by Prit Buttar
Hauptmann Nökel, commander of a battalion of 31st Panzer Regiment and part of the 5th Panzer Division battlegroup attached to Grossdeutschland, was singularly unimpressed by the terrain over which he was meant to advance:
It came to the most absurd situations. These included tank attacks through dense, tall trees. Escorted by a few infantry patrols, our tanks broke unto the trackless woodland on a broad front and wove through the trees. To do this, the guns had to be turned to 6 o’clock (to the rear), to avoid damaging them. If the infantry or tank commanders saw the enemy, the tanks had to drive back to an open area, the guns turned to 12 o’clock (to the front), and then drive forward again, engage the enemy with machine guns and main armament, then turn the turret to the rear again and weave further through the wood. Although the battalion achieved considerable defensive successes and earned the approbation of the division commander [of Grossdeutschland], we were delighted when we were able to return to the ranks of our own division and get a few days’ rest.46
By the end of the day both 4th and 7th Panzer Divisions ran into tough resistance on the northern side of the advance. Grossdeutschland struggled to make headway through the dense woodland, and finally reached its objective, the high ground immediately to the south of Dobele. The battle returns from the divisions reflected the terrain over which they had advanced; they claimed the destruction of only a dozen Soviet tanks and assault guns, and eight anti-tank guns.47
18 September once more brought heavy air attacks against the German forces. Nevertheless, a coordinated attack by 4th and 7th Panzer Divisions reached the high ground a little over two miles west of Dobele. Both Raus and Reinhardt travelled to Saucken’s headquarters to discuss the situation during the afternoon. Reinhardt advised his subordinates that in addition to tying down a substantial portion of the Soviet armoured forces, XXXIX Panzer Corps had forced the Soviet leadership to abandon their plans for a renewed drive to the Gulf of Riga. The objectives of Cäsar, he concluded, had been achieved, and Grossdeutschland should prepare for a defensive tank battle, as a Soviet tank corps was expected to launch a counter-attack the following day. 4th and 7th Panzer Divisions were to continue their attack, but only in order to establish firm contact with Army Group North’s 81st Infantry Division, to the north of Dobele.
For the next three days, the two panzer divisions battered their way forward. As ever, the terrain proved as much a hindrance as the Soviet defenders, who were primarily from 204th Rifle Division and 71st Guards Rifle Division. For 4th Panzer Division, the battle for Hill 92.0 to the west of Dobele turned into a bitter and costly struggle. After bitter fighting that lasted for most of 18 September, Betzel pulled his division back a short distance and launched a new assault after dusk. At first, the attack went well, but when a small farmhouse went up in flames, it provided enough illumination for the Soviet anti-tank guns to bring that attack to a halt. The commander of the division’s Panther battalion was badly wounded by almost the last shot of the night, but the following morning, after a furious bombardment of the hill, the German attack finally succeeded in securing the hilltop.48 Late on 21 September, 4th Panzer Division reached the railway line to the north-west of Dobele, and linked up with 81st Infantry Division. The operation was at an end.
Rudolf Meckl, a Leutnant in 4th Panzer Division’s 35th Panzer Regiment, was badly wounded by Soviet artillery fire while attempting to repair broken tracks on his tank. He was evacuated to the naval hospital in Liepāja, where he found himself in a partitioned ward, with about 40 other badly wounded men. They were mainly soldiers for whom the surgeons could do little, and most died of their wounds. One of the wounded was a fellow Leutnant, whose injuries were less severe than those of his comrades, and had been acquired in a singularly unfortunate manner:
[Leutnant] Hänsgen was the commander of a Panzerjäger staff company, and his wounding was a direct consequence. Anyone who remembers the small Courland roads, which were flanked closely by deep ditches, knows that possibilities of escaping a sudden air attack were limited, and often the only hope was the poor training of the Russian pilots.
