by Prit Buttar
Oberstleutnant Weitzel, commander of the division’s 6th Panzergrenadier Regiment, was killed, as well as his adjutant and the adjutant of the division’s Panther battalion. Whilst open-backed half-tracks allowed panzergrenadiers to deploy easily, they were very vulnerable to plunging artillery fire, as 7th Panzer Division discovered at its cost.
In the midst of the ongoing fighting, there was another round of changes in the German command. Model was dispatched to take command of the Western Front, and was replaced as commander of Army Group Centre by Georg-Hans Reinhardt. Raus took command of 3rd Panzer Army.
From the Soviet perspective, the attack by XL Panzer Corps appeared to pose the greatest threat, though 51st Army reported that the forces attacking it – mainly 4th and 5th Panzer Divisions, though the Soviet forces had not yet identified them – consisted of ‘about 200 tanks and strong infantry formations’.15 1st Tank Corps and 103rd Rifle Corps were dispatched to Šiauliai from 1st Baltic Front’s reserves. Although 5th Guards Tank Army was moving to the area, Bagramian was frustrated to learn that it had only 17 tanks ready for combat, in place of the 500 tanks he had expected. General Konsantin Skorniakov, commander of 1st Baltic Front’s tank and mechanised forces, responded by presenting the report of Major General Petr Kalinichenko, 5th Guards Tank Army’s chief of staff:
We have been in action for almost two months, taking part in operations at Vitebsk and Kaunas and have suffered losses. For sure, not just from the enemy, but also through wear and tear, and a shortage of spare parts. The army lost many tanks on the roads around Šiauliai. Moscow has dispatched a really substantial amount of equipment to us. We hope that we will be given time to restore our units and restore order to their ranks. The trains carrying [replacement] tanks are already underway.16
Meanwhile, after receiving further reports of a build-up of German forces near Riga, Bagramian dispatched two infantry divisions and a mechanised division to the front closest to Riga, while holding a further tank formation in reserve. An anti-tank brigade was transferred to Bagramian’s front from Cherniakhovsky’s 3rd Belarusian Front, and an additional three such brigades made available from strategic reserves. Given the nature of the terrain, with limited line of sight and relatively poor roads, these anti-tank guns were precisely the weapons needed to hold up the German advance.17
The painfully slow advance of XXXIX Panzer Corps continued on 18 August. 12th Panzer Division seized high ground immediately south of Auce, and after reorganising its forces overnight, 4th Panzer Division attacked with two battlegroups, pushing forward perhaps two or three miles before running into a Soviet counterattack by about 40 tanks; prisoner interrogations identified these as being part of 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps. The pace of the attack gave the Soviet forces ample time to prepare their defences, as 5th Panzer Division’s Jaedtke found:
Setting off the following morning towards Veršiai, we were surprised to encounter a Pakfront [a coordinated line of anti-tank guns] only 3km north-east of Gaudikiai, which brought heavy fire down upon us. The individual anti-tank guns were well-camouflaged on the edge of a wood either side of the road, which we had to capture through about 6km of woodland. After our artillery had brought heavy fire to bear on the edge of the wood – at our request, there were a few smoke rounds in the last salvo – we attacked. We broke into the wood under cover of the smoke. The Russians fled and left 10–12 anti-tank guns behind.
Advancing further, we discovered that the woodland road was more of a clear lane, about 60–80m wide, with a few young saplings. The Russians had positioned even more anti-tank guns in key positions, which were hard to spot and were protected by infantry. We therefore had no choice but to advance with dismounted panzergrenadiers either side of the road and to try to clear the anti-tank guns from our path, while our tanks leapfrogged forward. This was a time-consuming enterprise and we only advanced slowly, as the woodland either side of the road was full of Russian infantry, who we had to guard against, to prevent them from making things unpleasant for our tanks and the half-tracks, which were amongst them and only manned by drivers and co-drivers. The road was also unpleasantly mined. They were only freshly planted and could be found relatively quickly by Hauptmann Pilch’s combat engineers and removed. After about two or three hours we reached the end of the woodland. The first tanks and half-tracks advanced into Veršiai, another kilometre ahead, and reported it free of enemy. We aligned ourselves along the wood edge and the company commanders reorganised their units, which had been disrupted in the woodland. We could see Žagarė about 5km to the north. Oberstleutnant Herzog appeared and ordered further reconnaissance to the north, and for both main roads to be guarded to the north and south until II/14 [2nd Battalion, 14th Panzergrenadier Regiment] arrived. At that moment, there was an unholy burst of ‘fire magic’ – apparently from numerous Katyushas – simultaneously on the wood edge and the dip beyond. As we were right by there, driving to the designated blocking positions, a radio message arrived from Regiment HQ: ‘Immediate withdrawal to Gaudikiai!’ That could not be right. I used Oberstleutnant’s radio to contact the regiment’s signals section. ‘The radio message is correct. There’s trouble on the right flank. Hurry!’
