by Prit Buttar
The following day, the assault group, consisting of 101st Panzer Brigade and SS Panzer Brigade Gross, attacked alongside SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 11. Although the SS reconnaissance battalion managed to penetrate to Tamsa, a few miles south-west of Nöo, Soviet defences proved too strong for the main armoured group to achieve a significant penetration. In any event, elements of 1st Guards Army bypassed the northern flank of the armoured counter-thrust, and reached the lower tip of Lake Võrtsjärv. The Soviet spearheads were now barely 40 miles from the Baltic, threatening to isolate Army Detachment Narva in Estonia. The armoured counter-thrust was abandoned, and its forces fell back to defend against a further Soviet drive to the west.
The Soviet 67th Army was concentrating against Tartu, and launched a determined attack with four rifle divisions to take the city on 25 August. Bitter street-fighting reduced much of the city to rubble, but by the end of the day, the exhausted German defenders were forced to abandon Tartu and retreat north-east over the River Emajõgi. On either side of Tartu, Soviet infantry succeeded in crossing the river and securing small bridgeheads, and Wagner tried desperately to salvage his shattered units. SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 11 was now assigned to his command, and with its mobility and firepower, it succeeded in stopping several Soviet penetrations. Sturmbannführer Leon Degrelle, commander of the Wallonien assault brigade, succeeded in establishing a defensive line around the Soviet bridgehead north of Tartu, and overall command of the German front between Lakes Võrtsjärv and Peipus was assigned to General Wilhelm Hasse’s II Corps.
With the German lines in disarray and Soviet forces across the Emajõgi at several points, there was a danger of multiple Soviet advances, either west to the Baltic, north into the rear of the Tannenberg positions, or north-west to Tallinn. Estonian soldiers who had been serving as part of the Finnish Jalaväerügement 200 (‘Infantry Regiment 200’) or JR 200, and had returned to Estonia as part of the amnesty declared at the beginning of August, had been formed into the 3rd Battalion, 1st Estonian Regiment, and were hurried south to the front. On 30 August, reinforced by an Estonian police battalion and a small force of German tanks, they attacked the Soviet bridgehead at Kärevere, which was defended by two rifle divisions. After a stiff fight, the Soviet forces fell back, and the Estonians not only eliminated the bridgehead, but also captured the bridge intact. Further attacks followed, reducing the Soviet bridgeheads closer to Tartu. By 6 September, elements of II Corps had reached the northern edge of the city, but could make no further progress.
To the south-west, 16th Army also came under heavy pressure as the Soviet 2nd Baltic Front attempted to force its way through to the coast. Most of the line was defended by the German Korpsgruppe Risse and Korpsgruppe Wagner, created from the remnants of burnt-out infantry divisions and whatever other men were available. General Paul Laux, commander of 16th Army, was killed when his reconnaissance plane was shot down by a Soviet fighter, and he was replaced by General Carl Hilpert. As much through Soviet exhaustion as their own efforts, the defenders were able to bring the Soviet attack to a standstill.
Slowly, stability returned to the front, mainly because the Soviet forces paused to regroup before launching what they intended would be lethal assaults to destroy Army Group North. On 10 September, Felix Steiner, commander of III SS Panzer Corps, was summoned to a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters in Rastenburg for a conference. Here, Hitler informed him that Estonia was to be abandoned. Finland had resumed negotiations with the Soviet Union in August, and on 4–5 September a ceasefire came into force between the two nations. One of the main rationales for holding Estonia – to prevent the Soviet forces from gaining bases that they could use to attack Finland – was therefore eliminated. The other two reasons to stay in Estonia were to make use of the oil shales on the Baltic coast, and to continue to recruit troops in Estonia. Neither of these was sufficient to justify a continued German presence, especially given that at three different points – in southern Estonia, to the west of Riga, and between Šiauliai and Klaipėda – the Red Army was in a good position to sever all contact between the armies in the Baltic States and the German Reich.
However, it was perhaps typical of Hitler’s thinking that the abandonment of Estonia would not be complete. Iron ore from Sweden, he insisted, would remain vital to the German war effort, and in order to ensure that this continued, a German bridgehead was to be established around Tallinn. This would continue to be held indefinitely.
