During the night, the Federal troops who had been north of the White Oak Swamp headed for the bridge. George Batchelder remembered, “The march this night was terribly wearing on the men, particularly the sick & wounded.” As they marched, men dropped out and fell asleep by the roadside, only to be aroused by the cavalry bringing up the rear. The riders “would wake up every sleeper, and start them along with the unvarying story that the rebels were close on their rear.” The men would march but soon fell out again, “with the certain prospect of being prisoners at daylight.” Although many fell behind, most reached the bridge and crossed, with Israel Richardson’s division bringing up the rear. His men began their march at about 1:00 a.m. on the morning of the thirtieth and marched “nearly until daybreak.” When they reached the bridge, they came upon a mass of stragglers from other parts of the army, with men packed in so tightly that they were unable to move. Richardson, “swearing like a trooper,” and his staff struggled to get them untangled and over the bridge. By 10:00 a.m., all had crossed over, and the bridge had been destroyed. The Federals also demolished the bridge at Brackett’s Ford, about two miles to the west.39
Israel Richardson. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Captain George Hazzard was in for a surprise: he and his battery were left behind. Exhausted, they had slept while the rest of the army packed up and headed for the river. The next morning, he heard reveille, but from a direction not occupied by his comrades the night before! Quickly realizing his predicament, Hazzard ordered his men to quietly move away, walking so as not to attract notice. When they had cleared the vicinity of the enemy, they began to pick up their pace, and they reached the bridge just as Israel Richardson’s men were preparing to destroy it. As his men headed for the rest of the army, they came across many stragglers and gave them warning that the Confederates were right behind, thus saving many from capture. Franklin admired Hazzard’s courage and actions but lamented that he was mortally wounded later that day.40
While his men continued to move toward the river, McClellan sought to protect his rear at the White Oak and Brackett’s crossings, as well as at the vital crossroads at Glendale, and he did this without concern over unit cohesion. At the White Oak Bridge area, Richardson’s Division of the Second Corps, Smith’s Division of the Sixth Corps, Naglee’s Brigade of the Fourth Corps and three artillery batteries were stationed to contest any attempted crossing. Their position was strong. On the north side of the swamp, from which the Confederates would be approaching, the road dropped down and passed through low, open ground for a quarter mile, which was “open to artillery from the south [Federal] side.” To the Confederate right, however, there were hills covered with woods, providing good cover for enemy artillery. On the Federal side, the road rose from the bridge and extended about a mile and a quarter to Long Bridge Road, which ran about two miles to the Glendale crossroads. The swamp was fringed with trees, but there were some clearings at the top of the rise; a small farmhouse stood with some outbuildings. With the bridges at White Oak and Brackett’s destroyed, the Confederates could still cross the swamp in spots, but the Federals would be able to contest any effort.41
A few miles away, McCall’s battered division, exhausted after its actions at Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines’s Mill, was posted across Long Bridge Road, one of the approaches to the Glendale crossroads. A portion of Slocum’s men remained near Brackett’s Ford. For the men of the Federal army, it had been a long and difficult night. “Men were exhausted with the excitement of battle, want of sleep and food.” It had been nearly impossible to find water, and when they halted for a few moments, they found that “the wells were drained and the springs made muddy.” Mostly they had hard bread and some coffee, but every so often they could hear the squealing of some unlucky pigs. The men continued on, knowing that failure to keep up with the rest of the army could mean disaster.42
Part of Porter’s Fifth Corps, George W. Morell’s and George Sykes’s divisions, plus a portion of the reserve artillery, had been sent south of Glendale in order to select a position to protect the remainder of the army’s withdrawal. Porter quickly recognized the natural strength of Malvern Hill, which commanded the roads leading from Richmond and the Chickahominy Swamp. He posted the artillery on the hill and ordered Warren’s brigade to station itself across the River Road to protect the army’s flank. While the Union position at Malvern Hill was very strong, the rest of the army remained in great peril. Amazingly, McClellan once again left his army without clear leadership or direction and headed for the river to meet with the navy.43
