Magruder was still hoping for Jackson to appear on his left, flanking the Federal defenders, but there was no sign of him. Time was wasting as he received a note indicating that Jackson could not cooperate, as he had “other important duty” to perform. Jackson did not clarify what that duty was. In any case, Major Walter Taylor, General Lee’s aide, soon arrived and said that Jackson had been ordered to cooperate with Magruder and that he was unaware of any conflicting orders. Taylor wanted to speak with Jackson but did not know the way, so Reverend L.W. Allen, of Magruder’s staff, was sent to find him. Jackson did not arrive until 3:30 a.m. the following morning. Without Huger and Jackson, Magruder now had only his own command on hand. Instead of the thirty-five to forty thousand men expected to participate in the battle, there were thirteen thousand. Nonetheless, his orders remained. He was to attack.19
William B. Franklin. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
At about 3:00 p.m., Confederate general Lafayette McLaws’s command approached the station. Initially, he ordered Joseph Kershaw to send forward a regiment to “ascertain the conditions of things in the front,” but Kershaw soon was directed to advance his South Carolinians (2nd, 3rd, 7th and 8th) along the tracks. Captain Del Kemper’s battery was placed along the Williamsburg Road. Kershaw had been informed that Jackson should be coming down on his left, so he was to exercise caution should he see troops advancing. After about a mile, the South Carolinians began receiving artillery fire on their left flank. Fearing that it might be Jackson’s men, Kershaw “restrained the fire of my men and sent a regimental battle-flag to the front to be waived on the railroad.” It quickly became apparent that the fire was not from Jackson; it was from the Federals!20
Union general William B. Franklin recalled the initial encounter:
Shortly before 4 o’clock General Sedgwick and I rode over to the hospital to visit some of our wounded friends…as we rode over an open field we saw a group of men come out of a wood on the north of the railroad, but some distance from the place where we expected to find Heintzelman. I thought they were our men, but General Sedgwick looked at them more closely, stopped, and exclaimed: “Why, those men are rebels!” We then turned back in as dignified a manner as circumstances would permit. But we had hardly started when they opened on us with a field-piece, keeping up a lively and uncomfortable fire.21
At about 3:00 p.m., Kershaw received orders for his South Carolinians to advance, and he saw the enemy “occupying a series of heavy earthworks at the far end of the field on the Williamsburg Road.” He halted his command at the brow of a hill and sent for Del Kemper’s battery. The 2nd and 3rd South Carolina regiments were ordered to move along a ravine and flank the Federals. Kemper’s guns arrived and fired with “rapidity and effect,” dispersing the enemy infantry to the immediate front. Kershaw again ordered an advance, although he was concerned that there were no troops to protect his right and that he was exposed to a flank attack. Quickly he learned that McLaws was reinforcing his right, having ordered Semmes’s brigade south of the road. Kershaw’s men advanced over the rising ground. Magruder ordered Kershaw to continue to advance, and another “heavy force” of enemy troops was encountered. Del Kemper’s guns were placed on the road, with Henagan’s 8th South Carolina on the right, across the road. The 7th South Carolina was also ordered forward. The colonel of the 7th South Carolina, D. Wyatt Aiken, at first ordered his troops to hold their fire but soon directed them to “load advancing and fire at will.” They were driving the enemy before them, through the woods into the adjacent field, “throwing them into confusion and strewing the ground with dead.” Soon, Federal troops appeared on the right, threatening Kershaw’s flank. Kemper’s battery continued to fire and “inflicted terrible havoc upon the enemy, whose dead lay in heaps along the road, scarcely 200 yards from the battery.”22
Union general William Burns remembered Kershaw’s attack: “[T]he dispositions were in progress when the enemy attacked furiously with infantry, he having been playing with artillery upon me.” Burns had been ordered by Sumner to take two regiments and hold the woods that lay between the railroad and the Williamsburg Road, and he positioned the 72nd and 106th Pennsylvania. As Kershaw advanced, the fight gravitated toward Burns’s position. Not having enough troops to cover his position, he sent word to Sumner for support. The 1st Minnesota arrived and was promptly placed on his left. Burns needed yet more men to cover his line, as his center was dangerously thin. More regiments were sent in support, but before they arrived, the Confederates made a rush for the middle and Burns was wounded. For a moment, the attackers broke through, but Burns’s “brave men rallied and drove them back.” The 88th New York “came across the field double-quicking and cheering.” Burns positioned at the Williamsburg Road, just as the fight shifted there. “The enemy opened artillery and infantry on them, but they never faltered.” Soon the 82nd New York arrived, and it was placed in the center, followed by the 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers, which was placed to the left of the 1st Minnesota. The 15th Massachusetts and the 20th Massachusetts came up, joined by the 1st California and the 7th Michigan. These last two units were held in reserve.23
Savage’s Station. Map by Hal Jespersen.