Steiner objected to the proposal, knowing that his own corps would probably be required to hold the Tallinn bridgehead. Hitler dispatched him back to Estonia, assuring him that further details and a final decision would follow, but Steiner had no intention of allowing his men to be sacrificed in what he regarded as a lost cause. On his return, he ordered rear area units to dispatch non-essential personnel to Germany, and his staff requisitioned as many motor vehicles as possible. These were then distributed primarily to 11th Infantry Division and 20th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division (1st Estonian), to ensure that they were as mobile as possible. He also discussed Hitler’s intentions with Schörner, who agreed that the proposal for a Tallinn bridgehead was absurd. He promised to take this up with Hitler directly.
None of Steiner’s actions to date were particularly controversial, but he crossed a distinct line when he contacted Major General Sodla and Colonel Sinka, officers in the Estonian military, and told them of German intentions. Quietly, arrangements were made for seaborne evacuation of a limited number of Estonians by sea.37 Meanwhile, Schörner decided to order Army Detachment Narva to make preparations for an organised withdrawal. He had no intention of having to organise such a complex undertaking under pressure of a Soviet attack.
In Latvia, both 3rd Panzer Army and Bagramian’s front were tidying up the aftermath of Doppelkopf. Since the termination of the operation, they had enjoyed relative peace, but the German armoured forces had largely remained in place, in anticipation of a Soviet thrust towards the west. On 11 September, three days before the great Soviet assault on Army Group North, Reinhardt asked 3rd Panzer Army whether it might be possible – if a Soviet attack towards the west did not materialise – to launch a German attack, in order to tie down Soviet forces that might otherwise be unleashed against 16th Army. Raus replied that he had a total of 420 tanks and assault guns available, and recommended a limited attack north of Bene. OKH wanted the attack to begin immediately, if necessary with whatever forces were already in the relevant sector, but Raus strongly advised against this; given the resistance that the panzer divisions had encountered during Doppelkopf, he argued, it was best to concentrate forces before an attack.
There was considerable discussion about the relative merits of attacking north of Bene, or even further north at Dobele. Šiauliai was also considered as an option, but on 14 September, it was decided that an attack through Bene was the best choice. Orders were accordingly issued for a commencement of an attack on 16 September, codenamed Cäsar. It was expected that this operation would relieve the pressure that was building up on Riga.38 Raus was not greatly optimistic about the prospects of the operation. He advised OKH that fuel was limited for his divisions, and that he did not regard it as likely that he would gain a great deal of territory. However, he was confident that the attack would tie down and destroy substantial Soviet forces.
Despite German fears of a Soviet attack towards the west, this was not yet part of Bagramian’s planning. For the moment, he turned his attention to a small group of about 900 men from 346th Rifle Division, who had been cut off close to the coast of the Gulf of Riga by the restoration of the link between Army Group Centre and Army Group North. On 2 September, this group radioed that it planned to attempt a breakout. Three days later, led by Major Bubli, commander of 1164th Rifle Regiment, some 700 men succeeded in reaching Soviet lines.39 Meanwhile, he submitted his plans for his front’s participation in the coming offensive against Army Group North. He felt that whilst he could contribute to the capture of Riga, his main contribu
tion would be to restore his corridor to the Gulf of Riga, and ordered 51st Army, supported by 5th Guards Tank Army and the independent 1st and 19th Tank Corps, to prepare for such an operation on 20 September. However, plans were also made for the assault towards Riga.
