Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746

by Glen Lyndon Dodds

  And what of the rest of the Scottish army? It is sometimes maintained that the other divisions—evidently with the exception of that under Argyll and Lennox—only began descending Branxton Hill upon seeing the initial success of Home and Huntly and in the belief that the victorious division would move against the Lord Admiral, thereby providing an opportunity to roll up the enemy. Such a view is at variance with Hall, who relates that although contact was first made on the left of the Scottish line all the divisions were soon engaged. That the other divisions came to blows shortly after the Scottish left clashed with Edmund Howard is no doubt correct. Moreover, although Home and Huntly’s division clashed first this does not automatically mean—as many have assumed—that it advanced before the other divisions. The nature of the terrain has to be borne in mind. As has been noted, the approach towards the English position for the Scottish left was not as arduous as it was elsewhere. Hence if the divisions had begun advancing in unison, or at least at about the same time, contact would inevitably have first been made by Home and Huntly.

  Owing to the lie of the land, the divisions in question were unable to maintain the momentum of their assault to the same degree as did their colleagues on the left, and their laborious approach was rendered more difficult by continued cannon fire from the English guns and arrows sent against them. Fortunately for the Scots, however, they were generally well protected—this is said to have been especially true of the king’s division—and thus did not suffer as severely as they would have done otherwise. As the Trewe Encountre states, the Scots were ‘as well appointed as was possible at all points with armour and harness, so that few of them were slain with arrows.’ Finally, and no doubt with a sense of relief on the part of some, they came to grips with the enemy.

  Determined, bloody conflict resulted. The division under the earls was evidently soon brought to a standstill but the king’s—which was supported by the reserve under Bothwell—seems to have done rather better, managing to drive Surrey back somewhat before likewise being halted.

  Meanwhile, what was happening on the right of the Scottish line? The evidence is conflicting and has resulted in some confusion. George Buchanan’s account, for example, states that Argyll and Lennox rushed down the hill in a disorderly fashion after being encouraged by the success of the Scottish left and were attacked in the rear by a body of English soldiers with disastrous consequences. In general, however, it is believed that Argyll and Lennox remained on Branxton Hill and it is said that they did so because Sir Edward Stanley’s division—with which they clashed— had not quite arrived on the scene, likely owing to a possible bottleneck caused while the English had crossed the Pallin’s burn. Hall declares that Stanley’s division ‘was the last that fought,’ becoming engaged shortly after battle was joined elsewhere. The contemporary Trewe Encountre states clearly that, unlike the other Scottish divisions which advanced to attack the English, that under Argyll and Lennox was attacked by Stanley, who ‘coragiously and like a lusty and an hardy knyght, did sett upon’ it when it was preparing to advance to assist the ‘King of Scottes batell.’

  All things considered, it thus seems reasonable to conclude that as Stanley approached the field he observed Argyll and Lennox’s inactive division and decided to move against it by advancing up the east slope of Branxton Hill with the aim of conducting a flank attack. We are told that his men removed their footwear to gain a better grip as they ascended the slippery ground. Their approach was unnoticed by the Scots whose attention was no doubt focused on the battle raging below. Indeed, it seems likely, as the Trewe Encountre states, that Argyll and Lennox were on the point of moving to assist James against Surrey when Stanley fell upon their right flank. The surprised Scots were subjected to a rain of arrows. Chaos soon reigned; the division rapidly disintegrated and those that could began to flee. The Trewe Encountre gives no details about their flight. Hall, however, relates that Stanley chased the Scots ‘over that place where the King’s battle joined...and the said Sir Edward...followed them over the same ground...and found there the Scots, who were by [Surrey’s] battle slain before...and fell a-spoiling.’

