Modern American Snipers

by Chris Martin

  Eric Davis has studied human performance intensively and he credits Kyle with rare psychological strength. He explained, “Sometimes people ask how he was able to live with himself after killing that many people. Here’s the thing—psychologically speaking—human beings can’t do something that’s disagreeable with their senses or their morals. That’s where PTSD can come from. You could kill a bunch of people but then all the guilt and the remorse and all that stuff will just wake your ass up at night.”

  Another former SEAL sniper instructor also explained the mind-set of a sniper. He said, “You have to find a way to justify your actions in your mind. These guys are able to compartmentalize it. Some guys, like Chris, see themselves as saving lives. Other guys see it as a profession: ‘I’m just doing my job.’ And some guys are just there to hunt.”

  Davis elaborated, “What’s going on is, you told yourself some sort of story in the moment to make yourself feel okay about what happened, but that story will not stand up over time because at the end of the day, it was just a story.

  “Now everything inside a human’s life is a story, but some are better than others. Chris’s confidence can come off like he’s just some redneck running his mouth. But he’s one of those tough guys where if you were able to unpeel the layers of the brain, you’d discover an incredible amount of intelligence. This ‘redneck bull-riding dude’ probably gave some pretty serious thought to it all. It was not the first time he thought about it.

  “So when he was out there operating and killing people, his brain had already processed the justification for doing so, at least to some degree. And when you can justify something, that’s when you can execute aggressively and violently. You’re already good to go.”

  Davis provided a specific example to illustrate this single-minded justification at work. The story may actually serve to confirm to Kyle’s detractors their suspicions of some sort of mental disorder. Davis would argue to the contrary considering what was at stake.

  A stray dog was adopted and kept around the camp where Kyle’s SEAL sniper element was resting between operations. Unfortunately for all concerned, the animal barked through the night, one evening after the next.

  “I’ve got to fucking go to sleep. I’ve got to wake up and go on a mission tomorrow. You get that dog to shut up.”

  When the owner proved unable to do so, the Texan took matters into his own hands and gutted the dog.

  “A lot of people were like, ‘Holy shit! We need to give this guy a psych evaluation,’” Davis said. “Chris admitted that people freaked out about it. But I would say, no, that is simply someone who is 100 percent mission focused. His job is to go out and save the lives of other Americans and he knew that this dog could stop him from doing that.

  “He was able to put his feelings and conscience aside to do what needed to be done. There are not a lot of people that can do that anymore.”

  9

  Industrial Revolution

  As JSOC adapted to the situation and developed increasingly accurate intelligence, the chaotic violence following the initial toppling of Hussein’s regime slowly came into focus despite its nuanced and evolving nature.

  A multifaceted insurgency composed of nationalist and jihadist elements was compounded by the escalation of an ugly sectarian conflict that cascaded into a full-blown civil war.

  What had been loose and disparate armed groups congealed into larger forces as tens of thousands were killed in an ever-ratcheting series of attacks. Sunni suicide bombings compelled equally repugnant executions carried out by Shia death squads, which sparked the next round of the cycle.

  Foreign influences driven by their own larger goals not only encouraged this intensification, they compelled it by pulling strings on either side of the equation.

  While the United States cited dubious ties connecting Hussein and al-Qaeda ahead of the invasion as a motivating factor, the presence of American troops on the ground made the fear of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) a reality. AQI solidified into a monstrously bloodthirsty faction, fanning the flames of civil war.

  Superficially supporting the nation’s Sunni population, AQI exploited the conflict to bring about more bloodshed and recruit new terrorists to wage jihad against the “infidels.”

  The profile of AQI’s leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, continued its stratospheric ascension. His notoriety was marked both by his boundless brutality (at a level that left even Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri uncomfortable) and his ability to continually slip free from the net as JSOC attempted to hunt him down.

