The Three Barons

by J. W Lateer

  It strikes this writer that the duty of investigating a list of defectors implies that this program was somehow connected to activities of the State Department, probably through foreign embassies. We know that, for instance, when Oswald defected to the USSR, the U.S. State Department for some reason that is unclear, held up his paperwork without honoring his request to renounce his U.S. citizenship. This made possible his easy return to the U.S. The excuse for this was that they were being big-hearted and felt sympathy for Oswald, i.e. that they were protecting Oswald from himself. However, it might also have been the case that while Oswald was living in the Soviet Union, he had been passing information to the U.S. through the U.S. Embassy or a consulate. When Oswald was in the Soviet Union he worked in an electronics factory. At that time, the U.S. had intelligence departments gathering information about the state of Soviet industry. A former CIA agent once hinted at that gathering of information on electronics by Oswald, when he went about explaining all of his duties while over in Russia.

  It is well known to anyone interested in JFK assassination research that when Lee Harvey Oswald returned to the U.S. following his defection, he was given a loan from the State Department to pay the expenses for both himself and his family to travel back to New Orleans. Those funds must have been legally available for such purposes. It is also true that Oswald, upon his return from the USSR, was put in contact with private parties and that some of these parties had connections to right-wing interests. Thus, it seems likely that if there were a string of double agents being run at that time that U.S. embassies would have been involved and that might be the reason for the State Department to be maintaining a file of Oswald.

  When one reads about the FBI Counter Intelligence and British S.O.E. during World War II, one sees that these agencies were each running a string of double agents. The reason that both of these agencies were interested in having a number of such agents was to benefit from economies of scale. In other words for example, all of these double agents needed a mail drop and short-wave communications with a home base. Multiple agents could all use the same mail drop and the same means of communication. Thus, the U.S. and the U.K. benefited in these efficiencies in maintaining double agents in Germany during World War II.

  The Kennedy Administration Begins as Otepka Meets

  Robert F. Kennedy

  On a day in December 1960, in a 7:00 p.m. special meeting between Otepka, Dean Rusk and Robert Kennedy in Otto Otepka’s office, Robert Kennedy came quickly to the bottom line: Kennedy wanted to know whether Otepka would clear W.W. Rostow for employment at the State Department on grounds of security. On two previous occasions, in 1955 and 1956, Otepka had declined to approve Rostow for State Department employment. (FTJ p. 431).

  “What kind of security problem would be encountered,” Rusk asked. The case against W.W. Rostow was threefold: first, because Rostow had a history of close associations with persons who were Communist Party members, some proven to be Soviet espionage agents, second, because two of his aunts were members of the Communist Party in the 1940’s, and third, Rostow’s father was a native of Russia and had been a Socialist there prior to the first Communist revolt which occurred in 1905. The elder Rostow continued as a Socialist activist when he came to the U.S. in 1905. The U.S. Air Force Intelligence had declared Rostow a “security risk,” a very serious charge in that field. Otepka indicated he would not clear Rostow. When he said so, Robert Kennedy exploded, saying “those Air Force guys are a bunch of jerks, they’re nuts!” As a result of Otepka’s rejection, instead of working at the State Department, W.W. Rostow became an advisor at the White House, where he would head up the Staff of the National Security Counsel. The State Department had no control over security clearances at the White House.

  The almost unbelievable sequel to these events is that Rostow, after being rejected by Otepka, went on to become the sole author of U.S. Foreign policy. He was the architect of the Vietnam War policy which divided Americans from 1963 to 1975. Vietnam was by far the most dominant issue in U.S. politics for that entire period. But Rostow’s clearance and thus his ability to work for the U.S. State Department hung from the tiny thread that was the personal opinion of Mr. Otto Otepka.

  It is argued in some sources that it was the emphasis on correct legal procedures that got Otto Otepka into instant trouble with the incoming Kennedy administration. But we also see that the negative decision on the Rostow clearance was not because of something that was carved in stone in rules and regulations of the State Department. Rostow was not personally accused of anything. Would the written regulations of the State Department require that if your relatives were involved with Communism, that you would be fired?

