War Day
Page 24
Documents
on Limited War and the Limited Economy
Red wine in the sunlight,
May weather—
While white fine fingers
Break the thin biscuit...
—Osip Mandelstam,
from Stone
LET THEM EAT WORDS
The official word from the Federal Complex in L.A. on the economy was one of cautious optimism.
In fact, there is no single American economy. It is possible to define the two big ones of East and West, but beyond those there are many, many more.
As we crossed the country from the prosperous valleys of the Pacific Coast to the dark Northeastern ports, we encountered dozens of economies. Life has focused down: people don't think in terms of long-range movement and trade anymore, outside California anyway. The concern is the farm on the hill, the plant down the street, the condition of one's own belly.
The following three documents illustrate how we have refocused to microeconomics because of the suddenness with which the macroeconomy disintegrated and the deep consequences of the shortages that resulted.
The document on the effects of the electromagnetic pulse on Warday is in one way curious: it suggests that there has been steady recovery in such areas as communications and data processing, beginning shortly after Warday. But our lives tell us differently. Even today the overall amount of recovery seems smaller than indicated. It is probable that the document was prepared by people living and working in Los Angeles, who assumed that their 242
ACROSS AMERICA 243
local experience was being mirrored across the country, and wrote their projections accordingly.
The paper on shortages tells a central truth: the mineral resources upon which the fabrication of high-technology devices depends are no longer available in substantial quantities to the United States. In losing the electronic superstructure of our economy, we also lost the means to rebuild it, and we must now look to the outside for help.
There is also a report on the state of agriculture. If a bureaucrat could write a dirge, this is a dirge. It is about 450 words long.
With twenty-nine million dead in the famine, that is over 64,000
lives per word.
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CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
INTERNAL DJSC DISTRIBUTION ONLY
SUMMARY OF EFFECTS INDUCED BY ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
IN THE OCTOBER 1988 ATTACK BY THE SOVIET UNION, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR RECOVERY
Defense Joint Systems Command
28 April 1991
1.0 OBJECTIVE
This report summarizes studies completed in the last seven months regarding multiple high-altitude nuclear detonations by the Soviet Union on 28 October 1988 over the United States of America. These detonations created powerful electromagnetic energy fields, known as electromagnetic pulse or EMP, which in turn produced widespread damage in both military and civilian enterprises. Data utilized in this report were supplied by the Department of Defense Joint Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Effects; Headquarters, Aerospace Defense Command ; and the National Security Agency.
2.0 BACKGROUND OF THE SOVIET ATTACK
The nuclear attack in October 1988 by the Soviet Union against the continental United States was initialized by the detonation of six large weapons in the 8-10 MT range some 200-225 miles above the U.S. Comprehensive studies of the attack and its effects are limited because of critical wartime conditions, though It is believed, according to limited data from intelligence satellites, that as many as 12 large MT weapons were targeted by the Soviets as EMP devices. Only six such weapons actually detonated, however.
Nuclear weapons detonated at such high altitudes produce extraordinary electromagnetic fields, which in turn travel A C R O S S A M E R I C A 245
Within the atmosphere and then strike the surface of the earth, where they can either severely damage or destroy sensitive electronic devices* A single weapon, detonated at a predetermined altitude, can affect an area of hundreds of thousands of square miles* The purpose of the Soviet attack, therefore, was to
''blanket'' the United States with preemptive levels of electromagnetic energy designed to destroy or severely cripple communications, data storage and processing, and electronic intelligence/detection capacities* Studies have shown that each detonating weapon apparently produced a peak field in excess of 100,000 volts per meter* Precise data are unavailable, though the energy fields thus produced far exceeded prewar military estimates of theoretical attacks* There were collateral effects on both surface installations and spaceborne intelligence satellites*
The six EMP weapons detonated in a pattern roughly forming two unequal triangles covering both halves of the continent* The effects were most pronounced in the U.S., but Canada, Mexico, and several Central American countries reported effects to one degree or another* There were substantial effects absorbed by both military and civilian populations*
A second attack wave followed, with strikes directed at three large urban centers and selected ICBM/SAC targets in the upper Central states* Recent data suggest that as much as 300 MT
of total destructive yield were realized in this second and ultimately final movement* The Western, Southwestern, and Central states were unaffected directly, though it is not known at this time whether this limited attack pattern on the part of the Soviets was the result of retaliatory American counterattacks or equipment failures In Soviet weaponry, or whether it was simply one phase of a larger but uncompleted Soviet attack strategy.
3.0 E M P E F F E C T S
3 . 1 G e n e r a l
E M P forces generate enormously high voltages, which destroy the atomic structures of earthbound or space borne objects contain-
246 WARDAY
ing electronic circuitry. This energy, which lasts only several billionths of a second, is sufficient to • 'burn o u t * most cir-9
cuits such as those utilized by microchips and similar devices.