As frustrated as Lee was with the lack of success on the twenty-ninth, he still had an opportunity to inflict potentially catastrophic damage on his opponent. Jackson had recalled Ewell from his watch at Bottom’s Bridge and was at full strength. Longstreet and A.P. Hill had crossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge and—after a long, hot, twelve-hour march—had spent the night camped on Darbytown Road at the farm of Jacob Atlee (modern-day Dorey Park). Huger’s division had not accomplished much and spent the night on the Brightwell Farm on Charles City Road. Theophilus Holmes had crossed the James and was moving up the River Road, where Walker’s Brigade joined him. Holmes’s section had some 5,170 infantry, 130 cavalry troops and four batteries of artillery.44
Jackson began his movement on the thirtieth, with his men finally crossing the Chickahominy, and he arrived at Magruder’s camp around 3:30 a.m. Greatly relieved to see Jackson, the exhausted Magruder finally grabbed an hour’s sleep, his “first in forty-eight.” At daylight, his men and Jackson’s discovered the urgency of the Federal retreat. About 2,500 sick and wounded, plus medical staff, had been left behind. As many as 1,000 stragglers were taken prisoner, and Confederates who had previously been captured were set free. D.H. Hill came upon a terrible sight, “what seemed to be an entire regiment of Federals cold in death,” and learned that the 5th Vermont had been slaughtered “in the desperate charge upon the division of McLaws” at Savage’s Station45
Hospital at Savage’s Station. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
There was also an unimaginable abundance of supplies—some burned, but many still useable. These included mountains of grain, rice, beef, thousands of axes, shovels, an abundance of medicine, rifles, knapsacks and blankets. Henry Berkeley of the Hanover (Virginia) Artillery remembered it seeming that there were enough blankets and tents to supply 100,000 men. John Casler of the 33rd Virginia saw great piles of burned coffee, some of it still of use, and they went for it “heavy.” There were “great stacks of bacon, crackers and desiccated vegetables…a revelation” to the hungry rebels. The 4th and 5th North Carolina were left behind to escort the prisoners and the haul of booty back to Richmond. As happy as the hungry Confederates were to see this bounty, not all sights were so well received: “There were other mementoes of their stay and of their hasty departure left by ‘our friends the enemy,’ not quite so attractive or appetizing—the ghastly leavings of numerous field hospitals; pale, naked corpses and grotesque piles of arms and legs.”46
Lee’s anxiety was growing; he could not let McClellan escape. With the lack of success the previous day, every moment now was crucial. Each hour saw the Union army slipping through his grasp. The Confederate commander well knew that a long war would be to the South’s disadvantage and that he had to try and end it as quickly as possible. Before him was a golden opportunity to strike a major blow to the Union war effort. He rode to meet Jackson and discuss his plans in person. According to artillerist Robert Stiles, the commanding general was immaculately attired. He rode up and “gracefully dismounted.” Jackson, on the other hand, “appeared worn down to the lowest point of flesh consistent with effective service.” His clothes were “one neutral dust tint,” and his cap “was pulled so low in front that the visor cut the glint of his eyeballs.” Stiles remembered that the two generals “greeted each other warmly, but wasted no time upon the greeting.” Jackson was facing Stiles, who was about thirty feet away, and he saw the Valley com
mander begin to talk in “a jerky, impetuous way” and draw “a diagram on the ground with the toe of his right boot.” After scratching out two sides of a triangle, Jackson traced the third line “slowly and with hesitation, alternately looking up at Lee’s face and down at his diagram.” Stonewall talked “earnestly,” and when he completed the triangle, “he raised his foot and stamped it down with emphasis, saying, ‘we’ve got him.’” Jackson immediately called for his horse and quickly mounted it and rode away. After this discussion, it would seem that Lee and Jackson must have been on the same page, but as events unfolded, that does not seem to be certain.47
Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
After speaking with Jackson, Lee visited Magruder and instructed him to take his command and move to Darbytown Road, where he was to provide a reserve for Longstreet and A.P. Hill. This Magruder did. His men marched twelve miles and arrived at Timberlake’s Store, on the Darbytown Road, around 2:00 p.m. Soon after his arrival, Magruder received word from Lee to rest his troops but to be ready to move at any time.48
Chapter 5
EXERCISES IN FUTILITY
Benjamin Huger had a solid career in the old army but was not experienced in the field. He had commanded a number of arsenals and had been General Winfield Scott’s chief of ordnance during the war in Mexico. He was assigned command of the Norfolk department in May 1861, his main achievement being the surrender of Norfolk to the advancing Union army and the burning of the Virginia. Following the ill-fated Confederate attack at Seven Pines, Huger was accused by Longstreet of poorly handling a division. He would add nothing to his reputation during the advance toward Glendale.49
On the twenty-ninth, while Magruder desperately needed support at Savage’s Station, Huger had advanced down the Charles City Road, but he moved with great caution when what was really needed was speed. His brigades led by William Mahone and Lewis Armistead marched on the Charles City Road, while those of Robert Ransom (temporarily under Huger’s command) and Ambrose Wright were sent to Magruder’s aid. Huger received a message from Lee, instructing him to advance all of his troops down the road, and as nothing seemed to be happening on Magruder’s front, he recalled Ransom and Wright. In his report, Lee stated that it was “apparent that the force in Magruder’s front was covering the retreat of the main body.” Apparently, Lee believed that Huger’s troops could be put to better use attacking the Federal column in the Glendale area. Magruder was left to fend for himself.50
Huger was to continue to move down the Charles City Road, which led directly to the Glendale intersection. As he was the closest to the crossroads, he would strike first, and he would be on Longstreet and A.P. Hill’s left flank, lending great weight to their attack. With Jackson’s four divisions of 25,300 men coming down across White Oak Swamp on the Federals’ northern flank, Longstreet and Hill’s 19,200 and Huger’s 12,000, plus Magruder’s 13,000-man division in reserve, Lee would have a massive juggernaut, roughly 70,000 men, striking the front and right of the Federal defenders at Glendale. This would be one of Lee’s greatest chances to deal the Union army a crushing blow. Everything would depend on timing and the initiative of each of Lee’s subordinates. Theophilus Holmes was also to play a role. His men and artillery were to guard Lee’s right flank on the river road and possibly harass the Union flank and supply trains if the opportunity presented itself.51
As Armistead and Mahone approached Brightwell’s, the left flank came under fire from the other side of the swamp. A boy who had been across the swamp told Huger that Federals were on the other side, and Huger began to worry that the aggressive Union general Phil Kearny had not retreated down the road on the other side (the New Road) but instead might be on his flank and rear. Kearny, however, had been ordered to cross the swamp and move in the direction of Glendale. He left behind some marksmen of the 20th Indiana, along with some artillery, to slow down any possible pursuit by the Confederates. This probably accounts for the boy’s story about the Federals still being in position. Afraid to move too quickly lest Kearny attack him from behind, Huger managed to progress only five miles down the road and stopped at Brightwell’s for the night. Ransom and Wright caught up with the remainder of Huger’s group.52
That night, Huger issued orders for Wright to move the Third Brigade out the following morning at daylight. They were to cross the swamp and head east down the New (Portugee) Road, protecting the division’s left flank. Wright was to move toward the White Oak Bridge area, cautiously searching for the enemy. Soon his men captured two enemy pickets, who said that Kearny’s men were moving away, heading toward the crossroads at Glendale. South of the swamp, Mahone’s men were heading down the Charles City Road, with a scouting party out front. They soon returned, saying that the bluecoats were only a half mile away. Mahone placed his brigade in position to meet the potential threat and had a brush with the enemy’s rear guard. They continued their advance as far as Fisher’s Ford, where it was apparent that a large body of the enemy had been the evening before. As they approached Brackett’s field, they finally ran into the rear guard of Kearny’s men and found the road blocked by obstructions.53