  Meanwhile, Iran quietly backed the Shia population. This was done as much to conduct a veiled war against the United States as it was to support their ideological allies and shape the future of Iraq to its long-term benefit.

  The Iranian presence generally came in the form of intelligence, training, and armament that effectively transformed the extremist Shia militias into a proxy paramilitary army, but the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s elite Quds Force was heavily suspected of playing a more direct role as well.

  With AQI and Iran dumping gasoline on an already volatile situation, matters were made even more complicated by the staging and smuggling of men and munitions across the border. This was not only in Iran, but also Syria, and, to a lesser extent, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

  Despite their fanatical differences, all sides with bad intentions viewed the coalition—and the Americans in particular—as enemy number one.

  The tactics utilized were among the most vile and gruesome imaginable. Wide-scale bombings of public markets, videotaped beheadings, mass executions in the systematic slaughter of innocents, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became the standard operating procedures of the rival factions in play.

  Genuinely at risk of losing control of the situation in Iraq beyond repair, JSOC responded to this unique and extremely challenging set of circumstances by undertaking the most ambitious and revolutionary special operations campaign the world had ever witnessed.

  * * *

  Then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld leveraged loosened restrictions to provide the Joint Special Operations Command with an open-ended mandate, unlimited funds, and a bolstered intelligence capability.

  Meanwhile, he also shielded it from oversight, with the idea of transforming it into a proactive, standalone counterterrorism powerhouse. Continually frustrated with interagency feuding and the CIA’s consistent inability to provide actionable intelligence to JSOC’s special mission units in the early stages of the Iraq War, Rumsfeld hoped to free up the Pentagon’s premier CT forces so that they might operate more freely and effectively.

  However, shortly after taking command of JSOC, General Stanley McChrystal seized the reins handed off to him by the Secretary of Defense and did an about-face: he took “the Command” in the opposite direction Rumsfeld expected in order to complete the radical transformation he desired.

  Rather than cut off ties and make the augmented command even more insular, McChrystal embraced the input of outside agencies and emphasized open lines of communication. This was done in an effort to slash through layers of bureaucracy, both inside JSOC and throughout its wider support network. Minimizing lost opportunities, JSOC radically ramped up its ability to collect, analyze, and act on intelligence.

  Along with a dramatically enhanced internal capability as JSOC created new units and strengthened preexisting ones, McChrystal’s inclusive approach also resulted in significantly improved relations with—and product from—the CIA, NSA, FBI, MI6, DIA, and other military intelligence units, conventional military forces, civilian contractors, etc. Anyone who could play a role in turning JSOC into a more effective machine was welcomed and empowered to do so.

  The combined efforts of these entities, along with JSOC’s authority to dominate ISR resources in country, eventually resulted in an “unblinking eye” of 24/7 surveillance provided by a fusion of imagery from satellites, UAVs, and manned aircraft in constant rotation. This allowed the Command to perform complex moveme
nt analysis, such as rewinding truck bombs or death squads to their point of origin, pinpointing the objective for the next direct action mission.

  Now spurred on by unprecedented intelligence, Delta’s gunfighters were truly unleashed. As this process was continually refined and perfected, the Unit slowly ratcheted up its operations tempo (OPTEMPO) to previously uncharted levels. By 2005, JSOC was executing multiple raids per night and hundreds per month in a relentless campaign to chart and dismantle webs of insurgents with Zarqawi’s AQI network serving as its primary target and victim.

  This effort was fueled by a system known as F3EA—Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze—in which each subsequent raid was rapidly processed in order to secure new intelligence with which to initiate the next series of direct action raids.

  Operators in the field communicated directly with a wide range of intelligence personnel and leadership on a daily basis. Operations and intelligence (O&I) video teleconferences (VTCs) connected the warfighters to their enablers both back at the JOC (Joint Operations Center) and Stateside six times a week. This ritual connected and united a dispersed effort (dispersed both by its globally distributed personnel and their widely varied skill sets and experience) and encouraged decentralized decision making, further quickening the pace.

