Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746

by Glen Lyndon Dodds

  It is moreover interesting to note that the ballad, Bosworth Feilde, (which apparently was initially composed within ten years of the battle by a member of the Stanley connection), states that Richard’s host was deployed in a dale, and that in his account of Bosworth written c.1540, Edward Hall declares that on the morning of the engagement the king’s men came ‘oute of their camp into the plaine.’ That the battle was fought on a plain is also mentioned by William Burton, the lord of the manor of Dadlington and Higham, who heard second-hand accounts of the encounter from local people who had known eyewitnesses of the event. In 1622 Burton wrote that the battle was ‘fought in a large, flat, plaine, and spacious ground, three miles distant from [Market Bosworth] between the Towne of Shenton, Sutton, Dadlington, and Stoke [Golding].’

  Furthermore, as M. J. Phillips has recently commented: ‘The preponderant weight of archaeological evidence does seem to point to Dadlington and its environs as the location of certainly the majority of deaths due to battle.’ For instance, the Hinckley Parish Register, Village Advertiser and Local Church Register of 1868, records that while a grave was being prepared in the churchyard at Dadlington ‘a number of human bones was found about 2ft below the surface, amongst them as many as twenty skulls,’ and notes that they were ‘supposed to be the remains of some of those who fell in the battle of Bosworth.’ Additionally, layers of compacted skeletons were unearthed in the churchyard when another grave was being dug in about 1950, a discovery which drew a crowd of onlookers. Reports of the discovery of skeletons believed to be the remains of men who perished in the battle have also come from the neighbouring parish of Stoke Golding. It is instructive to note that Burton relates that at the enclosure of Stoke Golding in about 1600 ‘divers peeces of armor, weapons and other warlike accoutrements’ were unearthed.

  As noted above, some historians have attempted to explain such discoveries by stating that the pursuit which occurred at the end of the battle was in the direction of Stoke Golding and Dadlington. However it is more reasonable to conclude that the traditional site for Bosworth is erroneous and that the battle was fought closer to Dadlington and Stoke Golding than hitherto thought.

  This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that in 1511 the churchwardens of Dadlington received royal permission to collect contributions in the Midlands for ‘the bielding of a chapell of sainte James standing upon a parcell of the grounde where Bosworth feld, otherwise called Dadlyngton feld...was done.’ (It appears that the resulting building work entailed repairs and improvements to an existing chapel of St James rather than the construction of a new structure). Furthermore, a confraternity letter of indulgence printed shortly after the licence was issued is also significant. It states that ‘ye bodyes or bones of the men sleyne in ye seyde feelde’ had been brought and buried in the vicinity of Dadlington church.

  The re-siting of the battle does not mean that Ambion Hill—which was first mentioned in connection with the engagement by Holinshed, and possesses a fine visitors’ centre—need be viewed as of no consequence as far as the events of August 1485 are concerned. There is reason to believe that the royal army spent the night prior to the battle encamped on the hill. For one thing, as Peter J. Foss has commented: ‘Such a vantage point, with its grass covered banks, vestigial closes [a deserted medieval hamlet had been situated on the hill], and ample fresh water, was an ideal place for a camp. Furthermore tradition has it that Richard drank from a spring on Ambion Hill (a cairn was erected at the supposed spot in 1813), and additionally, the odd cannonball has been found on the hill. In short, it is reasonable to conclude that the statement in Holinshed’s Chronicle that the royal army encamped on Ambion Hill on the eve of the battle was based on accurate information.

  The earliest record of the battle—save for Tudor’s proclamation—is in the York House Book B2-4 which contains an entry made on 23 August 1485. It refers to the engagement as ‘the feld of Redemore.’ The name ‘Redemore,’ like that of ‘Sandeford’ has disappeared from the map. In part it refers to wetland and thus chimes with references to a marsh by writers such as Polydore Vergil—our principal source for Bosworth—a distinguished scholar who wrote his account of the battle in the early sixteenth century after talking to participants and evidently reading earlier material.

