War Day
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NEW YORK 315
are the entire contents and paneling of the Fragonard Room at the Frick, which was transferred to the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston. We have also saved the embalmed brain of a Mr.
A. J. Carnegie, which was found in a closet at New York University. The how and why of that one remains a mystery. If you wish, you can see the brain. It's in our collection here at the armory, along with a number of other especially unusual exhibits.
The decision to salvage New York rather than attempt to repopulate it was made by the Joint Chiefs of the Continental Military Command, which consists of General Youngerman, USA, General Joe Point of the USAF, Admiral Whitaker, General Sir Malcolm Law of the British Continental Military Advisory Command, and General Topp of the Canadian Army.
Their decision was made as a result of the water and pollution problems I outlined to you earlier. The chemical spills have created an effective Dead Zone in eastern New Jersey every bit as lethal as any nuclear-impact area. Thus this region, in which most of New York City's primary petrochemical, food, and fuel supply points were located, has been evacuated. There is also the matter of the abandoned nuclear power plants, and the possibility that one or more of them could emit radioactive materials at some time in the future. Also, whenever the wind comes in from the east, Manhattan receives a dusting of thousands of particles of strontium 90
and cesium 137. Unfortunately, the bombs were so designed that the primary issuing particle was strontium 90 which has a half-life of nearly thirty years. Of the particles we collect, fifty-six percent are this element, thirty-one percent are carbon 14, and thirteen percent are cesium 137.
Thus there are so many obstacles to the repopulation of the city that the Joint Chiefs were compelled to make the determination to undertake salvage instead of resettlement.
As you know, Manhattan is identified as a Red Zone, which means that unauthorized persons are liable to be shot for intruding. Nevertheless, the island supports a small population consisting of people who either refused to leave or have returned and are intent on protecting their former property. There is even an im-promptu real-estate market. A few months ago, two individuals ap-
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plied to the State Office of Title Reclamation in Albany for a grant to clear title to a property in the city, then the right to transfer that title between them. It turned out that both were active in this strange Manhattan real-estate market, and they lived in the city.
Both were arrested.
Of course, what they were doing is meaningless. All property in Manhattan has been sequestered by the Army. The state government in Albany has no authority over military areas. Salvage proceeds go to the Special Refugee Account for use in areas where the most former New York City residents now live.
You requested that I add as much personal color to this report as I can. I am married and have three children. My wife is Joyce Keltie Briggs. The kids are George Junior, Mark, and Nancy. We are members of the Baptist Church. My age is forty-three, and I have no living parents, sisters, or brothers. I was born on June 12, 1950, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. I am an army brat, the son and grandson of army brats. I live with my family in Bronxville, in a home on Birchbrook Avenue, which has been designated as Residence, Commanding General, New York Military Area, by the Continental Army Command. This home was not owned or occupied at the time it was commandeered by the U.S. Army.
I have held a commission since 1972, when I graduated from West Point. I was promoted to general officer on January 14, 1990, and assumed this command in February of the same year.
I see that I have a couple of minutes remaining before I have to inspect the Critical Minerals Salvage Holding Depot in the rail-yards, so I would like to make a statement to all Americans who read your book. My statement is this:
11
Since the war I have seen a tremendous change in our country.
It has been terrible for us all, but nevertheless it has revealed toughness and gristle and fellow-feeling that we didn't even know we had. There was a time when I might have said, "If a nuclear war will toughen us up, let it come." Having lived through one, I would not say that now. I was a damned fool ever to have thought such a thing. By 1984 there was a substantial body of opinion in the military that a nuclear war was possible, and that we should therefore devote our attention to planning methods that would encourage the Soviets to engage in a limited rather than an all-out NEW YORK 317
exchange, or reduce their ability to project their warheads into U . S . territory. This is an error.
Not a day passes that I don't wish for the soft old America with all its faults. But everything has an end, and that world and way of life ended.