Consequently, six 9-l0 MT Soviet w e a p o n s , detonated over 200
miles above the United States, produced a nearly simultaneous energy field that destroyed close to 70 percent of all microelectronics in use by both military and civilian organizations.
Shielding, such as that employed in the late prewar years by both the military and industry, was largely ineffective in coping with blasts and subsequent EMP forces of such m a g n i t u d e . The two areas most severely affected by the EMP effect, for both the m i l -
itary and civilian populations, were communications and electronic data storage/processing.
Brief summaries of the damage sustained by EMP are d e -
scribed in the following sections.
3.2 Military
3.2.1 Overview
Five broad areas within the military system sustained the most severe damage from EMP-generated e f f e c t s : PERCENTAGE OF DAMAGE
AREA SUSTAINED
Communications 75%
Data storage/processing 75
Guidance systems 65
Intelligence-gathering systems 60
Detection systems, including radar 70
3.2.2 Discussion
Overall assessment: Nearly catastrophic at 70-percent l e v e l .
The substantial dependence by the military establishment on m i -
croelectronics is demonstrated by the severe damage rates cited above. Prewar shielding procedures and methods proved to be largely ineffective. The failure to sufficiently employ ''hard ened'' microchips is only one explanation, h o w e v e r . Although A C R O S S AMERICA 247
experiments were conducted before the war to measure EMP effects, all experiments failed to consider the massive EMP forces created by large MT weapons geostrategically placed. As demonstrated above, most communications, guidance, and information storage/processing capabilities were destroyed. Continental radar systems were similarly affected and, because of orbital satellite conditions and in-flight aircraft locations, substantial intelligence-gather
ing capacities were destroyed.
Communication facilities utilizing lasers, buried light fibers, and similar equipment survived relatively unharmed* Guidance systems in ICBMs in hardened silos also survived.
Electronic equipment utilizing non-microelectronic components received little or no damage.
3.2.3 Recovery Projections
Recovery of microelectronic capacities is dependent upon three critical factors: (1) the ability to replace/convert damaged components and systems with stockpiled prewar components/sys-tems ; (2) the capacity to replace damaged systems with new systems utilizing imported microelectronic components ; and (3) the long-term capacity of the United States to rebuild its microelectronic industries*
Given these three factors, the following projections have been made:
PERCENTAGE
PERCENTAGE
OF RECOVERY IN
OF CAPACITY
AREA
CAPACITY TO DATE
NONRECOVERABLE
Communications
25%
45%
Data processing/storage
20
65
Guidance systems
60
22
Intelligence-gathering systems
18
72
Detection systems
24
40
The ''Percentage of Capacity Nonrecoverable'' statistics suggest estimated requirements for both imports and internal U . S .
rebuilding efforts.
248 WARDAY
3.3 Civilian
3.3.1 Overview
This study has identified 12 major civilian business/industry/
public enterprise areas most affected by EMP-generated effects: PERCENTAGE OF DAMAGE
TYPE OF ENTERPRISE SUSTAINED
Computer/information systems 87%
Defense industry 57
Electronic/telecommunications 73
Financial industry 41
Government (all levels) 67
Heavy industry 31
Manufacturing 28
Petrochemical 38
Power/utilities 57
Service industry 39
Transportation 60
3.3.2 Discussion
Overall assessment: High-end damage at 50-percent level. The nation's civilian enterprises were affected almost as significantly as the military, perhaps because of inadequate shielding provisions. Although no precise figure can be calculated, it is believed that over 50 percent of the nation's civilian microelectronic capacities were destroyed by EMP.
As with the military, the prewar civilian groups, including government, made extensive use of microelectronics, largely in computer applications for information storage and processing, and to a lesser extent in systems for manufacturing, airplane guidance, radio and television communications, and the like.
Unfortunately, because of national defense and reconstruction needs, few prewar surplus components are available and current import allocations are limited* As a consequence, the rate of recovery is lower than that for the military*
A C R O S S AMERICA 249
3.3.3 Recovery Projections
Projections for civilian recovery are based on factors similar to those outlined in 3.2.3 above. They are as follows: PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE
OF RECOVERY IN OF CAPACITY
AREA CAPACITY TO DATE NONRECOVERABLE
Computer/information systems 24% 55%
Defense industry 27 57
Electronics/telecommunications 37 72
Financial industry 21 60
Government (all levels) 32 45
Heavy industry 15 40
Manufacturing 15 57
Petrochemical 39 46
Power/utilities 42 37
Service industry 18 69
Transportation 26 59
4.0 SUMMARY
Prewar estimates of EMP effects have proven to be vastly understated and to some extent unforeseen. EMP effects are centered on microelectronic components, and all levels of both military and civilian populations were affected. Prewar efforts to shield sensitive systems were, to an unfortunate degree, ineffective. Only large-scale prewar efforts to stockpile critical components have permitted the constrained recovery which has occurred to date. There remains a severe shortage of these components and systems, which only accelerated Allied imports and long-term rebuilding can overcome.