  Collectively, this allowed JSOC and Delta Force to increasingly outpace and outmaneuver the adaptable terrorist groups that had proven such elusive targets prior to this transformation.

  A retired Unit recce operator summed it up: “You know why we won in Iraq? And you know why Stanley McChrystal was the greatest general we’ve ever seen? The Internet and global real-time video conferences.”

  In the words of McChrystal himself, “It takes a network to defeat a network.”

  It must be noted that the early phases of this effort certainly encountered growing pains—to say the least. There are troubling stories of detainee abuse and questionable interrogation practices in secret detention centers.

  It’s been reported that frustrated task force members attempted to wring out the vast amounts of intelligence necessary to ramp up operations to the desired level. However, gradually the larger process built up its own momentum, lessening a sense of need to regularly engage in these sorts of objectionable activities.

  * * *

  While McChrystal and his chief intelligence officer (or J2) General Michael Flynn have widely been credited as being the primary architects behind this “industrial-scale counterterrorism” approach, in reality much of the innovation was driven from the ground up.

  In 2004, when McChrystal was in the earliest stages of conceiving this network, he was approached by then-Delta Force commander Bennet Sacolick, who presented the F3EA solution to the general.

  This idea built and capitalized upon the tagging, tracking, and locating techniques the Unit had developed internally while hunting down the scattered fragments of Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, including the dictator himself, along with its pioneering use of unblinking ISR.

  John McPhee, a sniper with the Unit at the time, explained, “The government inherently does not know how to harness technology. We really got things working in Iraq when JSOC got out of the way and we ran the show.”

  Long championed for its creative problem solving—from dreaming up the modern spike strip to capture PIFWCs (Persons Indicted for War Crimes) in Bosnia to contemplating bicycle-mounted, cross-border offset infils—the Unit continued to deliver operational breakthroughs that helped fast-track the success of the new initiative. A pair of operators suggested a modification to an existing technology that, when utilized with specialized ISR aircraft, allowed for real-time target tracking. This also made possible the deep mapping of the target’s network of associates and eventually the enemy organization as a whole.

  * * *

  Both Delta’s tactical and its research and development influence tend to trickle down and spread out wide over time.

  The Heckler & Koch HK416 carbine was originally developed for, and in collaboration with, the Unit. It was widely adopted by Delta Force in 2004 and quickly subjected to an extensive trial by fire as JSOC had just started to cut a wide swath through Iraq’s terrorist factions. It’s since become established as the preferred assault rifle among elite military and law enforcement units across the globe.

  Similarly, variants of the Knights Armament SR-25 have largely proven to be the weapon of choice among special operations snipers during the Global War on Terror. A semi-automatic sniper rifle that doesn’t feel altogether unfamiliar to those trained on M4/M16 platforms, the SR-25 delivers a heavier 7.62×51mm NATO caliber round versus the former’s 5.56x44mm.

  This makes the SR-25 useful to spec ops snipers both at a considerable distance and in more confined spaces, capable of dropping targets whether they’re eight or eight hundred meters away.

  However, the SR-25 didn’t always have such a sterling reputation. And without the weight of Delta’s influence forcing improvements along, it may have never come into such wide use by the nation’s SOF marksmen.

  The SR-25 was originally developed by Eugene Stoner in the early ’90s as an improved version of his ’50s AR-10 design. However, according to a former Unit operator, “It took a long time to get that gun sorted out. By all accounts now, though, it’s a pretty damn good gun and you can thank Delta for that because they held Knights’s feet to the fire. Knights was smart enough to know that if Delta no longer used their gun, that would have a horrendous effect on them. They were about the only organization that could really leverage Knights to fix the gun.”