Amongst the obstacles facing Bagramian’s front were the Rivers Mēmele and Lielupe. Crossing these in the face of resistance would be hard enough; maintaining supply lines across them for a rapid advance would be still harder. Bagramian was therefore relieved when General Vasili Kosarev, the front’s Chief of Engineers, offered a solution. It would be possible to dam the Mēmele and the Muša – a tributary of the Lielupe – and thus lower the river to a more manageable level.40 Preparations were also made at a political level:
The political work was very effective, as there were strong Party organisations amongst the companies. The total of Communists amongst the troops was about 173,000 … in 4th Shock Army and 43rd Army, the Communists and Komsomol members formed 27 to 40% of the personnel. In every division, there were permanent representatives of the political organisation of the Front and individual armies, who exhorted their comrades to raise their efforts using various means and methods. Before the attack, 43rd Army’s council called a special assembly. Its declaration stated that the attack would be supported by over a thousand guns, about a thousand planes, as well as many tanks and self-propelled guns. When I saw this declaration, I was worried whether we were handing the enemy information that he might be able to use. But then I accepted the text, as I told myself that nothing could save the Fascists, and the morale effect of this document on the soldiers would be enormous. This declaration was at the heart of the meetings of the troop formations and played an important role in increasing their combat spirit.41
Malyschev’s 4th Shock Army launched its preparatory attacks on 11 September, attempting to take the Germans by surprise. A decoy smokescreen was used to distract German attention away from the main assault, which was launched by 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. The Soviet forces swiftly secured a bridgehead over the Mēmele.
On 14 September, Beloborodov’s 43rd Army was due to begin its assault, but the original attack was delayed by bad weather. As planned, 1st Baltic Front’s engineers had completed their damming work, lowering the level of the critical rivers by about 20 inches, and as the weather improved through the day, the assault was launched at 1300hrs. Crossings over the Mēmele and Lielupe were swiftly seized, and Beloborodov’s 1st and 84th Rifle Corps made good progress. By the end of the day, Soviet forces had reached Iecava, their objective for the first day, but to the disappointment of Bagramian and other senior officers, the delays brought by the morning’s bad weather prevented the seizure of the town. Lauchert’s 101st Panzer Brigade, which had been part of Strachwitz’s improvised division, was committed to block the Soviet advance near Bauska, and with German resistance rapidly increasing, Bagramian ordered Beloborodov to bypass Iecava. On 15 September, 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps – considerably replenished since its battles during Doppelkopf – advanced to the east of the town, followed by 1st Rifle Corps. Bagramian was aware from aerial reconnaissance reports that German forces were being fed into the defensive line south of the Latvian capital, and urged 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps and 43rd Army to advance as fast as they could. The following day, Beloborodov reported that his leading units had reached Baldone, only 12 miles from Riga.
Early on 14 September, 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts also launched attacks along the entire front of Army Group North. 14th Panzer Division was dispatched to shore up the front to the east of Riga at Ērgļi. On 16 September, even as Beloborodov’s 43rd Army advanced almost within touching range of Riga, Schörner flew to Rastenburg and gave Hitler a detailed and pessimistic report of his army group’s situation. He had no significant reserves left, and the collapse of his front was only a matter of time. There were insufficient men to hold off the Red Army whilst simultaneously preparing ‘fortress’ positions as Hitler wished, and only a withdrawal would prevent the annihilation of the entire army group. After only 15 minutes’ discussion, Hitler agreed to an immediate withdrawal, codenamed Aster.
Detailed orders for such an operation had been in preparation for several days, and now slipped into action. III SS Panzer Corps was to pull back on 18 September to Pärnu on the Baltic coast, with II Corps forming a rearguard that would withdraw a day later. Generalmajor Gerok was given command of a mixed group that would fall back to Tallinn, from where it would be evacuated by sea.
Meanwhile, using whatever forces he could scrape together, Generaloberst Hilpert, commander of 16th Army, attempted to mount counter-attacks south of Riga. Although these achieved little, General Chistiakov, commander of 6th Guards Army, advised Bagramian that a substantial force of perhaps 300 German tanks and assault guns was preparing to attack towards Dobele: Soviet reconnaissance had spotted the German build-up for Cäsar. Reluctantly, Bagramian was forced to concentrate on defending against renewed activity by 3rd Panzer Army.42
Cäsar, 3rd Panzer Army’s spoiling attack to relieve pressure on Army Group North, began on schedule on 16 September, with Grossdeutschland and 4th Panzer Division attacking north of Bene. At first, despite 6th Guards Army apparently detecting the German build-up the previous day, the two German divisions appeared to have surprised the Red Army, and Grossdeutschland in particular made good progress, advancing some five miles before encountering strong resistance. The terrain was dotted with small woods and, as had been the case with Doppelkopf, the Soviets made excellent use of the available cover to deploy powerful anti-tank forces. 4th Panzer Division encountered increasingly tough resistance, forcing the initial attack to grind to a halt after minimal gains. General von Saucken, the commander of XXXIX Panzer Corps, and Reinhardt visited the headquarters of 4th Panzer Division’s 33rd Panzer Regiment to discuss matters with General Betzel, the division commander. A renewed attack was agreed, but again made minimal progress despite sustaining heavy losses. At the end of the day, Saucken recommended shifting 4th Panzer Division’s units further north, in order to take advantage of Grossdeutschland’s success. 7th Panzer Division, the third component of the German operation, began to form up on the northern flank of Grossdeutschland, and towards the end of the day made its initial attack, gaining a little territory before nightfall, apparently through a hitherto-undetected gap in the Soviet defences. Consequently, it was decided to extract 4th Panzer Division’s main battlegroup from its current position and deploy it in support of Grossdeutschland and 7th Panzer Division.
