The Confederate army was quite a different lot. It was led by Robert E. Lee, who would be an audacious commander, perhaps one of the finest in American military history. He commanded a force of separate divisions (the Confederate government had not yet authorized the creation of a corps-level structure). This would be problematic for Lee, as it caused a very wide stretch of direct supervision. At this point of the war, Confederate high command had a distinct advantage in quality over its Federal counterpart. The most famous at the time was Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, who, together with Lee, had masterminded the strategy for dealing with the Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley and then took their plan and executed the brilliant campaign that drove the enemy troops from the Valley. Under Jackson’s command was the solid division commander Richard Ewell, who would later rise to corps command.
D.H. Hill was a division leader, competent and aggressive, but his personality would lead to future difficulties with Lee. James Longstreet would, after Jackson’s death at Chancellorsville the next spring, rise to become Lee’s most trusted subordinate. A very capable leader, Longstreet displayed some disturbing traits, such as unfairly deflecting the blame for the failure of the Seven Pines attack to Benjamin Huger. A.P. Hill was an aggressive but often impetuous field commander and would rise to command of the Third Corps the next year. At the brigade level, John Bell Hood did a very solid job and was one of leaders who broke the Federal defenses at Gaines’s Mill. Other competent commanders included Micah Jenkins, Charles Field, Lafayette McLaws, Jubal Early, Joseph Kershaw, Lewis Armistead and Cadmus Wilcox. The cavalry was centralized and was led by J.E.B. Stuart, one of the war’s finest cavalry leaders.
While the Confederate army was well stocked with talented leadership, all was not perfect. Lee would find three of the division commanders wanting, and they would be transferred out of the army soon after the current campaign. Benjamin Huger and Theophilus Holmes were thought to be not aggressive enough, and John Magruder had lost Lee’s confidence because he could not seem to keep his emotions under control. Lee found that to be a serious flaw in a commander.
The artillery was dispersed, with a central reserve. Unfortunately, it was led by the unimaginative William Pendleton, who was not up to the task. An additional deficiency affected the artillery: it was well behind its counterpart in terms of the quality of its guns and ordnance. The Federal batteries were generally made up of six guns, as opposed to the Confederates’ four. Almost all of the Union guns were the rifled Parrotts and Ordnance rifles, plus the effective twelve-pound Napoleons. Their counterparts had a variety of guns, including obsolete howitzers and six-pound smoothbores. The Federals enjoyed a decided advantage in weight, distance and supply. The Confederate guns often had a shorter range, and the six-pounders were completely outclassed. Additionally, the gun types were mixed in the Confederate batteries, causing major challenges for their supply officers. The quality of Confederate ordnance was also problematic. Porter Alexander wrote that the “smooth bore shells & shrapnel would frequently explode prematurely, & our rifled shot and shell…had no range at all.” Fuses were unreliable. Fortunately for the Confederate army, many, but not all, of these problems would be remedied by the following spring.7
Chapter 3
MEETING AT THE STATION
It was the morning of June 28, 1862, and Robert E. Lee had a difficult decision to make. The Federal army had retreated across the Chickahominy, and now the entire Federal force was south of the river. What would McClellan do next? He seemed to have multiple choices. The most threatening was that McClellan could take his entire army and drive toward Richmond. Most of the Confederate force was north of the river, and although he had gained control of the New Bridge, Lee would need to repair others to more rapidly transfer his force across the river. Could that be done in time to stop a Union drive? Alternatively, McClellan could try to re-cross the Chickahominy to protect his supply base. He might retrace his steps back down the Virginia Peninsula, reorganize and move on Richmond again. Finally, McClellan could be moving to the James River. Lee had to be careful; if he guessed incorrectly, it could lead to disaster. Added to his concerns was the exhausted state of most of his army, parts of which had fought vicious engagements on the previous two days.
