Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746

by Glen Lyndon Dodds

  Moreover, reportedly several senior figures in Newcastle’s army were opposed to giving battle. Eythin was one such. According to one of Cholmeley’s sources Eythin was responsible for the dispersal of the assembled foot, something which he himself denied. Furthermore, Sir Francis Cobbe, who served as the commander of Clifford’s Tower during the siege of York, informs us that Eythin told Newcastle not to commit all his forces to Rupert’s intended confrontation with the allies.

  Upon arriving at Marston Moor, the marquis told Rupert that he had left Eythin to bring on the foot as soon as possible. At this, according to Cholmeley, the prince stated that he would attack without them (thereby attempting to take advantage of the disordered state of the allies), but was persuaded by Newcastle to await Eythin.

  It is now time to discuss the character and career of Prince Rupert and the senior allied commander, Leven, and to discuss the composition, weaponry and tactics of the opposing armies.

  The Commanders and their Armies

  Prince Rupert was born in Prague on 17 December 1619, the third son of Charles I’s sister, Elizabeth, and her husband Frederick of Bohemia, the ‘Protestant Champion of Europe.’ Within a year of Rupert’s birth, his father lost his kingdom at the beginning of the Thirty Years War and the family was forced to flee, receiving sanctuary in the United Provinces. After initially residing at the Hague, they moved to Leiden in 1623, a place where Rupert found much of interest. For one thing, he soon became fascinated by ships and spent much time talking to sailors about their tasks and adventures.

  Rupert soon demonstrated an aptitude for war. It is said, for example, that by the age of eight he had mastered the pikeman’s eighteen postures and the musketeer’s thirty-four. He was moreover keenly interested in the progress of the Thirty Years War.

  In 1633, at the age of thirteen, he was invited by Prince Frederick Henry, the Stadholder of the United Provinces, to participate in the siege of Rheinberg (which was to fall in October) and hence had his first taste of campaigning. In later years one of Rupert’s strengths was besieging towns, and no doubt serving with Frederick Henry, a master of siegecraft, laid the basis of his skill in this field.

  In 1635 Rupert participated in a larger campaign than that of the Rheinberg siege—the invasion of Brabant—and did so as a volunteer in Frederick Henry’s Lifeguard. The prince was in the thick of the fighting and displayed conspicuous bravery. He subsequently participated in the successful siege of Breda in 1637, and was captured the following year after an army in which he commanded a regiment was defeated at the Battle of Vlotho in Germany. He spent the next three years incarcerated at Linz on the Danube, save for occasional brief periods of parole.

  Rupert regained his freedom at the end of 1641. In July of the following year—as England was descending into civil war—he landed at Tynemouth and made his way to join Charles at Nottingham to serve on his behalf in the impending conflict. The tall, elegant young prince, who held the post of General of the Horse, his first major command, distinguished himself from the beginning of hostilities for he was decisive, inspiring, knowledgeable and able. Sir Thomas Roe observed, ‘whatsoever he undertakes he doth it vigorously and seriously’ being ‘full of spirit and action.’ A string of successes rapidly won him the reputation of being the best Royalist commander: he was on the way to becoming a legend. Although Rupert’s faults included tactlessness, a degree of impetuosity, as well as over sensitivity to criticism and at times lack of judgement, he was overall a very able operational commander.

  An interesting and enigmatic man of wide interests (he was among other things a gifted scientific experimenter), Rupert lived until 1682 and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

  Alexander Leslie, first Earl of Leven, was born in Scotland in around 1580 and was the illegitimate son of the Captain of Blair Castle and a ‘wench in Rannoch.’ An experienced soldier, Leven had entered the Swedish army in 1605 and had fought with distinction under the command of Charles IX and his redoubtable successor Gustavus Adolphus, the Lion of the North, during wars with Poland, Denmark and Russia. Indeed, his successful defence of Stralsund against Wallenstein in 1628 made him a soldier of repute. He fought at Lutzen in 1642, where Adolphus was killed, and some years later returned to his homeland where he was prevailed upon to lead the Covenanters in the Bishops’ Wars. Though a soldier of ability and experience, he seems to have been past his best by the time of Marston Moor.