But Hänsgen hadn’t thought of that. When he was driving along such a road in the command vehicle and suddenly saw the shadow of an aircraft overhead, he dived headlong out of the vehicle into the ditch. He had forgotten beforehand to switch off the engine and apply the handbrake properly. His vehicle … then promptly followed the gentleman into the ditch. The result was a complex lower leg fracture and transfer to the naval hospital in Liepāja.49
Despite being adorned by a large red cross, the building housing the naval hospital was hit in several Soviet air attacks; whilst such conduct in the west would have been regarded as unacceptable, neither the Germans nor the Soviets regarded themselves bound by the Hague Convention when it came to conduct on the Eastern Front. Meckl later recalled the nightmare of the attacks:
With every explosion, huge lumps of mortar and plaster fell on the beds. But we were captive, secured to our beds by our wounds, and experienced the fearful suffering of the helpless. Panic lurked in the shadows. But it didn’t break out, not even when a shock wave smashed the windows in the ward, raining glass splinters over the beds …
There were three nurses who prevented blind self-destruction breaking out as a result of the fear of the immobilised.
One would have expected the strict, uncompromising East Prussian Alla capable of looking fear boldly in the face without mucking about, but it was remarkable to see the same thing in the other two nurses: young things, recently arrived from the homeland …
They stood between the rows of beds like guardian angels, their calm and watchful gaze moving searchingly from face to face, and where one of the helpless souls buckled under the unbearable strain and anxiety, they laid a cool, gentle hand on the snow-white face; thus it remained calm in death’s waiting room.
I learned thus of the silent courage of these young women, who voluntarily abandoned the safety of the shelters to help the wounded through the hell of fear, that a man’s heedless bravery is nothing compared to the warm-hearted love of a woman.50
In many respects, Cäsar would have been a more effective operation if it had been conducted with strong infantry formations rather than armour. The problem for the Germans was that such infantry divisions were simply not available; Raus felt that of his infantry formations, only 1st Infantry Division had anything approaching the level of effectiveness required for prolonged combat on the Eastern Front. Despite gaining only about seven miles, the operation forced the diversion of Soviet forces from both the Riga front and a renewed push to the Gulf of Riga.
Far to the north, the withdrawal of Army Detachment Narva went relatively smoothly, except for the ad hoc Division zbV 300 (Division zur besondere Verfügung or ‘Special Purpose Division’). Formed from the remnants of 13th Luftwaffe Field Division and four Estonian border guard regiments, the division was deployed as two brigades on a broad front immediately north of Lake Peipus. Its withdrawal route was along a single corduroy road through the marshes that had protected the southern flank of the Tannenberg positions earlier in the year, and an initially orderly withdrawal rapidly degenerated late on 18 September, as one of its officers reported:
I had to leave my command post at 2100 in order to perform traffic control duties with my staff. Chaos ruled where the corduroy roads from the northern and southern brigades came together. No one had told us that half of the southern brigade was to march back with us on the same corduroy road. There was no rest for us from 2200 to 0200 during the night of 19 September. All of the units had to be funnelled in on a single road. The Estonians did not understand any German. Everything had to be accomplished by pushing and poking. The small Baltic horses got stuck in the mud holes again and again.51
Soviet forces had meanwhile crossed the Emajõgi and threatened to cut off the German line of retreat. SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 11, the reconnaissance battalion of III SS Panzer Corps, repeatedly functioned as an armoured battlegroup, att
empting to fight a series of delaying actions across a broad front. Reduced to less than 2,000 men, Division zbV 300 broke into three groups, each led by a German colonel, which then attempted to make their way back through the wilderness. The 7th Estonian Rifle Corps, fighting in the Red Army, overran the area, and few of the men in the three German groups escaped. Some of the wounded Estonians from the German division took shelter in a church in the village of Avinurme. When the Estonians from 8th Rifle Corps arrived, they massacred the wounded and other prisoners.52
Gerok’s force, consisting of a mixture of Estonian Omakaitse, artillery batteries, and elements of both 11th Infantry Division and 20th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division, fell back to Tallinn. The Soviet pursuit was close behind, and fighting around the perimeter erupted briefly on 21 September. There was no intention of a prolonged resistance, and troops and other personnel embarked aboard the waiting ships in a steady stream. The first convoy of five steamers left at first light on 22 September. Finally, two German torpedo boats took off the last defenders, and the city was in Soviet hands by the end of the day. During the brief operation, Admiral Theodor Buchardi’s ships had lifted a total of 80,000 people from Tallinn. Soviet aircraft repeatedly attacked the ships, sinking several, including the hospital ship Moero, which went down with the loss of over 600 people, but losses amounted to less than 1 per cent of those embarked from Tallinn. For the soldiers of Govorov’s Leningrad Front, who had spilt so much blood attempting to force the Tannenberg Line, there must have been a sense of unreality about the swiftness with which they overran Estonia.