  Not likely. The guilt of Rostow was based on the alleged pro-Communist acts of his relatives and acquaintances. So Otepka’s decision did not really amount to “going by the book.” It was rather the same old guilt by association as practiced by Joe McCarthy. If an investigator such as Otepka can consider anything he wishes to be classified as subversive, he is not “going by the book.” Instead, he is writing his own book every time he makes a decision.

  Since Otepka was a long term, experienced security officer, with 25 total years in the U.S. Government, he felt he knew pretty well what the challenges were in enforcing security in the State Department. In 1960, in an evaluation of Otepka himself, he was commended for his knowledge of laws, regulations, rules and procedures in all aspects of security. The evaluation also mentioned that he was especially knowledgeable about Communism and its dangerous role in subversion in the United States.

  The Blunder of Wieland Opens The Door To

  Castro

  So now we will look into the biggest mistake of all from this era regarding the Communist menace. This would be the question of “who lost Cuba?” And the one person who, more than anyone else got the blame was a State Department representative named William Wieland.

  In a press conference on January 24, 1962, a veteran journalist named Sarah McClendon confronted President Kennedy about the case of William Arthur Wieland. Reporter McClendon described Wieland as a well-known security risk who had apparently been put on a task force to reorganize the [State Department] Office of Security. It came to light that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) had been investigating State Department employee William Wieland for over a year. Kennedy had replied to the question by Sarah McClendon by saying that Wieland was cleared on grounds of security. In fact Otto Otepka had refused to clear Wieland. SY (Security) Director William O. Boswell, Otepka’s immediate boss and Roger Jones, Deputy Undersecretary for Administration had both confronted Otepka and demanded that Otepka clear Wieland immediately.

  The Wieland situation was up in the air for months. SISS was involved (in the person of acting chairman Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut). Secretary of State Dean Rusk told Dodd that he, Rusk, had personally cleared Wieland. Rusk had not. This interaction between Rusk and Dodd represented the security “war” that had erupted due to the conflict between SISS, Dean Rusk and the Kennedys. But who was the subject of this dispute, William Wieland? See: [http://havanaschooleng.blogspot.com/2012/05/cuban-conspiracy-nine-wielands-case-i.html] Viewed 3-19-15, hereinafter “havblog.”

  Wieland joined the State Department in 1941, and in 1957, he had reached the high position of Director of the Bureau for Mexico and the Caribbean of the Undersecretary of State for Latin America. The problem was that Wieland’s long career in the State Department apparently had both begun and developed without the required security clearances. In addition, Wieland had never even managed to present the necessary identity documents to begin work of the Department. Nobody knew for sure what his real name was. Wieland sometimes appeared as William Arthur Wieland, at other times as Arturo Montenegro and still others as William Montenegro. These questions about Wieland led to the investigation of sensitive foreign policy decisions in which Wieland was involved.

  Wieland was regarded as the man responsible for the overthrow of Fulgen
cio Batista in Cuba. But after that, he was also a central player in the rise and consolidation of power by Fidel Castro. Members of SISS and several State Department officials who testified before SISS were suspicious about Wieland. They found that Wieland was the main instigator of the suspension of arms shipments to General Batista’s government. This had set the stage for the fall of Batista and the rise of Castro.

  As Director of Mexican and Caribbean affairs in the State Department, Wieland was able to recommend policies whenever he wanted toward any country of the region. He also had considerable influence with his boss, Roy Rubottom, the Undersecretary of State for Latin America, on how to implement these policies.

  In addition, Wieland, was pointed to (by some) as the mastermind of the international media manipulation that shaped the image of Fidel Castro. Castro was first heard of as a little known guerilla leader in the mountains of Cuba. He was cast in the media as a modern-day Robin Hood. Apparently, Wieland had much to do with a famous interview by Herbert Matthews, the star reporter of the New York Times. Matthews met with Fidel Castro when Castro was still fighting in the Sierra Maestra mountains against Batista. In addition, along the same lines, there was a pro-Castro CBS television documentary where Castro’s guerrillas in the mountains of eastern Cuba were portrayed in a favorable light.

