Between Giants

by Prit Buttar

  Bagramian’s assessment of German intentions was correct: as early as 9 October, Schörner proposed a counter-attack from western Latvia towards Klaipėda and from there towards East Prussia. However, this attack was contingent on Hitler agreeing to the evacuation of Riga, in order to release sufficient forces for the operation. As was often the case, Hitler agreed to such a proposal from one of his favoured commanders, where he would have refused to yield an inch if another army group commander had made such a request. By this stage, much of Riga was within artillery range of the Red Army, and the only relatively safe route from the area east of the city into Courland was along the beach road. The withdrawal from Riga was codenamed Donner (‘Thunder’), and with 227th Infantry Division forming a rearguard, Schörner’s troops conducted an orderly withdrawal through the city, destroying the bridges over the Daugava as they fell back. The men of the 19th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division must have experienced particularly bitter moments as they pulled back, crossing the Daugava to the south of Riga; they had continued their hard-fought retreat across their homeland, almost constantly in contact with the Red Army. The battles a few miles to the east of Sigulda, holding what became known as the Segewold Positions while German units further north pulled back from the Estonian border, were remembered by Latvian veterans as particularly bloody.28 By 13 October, most of the Latvian capital was under Soviet control. Shortly thereafter, the 3rd Baltic Front was disbanded.

  Whilst he prepared to repulse the expected German counter-attack, Bagramian wanted to maintain pressure on the two trapped German armies:

  It seemed to me at the time that it was important in this situation that the formations of Army Group North retreating from the fortified area around Riga should be followed by 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts without regrouping or any pause in the attack in order to prevent their unhindered retreat. One had to inflict a defeat on them, as the Fascists would take up strong defensive positions in the woody and swampy terrain of Courland and would be able to save themselves from our blows. It was vital to make maximum use of the dry time of year for a concerted attack to destroy the enemy’s forces in Courland with the combined power and resources of the Baltic Fronts and the Baltic Fleet before the wet season typical of the Baltic region arrived.29

  The dissolution of 3rd Baltic Front, with some of its forces being withdrawn into strategic reserve, was therefore not welcome news to Bagramian. Nevertheless, he made a bid to capture the vital port of Liepāja, on the west coast of Courland. Originally developed as a base for the Czarist navy, the port – known to Germans as Libau – was vital if the forces in Courland were to survive; the port of Ventspils, further north, was too small to support the two trapped armies. Chistiakov was therefore ordered to send forces north in an attempt to secure Liepāja before the German line could solidify. In an attempt to counter this, Schörner dispatched III SS Panzer Corps to the area around Priekule. Late on 12 October, Chistiakov’s army penetrated through dense woodland immediately to the north of Skuodas, and SS Panzergrenadier Brigade Nederland rushed two battalions to the area. Combining with elements of 11th Infantry Division, the SS mobile forces succeeded in surrounding the Soviet troops that had broken through, and over the next two days reduced the pocket. A little to the west, 4th Panzer Division had been joined by 12th Panzer Division on its western flank, and on the same day that Chistiakov attempted to push through to Liepāja, the two German divisions launched an attack to clear the woodland to the south of the River Venta. Two days of heavy fighting followed, with the divisions making slow but steady progress; the terrain was every bit as difficult as that encountered during Doppelkopf, but the Soviet defences were less well organised, and by the end of 13 October, with their reserves still not committed, the German divisions were confident that they would be able to build momentum in the coming day, particularly as they had cleared almost all of the woodland that so favoured the defenders.

  Chistiakov had not abandoned his attempts to drive into Courland, if only to disrupt German plans, and on 13 October, his forces breached the lines of 61st Infantry Division, midway between the two German panzer divisions and III SS Panzer Corps. 4th and 12th Panzer Divisions were ordered to stop their attack. 225th Infantry Division would relieve them, allowing them to be pulled out of line in preparation for Schörner’s planned counter-attack towards Klaipėda. Bagramian’s estimate of the forces available was substantial: he later wrote that Schörner had no fewer than seven or eight panzer or panzergrenadier divisions at his disposal. The truth was that Army Group North had 4th, 12th, and 14th Panzer Divisions, together with the few remaining armoured formations of III SS Panzer Corps.