Lee didn’t think that McClellan was likely to choose the first option. The Federal commander had not demonstrated much aggressiveness so far, and Lee thought it would be doubtful that so cautious a commander would strike toward Richmond with his supply base exposed to the Confederates. He believed it entirely conceivable that the Federal commander might re-cross the Chickahominy and fight for his White House Landing base. The last two choices were also very possible. In order to ascertain whether McClellan planned to move down the Peninsula, Lee sent Richard Ewell’s division and the 9th Virginia Cavalry to seize the York River railroad and ordered Stuart and his cavalry to Dispatch Station. “Columns of dust south of the Chickahominy” soon told Lee that the Federals were in motion. Stuart reported that the enemy had burned the railroad bridge over the Chickahominy, which meant that McClellan would not move in that direction. He might, however, move to the lower bridges over that river and still head east. Lee thought it “necessary that our troops should continue on the north bank of the river,” and until McClellan’s true intentions were determined, Ewell was ordered to proceed to Bottom’s Bridge. The cavalry was to watch the bridges below. South of the river, the Federal works opposite Benjamin Huger and John B. Magruder were fully manned, with the area below them being “densely wooded and intersected by impassable swamps.” With Huger and Magruder being unable to divine McClellan’s intentions, they “were therefore compelled to wait until his purpose should be developed.” By late afternoon and early evening, it was becoming clear to Lee. His pickets had not discovered any indication of a Federal move toward the lower Chickahominy bridges. McClellan was heading for the James.8
The Federal commander had limited options in moving his army south. It would have few north–south roads on which to travel, the most notable being the road across White Oak Swamp. The army would not be able to move quickly, as his progress would be limited by the slow speed of his supply trains. McClellan had roughly 100,000 men, 281 field guns, 26 pieces of heavy siege artillery, 3,800 wagons and ambulances and a herd of 2,500 beef. It would take time to move such a large army. To compound the problem, the bridge over White Oak Swamp had been heavily damaged, and it was not until two hours after daylight on the twenty-eighth that it was usable. By that evening, another bridge, two miles to the west at Brackett’s Ford, was also ready.9
Lee, on the other hand, had a good road network with which to work. Four roads ran roughly west–east. The northernmost was the Williamsburg Road, followed by Charles City, Darbytown and New Market Roads. Darbytown eventually ran into another road called Long Bridge. An interesting thing was that the White Oak, Charles City and Long Bridge roads all converged at an intersection near Riddell’s Shop (now known as Glendale). The New Market Road ran parallel to the James River, but it split just before Malvern Hill; the northern branch was Long Bridge Road. For McClellan, it was crucial that he keep the road junction open. Another potentially important spot was just south of that intersection. Malvern Hill was a gently rising slope, perfect for artillery, and could command a movement toward the James. If McClellan could get there first and hold it, his progress would be much more secure.10
The Riddell’s Shop intersection was therefore critical to Lee. If he could get his army there before McClellan, he would have an opportunity to severely damage or destroy his opponent. If he could get his own artillery on Malvern Hill and block McClellan’s retreat, so much the better. The trick for Lee was how to get to the crossroads first. McClellan held one advantage: he had slipped out of his works on the twenty-eighth and was heading south, leaving a very strong force to protect his rear. Most of the Confederate army was still north of the Chickahominy River, and few bridges were in good enough shape to get the army across rapidly.
/> Lee needed to buy time, and he had several options. The command of John B. Magruder (which included his division and those of Lafayette McLaws and David R. Jones) and the division of Benjamin Huger were already south of the river, so they could be moved to Glendale. However, until adequate Confederate forces could cross the Chickahominy, Richmond would be exposed to a direct Federal attack. As unlikely as that might have seemed to Lee, he could not afford to take that chance. He decided that he would use Huger and Magruder to threaten and slow the Federal retreat. A.P. Hill and Longstreet would cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge, move down Darbytown Road and then march up Long Bridge Road to Glendale. Jackson would repair the bridges over the Chickahominy in his sector and could then perform several functions: guard against a Federal re-crossing, be in a good position should McClellan move east and be able to harass McClellan’s rear should the Federals move toward the James. Theophilus Holmes could be brought up from Petersburg, moved down the New Market Road and possibly seize Malvern Hill. If that eminence could be secured, McClellan would effectively be in a Confederate vise. Holmes would block his way to the river. A.P. Hill and Longstreet would hammer him at Glendale, to be joined by Huger and Magruder. Jackson could attack his rear. It was a recipe for disaster for the Federals, but everything depended on swift movement and good timing by the Confederates. As audacious and challenging as the plan might be, the potential reward was spectacular. Could they move quickly enough?
On the morning of the twenty-ninth, Colonel Lawrence Baker was ordered to take his 1st North Carolina Cavalry and ride down to the river (New Market) road to reconnoiter. Joined by the 3rd Virginia Cavalry, Baker took five companies of his regiment and proceeded to the junction of the Long Bridge and Charles City crossroads. Rumor had it that there was a Federal camp near the church on the Willis Church Road (sometimes referred to as the “Quaker” road), and Baker wanted to see if that information was accurate. Near the crossroads, Baker encountered units of Averell’s Union cavalry, who were posted in front of Couch’s division. He “determined to drive back their cavalry force, which was covering their movements, and proceed to the Quaker Road.” Averell’s cavalry gave way “judiciously” until they were within fifty yards of the Federal artillery. Lieutenant Munk of the 1st Pennsylvania Artillery then opened with a section (two guns), firing canister and case shot, blasting the Confederate troopers. Baker’s men suffered about eighty casualties and withdrew, but they had found out that the Federals were on the Willis Church road in force. Tom Rosser’s cavalry, on Baker’s right, confirmed the Union movement. If Lee harbored any more doubts about McClellan’s intentions, they were now dispelled. The Federals were definitely heading for the river.11
