HASTINGS TO CULLODEN
Battles in Britain 1066-1746
Glen Lyndon Dodds
For my brothers,
Shaun and Gavin
First published as Battles in Britain 1066-1746 by Arms and Armour Press, 1996. ISBN 1-85409-297-9
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Tell me not, Sweet, I am unkind,
That from the nunnery
Of thy chaste breast and quiet mind
To war and arms I fly.
True, a new mistress now I chase,
The first foe in the field;
And with a stronger faith embrace
A sword, a horse, a shield.
Yet this inconstancy is such
As thou too shalt adore;
I could not love thee, Dear, so much,
Loved I not Honour more.
Richard Lovelace (1618-1658)
PREFACE
HASTINGS 14 October 1066
THE STANDARD 22 August 1138
LINCOLN 20 May 1217
LEWES 14 May 1264
EVESHAM 4 August 1265
FALKIRK 22 July 1298
BANNOCKBURN 24 June 1314
HALIDON HILL 19 July 1333
NEVILLE’S CROSS 17 October 1346
OTTERBURN 5 August 1388
SHREWSBURY 21 July 1403
TOWTON 29 March 1461
BARNET 14 April 1471
TEWKESBURY 4 May 1471
BOSWORTH 22 August 1485
FLODDEN 9 September 1513
PINKIE 10 September 1547
EDGEHILL 23 October 1642
THE FIRST BATTLE OF NEWBURY 20 September 1643
CHERITON 29 March 1644
MARSTON MOOR 2 July 1644
AULDEARN 9 May 1645
NASEBY 14 June 1645
DUNBAR 3 September 1650
WORCESTER 3 September 1651
SEDGEMOOR 6 July 1685
SHERIFFMUIR 13 November 1715
CULLODEN 16 April 1746
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PREFACE
Battles have played a decisive part in determining the course of history. Hence military history is a subject worthy of serious attention. Students of Britain’s past have a rich military heritage to explore, for over the centuries many engagements have been waged on this island and although the details of some of these are unknown, the course of others can be ascertained with varying degrees of accuracy from relevant source material.
In this book I have dealt at some length with nine battles fought in the period 1066-1746 and, moreover, have summarized another nineteen engagements from within the same period. In the main accounts I have said something about the character and background of the commanders, and have discussed the composition and weaponry of the forces they led, thereby hopefully giving a more rounded out view than is sometimes the case in books of this nature.
This is also true of the political dimension. Frequently scant regard is paid to what led to the battles, but they were not fought in a vacuum and I have thus endeavoured to place them in their historical context. Furthermore, where space has permitted I have analysed the part the battles played in determining the course of events.
Finally, I wish to thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement. In particular, I wish to thank my brother, Gavin Dodds, for preparing the maps. I also wish to thank the staff of Sunderland City Library and Monkwearmouth Library for obtaining books and articles requested by me.
Glen Lyndon Dodds
Guildford, 27 August 1995
1
HASTINGS 14 October 1066
‘If anyone desires to know what kind of man he was or in what honour he was held . . . then we will write of him just as we perceived him . . . . King William, of whom we speak, was a man of great wisdom and power, and surpassed in honour and strength all those who had gone before him. He was mild with good men who loved God, though stern beyond measure to those who opposed his will.’
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
According to the 12th century historian, Wace, William of Normandy was preparing to hunt near Rouen when he received news that his cousin Edward the Confessor, England’s king, had died and had been replaced by his brother-in-law, Harold Godwineson, Earl of Wessex. It is reported that the news, which arrived on or around 10 January 1066, threw the duke into such a fearful temper that only William fitzOsbern, one of his closest friends, dared talk to him.
Just where William received the news of Harold’s accession is in fact uncertain. What is beyond doubt is that he reacted angrily. He felt that he had been cheated — the crown should have been his. William had a number of reasons for believing that the kingdom of England should have passed to him upon the death of the Confessor. It is evident that in 1051 or 1052 Edward had promised the succession to him, a natural enough promise for the childless monarch to have made to his cousin, for Edward had grown up in Normandy while living as an exile and thus had strong Norman sympathies. Furthermore, in 1064 or 1065 Harold himself had promised, while in the duchy, to help William secure the English crown upon the demise of the Confessor.
It is highly probable that Edward expressly sent Harold to Normandy to make this promise for he was the most powerful nobleman in England and without his backing the duke’s chances of ascending the throne were slim. According to a biography of William written in c.1074 by his chaplain, William of Poitiers, while an honoured guest in the duchy Harold swore an oath that he would do all in his power ‘to assure [Duke William] the possession of the English kingdom after the death of Edward’, and some other sources, such as the Bayeux Tapestry (which likely dates from c.1080), maintain that he swore the oath whilst touching holy relics. Subsequent events, however, proved that this was not a promise the Englishman intended to honour. It was, he later claimed, sworn under duress. Consequently, Harold had no qualms about ascending the English throne himself upon Edward’s death on 5 January 1066: if William wanted the crown he would have to fight for it.