  Is Hall correct in saying that by now the king’s division had been destroyed? It seems not. An account of the battle by Bishop Leslie (which dates from 1578) tells us that Stanley attacked the king from the rear. That Stanley proceeded to attack James’ division after routing the men under Argyll and Lennox seems more reasonable than what we read in Hall. After all, the battle continued until nightfall, about 6.00pm, and if, as Hall states, Stanley was in action not long after the other English divisions acceptance of his statement that Stanley chased the fleeing Scots over ground covered with the wreckage of James’ division would mean that Surrey had soon overcome the most powerful and best equipped component of the Scottish army. It could of course be maintained that Stanley clashed with Argyll and Lennox later than Hall believed. But this again is unlikely. It is improbable that the earls would have stood idle for any significant length of time while their king was engaged in a ferocious encounter with Surrey. In short, a number of modern historians believe that after overcoming Argyll and Lennox, Stanley closed in for the kill against the division of the Scottish king and this view is accepted here.

  If so, it appears that Stanley’s men were not the only ones to assist Surrey. Apparently, the Lord Admiral did so with at least part of his command after destroying Crawford and Montrose’’ division in, as Hall states, ‘a great conflict’. (The rest of his men may have been in pursuit). Hence, as Leslie comments, likely with a degree of exaggeration, the king was ‘surrounded on every side.’

  Like the division of Crawford and Montrose, the Scots under the king and Bothwell put up a good fight, ‘determyned outher to wynne the ffelde or to dye’ says the Trewe Encountre. But it was a fight they could not win, for in common with the men under Crawford and Montrose, they fought at a disadvantage. It soon became apparent that their long spears were not as effective—as deadly—as the bills of many of their adversaries. The tips of the spears were chopped off and when the Scots had recourse to their secondary weapons they found themselves again at a disadvantage for they were outreached by their assailants. Nonetheless they continued fighting stubbornly. As Ruthal states, ‘the Scots faght sore and valiauntlye with their swerdes.’

  The conflict degenerated into a one-sided affair. The Scots’ formation began to disintegrate. More and more of them were slaughtered as English soldiers penetrated their ranks wielding their bills to deadly effect. It is said that some of the Scots tried to surrender but received no mercy. The Trewe Encountre relates that because the Scots ‘wer soe vengeable and cruell in their feightyng...when Englisshmen had the better of thaim they wold not save thaim.’

  At some point, perhaps quite soon in the bloodbath, King James was himself cut down. We are told that he had fought bravely, something which need not be doubted. Indeed, according to the Articles of Battle he got to within a spear’s length of Surrey when he fell, struck by an arrow and gashed by a bill. For some time after his death resistance continued to be given, but such an uneven contest could not go on for very long and by about 6.00pm it was all over.

  Some of the English soldiers pursued fleeing Scots far from the field, but others fell to plundering. Ruthal comments: ‘King, bishops, lordes, knightes and nobles, and others were not so soon slain but forwith despoiled out of thair harnais and array and lefte lying naked in the felde.’ Ruthal further relates that the abundant supplies of food and drink found by the victors provided sustenance, to their ‘great refreshying’, which is not surprising considering the privations they had endured.

  Surrey’s tired but exultant men spent the night on the field they had won. The following morning a body of Scottish horsemen appeared on the skyline before them but departed after a few rounds of cannon fire from the English guns. The rest of the day was spent sorting out the dead and preparing for their burial.

  The
legend subsequently developed that King James had survived the slaughter. As Adam Abell, a friar of Jedburgh, noted in 1533: ‘Of him diverss is opinion; ane is at he wes nocht slane in that feid of flowdone....Ane odir is at he wes slane in the feild.’ It is, however, certain that James did perish at Flodden for his body was identified by Lord Dacre (who knew him well) and by the king’s captured secretary Sir William Scott. It was subsequently transported south to the Carthusian monastery of Sheen near London—and establishment founded by another warrior-king, Henry V—and was later taken to London and buried with royal honours at St. Paul’s.

  The king was not the only exalted Scot who perished at Flodden. Many others also fell. One such was James’ bastard son, the 23-year-old Archbishop of St Andrew’s who, according to Erasmus, was so short-sighted he ‘could not read without holding his book to the very end of his nose.’ One bishop also perished, as did nine earls (Huntly, Home and Marischal were the only ones who survived), and fourteen barons. As William Seymour has observed: ‘The chronicles of calamity have few precedents for the extinction in battle of almost a complete generation of a country’s nobility.’ Just how many lesser Scots died is uncertain, but that they died in significant numbers is undoubted. The English put the figure at 10,000, while the most moderate contemporary estimate (by a Scot), is 5,000. No doubt the former is closer to the truth.