  Wieland had also managed to replace Arthur Gardner, the American ambassador who was sympathetic to the Batista government, with Earl E.T. Smith, who would play an important role in the fall of the Batista regime. The final bottom line with regard to Wieland and his support of Castro, came on an important plane flight. In August 1959, Ambassador to Mexico Robert C. Hill told SISS that he was trying to get the word to President Eisenhower about Castro’s true colors. Hill tried this by informing Presidential advisor Milton Eisenhower about the bad side of Castro. Milton Eisenhower was acting at that time as the White House advisor on Latin America. On the plane flight in question, Mr. Raymond Leddy, political counselor to the American Embassy in Mexico City and Colonel Benoid Glawe, the embassy air attaché had both told Milton Eisenhower that Castro was a Communist. Wieland, being on the same flight, shouted that these men were lying, so Milton Eisenhower would not listen further to any discussion on the Castro issue.

  Around this same time, the SISS began an investigation of Wieland. The overall purpose of SISS was to help enforce the Internal Security Act of 1950.

  It is the job of the Senate to pass legislation. But also through the committee system, Congress is allowed to gather information to enable it to pass appropriate laws. However, the Supreme Court has held that Congress has no power to investigate simply to investigate. The investigations by Congress have to have at least some connection to legislating and legislation, or for purposes of presidential and other appointments and similar issues.

  Another, more controversial theory regarding committees of Congress would allow them to monitor the Executive to see whether the Executive is doing its job and enforcing the laws. Some scholars have argued that this function of monitoring the executive branch is really not appropriate according to the separation of powers unless the Senate might be putting a President on trial for “high crimes and misdemeanors” preparatory to impeachment.

  The dichotomy of freedom versus security would, as we shall see, go on to cause the rift between reactionary forces in Congress and more pragmatic individuals within the executive branch. There were moderate, non-political individuals and bureaucrats in the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. These moderates (which could well have included Rockefeller-affiliated Republicans of the day) were charged with actually making things work on a day-to-day basis. They tended to favor expediency regarding such issues such as “atoms for peace,” “open skies policies,” arms control, the Test Ban Treaty and summit meetings. One could even throw into that category the pragmatic policies which attempted to solve the Korean and Vietnam wars. However, in Congress there were some right-wing extremists who favored dogmatic responses.

  Otepka Battles the Kennedy Administration over State Department Security

  Author William J. Gill states in The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, that the preeminent interest of Robert Kennedy was the State Department. It is generally agreed by historians that the JFK administration was oriented most strongly to foreign policy.

  Despite this heavy emphasis, it seems strange to this author that State Department security was placed in the hands of a single middle-level bureaucrat like Otekpa, to the exclusion of the Secretary of State, the head of the Security Department and even the President himself. The concern of RFK about the clearance for Walter Rostow was only one example of conflicts between the White House and State Department bureaucrats over the State Department security issue (see DOD p. 242).

  Otepka had been working in security during the transition between what we can call the two Robert Kennedys. It was the old Robert Kennedy who was Assistant Counsel and close personal friend for life to Joe McCarthy, working in McCarthy’s outlandish Red-baiting crusade. It was the new Robert Kennedy who Otepka would view as a coddler of Communists. In 1961, the Kennedys would synthesize their experiences with Communism and change themselves into the leaders at the forefront of the effort to achieve detente with Communism on a world-wide basis.