  Theoretically, most Royalist regiments of horse comprised six troops (each 70 strong), thus totalling 420 men plus officers. In practice, regiments were usually below full strength, often well below, and this was certainly the case on 2 July 1644. On the other hand, Rupert’s regiment of horse comprised ten troops and was probably nearly 500 strong at Marston Moor.

  Throughout the Civil War Royalist regiments of horse usually had three field officers, a colonel, lieutenant-colonel and major, all of whom were troop commanders, though in practice the colonel’s troop was led by his captain-lieutenant. The other troops were led by captains.

  Although the regiments at Marston Moor varied in quality and experience, on the whole the Royalist horse had an excellent reputation. At Edgehill, for instance, they had easily swept all before them. They were mostly of gentle birth, possessed fine mounts, and had a high degree of horsemanship. However, lack of discipline was a problem. This was noted by Lord Clarendon, who wrote that although they usually ‘prevailed in the charge’ they ‘seldom rallied themselves in order.’

  In Parliamentarian regiments of horse the theoretical strength of a troop was 71 men plus officers, and many of the regiments had six troops. Again, the strength of the regiments varied greatly. Some were well below 426 men strong while others exceeded this figure substantially and contained more than six troops. The majority of regiments did not have a lieutenant-colonel (they only did so if they were very strong), and the colonel and major both served as troop commanders. The other troops were under captains.

  In the early stages of the Civil War the Roundhead horse had been inferior to that of the Royalists. Cromwell noted this at Edgehill and subsequently told his cousin, John Hampden: ‘Your troopers are most of them old decayed serving men and tapsters, and such kind of fellows....Do you think that the spirits of such base and mean fellows will ever be able to encounter gentlemen that have honour, courage and resolution in them? You must get men of a spirit that is like to go as far as gentlemen will go.’

  Cromwell practised what he preached and raised a formidable cavalry regiment comprised in the main of East Anglian yeomen, godly ‘men of spirit’ who were staunchly committed to the cause they had espoused. Cromwell and his regiment were in the ranks of the allied army at Marston Moor. On the other hand, as with the Royalists, some of the other Parliamentarian regiments of horse present had had little experience of serious fighting.

  There were six Scottish cavalry regiments in the allied army, and like the majority of Royalist regiments of horse they had lieutenant-colonels. In general the troopers rode inferior mounts to those of their English counterparts, for they rode ‘little light Scotch nags.’ Moreover, although the majority of field officers had seen service abroad the troopers were rather inexperienced.

  Troopers on both sides usually carried a heavy sword. Many also had a pair of pistols which in some cases was supplemented by a wheel or flintlock carbine. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that some of the Scottish troopers used the lance, a weapon not employed by their southern counterparts.

  Many troopers wore back and breast plates over a buff leather coat, though by this stage of the Civil War many had forsaken armour in favour of a thick buff coat which was full skirted, frequently sleeved, and offered a high degree of protection as well as easier movement. Helmets were commonplace. The most popular was the ‘lobster-tailed pot’, which had a round skull with attached earguards, neckguard, and faceguard of one or three bars dropping vertically from the p
eak. Finally, many troopers wore high heavy leather boots which afforded additional protection.

  At the start of the Civil War Prince Rupert introduced a tactic pioneered by Gustavus Adolphus, one in marked contrast to the accepted Dutch practice in which horse trotted forward at least five ranks deep, halted close to the enemy and fired, before advancing again to engage in hand-to-hand combat. Rupert preferred to move forward with his cavalry three ranks deep and then charge home at the gallop sword in hand, reserving fire until contact had been made. This approach proved successful and some Parliamentarian officers, Cromwell for one, soon adopted the tactic themselves.