Those were good times. May God grant that we remember them always, but also give us the strength not to torment our children with tales of what has been denied them.
Documents from the Lost City
who created great suicidal dramas on the
apartment cliff-banks of the Hudson under
wartime blue floodlight of the moon & their
heads shall be crowned with laurel in oblivion . . .
—Allen Ginsberg, Howl
THE MECHANICS OF ABANDONMENT
It is hard to believe silence in relation to so big a place as New York. You can hear a single truck coming for miles on the New York State Thruway. And that is usually a military truck. I cannot help wondering what it will be like here when even the soldiers are gone.
The documents I have gathered for this section are related to the management of the human withdrawal from New York. In an odd way I find their crisp tone reassuring. After the first panic, we did our leaving well. We were told that the city picked up tens of thousands of shoes in the days after Warday. But later there were staged withdrawals and organized retreats from Dead Zone to Red Zone to Orange Zone to elsewhere.
Beyond those early assessments, there really isn't much documentation about New York. I would have liked to include some sort of a list of paintings or books or valuables still in the city, or perhaps an evaluation of the present condition of buildings. Such documents did not present themselves.
I could have listed the orders of the day for the New York Military District, for every day since they have been here.
But those orders aren't important. The remaining valuables aren't even too important. There is no document that describes the 318
NEW YORK 319
emptiness of this city, no more than there is one to describe the immense complexity of the mind that caused it.
Nineveh. Babylon, and Rome each bustled a time in the sun. So also, New York. Nobody ever called it an eternal city, it was too immediate for that.
But we all thought it was one.
320 WARDAY
004 1500 ZULU April 92
TELEX TO 8th ARMY AREA COMMANDER
PHILADELPHIA HDQ. RECONPAC 34AQ
CLASS CONFIDENTIAL
You are hereby instructed that reconnaissance by RADPAC on 4 / 2 / 9 3 mandates following RADZONE assignments for New York area:
1.0 DEAD ZONE:
Original North/South strike centers from Bayville-Hemp-stead-Bellmore remain lethal and off limits to all personnel for foreseeable future. Radioactive levels remain at
300-500.
2.0 RED ZONE:
Eastern limit now set at Highway 27 with all entries to Dead Zone closed and monitored by electronic surveillance.
Eastern boundary now set at Highway 110 with similar observation. Radioactivity levels vary. Damage not rectifiable.
Looting reported by aerial reconnaissance. Shoot-to-kill order still in force.
1.0 ORANGE ZONE:
Radioactivity localized to standing structures and untreated ground surfaces. Highway 6 7 8 in Queens still usable with protected vehicles. No local traffic allowed. Eastern perimeter temporarily set at Highway 111.
The Brooklyn-Bronx-Manhattan areas remain under ORANGE
ZONE des
ignation. Radioactivity levels are negligible but damage is still largely uncorrected. Regular looting reported despite assignment of National Guard units. All major access points controlled as per continuing order.
NEW YORK 321
4 . 0 BLUE ZONE;
New Jersey area to Hudson remains under control of 8th Army units. Radioactivity levels non-life-threatening.
New Assignments due 5 May 93*
ORDER END. STOP. RPX.54.30
322 WARDAY
D E C L A S S I F I E D
5.25.92
REPORT FOR JT. DEFENSE TASK FORCE
NORADHQ. ACTING DESK FOR WAR ASSESSMENT
NOVEMBER 6, 1988
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON SOVIET TARGET NEW YORK AREA
1. RADCON SURVEY. Between 1 2 / 1 / 8 8 and 1 2 / 3 / 8 8 , RADCON procedures were implemented to map the New York City Area in an effort to assess the nature and extent of the USSR attack on this target. RADCON
implemented at Level Three employs aerial surveys and radiologic sampling.
As of 1 2 / 3 / 8 8 , Level Four earth-sampling and ground surveys were impossible to implement.