Confederate general Lafayette McLaws sent Paul Semmes’s brigade below the Williamsburg Road in order to support Kershaw. Semmes advanced the 10th Georgia and the 32nd Virginia and then the 5th Louisiana. As they advanced through thick woods, they made out some troops about forty yards in front of them. These were the men of William Brooks’s brigade of Smith’s division. In the thick underbrush, Semmes ordered Private Maddox of the 5th Louisiana to challenge, “Who are you?” The reply came back: “Friends.” Semmes heard the reply and demanded, “What regiment?” The response was quick: “Third Vermont!” The Confederates immediately commenced firing, and the action continued until darkness overtook the field.24
Savage’s Station. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
William Brooks, commander of Smith’s Second Brigade, had earlier passed Savage’s Station on his way to the White Oak Bridge. When the Confederate presence was discovered, he was ordered to return to the field and was placed on the left of Williamsburg Road. In the woods, he positioned the 5th and 6th Vermont regiments in front, with the 2nd and 3rd behind them in reserve. As soon as the firing began, the two reserve regiments were deployed, and they opened on the enemy. The firing was intense, with some of the Vermonters using all of the sixty rounds of ammunition allotted to them. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Grant was leading the 5th and “ordered a bayonet charge, which was executed at a double-quick in splendid style.” The Confederate force there broke. Wounded in the leg, Brooks remained with his troops and his regiments halted the Confederate advance, but a “galling fire” continued until nightfall.25
The fight between Semmes and Brooks occurred to the right rear of Kershaw’s attack. South of the road, John Henegan’s 8th South Carolina (under Kershaw) was ordered to halt around 6:00 p.m. He spent some time moving his men, dodging Federal artillery, and then received orders to advance. Semmes’s 10th Georgia passed over his line in the woods to his front. Moving his men to get clear of the 10th, he received fire from both his front and from Semmes’s troops in his rear. Henegan ordered his men to lie down in order to avoid the crossfire. Other units had difficulty with the terrain. In the thick woods, Colonel Wyatt Aiken of the 7th South Carolina heard firing to his rear but could not make out the source. He sent a sergeant major to assess the situation, and he returned to state that the enemy was in his rear. Aiken responded by pulling back his men about fifty yards.26
Magruder ordered two of William Barksdale’s regiments, the 17th and 21st Mississippi, up in support of the attack. They advanced “gallantly and promptly” and fired several volleys. They were soon asked to cease firing, for fear of the “danger [that] would result from it to our friends.” Darkness was falling on the battlefield.27
Sumner had learned that he did not actually have three corps on hand but two. Although McClella
n had left no one in charge, Sumner was the ranking general, and he had ordered Heintzelman to set up his troops for defense. As no one was technically in command, Heintzelman ordered his troops to pull out and head for the White Oak crossings. In defense of his decision, Heintzelman later wrote, “[T]he whole open space near Savage’s was crowded with troops-more than I supposed could be brought in action judiciously.” He also thought it “impossible for all the troops to retire by the roads leading by Savage Station.” It was just too many men and too much equipment to move quickly. As a consequence of McClellan’s absence, a large part of the Federal defensive force had melted away. Sumner was furious.28
