From London, Harold rode to Rochester where he crossed the Medway. He then moved south along the Hastings road and entered a great forest known as the Andredsweald a mile or so beyond Maidstone. His destination was Caldbec Hill, a prominent and well known junction for roads, which dominated the exit from the Hastings peninsula. There he would rendezvous with select units from the southeastern shires which had been ordered to congregate at that location.
Harold is generally believed to have arrived at Caldbec Hill on the evening of the 13th. He was just seven miles from William’s base and it is possible that it was his intention, as soon as his men were rested, to launch a lightning attack reminiscent of that which had surprised Hardrada. On the other hand, some historians believe that he intended to remain on the high ground in the vicinity of Caldbec Hill and allow the Normans to attack his strong defensive position, thereby limiting the effectiveness of William’s cavalry, after which a counterattack could be launched with the hope of routing the invaders.
However, according to the C version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, it was William who now called the tune. He was aware of the proximity of the English army and was determined to meet it on his terms. At dawn on Saturday 14 October, he began marching towards Harold’s position: a battle that would decide the destiny of England was soon to begin.
But before discussing what transpired, something needs to be said about the background and character of the opposing commanders and of the composition, weaponry and tactics of the armies they led.
William and his Army
William was born in 1027 or 1028, the illegitimate son of Duke Robert the Magnificent and Herleve, a tanner’s daughter. In 1035 he succeeded to the duchy and his accession was followed by a period of intense anarchy in which several factions fought for supremacy. William’s chances of survival were slim: more than once his guardians were murdered, more than once he had to flee for his life. In part, his survival was due to his overlord, Henry of France, who came to his assistance in 1047 when William faced a major revolt, and crushed the rebels at Val-es-Dunes.
In the years which followed, William consolidated his position by, for example, displacing those who had opposed him and giving their lands to faithful companions. Furthermore, in the early 1050s he married the daughter of the count of neighbouring Flanders, thereby allying himself with a potential adversary.
In 1053 William again faced a major challenge when one of his uncles proclaimed himself the rightful duke and received support from Henry who had turned against William. Henry invaded the duchy but withdrew following a reverse at St Aubin-le-Caulf. The following year he invaded again in a two-pronged attack, with one of the armies led by his brother, but again withdrew after the latter’s defeat at Mortemer by one of William’s vassals. Another expedition in 1057 also ended in failure when William fell on part of the French army at Varaville and cut it to pieces.
William also fought outside his duchy. In 1063, for example, after repeated ravaging over many years, he finally conquered Maine, and in the following year he overcame the Bretons. Thus by 1066, William was an experienced commander whose exploits had earned him the fear and respect of others, so much so that he was known as William the Great. It is worth noting, however, that he did not have any experience of commanding a set engagement. He avoided battle where possible, preferring either to ravage enemy territory before withdrawing, or when on the defensive, to shadow and harass his opponents.
From the above it is axiomatic that William was tough, resourceful, courageous and indomitable. He was, moreover, remarkably dynamic and methodical; a man who could inspire others and exercise discipline effectively. He was also deeply religious, but could nonetheless behave with great ferocity when crossed.
In view of the campaigns referred to above, William’s invasion force inevitably contained many seasoned warriors, the most important of whom were knights. The Bayeux Tapestry vividly portrays the knights whom William brought to England in 1066. It shows that they fought with a variety of weapons. Among these were spears which could either be thrown at opponents or, more often it seems, be used in hand-to-hand fighting. Some knights, moreover, apparently fought with couched lances. Knights also carried a sword, though some preferred to have an axe or mace instead. The swords had broad, two-edged blades, while the hilts were often elaborate, for instance, being inlaid with gold, copper, silver, or niello.
The knights wore coats of mail for protection. These weighed about 14kg, reached to the knees, and were slit from hem to crotch at the front so that they could be worn while mounted. The Tapestry shows that William and his leading associates also wore mail leggings and that all knights wore iron helmets which were conical in form and had nose guards. Kite-shaped shields afforded additional protection, and were about 1.25m long and 55cm wide.
The Tapestry indicates that the knights’ mounts were almost all stallions trained to join in the fighting with hooves, teeth and forehead. As can be imagined, it required horsemanship of a very high order to retain control of a mount and fight at the same time.
The knights were undoubtedly the elite warriors of William’s army. They were born and bred to arms and were used to fighting alongside fellow knights in the contingents of their respective lords. ‘Such units,’ as R. Allen Brown has commented, ‘trained together over long, arduous years, and bound by the companionship of expertise, had ample discipline and the capacity not only to work and fight together but also to combine with other similar units.’
The infantry consisted of heavy infantry and archers. The principal weapon of the heavy infantry was the sword. For protection the men wore caps and hauberks of stout leather, though some evidently possessed coats of mail, and all no doubt carried shields. Some of the 29 archers depicted on the Bayeux Tapestry are well dressed or even armoured in contrast to the others shown and probably represent professionals. The lesser archers present were likely sailors from the Norman fleet who accompanied the army into battle. The Tapestry shows the archers using ordinary bows, but some may have employed crossbows for these were used in Norman armies during this period.