  Where this marsh was situated has long been disputed. It is apparent that much of this part of Leicestershire was once marshy and this is certainly true of the chapelry of Dadlington. For example, a document dated 1283 refers to ‘six roods of meadow in Redemor, in the fields of Dadlington.’

  On geological grounds it has recently been argued that the most likely location for the marsh which featured in the events of 22 August 1485 was to the southeast of Ambion Hill and the northeast of Dadlington. That a marsh existed hereabouts is a reasonable deduction. On the other hand another recent writer, Foss, whose work The Field of Redemore is essential reading for anyone seriously interested in the Battle of Bosworth, argues that the marsh was to the west of Dadlington and to the north of Stoke Golding where there is ‘a band of alluvial flatland subject to periodic flooding. This must once have remained open water or marsh for much of the year, fed by streams and springs emerging from the cleft of the hills between Dadlington and Stoke [Golding].’

  It is reasonable to accept Foss’ location for the marsh which features in accounts of the battle. For a start, Vergil states that the marsh was situated between the opposing armies, that is, across Tudor’s line of advance from the west on the 22nd. In view of this, the former of the two proposed sites just mentioned for the relevant marsh is surely too far east bearing in mind the finds, and reports of finds, referred to earlier associated with Bosworth in the Stoke Golding/Dadlington area. Moreover, Foss’ site is close to Crown Hill near Stoke Golding, where as noted, tradition maintains that Henry was crowned immediately after the battle.

  If, as is accepted here, Foss’ site for the marsh is correct, then it is also reasonable to conclude that the ‘Sandeford’ mentioned in Tudor’s proclamation was connected with it. An eminent philologist, Margaret Gelling, has stated that the suffix ‘ford’ has not only been employed in connection with crossings of rivers and streams, but also with causeways across marshland. Hence it is possible to assume that the ‘Sandeford’ in question referred to the area where the Roman road from Mancetter to Leicester crossed the alluvial land mentioned by Foss, an area where, as he notes, there are ‘pockets of running sand below the soil surface.’

  Like the location of the battlesite, the size of the armies at Bosworth is also a moot point. According to the act of attainder of November 1485 Richard’s force had been ‘a great host.’ That it was stronger than Henry’s is certain, though the wildly inflated figures given for its strength by some sources have to be rejected. The Castilian courtier Diego de Valera, for instance, who wrote about Bosworth in 1486, relates that Richard had ‘as many as 70,000 combatants.’ We must reject too the statement dating from the same year in the Croyland Chronicle that the king had ‘a greater number of soldiers than had ever been seen before in England assembled on one side.’

  As mentioned earlier, Richard received the news of Henry’s landing on 11 August and hurriedly sent instructions hither and thither for the assembly of an army ‘in all haste.’ For example, a Derbyshire gentleman, Sir Henry Vernon, was summoned to urgently ‘come with such number as ye have promised...sufficiently horsed and harnessed...upon pain of forfeiture.’

  As Charles Ross has highlighted, Richard’s force at Bosworth ‘must very largely’ have consisted of men who had arrived on horseback, irrespective of whether they intended to fight mounted or not. Even allowing for this, there can be no doubt that not all of those who responded to the king’s summonses were present at Bosworth owing to the speed with which he clashed with his adversary. Ross was thus of the opinion that Richard ‘may have had no more than 8,000 men in his command, although 10,000 is by no means unlikely.’ Some historians hav
e given rather smaller or larger figures than these. A force of approximately 8,000 men is the figure accepted here.

  And what of Tudor’s army? It is generally said by historians to have numbered about 5,000 men, and as mentioned earlier, included a strong French contingent. As for the Stanleys, between them they may have had nearly 5,000 men.

  Before discussing the events of Monday 22 August 1485, it is worth noting that the arms and armour of the men in the opposing armies had changed little, if at all, since the days of the Towton campaign in 1461. (See Chapter 12).

