by Prit Buttar
There were similar problems elsewhere along the Soviet front line. The Red Army reached the eastern outskirts of Warsaw, triggering the uprising in the city by Polish resistance fighters, and although it was most convenient for Stalin to sit and wait for the Germans to destroy the anti-communist Home Army, the reality was that the armies outside Warsaw were as exhausted as Bagramian’s troops. In addition to their losses and overstretched supply lines, they had suffered a setback at the hands of the German XXXIX Panzer Corps, whose main strike power was provided by 4th Panzer Division. Acting with their old speed and flexibility, the German forces took advantage of the increasing lack of coordination of the Soviet spearheads and launched a counter-attack east of Warsaw, smashing 3rd Tank Corps and greatly reducing the strength of 8th Guards Tank Corps.4
Coming at the end of a summer of unprecedented disasters for the Wehrmacht, the isolation of Army Group North was a huge setback. Armies had been isolated before – most notably when 6th Army was surrounded and eventually destroyed in Stalingrad – but this was the first time that an entire army group was separated from the Reich. Restoration of contact was given a high priority, and the Wehrmacht began to scrape together a strike force capable of breaking through to Schörner’s army group.
Slowly, the German front was stabilising again. Following the fall of Kaunas, Cherniakhovsky’s 3rd Belarusian Front continued to push on towards the East Prussian frontier. An armoured force reached the German town of Schirwindt before being driven back by elements of Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland on 5 and 6 August. Nevertheless, for the next three days, Cherniakhovsky urged forward his 33rd Army to attack again towards Schirwindt, and a little further north elements of 39th Army and 5th Guards Tank Army attempted to force their way towards Tilsit along the northern bank of the River Niemen. However, German counter-attacks made good progress. Grossdeutschland beat off all attacks towards the East Prussian border, while 7th Panzer Division, which had fallen back into south-west Lithuania, was extracted from the front line and replaced by 252nd Infantry Division. Bitter fighting raged between the infantry division and the two tank corps of 5th Guards Tank Army, leaving the town of Raseiniai, the scene of the momentous tank battle of 1941, in ruins. The mobile forces of 7th Panzer Division were thus freed up to probe towards the north, establishing firmer contact with Gruppe Mäder. It was even possible to start pulling Grossdeutschland out of the front line.
Meanwhile, at the northern point of the front line, Standartenführer Gross started to probe forwards. His armour reached within two miles of Tukums, though an attack on the town itself was abandoned. Reconnaissance units were able to filter forwards and establish the most tenuous of contacts with Army Group North to the east of Tukums. 4th Panzer Division began to move north from Poland on 11 August. The trains carrying the division crossed East Prussia; for many of the soldiers of the division, it was their first sight of their homeland for several years, and it roused mixed feelings. On the one hand, there was joy at seeing Germany again, but on the other hand, their journey highlighted the proximity of the front line to East Prussia.
As had been the case since the end of 1941, Army Group North consisted of 16th and 18th Armies. In order to facilitate better coordination of all German forces north of the German frontier, Raus’ 3rd Panzer Army was temporarily assigned to Army Group North. Plans were rapidly drawn up for establishment of a strong link between 16th Army and 3rd Panzer Army, and were presented to Hitler on 8 August. The proposal was to move Grossdeutschland to the front opposite Raseiniai, to give the appearance of a threatened push to retake both Raseiniai and Šiauliai. Further north, there would be two thrusts, one with one or two panzer divisions and an infantry division towards Šiauliai, and another with three or four panzer divisions towards Jelgava. The following evening, the proposal was assigned the codename Doppelkopf, the name of a card game that was popular with German soldiers at the time. Perhaps as a result of Hitler’s influence, the plan had developed somewhat more grandiose aspects. After restoring contact with 16th Army, the attacking panzer divisions would then turn south towards Kaunas, with the intention of thrusting into the rear of the Soviet forces facing 3rd Panzer Army. It seems that this additional aspect of the plan was ignored from the outset by the division and corps commanders involved as entirely unrealistic.5