The Estonians had been preparing for a German departure for months. The Eesti Vabariigi Rahvuskomitee (‘National Committee of the Estonian Republic’) declared the return of independence on 18 September, and there were isolated clashes between Estonians and retreating German units. Jüri Uluots, the last prime minister before the Soviet occupation in 1939, was terminally ill with cancer, and appointed Otto Tief as prime minister. Although the committee appealed to the Soviet authorities for recognition, they must have known that there was little prospect of this occurring, and had laid plans for the government to flee into exile. Estonian soldiers under the leadership of Admiral Johan Pitka seized Toompea Castle in Tallinn even as the Germans were leaving, and then attempted to fight off the Soviet troops of the Leningrad Front. The uneven battle was quickly over, with Pitka disappearing in the fighting, presumed killed. Uluots escaped to Sweden, where he died in early 1945. Tief was arrested and sent to Siberia; he survived a long spell of imprisonment, and returned to Estonia long after the war, dying there in 1976. The attempt to re-establish the Estonian Republic was over almost before it began.
The swift advance of 2nd Shock Army across the Emajõgi, scattering the German 87th Infantry Division and 207th Security Division, was unable to intercept the retreating German forces, which hurried to reach the area west of Lake Võrtsjärv before they could be encircled. The last German unit in Estonia was the Nederland brigade, and after destroying the port facilities in Pärnu, the rearguard fell back towards Latvia. The last fighting took place on the line of the River Lemme, immediately north of the border. Late on 24 September, after a final action against advancing Soviet tanks, the Dutch SS soldiers retreated into Latvia.
There was no rest for the retreating elements of III SS Panzer Corps. The crisis on the southern approaches to Riga demanded urgent attention, and on 22 September, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 24 Danmark was attached to 14th Panzer Division, with orders to attack towards Baldone from the north, with SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 23 Norge on its eastern flank. The few remaining tanks and assault guns of Nordland were also committed in support of the attack, which began on 23 September. The tanks of 14th Panzer Division were delayed, and the SS panzergrenadiers launched their attacks with only the support of the vehicles from Nordland. As 14th Panzer Division’s tanks finally arrived, a Soviet counter-attack began, and bitter fighting raged all day. By dusk, the Germans had gained perhaps three miles, though at a terrible cost – Danmark alone lost nearly 300 men.53
On the eastern flank of the attack, Norge pushed forward towards Baldone, reaching the outskirts of the town on 25 September. By this stage, the regiment’s losses left it in no state to continue its advance. Indeed, Bagramian’s forces rallied and counter-attacked, with minimal ground changing hands. Obukhov’s 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps was in the thick of the fighting, as Bagramian later described:
It was almost impossible to determine who was attacking and who was defending. When the Fascists had to defend in one sector, our troops were cut off by other counterattacks. But we wanted to retain the initiative at any cost.