  Sunrise on the 22nd occurred at 5.15 a.m. Richard’s camp must soon have been a hive of activity—indeed it may have already been so—as his army prepared to leave Ambion Hill (an unsuitable location for the effective deployment of his substantial force), aware that Tudor was no great distance away. It is said that confusion reigned in the royal camp. The Croyland Chronicle, for example, states: ‘At dawn on Monday morning the chaplains were not ready to celebrate mass for King Richard nor was any breakfast ready with which to revive the king’s flagging spirit.’ Perhaps this was so. Recently, however, John Woods has expressed doubts on the matter and has plausibly suggested that the idea that Richard did not hear mass was probably invented to portray him as a villain foredoomed to disaster.

  Before long the foremost units of the royal army must have been taking up positions on the lower ground to the southwest of Ambion Hill.

  Henry’s men had likewise been stirring. While preparing to move off, the pretender sent a messenger to Lord Stanley asking him to join forces with him. Stanley, who had avoided committing himself at several battles, did not comply. Vergil relates that he told his stepson that he ‘should set his own men in line’ and that he ‘would be at hand with his army in proper array,’ a reply ‘contrary to what was expected.’

  However, according to Bosworth Feilde, on the morning of the battle Lord Stanley did augment Tudor’s force with a contingent led by four knights, John Savage, Robert Tunstall, Hugh Pearsall and Humphrey Stanley. Furthermore, like Ladye Bessiye (another ballad which evidently contains material of an early date), Bosworth Feilde relates that after reinforcing his stepson Stanley took up a position on a hill to watch the expected clash of arms. It seems reasonable then to conclude that Henry’s request met with partial success, and that before moving towards the enemy he was augmented by the reinforcements in question.

  Lord Stanley appears to have already been on the move when he received Tudor’s request—having as noted probably spent the night near Higham on the Hill—and he evidently proceeded to take up a position near Dadlington by which time, most likely, much of Richard’s army had descended on to the plain. At this juncture Richard may well have still been on Ambion Hill for Lady Bessiye describes him ‘hoving’ on a ‘mountaine’, cognizant of the banner of the ‘boulde Stanley.’

  And what of Sir William Stanley? Where was he? Some are of the opinion that he was to the north of the battlefield. This idea is derived from a speech attributed to Henry by Hall in which the pretender states, ‘before us be our enemies, and on either side of us such as I neither surely trust nor greatly believe.’ But when the date of Hall’s work is borne in mind it becomes clear that it is unwise to give much credence to what he says on this point. It is, moreover, sometimes said that Sir William was to the north of the battlefield because his intervention late in the proceedings led to the southward flight of the vanquished, but as we have seen none of the sources stipulate the direction of the flight and though some of the fugitives may indeed have fled southward most, if not all, of the material associated with Bosworth found in the Stoke Golding/Dadlington area can be explained as the debris of the battle itself.

  On the whole, the evidence indicates that Sir William Stanley was on high ground to the south of the battlefield as was his brother. Bosworth Feilde states that Sir William was ‘hindmost at the outsetting,’ and he was most probably in the vicinity of Stoke Golding.

  As with so much else about Bosworth, uncertainty exists about the dispositions of Richard’s army. Part of the royal host was commanded by Northumberland and of him the Croyland Chronicle notes: ‘In the place where the Earl of Northumberland was posted, with a large company of reasonably good men, no engagement could be discerned, and no battle blows given or received.’ This, and subsequent statements such as that of the chronicler Robert Fabyan (written early in the sixteenth century) that ‘some stode hovynge a feere of tyll they sawe to whiche partye the victory fyll’, have led some to conclude that Northumberland opted out of the conflict by remaining back on Ambion Hill.

  On the other hand, however, Vergil relates that Richard ‘drew his whole army out of their encampments’ on the morning of the 22nd and proceeded to array his forces for the impending engagement. The resulting battle line ‘extended at such a wonderful length’, being composed of ‘footmen and horsemen packed together in such a way that the mass of armed men struck terror in the hearts of the distant onlookers.’ In the front, Richard ‘placed the archers, like a most strong bulwark, appointing as their leader John, Duke of Norfolk.’ The king was to the rear of the battle line ‘with a select force of soldiers.’