Prior to its move north, Grossdeutschland launched a further assault in its current sector on 9 August, recapturing the town of Vilkaviškis in a surprise attack. The advance began before first light, and taking advantage of misty conditions, the assault group bypassed the Soviet defences south of the town before turning north; they had effectively surrounded Vilkaviškis to the west, south and east before they were even spotted. Heavy fighting erupted as German units penetrated into the town, but by nightfall, only a few isolated pockets of Soviet troops remained, and they slipped away during the darkness.6
Intelligence reports reaching 3rd Panzer Army suggested that the Red Army was indeed exhausted after its long offensive, perhaps even overextended; prisoner interrogations revealed that 5th Guards Tank Army had only 40 operational tanks left, out of an establishment strength of over 500.7 It therefore seemed an ideal moment to launch the counter-attack towards Šiauliai, and the planning for Doppelkopf gained pace. XXXIX Panzer Corps would launch the main assault, with 4th, 5th and 12th Panzer Divisions forming Gruppe Libau and attacking in two thrusts from the area north-east of Telšiai, with the intention of pushing through to Jelgava. Meanwhile, the 101st Panzer Brigade, created from what remained of 18th Panzergrenadier Division, was placed under the command of Oberst von Lauchert and dispatched by sea to reinforce Gruppe Gross in northern Courland. From here, the combined force, under the energetic command of Hyazinth von Strachwitz, would drive through Tukums to reach Riga. Further south, XL Panzer Corps, with Grossdeutschland and 14th Panzer Division, would advance on Šiauliai from the south-west. 7th Panzer Division would reinforce the attack at a later date.
From the outset, there were tensions between the various German commands. 3rd Panzer Army was of the opinion that the assault should start on 17 August, as it would take at least that long for all elements to assemble. By contrast, due to the perilous plight of 16th and 18th Armies, trapped north of the Soviet breakthrough to the coast, Army Group North pressed for an earlier start to the attack. There would have to be an unhappy compromise between waiting until sufficient forces had been gathered to have maximum effect, and the pressing need to break through to the trapped armies.
Meanwhile, the Red Army reshuffled its forces. 1st Guards Rifle Corps, part of 51st Army, was the main force in the Soviet-held corridor that ran from Jelgava to the Gulf of Riga. To the south, 5th Guards Tank Army received badly needed reinforcements in the shape of 100 new T34 tanks, and was ordered to prepare to drive north-west from its current positions around Kelmė to the area west of Šiauliai, while 4th Shock Army was transferred to 1st Baltic Front. Its 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps was deployed south of Jelgava, while 1st Tank Corps, weakened by the summer fighting, remained in reserve in the area east of Šiauliai. The German counter-attack would face formidable resistance.
The Red Army also detected the northward movement of German armour. Its assessment of the power of the Wehrmacht, though, was somewhat wide of the mark; the overall strength of Army Group North was reported to be 700,000 personnel, more than 1,200 tanks and assault guns, about 7,000 artillery and mortars, and 400 combat aircraft. The Leningrad Front and the three Baltic Fronts, by contrast, had 900,000 troops, over 3,000 tanks and assault guns, about 17,500 artillery and mortars, and about 2,650 combat aircraft, under the collective command of Marshal Vassilevsky, the Deputy People’s Commissar for Defence.8 Even if the Soviet assessment of German strength had been accurate, the Wehrmacht would have faced a formidable struggle.
On 13 August, Vassilevsky reported to Stalin that ‘it is possible that the enemy intends to cut off the salient that we have pushed to the Gulf of Riga from both sides’. In order to hinder this, orders we
re issued to 1st Baltic Front to attack towards Riga with 4th Shock Army and 6th Guards Army, to tie down forces of the German 16th Army. 43rd Army would hold its positions to the south of Jelgava, facing towards Riga, but would join the attack as it developed. In the corridor to the Baltic, 51st Army would establish strong defensive positions, with 2nd Guards Army to its south.