The commanders of the 51st Army and 6th Guards Army advised their front commander that their men had destroyed about 60 German tanks, but had still been driven back, though only a short distance. Whilst it seems that – as was often the case with such claims by either side – this estimate of enemy losses was an exaggeration, there was no doubt that the German assault formations had taken punishing losses. The commander of 4th Panzer Division’s 33rd Panzergrenadier Regiment wrote that it had been ‘a black day’ for his regiment, with over 100 killed or wounded, including two company commanders killed and five other officers wounded.43 Chistiakov also sent Bagramian news of a document that his men had captured: a proclamation from Schörner to his troops, ordering them to resist at all costs, and warning that any man found behind the front without orders was liable to be shot.44 With both 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts reporting increased German resistance, Bagramian was urged to continue his advance on Riga. In bitter fighting, 43rd Army took two days to consolidate its hold on Baldone, while further east, 4th Shock Army battered its way to Jaunjelgava. Beloborodov also reported repeated German counter-attacks, and Bagramian later claimed that the Germans had massed two panzer divisions and four infantry divisions in the area. The reality was that Army Group North had very limited armoured assets at its disposal, and even if four infantry divisions were present, they probably amounted to less than a division in terms of numbers.
Overnight, Gruppe Betzel, a large part of 4th Panzer Division, moved from its posi
tions on the southern wing of Grossdeutschland to 7th Panzer Division’s sector in the north. Attacking in mid-morning on 17 September, the armoured battlegroup, with some 120 tanks and self-propelled guns, made good progress at first. Slightly to the south, 7th Panzer Division attacked with about 70 tanks, assault guns and self-propelled guns, with Grossdeutschland at the southern end of the attack, fielding another 137 tanks, assault guns and self-propelled guns. These substantial force concentrations were achieved in part by reinforcing the attack formations with other units – 4th Panzer Division included a tank battalion from 12th Panzer Division, and Grossdeutschland was reinforced by a battlegroup from 5th Panzer Division. Unfortunately for the German divisions, the territory they were contesting, with woodland stretching almost as far as Dobele, was singularly unsuitable for the operation of massed armour. Gefreiter Riesche, from 5th Panzer Division, recalled the day:
At first light, he [the enemy] made a grand racket with his artillery; quite the full load. We were guarding the main road to Semkino south-east of Dobele. 8 Coy was to our left. There were constant air attacks, all hell was loose overhead. There was a constant noise, clattering and crashing, and nobody could leave the vehicle.
Our machine guns in front of us were firing, answering Ivan. The Katyushas fired, then anti-tank guns and artillery from Ivan, followed in turn by our mortars and artillery. Amongst this, repeated enemy aircraft, with no sign of our own. This tale of battle raged on the entire day. I stayed in my gun-aimer’s seat. We mounted a reconnaissance raid to Semkino, fire struck our vehicle, one wounded. Back to Battalion HQ, to take the wounded to the battalion doctor. Then back to our old position. Ivan’s air attacks were ever grimmer. Bombs blasted our wood, Ivan blazed away with fixed weapons. For us it was just a case of ‘Hatches open’, incoming fire, ‘Hatches closed!’ We had infantry with us, mainly lying under the vehicle.45