William was equal to the challenge. Following the news of Harold’s accession he began planning to take by war what he considered his by right. An adroit politician, he fully realized the importance of creating a favourable atmosphere for his endeavours. Thus a delegation was sent to Rome to gain papal approval for an invasion of England and there can be little doubt that the duke fully expected to receive support. He had tried to bring about a peaceful settlement (an embassy had been sent to England to demand that Harold step down) but had only met with intransigence from Harold. Furthermore, William was held in high regard by the papacy for he had been very generous to the Church, while for various reasons England’s ecclesiastics were out of favour in Rome. Not surprisingly, matters went William’s way. He received authorization for an invasion and a papal bull excommunicating Harold and his supporters. His planned campaign had the seal of approval: it was to be a Holy Crusade.
William now set about winning the support of his barons for he needed their backing if he were to carry out his projected military venture. He had little difficulty with his greatest vassals. They were generally closest to him and in m
any cases owed their wealth and position to his patronage. However, the lesser barons were not so easily won over. After failing to gain their collective support at a great meeting at Lillebonne, William resorted to seeing them individually, promising them wealth and glory in return for their services if the invasion were a success. By such means the hitherto unwilling barons pledged their assistance.
It is understandable why many were uneasy about the planned campaign. Warfare is after all a risky business, and a seaborne invasion in particular would be daunting. Furthermore, Harold was a fine warrior. He had fought alongside William against the Count of Brittany during his visit to Normandy and had distinguished himself while doing so. He would no doubt prove a worthy adversary, and could be expected to lead a formidable army.
Though William now had the backing of the pope and his barons, was Normandy strong enough and sufficiently wealthy for the massive undertaking it faced? Moreover, who were the Normans?
The duchy of Normandy had originated in 911. One of William’s Viking ancestors, a chieftain by the name of Rollo, made an agreement with the French king, Charles III, whereby he and his followers would accept Charles’ sovereignty and renounce paganism in return for his recognition of their possession of lands which they had occupied in the valley of the River Seine. Then, in later years, the Norsemen gained control of neighbouring territory which included places such as Bayeux, Caen and Falaise.
For much of its history the duchy was weakened by internal strife and threatened by hostile neighbours, but by 1066 Normandy was more powerful and more wealthy than it had ever been. This was due to the leadership of William. He took steps to curb private warfare, dealt successfully with external threats to his position, and ensured that local administration was conducted by trusted subordinates from whom he received a substantial regular income. Moreover, owing to his dynamic personality and achievements, he retained the services of men of knightly rank who might otherwise have forsaken the duchy to serve elsewhere, as had happened in the past.
Nonetheless, Normandy’s resources were insufficient for an invasion of England. Hence the duke resorted to enlisting support and such was his reputation that he attracted volunteers from Maine and Brittany (both of which were subject to him), and from lands such as France, Flanders and Aquitaine.
It is sometimes said that the Normans were Vikings, but in fact they were of mixed blood. The Scandinavian settlers had not driven out the numerically superior indigenous populations of the lands which came under their sway and intermarriage had occurred. The descendants of Rollo and his followers were therefore essentially French in their customs, speech and dress. They were also influenced by the French in the field of warfare, for unlike their Viking forebears who fought on foot, William and his principal warriors were knights, and men trained to fight while mounted had been a feature of warfare in France since Carolingian times.
It has often been maintained that Norman lords and senior churchmen had to provide the duke with quotas of knights imposed by him to serve for a set period. Research has shown that this was not the case. Feudalism in Normandy was not as advanced as it was to become (one of the methods by which knights were provided to serve the duke seems to have been individual agreements between lord and vassal), and an eminent Anglo-Norman scholar, Marjorie Chibnall, has suggested that the change to systematised service commenced on the eve of the Conquest during the preparations for the invasion of England.
Once William was sure that he had the backing of his barons, he set to work with them to provide a fleet sufficient for transporting a sizeable army to England. Some ships were commandeered, but many others had to be built and for months craftsmen along the coast of the duchy laboured to provide the requisite vessels.
By mid August William’s army and fleet were assembled at Dives-sur-Mer where there was an excellent anchorage. Just how many craft there were is uncertain. Wace, for instance, states that there were 696 ships. It is, however, possible that there were as many as 900 vessels of various kinds. Not surprisingly, the size of the army is also a moot point. A realistic figure is nearly 9,000 men, though not all of these would have been combatants.
William remained at Dives well into September. According to Poitiers, he was waiting for a favourable wind that would enable him to sail to England. This may have been the case. However, Chibnall has suggested that the duke’s stay at Dives was deliberate and intended to perplex Harold.