  Interestingly, though, the Croyland Chronicle states that Norfolk was with a ‘wing’ while, to add to the confusion, Jean Molinet (whose account dates from about 1490) comments that Richard’s van, which he believed ‘had 11,000 or 12,000 men altogether,’ was commanded by Norfolk and Sir Robert Brackenbury, the keeper of the Tower of London.

  All in all, it seems likely that Richard intended drawing the bulk of his army up in the usual way—a line of three battles with the vanguard and rearguard taking up positions on the right and left respectively and with, less typically, himself and his household troops and perhaps a few peers to the rear. If so, it seems probable that this deployment was not entirely achieved, with the rearguard under Northumberland halting en route to take up its position, likely upon seeing Lord Stanley arrive in the vicinity of Dadlington.

  If this interpretation is correct, we can envisage two battles in line, the king and his ‘select troops’ to the rear, and Northumberland further back still. As shall be seen, it is reasonable to conclude that Norfolk was in command of the northernmost of the two proposed foremost battles. It will be remembered, moreover, that Molinet was of the opinion that Brackenbury was in joint command of the ‘vanguard’ and it is thus perhaps safe to conclude that Brackenbury had been placed in command of the other battle. If so, this was a rather unusual occurrence in view of the fact that he was a commoner. The frequent references in later sources to Norfolk solely commanding a vanguard probably derive from the fact that his battle had evidently been the van on the march from Leicester and the fact that Bosworth commenced in earnest, following an exchange of fire, when Norfolk closed with the oncoming enemy.

  The bulk of Tudor’s army was evidently placed under the command of the Earl of Oxford, an experienced soldier who had distinguished himself when leading the Lancastrian left wing at Barnet and in other military ventures. Not for nothing did the Croyland chronicler describe him as ‘a most valiant soldier.’ Vergil relates that at Bosworth Oxford was protected by wings. That on the left was under Sir John Savage junior, while Gilbert Talbot was in command of that on the right. Tudor was to the rear of this ‘vanguard’ as it is sometimes called, with a company of horsemen and a few infantry.

  Vergil states that between the two armies ‘was a marsh...which Henry deliberately left on his right, to serve his men as a defensive wall’, and that in so doing ‘he simultaneously put the sun behind him.’ Of this stage of the proceedings Molinet writes: ‘The king had the artillery of his army fire on the earl of Richmond, and so the French...resolved, in order to avoid the fire [Molinet makes no mention of a marsh at this stage in his narrative], to mass their troops against the flank rather than the front of the king’s battle.’ The Rose of England, a ballad probably composed in or shortly
after 1485, states: ‘The right hand of them [the enemy] he [Oxford] took.’ We can thus picture the pretender’s host turning north or northwest from the Roman road near the marsh postulated by Foss and skirting the wetland under fire in order to close with Richard’s right wing.

  As Anthony Goodman has commented, Henry evidently had a penchant for remaining at a distance at military encounters, (he did so at Stoke in 1487 and at Blackheath in 1497), and it seems likely that on this occasion he remained in the vicinity of the Roman road near where it commenced crossing the marsh, and thus not far from the Stanleys upon whom he was relying for support.

  Apparently, before the armies joined, Richard ordered the immediate execution of Lord Strange, having been angered by the behaviour of the man’s father, Lord Stanley. For some reason the order was not carried out, most probably because the onset of fighting diverted the king’s attention from ensuring that the deed was performed.

  Vergil relates that as soon as the pretender’s army had advanced past the marsh Richard’s men raised ‘a great shout’, whereupon the archers in the royal ranks let fly their arrows after which their opponents ‘in no wise holding back, returned the fire fiercely.’ Fighting at close quarters followed. As Hall comments: ‘The terrible shot once passed, the armies joined and came to hand strokes.’