Kenya, Aden, the Radfan, and Borneo. All demanded that UK Special Forces learn to operate across a range of terrain, that they should work closely with local forces, and pursue the Holy Grail of ‘hearts and minds’.

  Despite the varying stresses of topography and demographics, the essential role is one LRDG would have recognised. In July 1972, a nine-man SAS patrol fought an epic fight against vastly superior communist forces at Mirbat in Dhofar. Stirling and Paddy Mayne would have approved wholeheartedly. SAS suffered three casualties but easily accounted for probably a hundred plus of the enemy.

  On the night of 11th May 1982 during the Falklands War the SAS carried out a reconnaissance of an Argentinian air base on Pebble Island off the coast of West Falkland. This was classic LRDG/SAS territory. The enemy possessed significant air power and their Pucara ground-attack aircraft constituted a deadly threat to the expeditionary force. On the night of the 14th the SAS came back to Pebble Island, this time looking for a fight. The attack was pure textbook. Aided by supporting naval gunfire, the raiders pulverised the airfield and its planes, effectively destroying the place and were gone within a couple of hours. Only one man was wounded.7

  One US officer, writing of the First Gulf War, described Iraq as a ‘Special Forces Theme Park’. Robin Neillands comments that it was never seriously in doubt that the Coalition forces would defeat Saddam Hussein’s army. Some ‘experts’ had predicted heavy casualties amongst ground forces when taking on the ‘elite’ Republican Guard, who in the event proved rather less than formidable. Saddam had begun shooting Scud Missiles into Israel, a flagrant provocation. Had Israel riposted then, Arab partners in the Coalition would have wavered. SAS and US Special Forces were tasked to seek out and destroy these Iraqi Missiles.8

  The SAS were born in the desert, fif
ty years before Desert Storm, so in many ways the regiment was returning to its birthplace in the Gulf War, albeit a few thousand miles further east from their old stamping grounds in the Western Desert of North Africa. The SAS were even equipped for this operation in a similar way. Long wheel-based Land Rovers replaced the traditional Willys’ Jeep and the GPMG [General Purpose Machine-Gun] was mounted in place of the Bren gun or the Vickers ‘K’, but otherwise not a lot had changed since the desert campaigns of half a century before.9

  In tandem with the hunt for Scuds, and reminiscent of the LRDG road watch, Special Forces were to interdict the major Iraqi internal supply routes – the saga of Bravo Two Zero came about in consequence.

  The Hunt for ‘Elvis’

  Within days of 9/11, advance reconnaissance teams from the CIA’s Special Operations Group (SOG) were in Afghanistan, essentially intelligence gathering and distributing bribes, followed by teams of Green Beret Special Advisors to prepare Northern Alliance warlords to take the fight to the Taliban.

  These were joined for reconnaissance and target acquisition by SAS/ SBS, who had far greater experience of such operations from Aden, Oman etc. At the time of 9/11, the UK was conducting Exercise Swift-Sword off Oman – deploying 22,000 personnel, 6.500 vehicles, twenty warships and close air support. The US already possessed a substantial forward base in Uzbekistan. The west had to respond swiftly once the ultimatums to the Taliban expired. Ground operations thus began on 7th October; it was essential to gain as much ground as possible before the onset of winter.

  The Taliban (c. 50,000 strong), plus several hundred Al-Qaeda, pitted against the Northern Alliance, (c. 15,000 strong), had been conducting sporadic conventional warfare with massed forces on the ground, from fortress complexes and extended trench lines. The early phase of the conflict was thus a conventional war for which the Taliban were neither ready nor equipped. As the Taliban were attempting to fight a conventional war, they were massively outgunned and quickly routed; airburst munitions and strategic bombing by B-52s resulted in the destruction of fixed defences, supply depots, command and communications networks. Special Forces were directing and leading the campaign, doing ‘hearts and minds’ and looking at target acquisition; overall the Taliban put up a poor showing.