  In Berlin, Heinz Guderian, Chief of Staff at OKH, made the first of several requests to Hitler for the evacuation of Army Group North. The divisions of 16th and 18th Armies, he argued, had been badly weakened during the fighting of 1944, but retained a solid core of experienced soldiers. These forces could be used to bolster the fragile front line that ran along the borders of East Prussia and into Poland and beyond. Bagramian and his colleagues also expected such a move, but Hitler refused. Courland was to be held at all costs, he maintained. Its evacuation would weaken the resolve of the Baltic soldiers serving in the SS, and the territory could serve as a springboard for future offensive operations against the Red Army. The professional soldiers of the Wehrmacht – and indeed of the Red Army – could not comprehend how the occupation of Courland by so many German divisions could be justified on the grounds of improving the fighting spirit of one Estonian and two Latvian divisions, and talk of future offensive operations was, in every sense of the word, incredible. However, Bagramian recorded that the Germans would have struggled to make sufficient shipping available for an evacuation, and this is probably true. Although the success of the German navy and merchant marine in rescuing hundreds of thousands of Germans from East and West Prussia in 1945 might suggest otherwise, there would have been little military advantage in evacuating the personnel of Army Group North without their equipment, and there simply was not sufficient shipping for such a massive undertaking. An evacuation would have been difficult and time-consuming, especially given Soviet air superiority, and the likelihood of substantial losses at sea. Furthermore, it is likely that Soviet forces facing the Courland ‘bridgehead’ would either have overwhelmed the German front as German troops were withdrawn, or would have been able to move to the Eastern Front faster than their German counterparts could be redeployed via a seaborne evacuation.

  The commander of III SS Panzer Corps awarding the Knight’s Cross to the Estonian Obersturmbannführer Harald Riipalu, in August 1944.

  Govorov and Bagramian; the commanders of the Leningrad and 1st Baltic Fronts.

  Lindemann commanded 18th Army from 1942 to 1944, and briefly Army Group North in 1944.

  One of the most successful Soviet commanders of the war, Yeremenko commanded the 2nd Baltic Front in 1944.

  After fighting for the Germans against the Red Army, Kaljurand became a resistance fighter in Estonia, remaining active until 1951.

  Two Latvian SS soldiers in a trench with a Panzerschrek anti-tank weapon in Courland, winter 1944–45.

  Trapped in the Courland pocket, German troops resisted repeated Soviet attempts to overrun them to the end of the war.

  Central Latvia was the scene of bitter fighting as the Red Army tried to isolate Army Group North in 1944.

  With no real prospect of victory, a German soldier awaits the next Soviet assault in the autumn of 1944.

  Although the Germans did not attempt to hold Riga to the bitter end, Soviet artillery and air strikes, combined with deliberate German destruction as they withdrew, left the city in ruins.

  As pressure on Army Group North increased, all means of transport available were put to use to withdraw remaining units through Riga into Courland.

  The Courland Bridgehead was entirely dependent on seaborne supplies, which were brought ashore by any means possible through the winter of 1944–45.

  Soviet i
nfantry advance in the face of determined resistance in Latvia, 1944.

  Whilst many were coerced into serving in the foreign divisions of the SS, others volunteered, often in response to recruitment campaigns in occupied territories from France in the west to Estonia in the east.