Lee set his army in motion. A.P. Hill and Longstreet were ordered to cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge and head for the Darbytown and then the Long Bridge Roads. Huger and Magruder were directed to attack the Federals and slow their retreat. Magruder was to move down the Williamsburg Road, and Huger was to use the Charles City Road. As Huger and Magruder advanced, they found the Federal works abandoned, with “large quantities of military stores of every description abandoned or destroyed.” Jackson was to cross at the Grapevine Bridge and “move down the south side of the Chickahominy.” Lee said that this would lead Jackson to the “flank and rear of Savage’s Station.” However, before he could do anything, Jackson would have to reconstruct Grapevine Bridge and the more structurally sound Alexander’s bridge nearby.12
Magruder, who had not slept that night, caught up with Lee on Nine Mile Road. As they discussed the plan, Magruder came to the misunderstanding that Huger would move down the Williamsburg Road, but in reality, the latter’s division would actually be several miles away, on Charles City Road. He and Lee continued on to Fair Oaks Station, which had been abandoned by the Federals. Magruder said that Lee repeated his instructions and then rode off. Magruder continued in his pursuit of the Federals. As his men advanced, they could soon see black clouds of smoke rising from the vicinity of Savage’s Station. The Union army was destroying everything it couldn’t carry away. Mountains of beef, pork, hardtack, coffee, whiskey, medicine and rifles were in flames. An ammunition train was set ablaze and sent into the Chickahominy. Anything not necessary for the “safety or maintenance of the troops” was to be destroyed. Hospital patients who could move were marched away; those who could not walk, plus their attendant physicians, would have to be left behind to the mercy of the Confederates. Those who remained healthy were now exhausted. They had “marched night and day… no sleep, scant food, and tired almost to death.” The Federal commander was sacrificing all in the name of speed.13
Samuel Heintzelman. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
McClellan ordered Porter’s heavily bloodied Fifth Corps to cross White Oak Swamp and set up a position to cover the roads leading from Richmond toward the line of retreat. Erasmus D. Keyes was to take the Fourth Corps across the swamp to protect the movement of the Federal trains. The corps of Sumner, Franklin and Samuel P. Heintzelman, as well as William F. Smith’s division, were to set up near Savage’s Station to cover the rear of the movement. McClellan departed and crossed over White Oak Swamp, and unfortunately for the Federal soldiers, he left no one in charge.14
Magruder advanced, fully expecting that Huger would be on his right, on the Williamsburg Road, and that Jackson would cross the Grapevine Bridge. He estimated that thirty-five to forty thousand Confederates would strike the Federals both in the front and on the flanks. Joseph Kershaw’s men went forward with skirmishers in front, and they soon found heavy obstructions on the railroad track. Clearing them, they soon made contact with the defenders, who were in “works well manned”; according to prisoners and to his scouts, the Federals had at least a division on hand. Magruder dispatched a staff officer to contact Jackson, and that officer returned stating that Jackson would need two hours to repair the damaged bridge. Adding to his growing consternation, Magruder received a message from Huger that the bulk of his force was not on the Williamsburg Road as anticipated. Instead of having the large number of troops he expected, Magruder was left to attack an unknown force with only his command. Nonetheless, on Sunday morning, June 29, Magruder followed instructions, and his men advanced.15
With no one left in charge, each Federal corps commander did what he thought was right. Sumner’s Second Corps set up at Allen’s farm, near the railroad, two miles from Savage’s Station. Unfortunately, Sumner was out in front of Heintzelman and Franklin, so the lines were not contiguous and they could not support one another. The two Federal commanders were anxious for Sumner to fall back and help them to establish a solid defensive line. It was too late, however, and at 9:00 a.m. Magruder’s advancing troops ran into Sumner. The fight lasted about two hours, but casualties were minimal, with the exception of Confederate general Richard Griffith, who was killed by a shell fragment while commanding a Mississippi brigade held in reserve.16
With his concern growing, Franklin rode to Allen’s Farm and persuaded Sumner to pull back, which he did, and the Federals set up a strong defensive position at a railway depot named Savage’s Station. On the north side of the railroad, behind the lines, there was a cleared field “filled with hospital tents laid out in rows.” Inside each tent were fifteen or twenty men, on “comfortable clean beds, with the necessary surgeons and attendants.” To the south, between the railroad and Williamsburg Road, was a clearing, nearly a half mile square, fronted by a ravine filled with undergrowth. To the east of the ravine were some small hills, good for defensive positions. To the west of the clearing was a stand of woods, where Franklin expected Heintzelman to be posted. South of Williamsburg Road were woods. Sumner’s corps was stationed between the railroad and Williamsburg Road, with Burns’s brigade of John Sedgwick’s division in front. Sedgwick’s remaining two brigades were behind Burns. Israel Richardson’s division was to the rear and slightly to the right. Baldy Smith was stationed in the woods to the left of Williamsburg Road. Near the front of the ravine
and to the left, there were three batteries of artillery: Hazzard’s, Pettit’s and Osborn’s. The corps of Franklin and Heintzelman were expected to be nearby, giving the Federals two corps plus Smith’s division of the Sixth Corps to defend the rear of the Union retreat.17
Edwin V. Sumner. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
When he arrived west of the station around noon, Magruder was aware that he still only had his own divisions on hand and requested that Lee send reinforcements. Huger was ordered to send two brigades down the Williamsburg Road and join Magruder’s right. Apparently concerned that he might be attacked, and waiting for Jackson to cross the river, Magruder hesitated for several hours. This delay cost him the use of Huger’s brigades, which were recalled at 2:00 p.m. Lee sensed that the troops facing Magruder were the Federal rear guard and that Huger’s troops could be of better use elsewhere.18
The Battle of Glendale Page 2