So, back along that stupid woodland road. A panzergrenadier company led, then three platoons of tanks, then the bulk of the battalion, and at the rear a tank platoon with panzergrenadiers. This tank platoon with panzergrenadiers was to hold the edge of the wood near Verniai until it was certain that we had once more reached the western edge of the wood. Even as we drove back, I heard the sounds of fighting from Gaudikiai. Hauptmann Elmers, commander of the 2nd Panzergrenadier Company, who had driven ahead, reported by radio: ‘Enemy tanks in combat against our artillery.’ A battalion of our artillery was positioned on the high ground north of Gaudikiai and was now in close-quarter combat with 15–20 Sherman tanks. A few guns fired over open sights. For my two tank platoons at the wood edge, the Sherman tanks were most handily positioned, as most had their rears to us. It did not take long before Hauptmann Eysser, who had proved himself in many battles and had been awarded the Knight’s Cross, shot up almost all the enemy tanks with his tanks. Two or three enemy tanks reached the wood, but were later found abandoned by their crews and were blown up.18
The Soviet tanks were from one of several groups deployed to disrupt the German advance. Taking advantage of the terrain and the gaps between the advancing German units, they attempted to isolate and destroy the German spearheads, as Hauptmann Nökel, another member of 5th Panzer Division, recorded:
During the course of the night [of 17/18 August], the enemy had driven past the right flank of the advancing division with three tank formations, each with 25 to 30 tanks, mostly Shermans and Josef Stalin Is, and attacked our deep right flank during the morning with strong artillery support between Gaudikiai and Kruopiai. Their aim was to destroy our spearheads, stopping our thrust. This attack was defeated with heavy enemy losses. East of Gaudikiai, the rearguard tanks of II/31 [2nd Battalion, 31st Panzer Regiment] shot up nine enemy tanks, near Gaudikiai the artillery with direct fire and Eysser’s tank company (3/31) together shot up 25 enemy tanks. At Kruopiai, Panzerjägerabteilung von Ramin [the division’s anti-tank battalion] knocked out 25 enemy tanks marching up. The division was mentioned in the Wehrmacht report for shooting up 56 tanks. The enemy tanks that attacked at Gaudikiai without infantry totally surprised us. Firing from all barrels, they overran my headquarters and that of Oberstleutnant Herzog in the edge of a wood east of Gaudikiai. They drove directly towards a battery of 116th Panzer Artillery Regiment’s 2nd Battalion, deployed in an open plain. Here they drove to their destruction in the cross-hairs of the artillery; the battery suffered heavy losses.19
Further to the south, Grossdeutschland continued to edge towards Šiauliai, supported by 14th Panzer Division. Opposing the German divisions was the Soviet 1st Tank Corps, and a division of ‘Latvian’ soldiers. Like the Red Army’s Estonian divisions, this division probably contained only a minority of nati
ve Latvians, with the rest of its strength made up of a mixture of ethnic Latvians from within the Soviet Union and Russians who had no Latvian ancestry whatever. Nevertheless, Bagramian recorded the deeds of father and son team Dauetas, who fearlessly engaged German tanks with anti-tank rifles and grenades, destroying a tank and a ‘Ferdinand’ assault gun. Given that there were no Ferdinands deployed in the battle, this was at best a case of mistaken identity, though far from unique. It was commonplace for all German assault guns and tank destroyers to be identified as Ferdinands, which at 65 tons were regarded by the soldiers of the Red Army as particularly formidable foes; similarly, soldiers on all fronts frequently claimed that the German tanks they had encountered were Tigers. Other members of the Latvian division were also singled out for high praise, and it seems clear that they were involved in heavy fighting, and generally acquitted themselves well. Indeed, the slow advance of the German troops is itself testimony to the determination of the Latvian division to hold its ground.20
General von Saucken, commander of XXXIX Panzer Corps, had a meeting with 3rd Panzer Army’s chief of staff, where he expressed his concerns that the attacking divisions were too far apart to achieve maximum effect. For the moment, though, the operation continued as envisaged. Once XL Panzer Corps had taken Šiauliai, he was assured, the two corps would move closer to each other and the threat to the flanks of XXXIX Panzer Corps would be greatly reduced.21 On the other side of the battlefield, Bagramian received reassuring reports that his front line was holding firm. Indeed, he felt sufficiently confident about his defences to order 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps to be pulled out of the front line and held in reserve.
