The Three Barons

by J. W Lateer

  In his March 1963 final appearance at SISS, Otepka discussed 1) Dean Rusk’s abbreviation of the security clearance process and 2) Harlan Cleveland’s advisory committee trying to reestablish a policy of placing Americans in U.N. jobs without first subjecting them to field investigations by the FBI. When asked about the topic of waivers, Otepka said that 398 waivers were issued to clerical and secretary personnel; only Dirksen and Roman Hruska had attached any real importance of these issues.

  In the opinion of this author, at this point, the debate between the State Department and SISS about the Otepka situation had begun to focus increasingly on trivial issues. Questions were being raised as to whether certain people could serve on an arts advisory council. The only objections were that they had flirted with Communism twenty years in the past.

  The question as to which Americans could be approved for work at the U.N. was of very little importance when compared to the 1940’s era issues such as “who lost China?” When examining the state of mind of Senators Dodd, Dirksen and the others, the real fear seemed to be that the tradition of McCarthyism would entirely die out.

  If the tradition of McCarthyism were forgotten, those who tended to agree with Adlai Stevenson and Eleanor Roosevelt could go about their business without fearing Congress. This would reduce the carefully crafted power of the Congressional alliance between southern segregationists and conservative Republicans. And in the view of these conservatives, that could lead to a policy which was agnostic and neutral on Communism overseas. Probably of equal importance was the dawning realization that America could be facing 24 years of Kennedy brothers’ presidencies!

  After three SISS appearances, Otepka became the target of clandestine surveillance in his workplace. On March 24, 1963, Otepka came in late to work and his office was invaded by David Belisle and Terence Shea, who were there to install wiretapping devices. In mid-March, Reilly had ordered expert Russell Waller to crack Otepka’s safe. Otepka’s trash was searched daily by Rosetti, Belisle, Terry Shea, Robert McCarthy, and Fred Traband. All of the above failed to turn up anything against Otepka. So Reilly and his allies decided to frame Otepka for a crime.

  Tongue Slashing and the Countdown to the Murder of JFK

  Otepka’s phone was tapped, but there were problems with the tap, so Stanley Holden, a State Department expert on electronic surveillance, removed the tap. In April 1963, Otepka invited expert Russell Waller to listen to his phone and Waller said “your phone is bugged.” On April 25, John Reilly testified before SISS. Senator Dodd, who had been less involved than he normally was, was at first favorable to John Reilly. But Dodd quickly realized that there had been an escalation of the conflict between SISS, the State Department and Otepka and that Reilly had been lying to SISS. (Keep in mind that at this same time, the “Battle of New Orleans” was occuring between SISS, LUAC, Eastland, Sourwine and SCEF and this involved Lee Harvey Oswald in a direct role). Ben Mandel, the Research Director of SISS, trying to play the peacemaker, called Otepka and asked him to effectively make peace with Reilly. Otepka informed Chief Counsel Jay Sourwine about the phone call from Mandel. When Otepka was given a transcript of Reilly’s secret testimony, he saw that Reilly had lied to an even greater extent than before. Then Otepka met with Sourwine. At this point, it almost seemed to the parties that this feud over State Department Security was careening out of control.

  The following is a summary of the things that happened to Otepka during this bureaucratic struggle with his superiors.

  His office was bugged.

  His telephone was tapped.

  He was put under physical surveillance even at home.

  His desk was ransacked.

  He was beset with various security personnel.

  His secretary was transferred without any reason.

  He was denied access to any secretarial services.

  Toward the end of May, 1963, SISS called Reilly back again to testify. The SISS-State quarrel descended to an even lower level. Reilly claimed that “Otepka had a tendency to dwell in the past,” had taken his demotion in a way which showed Rielly that “He seems emotionally overwrought on that topic and said that “He does not strike me as being a balanced individual.”