An insight into the high degree of control William exercised over his army at this time is provided by Poitiers:
He made generous provision both for his own knights and those from other parts, and did not permit any of them to take their sustenance by force. The neighbouring peasantry could pasture their cattle and sheep in peace . . . or . . . move about the district...without trembling at the sight of soldiers.
On 12 September William and his armada sailed from Dives and headed north-east up the coast, either intending to turn due north for a short crossing of the English Channel from the vicinity of St Valéry, or to put in at that port for additional provisions before setting out for England. A storm blew up, however, and several ships were lost before the fleet arrived at St Valéry as planned or owing to a change of plan brought about by the inclement weather.
Once again, or perhaps for the first time, contrary winds blew for days on end—it may well be significant that according to William of Poitiers and William of Jumièges it was only after the duke arrived at St Valéry that prayers for a favourable wind were made. To make matters worse, rain set in.
Then, suddenly, on 27 September, the wind began blowing from the south. Elated, William ordered his men to embark. This was done under welcome sunshine. Embarkation took many hours and it was nightfall when the fleet put to sea with William leading the way in his ship, Mora.
During the course of the crossing the duke’s vessel outdistanced the rest of the fleet and when dawn broke the Mora was alone in the middle of the Channel. William thus hove to and awaited the fleet. If English warships had borne down on the duke his enterprise would have ended in disaster. Fortunately for him, Harold’s fleet, which had been stationed off the Isle of Wight for months in expectation of invasion, had sailed to London earlier in the month owing to the deteriorating weather conditions and the fact that provisions had run low.
At about 9.00am on Thursday 28th William landed at Pevensey. Here members of his army likewise disembarked, while others did so in the vicinity. Although William and his men came ashore in Harold’s home county, Sussex, the landing was unopposed. England’s king and his army were not in the neighbourhood, or indeed anywhere else in the southeast. Instead, Harold was hundreds of miles away, for although he had spent several months on the south coast awaiting William, he had recently dashed north to confront a formidable army under Norway’s king, Hardrada, which had landed in Yorkshire in mid September intent on conquest. Hardrada was a notable warrior, but on 25 September Harold had surprised and annihilated him and his army in an epic encounter at Stamford Bridge.
Upon landing, William carried out a reconnaissance of the neighbourhood and concluded that Pevensey was not a suitable base. For one thing, it was bounded to the north and east by marshy levels. He thus soon moved east to Hastings, which was a more advantageous location, for among other things it had an excellent harbour. Here a fortress of earth and timber was hastily constructed.
News of William’s arrival was soon received by Harold. According to the most probable accounts, the king heard of the duke’s landing while attending a banquet in York on the evening of 1 October celebrating the destruction of Hardrada and his army. However, some believe that by this date Harold was en route south and so received the news while riding towards London. This is unlikely. After all, following their recent exploits Harold and his men must have been in dire need of rest. Furthermore, the king had to ensure that the inhabitants of the North were loyal to him for it appears that
many of them had been prepared to throw in their lot with Hardrada. Consequently, it seems reasonable to believe that Harold was indeed in York when he received the unwelcome news of William’s landing.
What is certain is that the information made him dash towards London. He was probably two hundred miles from the city: William was closer, much closer, and could easily have arrived first if he had wished to do so. Instead, he remained at Hastings, watching and waiting.
Harold entered London on or around 6 October. Here his weary army was reinforced by fresh fighting men, members of the select levies of London and the local shires which had not participated in the northern campaign. Furthermore, Edwin and Morcar, the young Earls of Mercia and Northumbria who had unsuccessfully confronted Hardrada in a battle at Fulford on 20 September, were raising their men once again.
In London Harold was faced with questions of strategy. Should he remain in the city and await the expected reinforcements? Or should he move against William as soon as possible and hopefully take him by surprise? He chose the latter. According to some sources, Harold’s younger brother, Gyrth, offered to lead the army and suggested that Harold should remain in London and await the reinforcements. His reason for making the offer is said to have been his belief that England could afford to lose an army but not its king. Harold, however was determined to confront William himself, and exact vengeance for devastation the duke had wrought in Sussex since his landing.
Harold probably left London on the morning of 12 October, and just prior to doing so he ordered a number of warships to sail to Hastings to prevent William escaping by sea. Some historians are of the opinion that the king was at the head of about 5,000 men, and this seems reasonable. What is clear is that it was only a fraction of the force he could have commanded had he stayed in London longer, but he evidently wished to trap William on the Hastings peninsula, (at this date Hastings was situated at the southern end of a peninsula formed by the estuaries of the Brede and Bulverhythe), and bring him to battle on his own terms.
Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746 Page 1
