The Unseen War

by Lambeth, Benjamin S.

  101.Darren Lake, “How Different It All Is from the Last Gulf War,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 26, 2003, 3.

  102.Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Hathaway, February 19, 2007.

  103.Nichols, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: CFACC/CAOC/NALE.”

  104.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 265.

  105.Bradley Graham and Vernon Loeb, “An Air War of Might, Coordination, and Risks,” Washington Post, April 27, 2003.

  106.Capt. Mark I. Fox, USN, “Air Wing of Destiny,” Foundation (published by the Naval Aviation Museum Foundation), fall 2004, 75, 77.

  107.Lorenzo Cortes, “B-2 Drops Pair of 4,700-Pound GBU-37 GAMs [GPS-Aided Munitions] on Iraqi Communications Tower,” Defense Daily, March 31, 2003, 5.

  108.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 6.

  109.As for actual SAMs themselves, those would be struck by TLAMs only if the CAOC had a confirmed location for them. Had an Iraqi SAM operator activated his radar long enough to detect a target and fire and guide a SAM, he would have been instantly attacked by a HARM or an ALARM [RAF air-launched antiradiation missile.] Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Cline, January 11, 2008.

  110.Davies, F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 48.

  111.Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 28.

  112.Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Cline, January 11, 2008.

  113.Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.

  114.Hampton Stephens, “B-1 Bomber Being Used in a Variety of Missions during Iraq War,” Inside the Air Force, March 28, 2003, 1, 8–9.

  115.A well-informed account explained: “Taking the standard Block 50D/52D F-16C and upgrading it to perform the SEAD role involved the addition of two main pieces of mission-specific equipment. The most obvious of these is the addition of the AN/ASQ-213 HTS—the HARM targeting system. HTS is a small pod carried on the right side of the [aircraft’s air] intake cheek that is used to find, classify, range, and display threat-emitter systems to the pilot. In doing so, it allows the pilot to cue the . . . HARM to specific threat systems. Supplementing the HTS is the AN/ALR-56M advanced radar warning receiver, AN/ALQ-131(V)14 electronic countermeasures pod, and the addition of under wing-mounted chaff dispensers to complement those already mounted on the lower rear fuselage adjacent to the horizontal stabilizers. The second key component . . . is the avionics launcher interface computer (ALICS), which resides in the . . . HARM launcher pylon and acts as the conduit between the HTS, the central computer, and the missile itself. Pronounced ‘A-licks’, the ALICS is essential for successful handoff of radar threats from the jet to the HARM” (Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 7–8).

  116.Ibid., 27. The HARM’s most effective operating mode against SAM threats is its “range-known” mode, in which the missile has accurate azimuth and ranging information against potential enemy IADS targets. “This is the mode that offers the best probability of kill, and known emitter locations can be programmed into the missile’s seeker head prior to flight, or passed dynamically via the ALICS during flight as the HTS sniffs the air for electrons. However, for much of Operation Iraqi Freedom, HARMs were launched using the preemptive mode, which allows the AGM-88 to be fired toward suspected or known sites in an arcing trajectory that maximizes the weapon’s time of flight. In this mode, the missile seeker activates as it heads toward earth and then waits to see if its assigned target [begins to emit].” The F-16CJ’s ability to react so swiftly to pop-up SAM threats is due almost entirely to intelligent software programming and the integration of hands-on-throttle-and-stick switchology in the cockpit. A pilot explained: “The jet’s smart enough that if we see something in the HTS pod, all we do is put our cursors over the threat and get a pretty accurate idea of its position, which will be good enough to launch a missile at it. At that point, we designate the target and let the HARM go” (ibid., 48).

  117.Ibid., 42.