  Sourwine indicated that over the years he had seen many anti-Communists branded as insane or emotionally unstable. The situation had descended to the low levels witnessed in the heyday of Joe McCarthy. “I’ve been wondering if this was coming,” Sourwine noted. Sourwine said that he had expected the charges of emotional imbalance to enter the discussion in discrediting Otepka and (by implication) SISS itself.

  Sourwine called Otepka on May 23 and asked for a meeting. Otepka knew he had to tell SISS the whole story because the top State Department officials would never force a Reilly retraction of his lies about Otepka. Otepka told interviewers in later years that he feared a possible Kim Philby situation in the State Department if security rules were not observed. (Kim Philby was an actual Soviet spy who infiltrated government at a very high level). Otepka actually feared that if he did not stand up for proper security procedures, that such procedures could disappear throughout the Federal Government.

  Otepka had discovered a mysterious man in an unfamiliar car parked in front of his house on a full-time basis. Police found that this stranger was Eric Eisenberg, an employee of a private detective agency. Two officers, including Deputy Assistant Secretary John F. Reilly, perjured themselves before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and had to resign in November 1963. However, Senate efforts notwithstanding, Otto Otepka was relegated to a meaningless position before his termination. So were some of his colleagues who had backed his efforts.

  At this point, author Gill expands the context of the SISS-State feud to the overall political situation in mid-1963. Per Gill, John F. Kennedy had decided at that time to formally adopt the Rostowian policies of convergence and détente. On June 10, 1963, President Kennedy delivered his tremendously famous speech at American University. Kennedy said that he had a formula which would bring peace for all time. Kennedy asked that all Americans examine their attitudes toward the Soviet Union. The President warned Americans “not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible.” Kennedy called on his countrymen to “help make the world safe for diversity.”

  Per author Gill, this was a far cry from the Wilsonian promise to make the world safe for democracy. “Let US re-examine our attitude toward the Soviet Union,” Mr. Kennedy reiterated and that the move toward peace “would require,” he said, “increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves…increased contact and communication.” It was at this point that President Kennedy brought up the possibility of a Test Ban Treaty with the Soviets. Krushchev later told Averell Harriman, the chief U.S. test ban negotiator, that it was “the greatest speech by any American President since Roosevelt.” This focus on the doctrine of “convergence” with the Soviet Union was set forth not only in The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, but also reported by Col. L. Fletcher Prouty in his book JFK: The CIA, Vietnam and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy. Col. Prouty had a Pentagon job which placed him right in the eye of this developing hurricane in Washington and the information in his book completely corroborates the 1963 situation that we have just described.

  Reilly approved a change to security regulations to permit the hiring of previous employees who had been banned on security grounds. Leo Harris, an assistant counsel in Abram Chayes’ Office admitted that this change was to permit the return of John Paton Davies to State. Otepka saw Dean Rusk as a representative of the old pro-Mao cabal. Otepka felt that bringing back John Paton Davies would open the floodgates to even worse potential employees. Otepka had handled the Davies case himself years before. There was proof that Davies had improperly delivered secret U.S. documents to Communist agents in the days of Chiang Kai-shek’s China. A SD hearing board had unanimously determined Davies to be a security risk. Davies, now in Peru, had been running
a furniture business which was possibly a front for the CIA and he also had secretly been communicating with the administration and advising the U.S. government about the Alliance for Progress.

  Otepka refused a clearance for Mrs. Patricia Glover Barnett, stating “I was not in any way influenced by the fact that Senator McCarthy once charged her with … close contact with Soviet agents.” In another perplexing situation, the Rockefeller Foundation had given Robert Barnett, her husband, four separate grants, despite the fact that he was declared to be a security risk by the State Department. The broad outlines of a situation like that appears to be some sort of confrontation between the wealthy Eastern establishment types like the Rockefeller family on the one hand and on the other the conservative Republican-southern Democrat coalition in Congress which would also include the Catholic anti-Communist activist lobby and even European fascists.