Although tactically a draw, the action at Savage’s Station was strategically successful for the Federals, as it held the attackers at bay and bought precious time for McClellan’s army to continue to move south. For the Confederates, it was an exercise in frustration. What could have been a powerful assault of up to forty thousand men on the Union rear devolved into a struggle between a few brigades. Jackson’s hammer blow failed to materialize. Huger never appeared on the Confederate right, and Magruder was left to attack with only his division. Lee was extremely disappointed. He knew that an opportunity had been lost to strike a blow at McClellan and set him up for even a larger one that could possibly destroy the Federal army. Would he ever have such a chance again? That evening, Lee wrote to Magruder:
I regret much that you have made so little progress today in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory the pursuit should be more vigorous. I urge you, then, again to press on his rear rapidly and steadily. We must lose no more time or he will escape us entirely…. P.S. Since the above was written I learn from Major Taylor that you are under the impression that General Jackson has been ordered not to support you. On the contrary, he has been directed to do so, and to push the pursuit vigorously.29
Lee’s rebuke does not seem to be entirely justified. Magruder had not been as aggressive as Lee would have liked, but he was exhausted and under medication. He committed only nine of his twenty-eight available regiments (3,100 of 13,000 men) to the battle and has received criticism from historians for this. In his defense, Magruder sensed that his command faced at least a corps of Federals, and this was borne out the next morning when he learned that his men had captured prisoners from three Union divisions. In fact, he faced two corps; he was outnumbered with no support. To attack with more troops likely would have resulted only in the sacrifice of more men. It was a very difficult situation. Lee expected Magruder to pin down the rear Union corps. A more forceful attack might have done that, but at great cost. The blame for the Confederate failure at the station does not appear to fall at Magruder’s feet alone. Jackson and Huger certainly share the responsibility, as does Lee’s staff work. It must be remembered that this was a new army, and this was its first campaign. When Jackson did not appear and Huger did not coordinate, Lee should have been kept apprised and should have sent staff to ensure that his plans were carried out. This problem had appeared a few days earlier in the campaign and would show its head again before the week was out.30
“Savage Station” by Henry Clow. Courtesy of the County of Henrico, Virginia Historical Preservation and Museum Services.
The day had been costly enough, considering that the only benefit went to the Federals, who succeeded in buying much-needed time. The Confederate losses have been estimated at 375 and the Federal at 600, plus the approximately 2,500 to 3,000 sick and wounded who would be left behind to the Confederates. Numbers are deceiving. While this battle was small in scope, it was desperate to those engaged, and the individual suffering was the same as in more famous engagements. A report in the Charleston Daily Courier provides the evidence:31
I beheld another sight, which few, thank God, have ever witnessed. In the middle of the yard something was lying upon the ground. At first glance I supposed it to be a roll of dirty blankets, but observing that it had motion, I walked up to it…A faint voice ejaculated, “Water!” I could hardly believe my senses. There lay a man, with the right side of his face, including the eye, nose, right ear and the entire right lobe of the brain shot away… maggots, mosquitoes, ticks, flies and vermin of every description filling the hole by the millions….a mass of corruption, suffering the torments of the damned and yet unable to die.32
A Confederate soldier, Robert Boyd of the 7th South Carolina, wrote to his father:
How we hav com throw Safe I cannot tell for the Bulet and canon Ball cum all around me as thick as iver I saw hale fall…. we hav gand a grat victory we hav driv the scondrels Back…i am in grat hops that the war wil come to and en be for long I don’t think it will last much longer for we whip them in ouer fight.