  JFK had always represented big-city bosses, some of the more conservative labor leaders and, quite importantly, leaders from the South. When it came to his brother Bobby, Gore Vidal had described RFK as “a dangerous, ruthless man.” On issues related to McCarthy, (as a Senator), JFK had joined Joe McCarthy to harshly criticize such diplomats as Owen Lattimore and John K. Fairbank who were typical Joe McCarthy targets. As recently as 1955, Robert Kennedy, acting as Chief Counsel of the Government Operations committee, drew up a report castigating the the military over subversives in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. This allegation about Communists in the Army was considered one of McCarthy’s most extreme accusations.

  Amazingly to the student of history, there was a specific day when JFK switched from “tough” to “soft” on Communism. This was right after the 1956 Democratic Convention. Eleanor Roosevelt had accused JFK of being “soft on McCarthyism.” According to Gill, it was JFK’s aide Theodore Sorensen, historian James Schlessinger, Jr. and economist John Kenneth Galbraith who turned JFK around to Liberalism.

  In June, 1959, JFK dined with a group of Harvard-type Liberal intelligentsia (see OOO p 60). This was the apparent date of JFK’s “conversion to Liberalism.” Soon after, JFK’s first Liberal act was to vote against confirmation of Lewis Strauss to be Secretary of Commerce. Liberals had a vendetta against Lewis Strauss because he had been head of the Atomic Energy Commission when the the AEC denied a security clearance to Robert J. Oppenheimer. This was done, despite the fact that Oppenheimer had given the U.S. Government the “gift” of the the atomic bomb.

  In his Lone Ranger quest to fend off Communists in the State Department, Otepka had begun informing to SISS whenever he was unable to deny clearances to suspected security risks by any other means.

  And when we look at the new Secretary of State under JFK, Dean Rusk, we find that Rusk had testified to SISS repeatedly during the period from just four weeks prior to Dallas on October 21, 1963 to sometime in 1965. However, when the JFK administration took over from Ike, Otto Otepka had come under fairly severe persecution because of his rigid approach to security. Rather than Dean Rusk, the blame for the persecution of Otepka was put on William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration in the State Department. On October 21, 1963 Rusk appeared before SISS, with 7 of the 9 Senators present:these were Dirksen, Dodd, Ervin, Hruska, Keating, McClellan and Scott.

  Rusk and Walter W. Rostow, the Anglophiles at State

  The politics of Secretary of State Dean Rusk were generally opaque. It seems that Rusk had worked very hard to disguise his politics. Author William J. Gill in OOO analyzes Rusk’s politics, not as pro-Communist or anti-Communist, but rather as Anglophile. Like many of the more sophisticated histo
rians, Gill analyzes Rusk as mostly influenced by his extensive period of study in England and Europe. Gill would claim that Rusk was functioning more along the ultra-high level guidelines unique to Rhodes-scholarly Anglophiles like himself and W.W. Rostow.

  Coming from humble beginnings on a tenant farm in Georgia, Dean Rusk had indeed gone on to become a Rhodes Scholar in England,. He studied there for three years. In his final year he won the “Cecil Peace Prize.” worth 100 British pounds. Then he had gone on for further studies in Germany. (Interestingly, there is no record of Rusk ever having commented on what he experienced in Germany during the rise of Hitler).

  We have already explained the extreme importance of the China issue to many public and private individuals in the U.S. We note that during World War II, Rusk worked in Army Intelligence (G-2) in the British Empire section, of which he became Chief. So in that crucial period, Rusk had been up to his eyeballs in the China issue. All of the State Department “China Hands” we have mentioned previously in this chapter were fellow China experts or persons with experience in China like Dean Rusk.

  By 1943, Rusk was on the staff of Gen. Joseph Stilwell. Rusk became Deputy Chief of Staff for the entire China-Burma-India theater. While Rusk was in China, also present were “old China hands” John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies, John K. Emmerson and Owen Lattimore. Rusk was secretly the architect of a proposed plan to arm 1 million Communist troops and put them under General Stilwell, a plan that was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek. As we have stated before, the policy of “divide and conquer” was the hallmark method of the British Empire and its advocates. So in this regard, Rusk was possibly doing the bidding of the U.K. as well as the U.S. in China.