  The realities of the Iraq War whittled the rifle down into a shorter, more maneuverable weapon better suited to tight engagements. “It’s really kind of your benchmark now. And what you’re also seeing is—due to the different kind of conflicts you have going on and the urban activities—hey, we don’t need this twenty-inch gas gun. We can get by with a sixteen-incher and make the shots we need to make in an urban environment out to four hundred meters or so. And then if we have to do CQB, it’s an easier gun to manage.”

  The former operator continued, explaining, “The Mk 11 Mod 0 was the big turning point for that gun, which was really around post-9/11. That had a lot of upgrades and a lot of stuff that was really ramrodded on Knights to do.

  “Delta bought a number of them. Previously, they were using M14s and they liked what the SR-25 brought to the table. But they had to have a big sit-down and create a list that said, ‘You’ve got to fix this shit and we’re going to give you X amount of time to do it. If you don’t, we’re getting rid of your guns.’

  “That would have been the death knell of that gun.”

  * * *

  Once fully up and running, JSOC’s industrial operations dealt with its adversaries with all the regularity of a mass production line.

  With a constant flow of intelligence guiding direct action elements, and JSOC’s pull ensuring they were supported by close air support at all times, AQI found itself under an unrelenting assault of brass and lead, bombs and missiles, and ones and zeroes.

  For Tier 1 CT units such as Delta Force, extreme proficiency in close quarters combat is considered a core competency, not to mention a source of pride and an area of distinction. In Iraq, the assaulters (and advanced assaulters) of the Unit were given the opportunity to demonstrate that capability on a scale previously unimagined. A staggering body count resulted.

  If you ask them, operators from DEVGRU, the UKSF’s Special Air Service, Polish GROM, and other leading units will insist that their respective outfit represents the global standard bearer in this particularly exacting and deadly arena.

  The same, of course, is true with operators from Delta Force. Their claim is made with complete and utter conviction, confident that their counterparts know this deep in their souls as well even if they are unwilling to make the admission public.

  While they would likely appear identical to the untrained eye, JSOC’s special mission units take contrasting approaches to CQB.
A former Delta officer described the Unit’s style as “instinctive” and “explosive” while terming SEAL Team Six as “more controlled and rigid” when things get kinetic in tight spaces.

  Think of Delta as jazz improvisation to DEVGRU’s classical score.

  John McPhee, a former Unit advanced assaulter said, “No one does free flow like the Unit. Why? No one else trains the right way. Effective training focuses on mind-set, lessons learned, and absolutely no ego. Plus there’s no myth or sacred cows. If it sucks let’s call it that and move on to better stuff. I could teach a SWAT team to do it in a couple weeks but they don’t have the right mindset. They see it as ‘too fast, too loose, too dangerous.’ Well, what happens if you don’t do it and the adrenaline is flowing when you’re out on a target? You get shot.”

  As the campaign against al-Qaeda in Iraq and other enemy forces lifted off, the Unit took its trademark speed, surprise, and violence of action out from the controlled conditions of the training kill house and into the wilds of Sadr City, Fallujah, and other extremist lairs.

  In mid-2004, A Squadron rescued multiple hostages while the Unit as a whole began the systematic decimation of AQI. By May of 2005, the Delta-spearheaded campaign had resulted in the deaths of Zarqawi’s top twenty-one lieutenants while capturing another thirteen, leaving just one unaccounted for. Three months later, some two hundred of AQI’s leaders had been eliminated.

  * * *

  While Delta’s Task Force Green took the fight to AQI in the areas surrounding Baghdad, the Rangers of Task Force Red operated to the north in much the same manner—and with equal ferocity and frequency.

  That actuality might have come as something of a surprise to those not paying full attention. Call it the Black Hawk Down effect.

  Too often when outsiders (including those in other spec ops units) think of the 75th Ranger Regiment, they envision a sort of supercharged version of a conventional infantry unit, filled with eighteen-year-old Privates who get the honor of playing “blocking force to the stars”—pulling security for Delta Force and SEAL Team Six.