  118.Lieutenant Colonel Hathaway explained that “the problem was that the SAM operators in the Super MEZ refused to turn their radars on. We didn’t know whether it was out of their fear of the coalition’s SEAD assets or . . . reflective of a determination to preserve their capabilities for a later ambush of coalition nonstealth aircraft. To support the land component’s imminent movement into the Baghdad area, we needed to get nonstealthy aircraft into the Super MEZ as quickly as possible so we could gain air supremacy and prepare the battlespace on the ground. After three days of not being able to draw down Iraq’s densest concentration of SAM radars with HARMs, we switched to a DEAD [destruction of enemy air defenses] campaign to track down and physically destroy the SAM sites” (comments by Lieutenant Colonel Hathaway, February 19, 2007).

  119.Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Cline, January 11, 2008.

  120.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 18.

  121.Elizabeth Rees, “363rd AEW [Air Expeditionary Wing] Weighs In on Ops Tempo, Force Strain, Enemy Air Defenses in War,” Inside the Air Force, March 28, 2003, 9. The SEAD campaign was also rendered relatively manageable because the Iraqi IADS in the Super MEZ surrounding Baghdad and Tikrit, while dense, was also both known and antiquated, consisting of such threat systems as SA-2s, SA-3s, SA-6s, and some Rolands that CENTAF’s aircrews had faced many times before. It did not include any advanced SAM systems like the SA-10 or SA-20. Lorenzo Cortes, “Leaf: Iraq Air Defenses Were Dense, Antiquated in OIF; Stealth Needed in Future,” Defense Daily, June 9, 2003, 6.

  122.Fox, “Air Wing of Destiny,” 78.

  123.Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 40–41.

  124.Elizabeth Rees, “Old Predators Used as Decoys to Provoke Iraqi Air Defenses,” Inside the Air Force, April 11, 2003, 7.

  125.An Australian analyst pointed to “perhaps the most bizarre happening in this phase of the air campaign,” namely, “the repeated gathering of Baghdadis on the opposite bank of the Tigris River—watching the mesmerizing sound and light show through the night” while standing mere hundreds of meters away from where allied munitions were detonating (Kopp, “Iraqi Freedom—the Hammer and Anvil,” 32).

  126.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 18.

  127.Philip P. Pan, “Turkey Lets U.S. Use Airspace,” Washington Post, March 21, 2003.

  128.Philip P. Pan, “Turkish Leader Makes Request on Airspace,” Washington Post, March 20, 2003. See also Richard Boudreaux, “Two Errant Missiles Fall in Turkey,” Los Angeles Times, March 24, 2003.

  129.Although the 3rd ID would eventually take in some 2,600 enemy prisoners of war, there was never any massive capitulation of entire units as occurred during Operation Desert Storm. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 109.

  130.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 12.

  131.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 204.

  132.Quoted in Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 88.

  133.Michael R. Gordon, “The Goal Is Baghdad, but at What Cost?” New York Times, March 25, 2003. A CENTAF planner later noted that another reason for this last-minute removal of multiple targets from the initial strike list was General McKiernan’s determination to avoid potential fratricide as his troops continued their high-speed advance north toward Baghdad. “Regrettably,” said this planner, “a lot of those targets were the local security offices in towns in southern Iraq” (comments by Lieutenant Colonel Cline, January 11, 2008).

  134.Nichols, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: CFACC/CAOC/NALE.”

  135.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 279.

  136.Ibid., 275.

  137.Ibid.

  138.Ibid., 274.

  139.Ibid.

  140.Ibid., 273.

  141.Ibid., 275.

  142.Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Hathaway, February 19, 2007.

  143.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 275–276. Another senior CAOC planner later recalled, “this was disappointing, because every town from Mosul to Basra h
ad a Directorate of General Security, Iraqi Intelligence Service, and Special Security Organization building or prison and torture chamber, and we wanted . . . to kill the bad guys inside as a symbol to the people who lived in those towns that the security forces were no longer in control” (comments by Lieutenant Colonel Cline, January 11, 2008).

  144.Conversation with General Moseley, August 2, 2006.