2. SOVIET TARGETS. Aerial mapping reveals three strikes in a N E - S W line, though preconflict data suggest that an additional 3 - 5 warheads were directed at the same general area. Atmospheric sampling confirms total radiologic levels to be consistent with a 6 - 7 warhead attack strategy. Data indicate that the additional warheads detonated over water south of Long Island. The three successful land targets were NORTHEAST, Glen Cove; CENTRAL, a point one-half mile west of Elmont; and SOUTHWEST, Oceanside.
3. SOVIET STRATEGY. The nature of the Soviet attack plan is not known at this time, though it is probable that the intended target was the Manhattan Island area. Lack of precise target control may have occurred, or the Soviets may have been unable to complete their full attack. Two other urban targets were struck on 28 October in other parts of the United States.
4. ATTACK STRENGTH. Radiologic surveys suggest that three thermonuclear warheads in the 9-10-megaton range detonated with high simultaneity.
This prevented predetonation from first blast production of extraneous radiation such as neutrons, g a m m a and X-rays, etc.
5. BLAST PARAMETERS. Two warheads detonated at an altitude designed to maximize ground effects. The airburst explosions occurred between 8,000
and 8,250 feet and produced fireballs approximately 3.5 miles in diameter each. The third warhead was detonated at the surface.
Overall blast effects were constrained by the moderate variance in terrain, although the general flatness of the area encouraged destructive yield. Blast NEW YORK
828
waves as measured in pounds per square inch, or PS I, varied by distance and terrain:
One Mile:
200+ PSI
Two Miles:
45+ PSI
Three Mites:
25+ PSI
Four Miles:
16+ PSI
Five Miles:
12+ PSI
Ten Miles:
4+ PSI
Fifteen Miles:
2.2+ PSI
Twenty Miles:
1.5+ PSI
It may be noted, for example, that reinforced concrete buildings can be destroyed by pressures of 1 4 - 1 6 PS I.
As a result of the high explosive yield, winds are calculated to have been over 2,000 mph at one mile from point of detonation; over 300 mph at five miles; over 1 2 5 mph at 10 miles; and over 50 mph at 20 miles. Physical damage from blast waves was amplified by the airborne dispersion of broken objects and particles.
Also, because of the close proximity of detonations—the warheads detonated between 1 and 3 miles of each other—the overall blast effects were intensified.
6. THERMAL EFFECTS. Over 25 percent of the total blast effects were produced as heat. Thermal effects on 28 October were lessened because the attack occurred during daylight with few clouds. Nearly 100 percent of the thermal energy produced was dissipated within 60 seconds.
Such radiation is produced in two waves, or pulses. Theoretically, at the high MT range, individuals have several seconds between the first pulse of thermal energy, which contains approximately 20 percent of the total energy emitted, and the second pulse. At 10 MT, the New York civilian population had 3.2 seconds to take protective action.
It is estimated that each weapon produced the following radiation calculated in calories per centimeter squared (cal/cm2):
One-three miles:
Over 1,000 cal/cm2
Three miles:
900 cai/cm2
Five miles:
300 cal/cm2
Ten miles:
66 cal/cm2
Twenty miles:
14 cal/cm2
Thermal radiation at these levels was sufficient to produce first-degree bums on all exposed individuals within 28-30 miles and second-degree burns on 324 WARDAY
exposed individuals within 22-24 miles. It is estimated that as m u c h as 20
percent of the population received thermal burns beyond normal statistical projections due to the number of weapons and their detonation points, which had the effect of broadening the radiation-exposure range.
Limited ground observations by trained personnel have been possible only in some localities. The data, however, confirm the dispersive effects of thermal radiation from three weapons. Numerous incidences of flash burns and "ghost figures" of humans were noted.
