The Unseen War
Page 2
Although this book is primarily a product of research, it is also informed by opportunities I was privileged to have in direct support of it to fly in six aircraft types that took part in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These experiences included a close air support training sortie in a Block 40 F-16CG with the 510th Fighter Squadron at Aviano Air Base, Italy, on May 19, 2004; a strike mission orientation flight in a Tornado GR4 with 617 Squadron out of RAF Lossiemouth on October 27, 2004; a fifteen-hour night combat mission over Afghanistan in an E-3C AWACS out of Al Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates, with then Lieutenant General North, CENTAF’s commander, in April 2007; three F-16B Topgun sorties and an F/A-18F Super Hornet sortie with the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Naval Air Station (NAS) Fallon, Nevada, on August 4–6, 2009; a U-2 high flight to more than 70,000 feet on a surveillance mission orientation sortie with the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron at Beale AFB, California, on September 3, 2009; and an air combat training sortie in an F/A-18 with No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit at RAAF Base Williamtown, Australia, on March 26, 2010, with an RAAF pilot who took part in the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. For these opportunities to gain firsthand conversancy with many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that figured centrally in the Iraqi Freedom air offensive described in the chapters that follow, I am grateful to Lt. Gen. Glen Moorhead (Ret.), former commander of 16th Air Force; and Maj. Gen. Mike Worden (Ret.), then commander of the 31st Fighter Wing, U.S. Air Forces in Europe; Air Chief Marshal Stirrup; General North; Vice Admiral Kilcline, then commander, Naval Air Forces; General Corley; and Air Marshal Mark Binskin, chief of air force, RAAF.
Finally, I thank Barry Watts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and my RAND colleagues Nora Bensahel, Paul Davis, James Dobbins, David Johnson, and Karl Mueller for their helpful suggestions regarding all or parts of an earlier version of this book. I am additionally indebted to Harun Dogo, a doctoral candidate at the Pardee RAND Graduate School of Public Policy, for his outstanding and well-targeted research support. Finally, I owe a special note of thanks to my able editor, Mindy Conner, for her keen eye and deft touch in improving my use of words at every chance. As always, any remaining errors of fact or interpretation, sins of omission, or other failings in the pages that follow are mine alone.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAA
Antiaircraft Artillery
AAMDC
Army Air and Missile Defense Command
ABCCC
Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ACA
Airspace Control Authority
ACCE
Air Component Coordination Element
A-day
Day of Commencement of Air Operations
ADF
Australian Defence Forces
AEF
Air Expeditionary Force
AFB
Air Force Base
AGM
Air-to-Ground Missile
AHR
Attack Helicopter Regiment
AIM
Air Intercept Missile
ALARM
Air-Launched Antiradiation Missile
ALO
Air Liaison Officer
AMC
Air Mobility Command
AMRAAM
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
AOC
Air Operations Center
AOD
Air Operations Directive
AOR
Area of Responsibility
APC
Armored Personnel Carrier
ARG
Amphibious Ready Group
ASOC
Air Support Operations Center
ASOG
Air Support Operations Group
ATACMS
Army Tactical Missile System
ATF
Amphibious Task Force
ATFLIR
Advanced Technology Forward-Looking Infrared
ATO
Air Tasking Order
AWACS
Airborne Warning and Control System
BCD
Battlefield Coordination Detachment
BCL
Battlefield Coordination Line
BDA
Battle Damage Assessment
BFT
Blue Force Tracker
C2IPS
Command and Control Information Processing System
CALCM
Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile
CAOC
Combined Air Operations Center
CAP
Combat Air Patrol
CAS
Close Air Support
CBU
Cluster Bomb Unit
CEC
Cooperative Engagement Capability
CENTAF
U.S. Central Command Air Forces
CENTCOM
U.S. Central Command
CFACC
Combined Force Air Component Commander
CFLCC
Combined Force Land Component Commander
CJSOTF
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CJTF
Combined Joint Task Force
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CNN
Cable News Network
COIN
Counterinsurgency
CRAF
Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSAR
Combat Search and Rescue
CTCB
Combined Targeting Coordination Board
CVW
Carrier Air Wing
D-Day
Commencement of Major Combat Operations
DASC
Direct Air Support Center
DCI
Director of Central Intelligence
DEAD
Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses
DGS
Distributed Ground Station
DSB
Defense Science Board
DSP
Defense Support Program
EASOS
Expeditionary Air Support Operations Squadron
EGBU
Enhanced Guided Bomb Unit
EUCOM
U.S. European Command
FAC
Forward Air Controller
FAC-A
Airborne Forward Air Controller
FDL
Fighter Data Link
FLOT
Forward Line of Own Troops
FMC
Fully Mission-Capable
FROG
Free Rocket Over Ground
FSCL
Fire Support Coordination Line
FTI
Fighter Tactical Imagery
G-day
Commencement of Ground Combat Operations
GAT
Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting
GBU
Guided Bomb Unit
GMTI
Ground Moving Target Indicator
GPS
Global Positioning System
HARM
High-Speed Antiradiation Missile
HMS
Her Majesty’s Ship
HMAS
Her Majesty’s Australian Ship
IADS
Integrated Air Defense System
ID
Infantry Division
IFF
Identification Friend or Foe
ISR
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JASSM
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAM
Joint Direct Attack Munition
JFCOM
U.S. Joint Forces Command
JFC
Joint Force Commander
JFN
Joint Fires Network
JIPTL
Joint Integrated and Prioritized Target List
JSOTF
Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSOW
Joint Standoff Weapon
JSTARS
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTAC
Joint Terminal Attack Controller
JTL
Joint Target List
JWICS
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
KI
Kill-Box Interdiction
LANTIRN
Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night
LGB
Laser-Guided Bomb
MAAP
Master Air Attack Plan
MAGTF
Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MAW
Marine Aircraft Wing
MEF
Marine Expeditionary Force
MEZ
Missile Engagement Zone
MIDS
Multifunction Information Distribution System
MOAB
Massive Ordnance Air Blast
MoD
Ministry of Defense
NALE
Naval Air Liaison Element
NAS
Naval Air Station
NIMA
National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NOFORN
No Foreign Nationals
NSTL
No-Strike Target List
NVG
Night-Vision Goggles
OIF
Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPLAN
Operations Plan
PAC
Patriot Advanced Capability
PGM
Precision-Guided Munition
RAAF
Royal Australian Air Force
RAF
Royal Air Force
RAN
Royal Australian Navy
RAPTOR
Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for Tornado
ROE
Rules of Engagement
RPG
Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RTL
Restricted Target List
SAM
Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR
Synthetic Aperture Radar
SAS
Special Air Service
SASO
Stability and Support Operations
SCA
Space Coordination Authority
SCAR
Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance
SEAD
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SEAL
Sea-Air-Land Commando
SIPRNet
Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
SLAM-ER
Standoff Land Attack Missile—Extended Range
SOF
Special Operations Forces
SOLE
Special Operations Liaison Element
SPIN
Special Instruction
TACC
Tactical Air Control Center
TACP
Tactical Air Control Party
TACS
Theater Air Control System
TAOC
Tactial Air Operations Center
TARPS
Tactical Air Recainnaissance Pod System
TBM
Theater Ballistic Missile
TBMCS
Theater Battle Management Core System
TES
Tactical Exploitation System
TF
Task Force
TIALD
Thermal-Imaging Airborne Laser Designator
TLAM
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TOT
Time on Target
TPFDD
Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
UAV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UEx
Unit of Employment “X”
UN
United Nations
UOR
Urgent Operational Requirements
USAF
United States Air Force
USAFE
U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USN
United States Navy
USS
United States Ship
VFA
Navy Fighter-Attack Squadron
VMFA
Marine Corps Fighter-Attack Squadron
WCMD
Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
WSO
Weapons System Officer
Introduction
The first Persian Gulf War of 1991 ended inconclusively for the United States. Although it succeeded in its overarching goal of driving Iraq’s occupying forces from Kuwait, it left Saddam Hussein in control as Iraq’s dictator and saddled the United States and the United Kingdom with the costly burden of enforcing the subsequent United Nations (UN)–imposed no-fly zones over Iraq through Operations Northern and Southern Watch.1 Twelve years later, Operation Iraqi Freedom, again led by the United States in close concert with Great Britain and now Australia as well, finally closed out that unfinished business in just three weeks of air and ground combat by bringing down Hussein’s regime once and for all.
America’s second war against Iraq differed notably from the first. Operation Desert Storm in January and February 1991 was a limited and purely coercive effort by U.S. and coalition forces to drive out Iraqi troops who had seized and occupied neighboring Kuwait nearly six months before in August 1990. More than five weeks of around-the-clock allied air attacks against Iraq’s forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, during which time the only significant and sustained ground combat activity involved allied special operations units, rendered Iraq’s armed forces ineffective. An equally relentless and punishing four-day combined air and ground offensive completed the routing of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, consolidated the allied military victory, and secured the coalition’s declared objectives.
In sharp contrast, the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom conducted in the spring of 2003 was a true joint and combined campaign by American, British, and Australian air, land, and maritime forces to bring about a decisive end to Hussein’s regime.2 President George W. Bush and his administration anticipated that the operation would lay a foundation for the eventual establishment of a post-Ba’athist democratic government in Iraq. Unlike the first Gulf War, the 2003 campaign featured a concurrent and synergistic rather than sequential application of air and ground power. During the course of this three-week campaign, U.S. and British ground forces pressed from Kuwait to the outskirts of Baghdad within just eight or nine days. Allied air power quickly neutralized the already heavily degraded Iraqi air defense system and established uncontested control of the air, while at the same time paving the way for the allied ground thrust toward Baghdad by defeating Iraq’s Republican Guard divisions even as a raging three-day sandstorm reduced visibility on the ground to mere meters.
This war was plainly one of choice rather than necessity.3 Senior members of the Bush administration did not regard Hussein’s regime as presenting an imminent threat to U.S. security at the time the campaign commenced. Nevertheless, given President Bush’s understanding of Iraq’s involvement in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and his fears that the September 11 attacks portended even worse future horrors, he judged that timely and decisive U.S. action against Hussein was warranted, with or without the legitimizing support of the UN.4 “If we waited for a danger to fully materialize,” he wrote in his memoirs, “we would have waited too long.”5
Some argued at the time that the nation should await a stronger casus belli. To such arguments the president replied that he could not afford to wait passively lest a nuclear mushroom cloud over an American city prove Hussein’s intent to provide weapons to Al Qaeda. In an interview on April 6, 2002, almost a year before the war against Iraq commenced, President Bush asserted: “The worst thing t
hat could happen would be to allow a nation like Iraq, run by Saddam Hussein, to develop weapons of mass destruction and then team up with terrorist organizations so they can blackmail the world. I’m not going to let that happen.”6