  English losses were lower, much lower. Contemporary estimates range from 400 to not more than 1,500 men, with the latter figure likely being the more accurate. Moreover, few persons of high rank were among the slain.

  Of King James’ performance at Flodden, Hall wrote: ‘O what a noble and triumphaunt courage was thys for a kyng to fyghte in a battayll as a meane souldier.’ That James was valiant and went down fighting manfully is accepted by modern writers. But what of his conduct of the Flodden campaign? On this matter opinion not unnaturally differs. James is sometimes portrayed as an individual whose courage surpassed his sagacity, a quixotic figure whose campaign was an ill-considered affair which inevitably ended in disaster. This is wrong. For a start, the army he led south was a formidable one, the largest and best equipped ever led into England by a Scottish monarch: a fact which testifies to his popularity and the quality of his preparations.

  Some believe that James displayed indecision during the campaign. He has been criticised for not advancing further into England instead of, it is maintained, dithering on the border. This criticism is unwarranted. James’ objectives were to secure Norham Castle—a fortress which the Scots had long wished to capture—and to honour his pledge to Louis XII by advancing across the border at the head of an army. Hence he did not have to move far into England: he could await Surrey with a rested and well positioned army instead.

  James has also been censured for not opposing Surrey’s crossing of the Till on the morning of the 9th. This again, as some historians have pointed out, is unreasonable. Time was against such a manoeuvre. If upon hearing that the English were crossing the Till, James had abandoned his strong position and moved against them he would have been unable to arrive in time to oppose the crossing.

  He is also criticised for not attacking the section of the English army under the Lord Admiral which arrived in the vicinity of Branxton while Surrey was still some distance away. It has been maintained that if he had done so he may have been able to defeat the two sections of the English army in detail. This is a rather more valid criticism. But James’ decision to remain on Branxton Hill is nonetheless understandable in the circumstances. He reasonably believed that he did not have to resort to such action to win the day, likely intending to use his cannon to soften up the English army as it approached his position before advancing with his formidable host to sweep it from the field.

  In the event, the performance of the Scottish artillery at Flodden proved lamentable. James thus deserves to be censured for sending his best gunners with the fleet to France, undoubtedly it was a blunder.

  Nevertheless, on the whole Colonel Burne’s comment, ‘I can see no blatant military faults committed by the King of Scotland in the campaign of Flodden’ is a reasonable one.

  The disaster which befell the Scots at Flodden can be primarily attributed to their use of the pike. As has been noted, the cumbersome pikes were chopped into pieces by the bills of their adversaries and the Scots were thus forced to fight at a disadvantage with their secondary weapons. Not for nothing did Bishop Ruthal write: ‘Our bills...did more goode that day thenne bowes for they shortely disapointed the Scotes of their long speres wherin was their greatest truste and whennne they came to hande strocke...they coude not resiste the billes that lighted so thicke and sore upon thaym.’ The same point is made elsewhere, such as in the Trewe Encountre, ‘the billes did beat and hew thaim downe’, it says.

  Nonetheless, Surrey could be justly proud of his conduct of the campaign which culminated in the epic engagement which is his chief memorial. Despite his advanced years, he had behaved with courage and resolution and had sensibly refrained from attacking James on Flodden Hill, preferring to execute the unusual march which brought his army to the vicinity of Branxton Hill, caused concern in the Scottish camp, and led James to abandon his well-nigh impregnable initial position.

  Surrey’s commendable performance did not go unrewarded. In February 1514 King Henry reinstated to him the family title, Duke of Norfolk, a title which had been forfeited through his father’s support of Richard III at Bosworth.