It took until early on 19 August for Gruppe Strachwitz to assemble sufficient forces to launch a major attack. Attacking with about 60 tanks, the Panzergraf made good progress, forcing the Red Army into a defensive ring around Tukums, held by two rifle divisions of 1st Guards Rifle Corps. 4th Panzer Division intended to attack to take Žagarė, but spent most of the day fending off repeated Soviet attacks. For a while, the two battlegroups of the division were in danger of being isolated, but determined local counter-attacks steadily restored the situation.
The counter-attacks in 4th Panzer Division’s sector had an impact on 5th Panzer Division to the south. After waiting in vain for 4th Panzer Division, which was a little to the north-west, to catch up, 5th Panzer Division’s Gruppe Friedrich and Gruppe Herzog were ordered to resume their own advance. They made good progress and reached Žagarė, but their previous tenuous contact with 4th Panzer Division disappeared as a Soviet force counter-attacked deep into the seam between the two divisions, and they came under repeated attack by Soviet units. With the aid of a Stuka squadron, they succeeded in beating off the attacks, but were left feeling increasingly isolated. Similarly, Grossdeutschland pushed closer to Šiauliai, but had to abandon plans for further attacks, as both its flanks were exposed. 2nd Guards Army, the main force opposing it, was now reinforced by further elements of 1st Tank Corps and 5th Guards Tank Army. As Bagramian described, the intense fighting was often at the closest of quarters:
On this day, the divisions of 11th Guards Rifle Corps, covering the south-west approaches to Šiauliai, were particularly valuable to us. For sure, the corps commander, General Rozhdestvensky, was wounded, but my old friend, Major General Aruschanian, had the command structure firmly in hand. He thus blocked the enemy’s intention to achieve a breakthrough with two infantry regiments and several dozen tanks in the sector of 85th Rifle Regiment from Major General Sakurenkov’s 32nd Guards Rifle Division. Although the artillery destroyed many tanks, many more penetrated into the regiment’s positions. There, they were attacked by the riflemen with anti-tank grenades and Molotov cocktails. Sergeant Gribeniuk from 4th Rifle Company threw himself under the tracks of a tank with an anti-tank grenade, which he then detonated. The sergeant was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.22
For the men of the panzer divisions, it was a different experience from previous battles, as Hans Schäufler, a signals officer in 4th Panzer Division, recorded:
For us this was an entirely new type of war, these tough struggles in the tightest of spaces, the bitterly conducted fighting for every metre of ground. We had to break up the enemy’s positions step by step. It was no impulsive surge forward, rather a painstakingly led fight in a restricted space. Coming out of the spaces of Russia, we only got used to this new war slowly.
Soon, the first Josef Stalins were positioned against us. After eight of them were blown into the air by our fire in a short time, this spell too was broken. They were huge structures with outrageous turrets and a gun like a tree-trunk.