Boyd went on to describe what the Yankees had left behind:
[F]ine guns the infield Rifle and we got coffee anuf to do us severl days [??] Socks, blankits tens wagons Horses comsary stors and a great miney other things…[As for the battlefield itself, he noted:] A Sit it is to go on the battle feld after battle the men la so thick that you mit walk them out [??] of setting your foot on the grond O it is all a dreadful sit to her the morning of woned an to see men shoot doon all around you round you.33
Questions were raised almost immediately and have continued to the present day: What happened to the mighty Stonewall? Why did he not attack on the Union northern flank? The leader of the spectacular Valley Campaign, Jackson had been largely ineffectual thus far on the outskirts of Richmond. Following Gaines’s Mill, his men were on the north bank of the Chickahominy. He had two bridges to rebuild, Grapevine and Alexander’s, one of which was three or four hundred yards above the other. The Federals had destroyed these during their withdrawal, and without them Jackson could not follow the retreating bluecoats. Curiously, he ordered Major Dabney, who was a preacher before the war and was not an experienced engineer, to rebuild the bridges. Not surprisingly, this was something that Dabney was unable to do. Jackson then sent for Captain C.R. Mason, who was an engineer but was some fifteen or sixteen miles away. When he finally arrived and began the work, Mason stated that given enough men for labor, he could complete the bridge in two hours, which he did. However, night would fall before the work would be complete. Time was slipping away.34
Some have argued that Jackson was near exhaustion. After fighting in the Valley, he traveled one hundred miles to Richmond to meet with Lee and then, without delay, returned to the Valley to gather his troops. Immediately, he pushed them to Richmond, giving him precious opportunity to rest. The distinguished and generally reliable Confederate artillerist Edward Porter Alexander was quite critical of Jackson and attributed his slow performance to other motives. Alexander stated that although the bridges would have to be rebuilt, Stonewall’s troops could have crossed at a ford used on the old country road that led to the Grapevine Bridge. This, of course, was by no means certain. Jackson’s command contained some twenty-five thousand men, plus artillery, supply wagons and the like. For all of his force to have efficiently crossed at one country ford seems implausible. Alexander also stated that the New Bridge was only three miles away, implying that Jackson could have traveled by that route. However, use of that bridge would have been problematic, as it was to be used by Longstreet and A.P. Hill. Alexander also suggested another reason for Jackson’s slowness: “[T]his was Sunday, and Jackson gave it strict observance. The greater part of his troops remained in camp all day and until after midnight Sunday night.” While Stonewall’s strict dedication to his faith was well known, there is no proof that this was the reason for his performance.35
Jackson’s biographer, Dr. James Robertson, argued that Jackson was obeying orders. A note signed by Lee’s assistant adjutant, Colonel R.H. Chilton, stated that Jackson was to watch the Chickahominy and resist any Federal effort to cross. When General Jones of Magruder’s command arrived and inquired as to when Jackson would come to Magruder’s aid, he received the “other important duty to perform” response.36
D. Scott Hartw
ig has noted another challenge that faced Jackson’s group: he kept details to himself when it might have been better to share them with his subordinates. His commanders were often unclear about his intentions. Jackson also demonstrated poor staff work. Delegation was not his strength, and his chief of staff was Robert Dabney, a minister whom Jackson admired. Dabney was not a good choice for the position. The result of these shortcomings was that Jackson’s group depended on his direct supervision. When he was unable to perform, so were they.37
While the reasons for Jackson’s tardy performance on the twenty-ninth continue to be debated, several things seem clear. He had received the note delivered by Colonel Chilton ordering him to stay north of the river. That alone would seem sufficient explanation, as Jackson was meticulous about obeying orders. Added to that was exhaustion and the need to repair two bridges. Poor staff work and communication played a significant role. Unfortunately for the Confederates, things would not get better the next day; in fact, they would get worse.
Chapter 4
RACING AGAINST THE CLOCK
Soon after the fighting at Savage’s Station had ended, Franklin suggested to Sumner that they follow McClellan’s directive and begin their march toward the river. Sumner immediately balked, exclaiming, “No, General, you shall not go, nor will I go—I never leave a victorious field. Why! if I had twenty thousand more men, I would crush this rebellion.” Franklin said that he would show the order from McClellan. After some difficulty in locating a candle, Sumner read it and exclaimed, “General McClellan did not know the circumstances when he wrote that note.” At his “wit’s end,” Franklin replied that McClellan had anticipated just such a fight, and unless he and Sumner began moving, they could put the entire movement in jeopardy. If they delayed, the Confederates could be on them “in force to defeat us utterly the next morning.” The ever-cautious Franklin was justified in his concern. Jackson had not yet crossed the Chickahominy, but when he did, his large command would be coming down on the Union northern flank. In support of Franklin, General Smith presented his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Mathew Berry, who said that he had seen McClellan shortly before and that the commander expected all of the troops to be across the swamp before morning. It was “with great reluctance” that Sumner agreed to proceed south.38
The Battle of Glendale Page 3