7. RADIATION. Initial nuclear radiation was intense and, within a radius of 2
miles, virtually lethal to all life. Almost 100 percent of radiation produced occurred within 15 seconds. The following radiation doses have been calculated for the New York attacks:
D I S T A N C E F R O M
B L A S T C E N T E R I N I T I A L R A D I A T I O N D O S E
Up to 2.4 miles 100+ rems
Up to 2.1 miles 500+ rems
Up to 2.0 miles 1000+ rems
It is estimated that the fatality rate at 500 rems is 70 percent; at 1000 rems it is almost universally 100 percent. Generally, the effects of initial radiation upon the individual depend upon his/her proximity to the blast center and degree of physical exposure. In terms of overall protection for individuals not exposed to the blast(s) directly, it can be noted that a minimum of 18 inches of concrete or similar material is necessary in order to reduce 1000 rems of radiation to a tolerable level of 100.
8. PHYSICAL EFFECTS. A thorough physical survey of the New York area has not been possible as of this date. Aerial photographs, however, reveal considerable damage to the Queens-Long Island areas, and severe-to-moderate damage to all adjacent areas. Given the variability of structures and terrain, the following damage table for the New York area has been constructed for each airburst:
D A M A G E R A N G E I N M I L E S
T Y P E O F S T R U C T U R E
D A M A G E L E V E L
F R O M B L A S T C E N T E R
1 . Wood houses and
S E V E R E
12 Miles (average)
buildings
M O D E R A T E
14 Miles
2. Masonry buildings
S E V E R E
8.5 Miles
M O D E R A T E
10 Miles
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DAMAGE RANGE IN MILES
TYPE OF STRUCTURE
DAMAGE LEVEL
FROM BLAST CENTER
3. Multistory wall-bearing
SEVERE
5.9 Miles
buildings
MODERATE
7.3 Miles
4. Reinforced concrete
SEVERE
5.7 Miles
buildings
MODERATE
7.0 Miles
Relating this schema to blast pressure (as discussed in Section 5 of this Report), the following table can be generated:
TYPE OF STRUCTURE
DAMAGE LEVEL
BLAST PRESSURE (PSI)
1.
Wooden buildings
SEVERE
3 - 4 PSI
MODERATE
2 - 3 PSI
2. Masonry buildings
SEVERE
5 - 6 PSI
MODERATE
3 - 4 PSI
3. Multistory wall-bearing
SEVERE
8 - 1 1 PSI
buildings
MODERATE
6 - 7 PSI
4. Reinforced concrete
SEVERE
11-15 PSI
buildings
MODERATE
8 - 1 0 PSI
Within these parameters, therefore, total destruction of all structures occurred within 3-4 miles of each blast center; severe damage occurred within 10 miles; moderate damage at 14 miles; and minor damage, such as broken windows, at 20 miles. Groundburst damage was more concentrated.
This effectively places the geographical area bound by Highway 678 to the west and Highway 1,06 to the east as a Dead Zone, with total destruction at the 85-95-percent level. The remainder of Queens and the northern half of Brooklyn are estimated to have experienced severe damage at the 60-70-percent level, as has Long Island to Highway 1 1#. Moderate damage, including downed power lines, broken windows, and roof damage, extends through Manhattan to New Jersey in the west, and to Riverhead and South-ampton in the east.
Overall destruction in the above area is estimated to be 85 percent within five miles of Ground Zero; 65 percent within 10 miles; 30 percent within 15
miles; and 10 percent within 20 miles.
9. MORTALITY. Definite counts are as yet impossible to calculate. Prelimi-nary estimates suggest that 2-3 million were killed instantly in the New York 326 WARDAY
attack on 28 October; another 1—2 million died within 4B hours; and perhaps as many as 3 - 4 million will suffer premature deaths from trauma or Radiation-rrduced diseases within the next 5-1#f years. These estimates are based on 1980 Census counts a n d statistical probabilities for radiation illnesses, 1,0. PROJECTED STUDIES. Further studies of all aspects of the October 1988 Soviet attack are planned as soon as trained personnel are released by the appropriate military and Department of Defense units.