  4th Panzer Division was assembling in the area immediately north of Priekule, in preparation for a major attack to restore contact between Army Group North and the rest of the Wehrmacht. The new assault would be close to the coast; this would allow German naval units to offer support, and was also the shortest possible path for such an assault. The operation, codenamed Geier (‘Vulture’), would involve all three of the panzer divisions trapped in Courland, with 4th Panzer Division close to the coast, 14th Panzer Division operating alongside, and 12th Panzer Division as a second echelon. With support from 126th, 87th and 11th Infantry Divisions, the panzer divisions would first thrust to Klaipėda, and from there would push on to East Prussia. But even as detailed planning for the operation began, Chistiakov continued to put pressure on the German lines. On 15 October, in the sector held by VI SS Corps, 19th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division (1st Latvian) experienced a heavy artillery bombardment, followed by a determined thrust to the north of Dobele. The following day, after another heavy artillery preparation, an assault was made in III SS Panzer Corps’ area against the segment of front held by Nordland and 30th Infantry Division, to the east of Priekule. Immediately, a deep penetration was achieved, forcing Schörner to commit 4th Panzer Division to restore the situation. Early on 17 October, the division’s artillery fired in support of Nordland and 30th Infantry Division, but the division diary suggests that III SS Panzer Corps had restored the situation sufficiently to require minimal further assistance.30 Fighting continued for several days, with no significant ground being gained by either side. Over a week of heavy fighting resulted in the Red Army advancing no more than a mile, on a front of about six miles, for disproportionately heavy losses.

  The tardy advance of 5th Guards Tank Army was one of the few areas of concern for the Red Army High Command. Vasily Timofeevich Volskii, who had taken command of the army after Rotmistrov was demoted earlier in the year, was suffering from tuberculosis, and although he remained with his army through the winter, he was hospitalised in early 1945. He died the following year; it is not clear how much his illness affected his ability to command his formations.

  To the rear of the front line, the Soviets set about restoring their control of the Baltic States. Bagramian regarded the moment as a happy one:

  Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which had had to suffer under the yoke of the Fascist invaders for over three years, were once more free and independent, and returned to the family of Socialist Soviet Republics … the members of the 16th Latvian Rifle Division, 130th Lithuanian Rifle Corps and 8th Estonian Rifle Corps fought on their home soil with great enthusiasm and unsurpassed courage.

  The workers of the Baltics, who had fought against the Fascist invaders for three years, made a great contribution to our victory. The most active form of their fight was the deployment of partisans and the patriotic underground organisations, at whose spearheads were the national staffs of the partisan movement. The central committees of the Communist Parties of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and their First Secretaries A.J. Sniečkus, J.E. Kalnberzin and N.G. Karotamm led the work of these staffs. Day and night they deployed their numerous partisan battalions and brigades in combat against the enemy. The entire land knew I. Sudmalis, the courageous leader of the Riga underground movement, the fearless Latvian patriot M. Melnikaitė and E. Aartee, the commander of the Estonian partisans. Partisans and army personnel of many nations had fought in the Baltics. This showed the unity and friendship of our people, the unifying Soviet patriotism and the vitality of the socialist order.31

  As has been discussed, partisan activities in the three Baltic States were actually fairly minimal, and in the main were carried out by Russians rather than Lithuanians, Latvians or Estonians. Imants Sudmalis had been an active member of the Latvian Communist Party before the war and was arrested several times during the 1930s; he fled his homeland in 1941, fighting with Belarusian partisans before his clandestine return to Latvia in 1942. He was captured in early 1944, and executed in May; although Soviet sources credit him with organising substantial partisan forces, there is little objective evidence for the efficacy of these units. Marytė Melnikaitė was only 17 when the Red Army first occupied Latvia, but she too left her homeland in 1941, returning in 1943; she was almost immediately wounded and captured during an encounter with German anti-partisan units, and subsequently executed. Although Aartee was an Estonian who fought as a partisan against the Germans, this was mainly to the east of the Estonian–Soviet frontier.