  And what of Scotland? Flodden left the country like a battered ship bereft of a popular and able captain and devoid of much of its crew; a vessel ill equipped to meet whatever storms might lie ahead. The new king, James V, was little more than a baby (he was born at Linlithgow in April 1512), and consequently in accordance with James IV’s will, the youngster’s mother, Margaret, became regent and a council of ecclesiastics and nobles was appointed without whose consent she was unable to act.

  Margaret soon lost the regency (upon her marriage to the Earl of Angus), and in July 1515 the Duke of Albany was proclaimed in a parliament at Edinburgh protector and governor of Scotland until James became eighteen. The subsequent period, however, was far from harmonious. For a start, the young king’s mother was compelled to hand him over to guardians after being besieged in Stirling Castle, and in the years which followed James was a pawn in the power game as factions endeavoured to secure his person and gain supremacy.

  When James finally became king in more than name he had to deal with significant lawlessness, conspiracies to destroy him, and English interference. As Norman MacDougall has commented, as a result of Flodden ‘the purpose, drive, and unanimity which [James IV] had instilled in the political community were shattered, and Scottish national self-confidence was lost for the remainder of the century.’ In view of this, and the losses sustained at Flodden, it is not surprising that the battle ingrained itself on the national psyche. It is not for nothing that pipers still play the haunting lament: ‘The Flowers of the Forest are a ‘wede away.’

  17

  PINKIE 10 September 1547

  In January 1547 England’s king, Henry VIII, was succeeded by his young son Edward VI, and it was soon agreed that the Duke of Somerset would serve as protector during Edward’s minority. At this date Scotland’s monarch, Mary, was likewise a minor. She had ascended the throne in 1542 when only a few weeks old, and the Earl of Arran was regent. In treaties of 1543 intended to improve relations between the hitherto hostile countries, and later nullified by the Scots, it was agreed that Mary would marry Edward. The Scots’ volte face had angered Henry, who sent punitive raids north. Though he was now dead, the protector was likewise determined to ensure that Mary would marry Edward Tudor.

  Military preparations commenced in the spring of 1547. On 1 September, following the failure of talks, Somerset crossed the border with 16,000 men, of whom 4,000 were cavalry. In support was the English fleet, under Lord Clinton, sailing parallel to the army
as it advanced up Scotland’s east coast. On 8 September Somerset arrived in the vicinity of Prestonpans and proceeded to deploy his forces on Fawside Hill and Carberry Hill, from where he had good views westward to where Arran had stationed his army on the far side of the River Esk. The infantry was in the centre, with cavalry on the wings.

  Arran had about 25,000 men, and thus although weaker in cavalry, was numerically stronger overall. The left wing was under the Earl of Huntly, then came 3,000 Highlanders under the Earl of Argyll. Arran led the centre. To his right were more infantry under another earl, Angus, and then came the cavalry under the Earl of Home.

  On the morning of the 9th, Home’s men crossed the Esk and carried out provocative manoeuvres intended to draw the English from their position. The move misfired, and misfired badly. At an opportune time, when the Scots were off balance, they were assailed by the heavy English cavalry and routed. Those that could, fled back across the river.

  At about 8.00am the following day Somerset advanced, intent on securing Inveresk Hill in close proximity to a bridge across the Esk and towards the left of the Scottish line. From here the English guns could dominate much of the Scottish position. As Somerset advanced the Scots began crossing the Esk, though what was left of Home’s horse held aloof. As Argyll’s Highlanders made their way across the river they came under fire from Clinton’s fleet off Musselburgh and fled. In contrast, Huntly’s men pressed on. Once across the Esk, the Scots formed a massive phalanx of pikemen and continued moving forward. Then, as they momentarily halted, the bulk of the English cavalry attacked them. They repelled the assault, only to be attacked again. As before, they held. But the attacks allowed Somerset to bring his guns to bear and they now began pounding the densely packed Scots, who were also shot at by mounted Spanish troops serving in the English army, who were armed with handguns and rode along their flanks firing as they did so. Arran’s hard-pressed men were then attacked by Somerset’s infantry. Finally, when the cavalry came forward again the Scots broke and fled, suffering numerous casualties as they did so. In all, Scottish losses may have approached 10,000 men. Reportedly, English losses numbered about 500.