Benjamin Huger. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Union general Slocum had ordered trees cut down to impede the Confederate movements. Rather than cut his way through the obstacles, Mahone, a former railroad construction engineer, made the fateful decision to cut a new road. As his men hacked their way, the Federals continued to chop down trees faster than the Confederates could advance. Rather than send a force ahead to simply stop the enemy from cutting, Mahone continued to chop away at a new road. After hacking away for about a mile, at Brackett’s Field, he began to meet more serious resistance, and he became convinced that the enemy was “fortified by the advantages of a superior position.” He decided to reconnoiter farther. Mahone placed a section of Moorman’s Battery in position and opened fire, “which was returned with great energy and effect.” Mahone was only two miles northwest of Glendale. The remainder of June 30 was basically spent in an artillery duel, with Mahone losing twenty-four killed and fifty-two wounded and the Union losing but twenty-five. By the time night had fallen, Huger had accomplished nothing. In his report, he said, “[W]e had many men killed and wounded.” Amazingly, he made no mention of hearing the furious action only two miles away.54
Although Wright had made some progress across the swamp, the three brigades south of it managed to move forward only about a mile. The division that was to be the spearhead of the Confederate attack was frittering away the day with cautious movement and the attempted construction of a new road. It would stop only a few miles from the Glendale crossroads, within earshot of the storm that was to come, but it would offer precious little assistance. It is arguable that even after being joined by Wright, Huger did not have sufficient force to drive Slocum, but his failure to attack in force significantly diminished Lee’s attacking force on the thirtieth and allowed Slocum to send reinforcements to his brothers fighting near the crossroads. Porter Alexander commented, “It seems incredible that this division [Huger’s], within four miles of Lee, could have been allowed to spend the whole day in a mere contest of axemen.” For Lee’s army, the cost of the lost opportunity was great.55
Huger was not alone in failing to show initiative. Yet another Confederate general would fail to add any luster to his reputation this day. Theophilus Holmes had won a brevet for bravery in Mexico and had risen to the rank of major in the old army before he resigned on April 22, 1861. He had commanded a brigade at Manassas, and in early 1862, he was stationed in North Carolina, keeping guard against Burnside’s presence in the North Carolina Outer Banks. On Sunday the twenty-ninth, Holmes responded to orders from the War Department and brought three regiments of Colonel Junius Daniel’s brigade (1,750 men), plus two batteries of light artillery and 130 cavalry, across the James River. That evening, General John G. Walker’s 3,600 effectives joined him, and they brought two additional batteries. They spen
t the night north of the river at Cornelius Creek. The following morning, when he received Lee’s orders, he moved his troops to the heights at New Market and established “a position of great natural strength, covering the junction of the Long Bridge and River Roads.” This was at about 10:00 a.m. Soon President Davis arrived and offered his approval to Holmes’s selected position. His force was in an excellent location to protect the Confederate southern flank. General Henry Wise came up with troops from Chaffin’s Bluff, and Holmes now had a force of about 6,000 men and six batteries of artillery.56
During the morning of the thirtieth, Colonel Thomas Rosser’s Fifth Virginia Cavalry sent some pickets down the river road. They noticed that the head of the Federal column was moving “hurriedly and confusedly” and was just beginning to cross Malvern Hill. This was brought to Rosser’s attention around 1:00 that afternoon, and he immediately sent word to Holmes and to Longstreet. Frustrated, Rosser noted that “for some reason or other no attention was paid to this report.” He sent word to Lee, who came in person to see and ordered Holmes to attack. Seemingly in no hurry, it took Holmes until 5:00 p.m. to get into position, and by that time, the Federals were in solid strength on Malvern.57
The Battle of Glendale Page 4