  For many – perhaps most – Baltic citizens, reality was somewhat different from Bagramian’s view. An early consequence of the arrival of the Red Army in the Baltic States was a wave of summary executions. In Lithuania, between 400 and 700 people were summarily shot in Kaunas, Zarasai and Šiauliai without any legal process.32 Another early impact of Soviet rule that was felt in all three Baltic States was forcible mobilisation of manpower for the Red Army. Many of these recruits, particularly those who had deserted from the various SS or police formations raised by the Germans, were deployed in the first waves of attacks without weapons, in order to draw German fire.33 Estonia saw a call-up of all men aged between 18 and 33 in August 1944, even while fighting continued on Estonian territory. Partly due to the ongoing combat, but more due to the unwillingness of Estonians to answer the call-up, it was repeated in March 1945. As with forcible recruits from Latvia and Lithuania, those who claimed to have had no involvement with the German occupiers were sent to serve in the ongoing war against German forces in Courland, while those who had performed ‘non-armed’ service for the Germans were instead used as forced labour. Whilst this was onerous, it was less likely to result in death, resulting in more and more men claiming ‘non-armed’ service for the German authorities. At the end of their forced labour, this declaration came back to haunt some of them, when they were labelled as war criminals and dispatched to Siberia.

  Many Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians had their first experiences of the return of Soviet rule at the hands of the Red Army. As was the case in the eastern provinces of Germany, rapes were frequent and widespread, especially after the better trained and better disciplined first wave of Soviet troops had moved on. It was commonplace for Soviet soldiers to treat all Baltic citizens as ‘fascists’, which served to accentuate a deep-seated Russian belief in their superiority over those who were from the Baltic States. This attitude even extended to children, who were labelled as ‘fascist children’ and treated badly as a result.34

  The assertion of Soviet control over every aspect of the Baltic States commenced almost as soon as the territory had been cleared by the Red Army. In the eastern parts of Latvia and Lithuania, the resumption of Soviet policies from 1940 was already underway by the time that Riga was abandoned by the Wehrmacht. Soviet organisations and administrative structures were once more imposed, and were dominated by non-Baltic citizens; even by the end of 1945, ethnic Latvians made up only 35 per cent of the Latvian Communist Party.35 Nevertheless, assertion of Soviet control was often hampered by a shortage of suitable personnel to take policies forward. In Tallinn, a visiting group of western journalists found little enthusiasm for Soviet rule in late 1944:

  The Estonians, it soon became evident, despised and feared the Russians … I don’t think a single one of us spoke to a single person during the whole trip who had a good word to say for the Russian re-occupation – except, of course, the spokesmen produced by the Russians.36

  Deportations of elements of the population began almost immediately, and continued for eight years. By 1953, Latvia alone had lost 100,000 citizens as a result of deportations, perhaps 10 per cent of the pre-war Latvian population. To this figure should be added some 330,000 deportees from Lithuania, and about 100,000 from Es
tonia. In addition to those regarded as having collaborated with German rule – and this included even low-ranking officials in most parts of the civilian administration – the same categories that had been targeted in the pre-war deportations were once more selected. Those who had in some way collaborated with the Germans were labelled ‘war criminals’, while those who were thought to be Baltic nationalists were regarded as ‘enemies of the people’. Inevitably, as will be seen later, the harshness of Soviet rule and the widespread availability of weapons resulted in a burgeoning resistance movement, and the families of those suspected of being involved in the armed resistance were also likely to be deported.37

  There were three main motives for the deportations. Firstly, the policy allowed for the population to be ‘cleansed’ of those regarded as hostile to Soviet rule. Secondly, the previous Soviet occupation had shown how the largely rural populations of the three countries were opposed to collectivisation of land, and the deportations were designed to reduce or eliminate this resistance. Thirdly, the threat of deportation was regarded as a major weapon in the suppression of the anti-Soviet armed resistance; not only were the families of suspected resistance fighters deported, but also the widespread depopulation of the rural landscape – similar to the German anti-partisan policy of creating ‘dead zones’ – would deprive resistance fighters of support and supplies.