  Considerable pressure was brought to bear in the case of the issuance of a special clearance to Abba Schwartz, czar of the Bureau of Security & Consular Affairs and a protégé of Adlai Stevenson. Otepka found security concerns with Schwartz. Schwartz had recently helped Abram Chayes, Nicholas Katzenbach and Bobby Kennedy subvert the law with regard to issuing passports to Communist agents. For these and other services rendered the Kennedy’s, Schwartz was rewarded with Scotty McLeod’s old job in the Department of State. Schwartz had trouble getting confirmed by the Senate in 1962 when he was ripped by Strom Thurmond.

  In May, 1963, Otepka uncovered actual evidence of a decision by Rusk to totally scuttle security procedures in the State Department. Otepka’s revelation about Secretary Rusk’s wholesale issuance of waivers in 1961-62 had created too many problems. It had now been decided to avoid a repetition of the waiver scandal by scuttling the security regulations entirely. Obviously, this decision had to be made at a very high level.

  Many months earlier, based on private sources, President Kennedy had tipped off the State Department that there may have been a major infiltration of Latin American Communists into various agencies in Washington, D.C., including the Organization of American States. On June 18, 1963, SISS summoned Reilly-Belisle and company to testify about the spying being directed against Otepka. Senator Edward Kennedy was in attendance to try to protect Reilly and his Massachusetts cohorts.. This was the only time Edward Kennedy had appeared in the SISS hearings. Senator Edward Kennedy was a member of the parent Judiciary Committee. Because of this fact, Kennedy had a legal right to attend (but not vote) at any hearing of a Judiciary subcommittee which included SISS. Attendance by Edward Kennedy at the SISS hearing could indicate he was hearing things through the grapevine about this dangerous situation.

  The spying on Otepka became known throughout Washington. When the pro-Kennedy State Department officials testified about the various wiretapping and surveillance measures taken against Otepka, they all denied any knowledge of it. Sourwine kept the focus on the safecracking job. Joe Rosetti had already established the fact that he was Chief of Domestic Security Division, but Sourwine inquired as to the duties which went with Rosetti’s job. Incredibly, Edward Kennedy interrupted the witness to ask: “Does he have the competency to know that? I just did not know whether the witness understands the full responsibilities of the Division Chief. Maybe he does, but I just want to know that, if he does know and understand what those responsibilities are or not.”

  The most important fact of all emerged when it became obvious that Rusk was fully prepared to defy SISS or the whole United States Senate if necessary. (Query whether Rusk was conferring closely with his Rockefeller backers in this controversy?) Reilly must have known this or sensed it. If he had lacked confidence in his being backed by Rusk, and therefore of his backing by the Kennedy’s, Reilly would never have gone totally against SISS as he did shortly thereafter.

  On Thursday June 27, 1963, Otepka was transferred to the job of preparing guidelines for evaluators and updating and reviewing the Office of Security handbook. This removed Otepka from his work for State Department Security. Otepka’s files were seized. These files contained up to 20 years of security clearance information about many State Department employees. Nine other SD employees were summarily transferred out of their jobs by John Reilly, who was acting under the orders of men who were determined to carry out a hidden revolution in the State Department and thus in U.S. foreign policy. The dead giveaway about the intentions of Otepka and his supporters lies in this claim of “revolution.” In making this characterization of a “revolution,” author Gill reveals that the Otepka-State Department battle was not really anything to do with true security issues such as espionage or criminal activities of employees. By describing the situation thus, Gill equates the control of the security clearance process to control of State Department policy.

  Actually, Otepka and his allies in SISS felt that they could and should be in control of State Department policy. For SISS, an Adlai Stevenson or Eleanor Roosevelt-type philosophy equated to being a Communist. Obviously, the control of foreign policy properly belonged in the hands of leaders duly elected or confirmed for that purpose.