Bagramian took the German preparations seriously:
The greatest worry for us was the tip of the salient that we had pushed forward to the west of Riga … it was 40 to 60km wide. The front was held by four rifle divisions from 1st Rifle Corps and 63rd Rifle Corps. It was clear to us that we could not hold the front with four battle-weakened divisions. But we had no more forces at our disposal. It was certain to us that the enemy would try to cut off this salient at its base, and this would be made all the easier for the enemy as we transferred more forces to the Gulf of Riga. In short, there was no doubt that the Fascists would attack. But unfortunately, until just before the beginning of the attack, we did not know from which direction, and with what forces.9
During their advance, Bagramian’s forces encountered the modest bands of pro-Soviet Latvian partisans, who provided intelligence on German troop dispositions. These reports suggested that German troops on the southern and western approaches to Riga were massing for a breakout; the reality was that 16th Army lacked sufficient armour to make any such attempt. In order to prevent such a breakout, Bagramian decided that, while 51st Army would take up a defensive posture in the face of the anticipated German attack from the west, 4th Shock Army and 43rd Army would prepare to launch an attack towards Riga. At the very least, this would disrupt German plans for a breakout.
On 14 August, the German IX Corps launched an attack with 252nd Infantry Division, reinforced by elements of 7th Panzer Division, immediately north of Raseiniai. The operation, codenamed Greif, was seen as a preparatory attack for Doppelkopf, and succeeded in taking most of the town. Over 60 Soviet tanks were reported knocked out, and 7th Panzer Division was extracted from the front line in preparation for the main operation. Late on 15 August, the divisions earmarked for the main thrust began to move from their forming up areas to the front line. As the troops wound their way along narrow roads, grim news from the west spread from man to man: the Western Allies had made an almost unopposed landing on the French Mediterranean coast. The difficulty of the task before them also became clear even before they reached the front line:
Everything was small, tiny copses, little hills, narrow roads, small bridges, drainage ditches and streams everywhere. In short, it was no country for armoured warfare, we could see that already after a few kilometres. Above all, the curvy, small roads and the bridges, which were too weak for our ‘heavy bears’, made things difficult for us. For sure, the combat engineers worked constantly and gave almost superhuman service, but still, here a ford proved unreliable, there a bridge collapsed under a heavy tank. Detours had to be reconnoitred, the columns constantly stopped before new obstacles. Where the tanks could still operate, it wasn’t possible for the fuel trucks to follow – and we desperately needed fuel with this constant driving. In the end, the 100km journey to our start line was achieved. But how many small acts of heroism had to occur during the dark of this night that would never be counted.10
Doppelkopf began on 16 August, a day earlier than 3rd Panzer Army had originally wanted. Despite the presence of five panzer divisions and a panzergrenadier division, the number of German tanks was disappointingly small – only 133 in XXXIX Panzer Corps, and only 148 in XL Panzer Corps. The weather, dry and sunny, was perfect for armoured operations. In the north, Gruppe Gross, which had pulled back from the outskirts of Tukums, made little progress in the face of determined resistance. With the allocation of 101st Panzer Brigade, still en route by sea, and assorted staff and communications elements, the group was somewhat grandiosely named Panzer Division Strachwitz. Further south, XXXIX Panzer Corps crossed its start line at 0800hrs. 4th and 5th Panzer Divisions were able to field substantial forces, and made good progress, but 12th Panzer Division still awaited the arrival of all its elements. 5th Panzer Division attacked in two battlegroups, and the southern one had to conduct an assault across the River Venta at Papilė, where it encountered heavy resistance and was forced to shift its point of attack, attempting to bypass the town to the south, as Alfred Jaedtke, commander of a panzergrenadier battalion, recalled:
The armoured group had only just overcome the most forward Russian elements in battle and had not yet penetrated the enemy’s lines adequately deeply, so the shift to the south meant that when marching past the town, it came under substantial anti-tank fire both from there [the Soviet forward positions facing west] and also in the left flank. This was the result of excellent directed fire from the Russian artillery …
There were still a few irritations from Russian anti-tank guns that were well-positioned in woodland about 6km north-east of Papilė. But the resistance was swiftly overcome. In the adjoining woodland (about 8km deep), we surprised a battalion of Russian artillery, a swift capture for our tanks. Weak enemy resistance in Mažūnaičiai was quickly crushed. On it went towards Kruopiai. Everywhere teemed with Russians, but there was never any meaningful resistance. It seemed they were from scattered units or rear area formations. The morale of our men was outstanding. After the numerous fighting retreats, we were at last advancing again, as in the old days.11
Further south, XL Panzer Corps thrust forward with Grossdeutschland. Held up by poor roads, the division struggled towards Kuršėnai, where it was able to secure a crossing over the River Venta when it captured an intact rail bridge. A little to the south, 14th Panzer Division also seized a bridge over the Venta near Šaukėnai, but 7th Panzer Division ran into heavy resistance north-east of Kelmė.