  145.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 276. On the other hand, a senior CAOC planner later pointed out, “I don’t think I would have wanted to be the one sitting in Kuwait waiting to uncoil as Iraqi artillery and FROG rockets started raining down” (comments by Lieutenant Colonel Cline, January 11, 2008).

  146.Davies, F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 44.

  147.Elaine Grossman, “Air Chief Won Ability to Hit Iraqi Bridges to Prevent Scud Launch,” Inside the Pentagon, June 12, 2003, 1, 10–11.

  148.Lessons from Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 48.

  149.On this point, during his briefing to media representatives as the campaign entered its last week, General Moseley commented: “The term ‘shock and awe’ has never been a term I’ve used. . . . We withheld some targets based on the initiation conditions and based on where the surface forces were. But that [was the] right thing to do anyway” (“Coalition Forces Air Component Command Briefing,” Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 5, 2003).

  150.Greg Jaffe, “Plan Is to Cut Off Top Officers while Allies Strike Air Defenses,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2003.

  151.Anthony H. Cordesman, “Understanding the New ‘Effects-Based’ Air War in Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., March 15, 2003, 3.

  152.Nichols, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: CFACC/CAOC/NALE.”

  153.Ripley, “Planning for Iraqi Freedom,” 11.

  154.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 278.

  155.Bush, Decision Points, 255.

  156.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 13.

  157.Thomas E. Ricks, “Unfolding Battle Will Determine Length of War,” Washington Post, March 25, 2003.

  158.As the focus of the air war shifted from attacking preplanned fixed targets to supporting coalition ground units on the move, the air component’s target development planners unexpectedly found themselves obliged to create “bomber boxes.” Their initial attempt to create such bomber holding areas, according to CENTAF staff, “failed to meet operator requirements.” Ultimately, the B-52 liaison element in the CAOC provided three essential requirements for a bomber operating box: the geographic coordinates of the box’s center, the length and width of the box measured in feet, and the magnetic heading (in degrees) of the bomber box’s major axis. Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.

  159.Ibid.

  160.Ibid.

  161.Ibid. In March 2003 the SCAR mission was not a formally recognized Air Force combat mission. CAOC planners adopted it from the Navy and Marine Corps for kill-box interdiction because of the mission’s assessed value. The same planners strongly recommended afterward that the Air Force formally include the mission in its operating repertoire and continue to perform it in any future engagements in which it might provide value to the land component.

  162.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 25.

  163.The “push-CAS” arrangement entailed maintaining an even flow of interdiction sorties into the Kuwaiti theater of operations around the clock, with a proviso that any of those sorties could be diverted as necessary to service CAS requests made by the Army’s corps commanders. Its point was to assure the corps commanders that they had on-call CAS should it ever be needed without tying up coalition aircraft.

  164.As used in this context, a minute is a unit of angular measure equal to one-sixtieth of a degree.

  165.For a detailed explanation, see Green, “Joint Fires Support, the Joint Fires Element and the CGRS,” 15–17. A later effort was initiated in the joint arena to develop and implement a “global area reference system” (GARS) that would align all regional combatant commanders using the same methodology to enable standardization of software and training for warfighters who might end up fighting in any of several theaters around the world. Now in joint use, GARS is essentially the same as CGRS but provides a single, globally referenced set of boxes, quadrants, and keypads.

  166.Comments by Colonel Neuenswander, March 6, 2007.

  167.Stout, Hammer from Above, 270.

  168.Davies, F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 44.

  169.Tim Ripley, “Closing the Gap,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 2, 2003, 26.

  170.Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.

  171.Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 89.

  172.Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 109.

  173.Ibid., 172.

  174.Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.

  175.Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 90.

  176.Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Baker, “Sandstorm Delays Army’s Advance; Units Set to Hit Guard near Capital,” Washington Post, March 26, 2003.

  177.Quoted in Capt. John W. Anderson, USAF, “An Analysis of a Dust Storm Impacting Operation Iraqi Freedom, 25–27 March 2003,” master’s thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., December 2004, 2.