During these tense days, Obukhov reported that as the rifle divisions had lagged behind, his brigade had to fight in a situation in which enemy units lay to his rear. But he refused to fall back to the main forces of 43rd Army. Obukhov never feared being encircled. He was a master of the art of manoeuvre and kept a clear head when he was isolated from the main force.54
The front line south of Riga stabilised on 27 September. Almost all of 16th Army was now in or around the Latvian capital, with 18th Army defending to the east. Soviet intelligence also suggested that the bulk of 3rd Panzer Army’s strike power lay in the north, as a result of Doppelkopf and Cäsar; consequently, the front line between Šiauliai and Klaipėda was weakly defended. Furthermore, the panzer divisions that had struggled to make any headway in the two operations had suffered substantial losses, and there was therefore still a chance of pushing through to the Gulf of Riga. On 23 September, Bagramian planned to visit the front line around Jelgava to investigate options, only to receive orders from Moscow: he was to stop all operations to reach the Gulf of Riga. Further orders followed, and it became clear that the axis of attack was to shift to the south and west, with a drive to the Baltic coast at Klaipėda.
In Estonia, after taking Tallinn, the Soviet 8th Army moved on to attack the Estonian islands. Just as in 1941, control of these islands was critical for freedom of movement by naval vessels in the northern Baltic. The three islands of the archipelago – Saaremaa, Hiiumaa and Muhu – were defended by 23rd Infantry Division, supported by a naval anti-aircraft battalion, two naval artillery battalions, and a battalion of assault guns. 218th Infantry Division was also designated to help hold the islands, but would not arrive until 1 October. There were a few skirmishes between Estonian nationalists and the German garrison, but these were swiftly suppressed.
The Soviet forces designated to take the islands, from 8th Army, were the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps and 109th Rifle Corps. The shallow waters around the islands were generally unsuitable for large vessels, and in order to attempt a landing, the assault formations were equipped with DUKW amphibious vehicles, acquired from the United States.
On 29 September, Soviet aircraft made repeated attacks on the German positions on the islands. The first Soviet troops came ashore in Muhu towards the end of the day. Only a small portion of the German force committed to hold the islands was on Muhu, and it withdrew across a causeway to Saaremaa without putting up any significant resistance, destroying the causeway behind it. Next, there were landings on Hiiumaa, on 2 October. This time, the Germans put up strong resistance, but were forced to evacuate the island. An attempt to follow up this success with a landing on Saaremaa two days later, ended in disaster, however, when German naval artillery subjected the beachhead to heavy fire, and an infantry attack then wiped out the landing party.
The following day, the Red Army tried again, sending a strong force from General Pärn’s 8th Estonian Rifle Corps ashore. This time, the landings were successful, and Soviet armour followed. On 6 October, the Soviet forces began to advance, and to the west of Kuressaare, two battalions from 23rd Infantry Division found themselves isolated. Elements of the Soviet 249th Rifle Division, many of them Estonians, had partially bypassed the German group when they encountered one of the German battalions late on 8 October. The Germans were attempting to withdraw to the south, and for a br
ief moment, managed to pass themselves off as a Soviet unit as they marched alongside the Soviet force, but fighting erupted after light cast by flares allowed the Germans to be identified. One battalion of Soviet troops was swiftly overwhelmed, but a second Soviet formation – an anti-tank battalion – had sufficient time to set up a defensive line. In confused, bloody fighting, the German force broke through the Soviet line and managed to withdraw to the south; the other German battalion, retreating south on a parallel route, took advantage of the confused fighting to get through without having to fight. Both sides lost about 300 men, and all who were unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner were shot out of hand.
The Germans were aware that they had little chance of holding the entire island, and had always intended to withdraw to the Sõrve peninsula at the southern tip. They made good use of the defensive positions built by the Red Army prior to 1941, and fought a slow retreat to the peninsula, inflicting heavy losses on 8th Rifle Corps. By 10 October, however, the Germans were confined to the small peninsula. In an attempt to outflank the defensive line across the isthmus at the northern end of the peninsula, the Soviet forces attempted an amphibious landing on 11 October near Löu, midway down the western coast; the operation was spotted in good time by the defenders, and crushed by a combination of artillery fire and an infantry attack against the few men and vehicles who managed to get ashore. A second attempt to land on the peninsula on 12 October was similarly defeated. Nevertheless, 8th Rifle Corps was able to push the Germans perhaps a third of the way south along the peninsula before grinding to a halt.