  What was never appreciated by observers at the time and especially not appreciated by JFK and RFK was the following fact: there were some overseas-based anti-Communist, monarchist, colonialist and related interest groups who were willing to commit murder to prevent a middle-of-the-road policy from becoming American foreign policy. Most importantly, this interest group was populated with ex-Nazis left over from World War II who were apparently organized and financed on a world-wide basis. And the reader must not forget the huge potential role of NATO in this epic confrontation. Of course, NATO itself was, in 1963, under the control of ex-Hitler associates. This emerging middle-of-the road policy was favored by professional foreign policy experts. Further, since this conflict over policy pitted the Congress against the Executive, then these desperate foreign anti-Communists had the perfect opportunity to sponsor a Presidential assassination. There could be guaranteed cover coming from the Republican-Southern Democrat coalition. It would be this coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats that would soon turn up and populate the Warren Commission.

  The members of SISS, who soon became allied with the plotters of the assassination, put forth the issue of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This was the political football which could be kicked back and forth as camouflage for the real issue. It could be put forth as a litmus test for pro- versus anti-assination partisans. But the real issue was the control of U.S. foreign policy. Even among the handful of people privy to Otepka’s fate there were not more than a few who understood fully the connection between the Treaty of Moscow and what happened to Otepka. “President Kennedy never grasped it, nor his brother Bobby. Dean Rusk knew, of course and certainly Walt Rostow.” This is a verbatim quote from Gill’s book at page 283.

  Here author Gill lays down his cards. Gill properly attributes the possession of foreign policy power and the struggle for this power at this time to Rusk and Rostow, over and above the power of the disorganized duo of JFK and RFK. This attribution follows the fact that both Rusk and Rostow had spent most of their early formative years studying in England and Europe. Their loyalty to the ideas absorbed at Oxford would simply overwhelm their loyalty to American democracy, plain and simple.

  The last week of July, 1963, Otepka learned that he was under investigation by the FBI for alleged violation of the Espionage Act. The reader should note the lack of any involvement by the FBI up to this point in the story. Mrs. Eunice Powers, Otepka’s former secretary, was questioned about Otepka’s activities. She was called back by the FBI to sign a statement regarding her knowledge of Otepka’s association with Jay Sourwine. On August 14, 1963, it became the turn of Otto Otepka to himself be interviewed by the FBI. There were two FBI agents, Robert Byrnes and Carl Graham who conducted the interrogation of Otepka. The agents explained that it was a “higher authority” in the Department of Justice who had ordered the investigation of Otepka. This phrasing would indicate that the Attorney
General, RFK,(and not J. Edgar Hoover) had instigated the case against Otepka. The questioning of Otepka took three days. Otepka did not deny his close association with Jay Sourwine. Otepka was shown certain papers which apparently had once contained classified labels, but the classified labels had been clipped off.

  Otepka was permitted to draft his reply to the charges of handing over classified materials to unauthorized persons. Otepka cited a law establishing the right of all Civil Service personnel “to furnish information to either house of Congress or to any Committee or member thereof.” On Friday morning at about half-past twelve, Otepka was asked to testify again to SISS. But by this time, Dean Rusk had issued a prohibition forbidding anyone in the State Department from providing information to SISS without advance permission from William Crockett, the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Administration. This prohibition would remain in effect for two years. But there were three State Department officials who SISS desired to hear from and to investigate. This trio was John Reilly, Elmer Hill and David Belisle. For six more weeks nothing transpired regarding the Otepka case.

  SISS believed that Dean Rusk and Robert Kennedy would agree to work out a suitable compromise in the Otepka case. On September 22, 1963 Otepka was given a termination letter from the Chief of the Personnel Operations Division at the State Department. It listed thirteen charges against Otepka. The charges alleged violation of the Truman directive 9835 prohibiting the release of classified information to the Congress. Otepka was also charged with mutilation of classified documents, among which was a memo to McGeorge Bundy at the White House.