… At night we always withdrew a little, and pushed on in the morning. One defensive system behind another. The breakthrough simply wouldn’t come.23
14th Panzer Division, which had started the assault in relatively good shape, had been additionally reinforced by 20 Tiger tanks belonging to Schwere Panzer Abteilung 510, but three days of fighting had made a substantial dent in its capabilities. On 19 August, it was involved in a fierce clash with Soviet armour along the line of the Ventos canal, and although it claimed to have destroyed 15 Soviet tanks, the division took significant casualties too. The division’s 106th Panzergrenadier Regiment suffered the loss of its commander, his adjutant, a battalion commander, and the battalion commander’s replacement in just a few hours. Engineering teams reported that in addition to enemy-inflicted losses, the division had suffered a substantial number of Panthers breaking down with engine and gearbox problems, while the Pz.IVs and assault guns suffered steering gear and brake failures. Spare parts were hard to find, and on many occasions, vehicles had to be cannibalised to keep others running.24
There was a further discussion at higher levels of the German command about the future course of the operation. The chiefs of staff of Army Group Centre and 3rd Panzer Army concluded that the chances of successfully driving on to Jelgava looked poor, and that there was far greater likelihood of success for Panzer Division Strachwitz, as the northern force was now known, in reaching 16th Army. Bagramian and his army commanders, too, discussed the situation, concluding that they had prevented all German efforts to break through so far, and remained confident that they would continue to block the two German panzer corps. However, with his reserves increasingly depleted, Bagramian was relieved to receive further intelligence refuting earlier reports that German armour was concentrating near Riga for a breakout by 16th Army. This allowed him to release further troops to face the threat from the west. In particular, he was able to withdraw Colonel-General Ivan Mikhailovich Chistiakov’s 6th Guards Army from its current position south-east of Riga, with the intention of inserting it between 51st Army and 2nd Guards Army.
On 20 August, Grossdeutschland was ordered to shift its attacks somewhat to the north, towards Gruzdžiai. This would allow it to achieve contact with XXXIX Panzer Corps’ divisions, held up before Žagarė, and would eliminate some of the threats to the flanks of the German thrusts. Aware that the German point of effort was slowly shifting north, Bagramian ordered 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps to deploy around Žagarė, and ordered 43rd Army to release 19th Tank Corps in order to create an operational reserve. But the most important development of the day came in the north, where Strachwitz had finally assembled his forces. He attacked and took Dzukste, then pressed on to Tukums. There was a substantial force of Soviet tanks in the town, but help for Strachwitz came in the form of the arrival of the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen off the coast. The warship fired over 250 rounds into Tukums with its 8-inch guns, destroying about 40 Soviet tanks, after which Strachwitz swiftly overran the Soviet defences. From here, the ad hoc division turned east, pushing through weak Soviet resistance to Sloka, where contact was established with elements of 16th Army. But despite relatively limited losses from Soviet action, Strachwitz finished the day with only nine Panther tanks; most of the rest had broken down en route, and were now subject to counter-attacks as the Red Army tried
to close the narrow corridor that Strachwitz had established.
Perhaps in an attempt to justify their own failure to stop Strachwitz, units of the Soviet 51st Army reported that Tukums had come under attack from at least 300 German tanks.25 Bagramian dispatched 19th Tank Corps and 60th Rifle Corps to reinforce 51st Army, and to restore the Soviet corridor to the Baltic. There was an even more alarming development later in the day, when General Iakov Kreizer, commander of 51st Army, reported that German forces had landed along the coast in an amphibious operation involving 35 ships. Furthermore, Kreizer continued, powerful infantry and armoured forces were threatening Tukums from the east. Neither of these reports was actually true; the suggestion of amphibious landings was probably the result of the intervention of Prinz Eugen and a small number of accompanying destroyers in the fighting at Tukums, and although a small force had been prepared by 16th Army to cooperate with Strachwitz, it did not amount to a serious threat. Nevertheless, the reports persuaded Bagramian that 1st Guards Rifle Corps, still clinging to the line near Tukums, was in danger of being outflanked and overwhelmed. Consequently, he ordered the corps to pull back both of its divisions about 15 miles to the south.
The previous day’s discussions between German staff officers were renewed, with suggestions that some of the armoured forces struggling towards Žagarė and Šiauliai might be moved to the north, so that they could exploit Strachwitz’s success. Saucken pressed for a resumption of the attack towards Jelgava, on the grounds that even if a decisive breakthrough was unlikely, his corps was tying down substantial Soviet forces. If one or more of his divisions were to be redeployed to the north, he argued, such a move would take at least two days, by which time it was highly likely that sufficient Soviet forces would also have been moved north to force the redeployed German forces to fight their way through to Tukums and on to 16th Army. For the moment, it was agreed that the attacks would continue, though planning began for the withdrawal of Grossdeutschland from its current position, with a view to redeployment further north in support of Strachwitz. In the meantime, 7th and 14th Panzer Divisions, attacking south of Grossdeutschland, were ordered to close the gap between their spearheads.26