  178.Throughout the buildup for and subsequent execution of OPLAN 1003V, the CAOC received twice-daily briefings on current and anticipated future weather conditions in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. Five-day forecasts kept ATO planners informed of prospective future conditions at major bases and in key target areas. During the three-week major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom, more than 75 percent of the daily ATOs were adversely affected by weather, with 20 percent suffering from “major” weather effects and more than 6 percent of their scheduled sorties having been either canceled or declared noneffective. Ibid., 84.

  179.Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 142.

  180.Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 33.

  181.Ibid.

  182.Ibid.

  183.For a graphic account of these harassment operations written by a Marine reconnaissance platoon commander whose unit was caught in the midst of them for several days, see Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 205–290.

  184.Andrew Koch, “Did Washington Underestimate Iraqi Resolve?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 2, 2003, 2.

  185.Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership (Norfolk, Va.: Joint Center for Operational Analysis, U.S. Joint Forces Command, March 2006), 55. A summary of the main findings of this landmark assessment may be found in Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: The View from Inside,” Foreign Affairs, May–June 2006. Saddam Hussein established the Fedayeen in October 1994 in response to the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings of March 1991 that immediately followed Operation Desert Storm.

  186.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 13.

  187.Peter Baker and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Republican Guard Units Move South from Baghdad, Hit by U.S. Forces,” Washington Post, March 27, 2003.

  188.Elaine M. Grossman, “Key Generals: Response to ‘Fedayeen’ a Vital Milestone in Iraq War,” Inside the Pentagon, May 8, 2003, 1.

  189.Quoted in Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 304.

  190.See Chapter 4 for more on the Blue Force Tracker system. The system also reduced fratricide because an allied tank equipped with it could be identified at a distance. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 63.

  191.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 305.

  192.Ibid., 314.

  193.Elaine M. Grossman, “Marine General:
Iraq War Pause ‘Could Not Have Come at Worse Time,’” Inside the Pentagon, October 2, 2003, 1.

  194.Lorenzo Cortes, “Leaf Says Severe Weather Accelerated Iraqi Forces’ Defeat,” Defense Daily, June 5, 2003, 1.

  195.TSgt. Michael Keehan, USAF, “15th EASOS [Expeditionary Air Support Operations Squadron] Operation Iraqi Freedom TACP Stories,” briefing by TACP team assigned to the 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 3rd Infantry Division, no date given, provided to the author by Col. Matt Neuenswander, head of the Air Force element, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  196.Ibid.

  197.Ibid.

  198.James Kitfield, “Attack Always,” National Journal, April 26, 2003, 1292–1296.

  199.Keehan, “15th EASOS Operation Iraqi Freedom TACP Stories.”

  200.Ibid.

  201.The others were, respectively, SSgt. Thomas Case, SSgt. Travis Crosby, SSgt. Joshua Swartz, TSgt. Eric Brandenberg, and TSgt. Jason Quesenberry.

  202.“Citation to Accompany the Award of the Silver Star Medal to Michael L. Keehan III,” document provided to the author by AFCENT/A9, Shaw AFB, S.C., April 17, 2009.

  203.“Citation to Accompany the Award of the Silver Star Medal to Michael S. Shropshire,” document provided to the author by AFCENT/A9, Shaw AFB, S.C., April 17, 2009.

  204.An assessment of the land offensive noted that “the sandstorm actually improved the coalition’s logistical situation, as it slowed the fast-moving spearheads enough to allow resupply convoys to reach them and replenish food and ammunition that had dwindled during the long, rapid advance. When the sandstorm lifted on March 27, the advance thus continued afresh with no meaningful long-term effect from the delay” (Biddle and others, Toppling Saddam, 18).

  205.Stout, Hammer from Above, 209.

  206.Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (New York: Gotham Books, 2006), 395. Of such air support, however, Col. William Grimsley, commander of the 3rd ID’s 1st Brigade, later noted that there is a “host of Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Royal Air Force pilots I would love to meet some day” (Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 167).