Harold and his Army
Harold Godwineson was a confident man with much to be confident about. Born c.1022, he was the second son of Earl Godwine of Wessex whom he succeeded in 1053. By the time of his accession to that important earldom Harold was already an experienced and prominent figure, well aware of the dangers and vicissitudes of political life. In 1051, for instance, Godwine and his two eldest sons (Harold was Earl of East Anglia at the time) had assembled their forces after Godwine fell out with King Edward. The situation was tense: bloodshed seemed inevitable. However, many of their supporters melted away rather than fight against the king and so Godwine and his sons resorted to flight. Harold made for Ireland while his father and brother fled to Flanders. The following year they returned to England at the head of mercenary forces and gained significant support, for in the interval Edward had alienated many people by showing favouritism to Normans in his court. A reconciliation of sorts thus occurred and Godwine and his sons were restored to their positions.
As Earl of Wessex, Harold led English armies on lightning campaigns in Wales in 1062 and 1063. The campaigns resulted in the regaining of lost territory, the death of the Welsh leader Gruffydd ap Llywelyn, and greatly enhanced Harold’s reputation. In 1062 the Earl of Mercia, the head of the country’s other most powerful noble family, had died leaving his earldom to a young son, Edwin. Hence an eminent Anglo-Saxonist, Sir Frank Stenton, has observed of Harold’s standing at this time: ‘No subject of the English crown had ever been at once so powerful in relation to other noblemen and so great a figure in the country at large.’
Although he came from a very ambitious, and at times very ruthless family, Harold is generally perceived as an essentially decent man. A contemporary, William of Jumièges, tells us that ‘he was extremely brave and bold’ and was ‘very handsome . . . ag
reeable . . . and affable with everybody.’
Harold Godwineson was a very able man then, brave, decisive, resourceful and a born leader. But what of his army? Was it a formidable force?
Harold’s army, or fyrd, was a fine one consisting of his housecarls, those of his loyal brothers, Gyrth and Leofwine, Danish mercenaries, and shire levies.
Until recently the royal housecarls were generally viewed as the corps d’elite of Harold’s army, a standing force of some 3,000 or so men founded by King Cnut (1016-35) and set aside from the rest of society by its professionalism and by its own rigid rules. In 1985, however, Nicholas Hooper challenged this view in a stimulating article in which he argues against the importance and uniqueness of the royal housecarls: they were not as numerous as has often been supposed and were little or no different from the household retainers who had served Anglo-Saxon kings militarily and in other ways before the days of Cnut.
Hooper’s contention that the royal housecarls did not form a powerful standing army is persuasive. Nonetheless, they may have constituted a law-bound guild for these were not unknown in late Anglo-Saxon England, and it is moreover probable, as a number of historians have maintained, that some were garrisoned at Wallingford. Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that the housecarls, like the military households of past kings, formed or at least partly comprised, the spearhead of Harold’s army.
The housecarls’ principal weapons were swords, axes and spears. The swords had broad, two-edged blades, which were usually some 75 to 80cm long and were primarily slashing weapons of which Peter Bone has commented: ‘Surviving archaeological evidence confirms that powerful sword cuts, backed by the flow of adrenaline in combat, could shear through skulls and cut through iron mail.’ Some of the axes were small, single-handed weapons, but many were two-handed battleaxes with cutting edges up to a foot in length and handles over three feet long. For protection housecarls wore iron helmets and coats of mail (which reached to the knees), and carried kite-shaped shields.
The arms and equipment of the housecarls of Harold’s brothers were no doubt identical to those of the royal housecarls, while the mercenaries must likewise have been well equipped, though most if not all of them probably had traditional round shields.
The bulk of Harold’s army has often been said to have consisted of ill-armed peasants. This was not the case. A system operated in the kingdom which ensured that the king was provided with a well-armed force when occasion demanded. Domesday Book contains an entry which states how this system operated in Berkshire: ‘If the king sent an army anywhere, only one soldier went from five hides [a hide was a unit by which land was rated for military service and taxation], and four shillings were given him from each hide as subsistence and wages for two months.’ Elsewhere in England under the hide system the principle of one warrior from a given number of hides — perhaps again, every five — evidently operated and it is apparent that in other parts of the country such as the Danelaw, where carucates were a means of assessment, the principle of one man from a given number of such units also existed.
Some of the men who served in the fyrd were peasants, but most of these appear to have been drawn from the ‘aristocratic’ element of the peasantry. Within the host they served alongside men of more exalted rank in shire units which were normally led by their respective sheriffs.
That the shire levies were generally well armed is indicated by the rate of pay given to warriors from Berkshire, £1 each for two months’ service, for as Richard Abels has commented this ‘was far from a negligible sum of money’ at this time and ‘was even comparable to the wages paid to Anglo-Norman stipendiary knights throughout the twelfth century.’