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT D-8072
SUMMARY REPORT OF CRITICAL MINERALS NEEDS, 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 5
TASK FORCE ON CRITICAL MATERIALS
MARCH 3 1 , 1 9 9 1
There is at present a severe shortage of materials, especially minerals, necessary for reestablishing the defense capability of the United States. While many factors impact recovery, including the necessary commitment of resources by the government, no progress can be made in the production of many microelectronic components of aircraft and weapons systems without necessary supplies of certain critical minerals. Prewar stockpiles have been nearly exhausted and imports are at present minimal because of present conditions in the world trade system and breakdown of prewar alliances.
This task force has identified eleven minerals, or mineral groups, that are crucial to defense needs and are unavailable in any quantity in this country.
Table One outlines these materials and the location of major reserves outside the United States. It should be pointed out that while reserves of these critical materials may exist, they may not be available to our industries. Recent political and economic postures put forth by the NATO countries, for example, suggest that internal restrictions may have been put on certain strategic materials. While it is not the purpose of this report to examine the rationale of these restrictions, they will no doubt further impede U.S. defense recovery.
TABLE ONE
PRINCIPAL SUPPLIERS OF CRITICAL DEFENSE MATERIALS
COUNTRIES WITH MAJOR RESERVES AND
MINERAL
PERCENT OF WORLD TOTAL
BAUXITE
Guinea 2 8 %
Australia 2 0 %
Brazil 1 1 %
Jamaica 9%
Cameroon 4%
CHROMITE
South Africa 6 8 %
(Chromium Ore)
Zimbabwe 3 0 %
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COUNTRIES WITH MAJOR RESERVES AND
MINERAL PERCENT OF WORLD TOTAL
COBALT
Zaire 4 9 %
Zambia 15%
USSR 9%
Cuba 8%
Philippines 8%
New Caledonia 4%
Australia 2 %
COLUMBIUM
Brazil 7 9 %
USSR 17%
Canada 3%
MANGANESE USSR 4 5 %
South Africa 4 1 %
Australia 6%
Gabon 3%
NICKEL New Caledonia 2 5 %
Canada 15%
USSR 14%
Indonesia 13%
Philippines 10%
Australia 9%
PLATINUM GROUP South Africa 81 %
USSR 17%
TANTALUM Zaire 5 7 %
Nigeria 1 1 %
Thailand 7%
USSR 7%
Malaysia 5%
TIN Indonesia 16%
China 15%
Malaysia 12%
Thailand 12%
USSR 10%
Bolivia 9%
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COUNTRIES WITH MAJOR RESERVES A N D
MINERAL PERCENT OF WORLD TOTAL
TITANIUM ORES
a. ILMENITE
India 2 3 %
Canada 2 2 %
Norway 1 8 %
South Africa 1 5 %
Australia 8 %
United States 8 %
b. RUTILE
Brazil 7 4 %
Australia 7 %
India 6 %
South Africa 4 %
Italy 2%
TUNGSTEN
Canada 2 %
USSR 8 %
United States 5%
North Korea 5%
South Africa 3 %
The minerals listed above, for all of which the U.S. is highly dependent on imports, are classified as vital to defense production and have limited convenient substitution possibilities in their major applications. The implications of worldwide reserves are as much political as economic. Only some of the nations identified are at present friendly with the United States. Other nations are themselves crippled as a result of the world economy and are experiencing difficulty in reestablishing prewar mining levels. Still others, including those under Allied spheres of influence, are perhaps being subjected to diplomatic pressures that make open exchange with the U.S. difficult.
It is recommended that this information be shared as soon as possible with the Executive Branch and with appropriate units within the Departments of State and Commerce.
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE NEWS
LOS ANGELES , CALIFORNIA 90048
Public Information Office
(213-555-6263) FOR RELEASE 7/21/92
AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION STILL DOWN IN 1991; WAR AND FALLOUT ZONES MOST AFFECTED
Agricultural productivity in America is still suffering from the effects of the 1988 war.
The first comprehensive study since 1987 of agricultural productivity in America has just been completed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The results reveal that even after three years, the United States still lags behind prewar productivity by nearly 50 percent. As a result, U.S. exports have dropped by more than 95 percent.
In 1987, for example, the nine major agricultural exports were wheat, oats, corn, barley, rice, soybeans, tobacco, edible vegetable oils, and cotton. In that year the United States accounted for more than 30 percent of the total world production in these nine products. In 1991, however, the U.S. accounted for only 14 percent of the total world production. Table One summarizes this trend.
The Department's recent study also confirms early surveys, which suggested that the 19 states most directly affected by the war remain considerably behind the rest of the nation in agricultural recovery. These states were either directly struck by the Soviets in 1988 or suffered from high levels of radioactive fallout. Total U.S. agricultural production is particularly affected because of the high prewar concentration of farms in these 19 states.