With its armoured forces concentrated in a relatively small area, 3rd Panzer Army left other parts of the German front exposed to enemy attack. XXVI Corps on the southern wing of the army defended a substantial part of its line with the weak 549th and 561st Grenadier Divisions; relatively newly raised, these formations had a large proportion of men previously deemed unfit for front line service through age or infirmity, and lacked both a core of veterans and any combat experience. Even as Doppelkopf began, elements of the Soviet 11th Guards Army, 33rd Army and 5th Army attacked in this sector. 6th Panzer Division was able to put up good resistance, but was driven back, and the attacks achieved significant penetrations in the sectors held by the two grenadier divisions on the flanks of the panzer division. These advances were a direct threat to East Prussia, and had to be countered. Consequently, the 1st Infantry Division, en route for deployment in Doppelkopf, was diverted to help reinforce XXVI Corps.
Bagramian received reports of varying seriousness. On the one hand, the defences facing XL Panzer Corps seemed to have held up well, though they claimed to be facing attacks by about 250 German tanks, i.e. a number almost as great as the entire German armoured strength along all axes of attack, but on the other hand, the reports of armoured attacks by XXXIX Panzer Corps gave little indication of their strength or which German units were involved. By the end of the day, he had confirmation that 126th Rifle Division had been forced back by elements of Grossdeutschland and 7th Panzer Division. Vassilevsky advised the move of 5th Guards Tank Army to the Šiauliai area be accelerated, and Bagramian harangued the commanders of 51st Army and 2nd Guards Army to make greater efforts to identify the units that were attacking them, and to move all artillery assets to the front line to provide maximum support.12
At dawn on 17 August, 4th Panzer Division assaulted Soviet defences around the village of Vegeriai, which had brought the previous day’s advance to an end. The village was taken swiftly, but attempts to push east made slow progress, due to a mixture of difficult terrain and determined resistance from well-positioned anti-tank guns. By the end of the day, the division had pushed forward barely three miles, though 12th Panzer Division made somewhat better progress to the north. 5th Panzer Division’s sou
thern battlegroup succeeded in reaching Gaudikiai, but like 4th Panzer Division to the north, was held up by tough anti-tank defences. Two days of fighting had moved the front line forward perhaps nine miles.
Grossdeutschland attacked and took the town of Kuršėnai, but 14th Panzer Division made little headway after its bridge over the Venta was damaged by artillery fire. Here, Bagramian’s order to deploy artillery in the front line had a marked effect, as he described in a style in keeping with most Soviet accounts of the era:
Colonel Pavlenkov’s 1187th Artillery Regiment had the hardest time. The gunners defended themselves to the last round. The crew of an anti-tank gun led by the communist Kustov alone sent five tanks, including two Tigers, up in flames. As German infantry with machine pistols approached the gun, they were engaged with hand grenades. Finally, only the gun-aimer Podgorny was left alive of the crew. Despite being wounded, he fired the last shell and then with the driver of the supply vehicle moved the gun to a safe location. Kostov and Podgorny were awarded the title Heroes of the Soviet Union by the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 24 March 1945.13
7th Panzer Division suffered a major setback as it attempted to attack from Kelmė, as one of its officers recorded in his diary:
The attack was already in full flow. The battlegroup gathered in a large dip in the land during the afternoon. It was generally quiet. The armoured unit officers had just started a discussion in the commander’s half-track when an apparently stray sighting round exploded in the dip. Immediately after there was a second shot. By chance, this round detonated in the regimental commander’s half-track. All the men in the vehicle were killed (the commander, adjutant, signals officer, driver and radio operator). Consequently, the entire command of the division’s groundbreaking battlegroup was knocked out.14