Many of the shire levies must have possessed swords. The principal weapons of others, however, would have been spears. There were two types: one for thrusting at an opponent; the other, a light throwing spear. Some levies were probably archers and if so, like all members of the fyrd, they would have also carried a knife which could be used to finish off a felled opponent or in lieu of a sword. Many of the levies no doubt possessed coats of mail, helmets and kite-shaped shields. The rest would have fought in their everyday clothes (except perhaps for wearing stout leather jerkins), and would have had round shields.
Description
As has been noted earlier, at dawn on Saturday 14 October 1066 William left his base at Hastings and marched towards Harold’s army on Caldbec Hill intent on engaging it on his own terms. According to the C version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, William’s decision to take the initiative resulted in his coming upon Harold before the king’s ‘army was set in order.’
It is perfectly reasonable to accept that Harold was surprised by William’s advance. Hence, upon hearing of the duke’s approach, Harold hurriedly began preparing for battle. He chose to make his stand on Senlake ridge, which lies east-west a short distance to the south of Caldbec Hill to which it is connected by a narrow neck of land. It was a strong defensive position, for owing to the lie of the ground and the fact that there were streams on either side of the isthmus, Harold could not be outflanked. Moreover it is likely that some of the ground to the south of the ridge, like that to the east and west, was marshy. Furthermore, the central section of the south slope of the ridge has a gradient of one in fifteen, sufficient to reduce the effectiveness of an assault against a force defensively arrayed on the top of the hill.
Nonetheless, the position was not ideal. The size of the ridge necessitated that Harold deploy his men in very close formation and according to Florence of Worcester (whose account was written before 1118), owing to the cramped conditions which prevailed, some of the king’s warriors deserted. The possibility that there was discontent in the ranks of the English army is strengthened by a statement in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle which records that in the battle Harold fought very bravely with those of his men ‘who would stand by him,’ a comment which indicates that there were others who forsook the king. William of Malmesbury—who wrote his account of the battle in c.1120)—explicitly states that some of Harold’s men deserted and attributes this to the fact that the king had failed to share Hardrada’s captured treasure with his soldiers following Stamford Bridge.
Nevertheless, despite the strong probability that some of Harold’s warriors had deserted, there can be no doubt that the army with which he engaged William was formidable. It probably numbered about 7,000 men and, as noted, the overwhelming majority were well-armed warriors, housecarls, mercenaries and select levies. The Bayeux Tapestry does portray a few members of the host as lacking good equipment. Perhaps they are meant to represent local rustics who may have participated in the battle in order to exact revenge for the harrying done by William’s army.
Harold’s position can be identified. It is known that he chose to stand near the highest point of the ridge, and William the Conqueror subsequently ordered that the high altar of a monastery he founded here — Battle Abbey — should mark the spot. Beside the king stood at least a contingent of his housecarls and above flew two standards, Harold’s own banner, The Fighting Man, and the Dragon of Wessex. The remainder of the housecarls were probably positioned to the fore with the mercenaries to form the front ranks of the army.
By now William was busy marshalling his own forces for battle to the south of the English position and with the front ranks about 200 yards from it. We know that his army, which probably numbered about 8,000 men, of whom perhaps around 2,400 were knights, was drawn up in three lines with the archers in front, the heavy infantry behind, and knights to the rear. It may have been the case that the army was also drawn up in three divisions, with that on the left commanded by Count Alan of Brittany, the centre under William, and the division on the right by Roger of Montgomery. This is said to have been the case by an unreliable source, the Carmen de Hastingae Proelio (‘Song of the Battle of Hastings’), whose authorship and date of composition are uncertain—it is usually attribute
d to Bishop Guy of Amiens and was possibly written in 1067.
The battle is said to have commenced at 9.00am but most historians are of the opinion, and probably correctly so, that it did so about half an hour later than this. Hostilities commenced when William’s archers moved forward until they were within effective range and began firing at the massed ranks of Harold’s army. Their efforts produced little result. Most of the arrows failed to penetrate the shield wall and so after a while the archers fell back, leaving behind them the bodies of unfortunate comrades who had been hit by an assortment of missiles including arrows fired by Harold’s few bowmen.
It was now the turn of the heavily armed infantry to go into action. As they approached the English they were also met by a shower of missiles. Some screamed and fell, but the rest pressed on determined to exact vengeance. Thus hand-to-hand combat ensued and the greatest slaughter began, with Harold’s finest warriors dealing out death and destruction to many of those who dared to assail them.
Upon seeing that the heavy infantry needed assistance, William rode forward with his knights. It is probable that the knights on the left, many of whom were Bretons, arrived on the scene first for the gradient here is only 1 in 33. What is certain is that it was they, and the infantry to whose assistance they rode, who broke first for William of Poitiers (whose account of the battle is the finest narrative source), relates that they fell back in disorder ‘panic-stricken by the violence of the assault’ which they had encountered.
Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746 Page 2