  Turning from cavalry to dragoons, it should be noted that although the latter rode to battle, they usually dismounted to fight. Among other things they were used to hold key points such as bridges, while on the battlefield they were sometimes used to line hedges or were stationed among the horse to serve as musketeers. They were armed with swords and muskets, though some officers also had pistols. They wore no armour and often did not have buff coats or helmets either. Their general appearance was much like that of the foot.

  Infantry regiments theoretically had ten companies. The colonel’s was 200 men strong, the lieutenant-colonel’s 160 and the major’s 140. The remaining companies were commanded by captains and were 100 strong. In practice, however, regiments were usually well below full strength owing to battle casualties, sickness and desertion, and varied in the number of companies they had.

  In theory, companies had a ratio of two musketeers for every pikeman. In actuality the number of musketeers was often more or less equal to that of the pikemen and this seems to have been especially true of the Royalists.

  Musketeers basically fought in everyday clothing, and the vast majority were armed with matchlock muskets. These were often 5ft long and weighed as much as 20lbs. Because of their weight they were frequently supported in the firing position by a rest—a wooden pole with a steel fork at the top. They were very unreliable weapons, for they were inaccurate and in inclement weather the smouldering match used to fire them was easily extinguished. Although the matchlock had a range of up to 400 yards it was only really effective at up to about 60. Furthermore, its rate of fire was slow. A good musketeer could probably manage to fire two or three times a minute.

  Musketeers had a bandolier from which hung twelve or more small powder containers, a priming flask and bullet-bag. The match, a length of cord soaked in saltpetre, usually hung from the belt. Moreover, many musketeers had short swords. English foot soldiers often ruined their swords by using them instead of axes to chop wood and preferred to use the butts of their muskets when fighting at close quarters.

  Musketeers were taught ‘fire by introduction’ and ‘fire by extraduction,’ both of which resulted in rolling fire. In the former, the front rank fired, then the rearmost moved forward between the files and did likewise, followed by the next rank and so on, thereby making a steady advance. In the latter the process was reversed. After firing, the front rank moved to the rear and so on, a technique which made for an orderly withdrawal. For a more concentrated volley musketeers were formed three ranks deep instead of six, the rear standing, the second stooping, the front kneeling, and fired a salvo in unison.

  Pikemen had to be strong to use their principal weapon effectively, for pikes were heavy and unwieldy. Officially they were 18ft long, but they were often a couple of feet or so less than this for the men were prone to cut off part of the shaft to render the weapon lighter and more manageable. The shaft was usually of ash and had a slim steel head and cheeks, which were strips of steel riveted to the shaft below the head to prevent it being hacked off by an opponent. Apart from the pike, ‘the queen of weapons,’ many pikemen carried short swords, though these were frequently of poor quality. For protection fully equipped pikemen had a steel helmet, back and breast plates, a gorget, which protected the throat, and long tassets which covered the thighs.

  To be effective pikemen had to fight en masse, and a regiment drawn up for action would have its pikemen in the centre and the musketeers on the flanks. When moving forward to engage the enemy pikemen often held their pikes horizontally and at shoulder height. To oppose a cavalry charge infantry formed a circle with the pikemen inside, holding their pikes at an angle of thirty degrees with the butt against the instep of the right foot, thereby affording protection to themselves and the musketeers who crouched before them under the pikes.

  Although officers, and to a lesser extent sergeants, dressed much as they wished, the rank and file on both sides were more uniformly dressed. For instance, the Earl of Manchester’s regiment of foot had coats of green cloth lined with red, and some of Newcastle’s regiments of foot wore white coats. The same basic colours were used by both sides and in order to avoid confusion on the battlefield distinguishing scarves were often worn (crimson for the Royalists and orange-tawny for the Roundheads), as were field signs. At Marston Moor, for example, the Parliamentarians had white handkerchiefs or pieces of paper stuck in their hats.

  As for artillery, the heaviest gun used at Marston Moor was evidently the culverin. This weighed 4,000lbs, had a calibre of 5in and fired shot of 15lbs. Its point blank range was 460 yards but at an elevation of ten degrees this was extended to 2,650 yards. More common was the saker, a mid-sized gun weighing 2,500lbs with a calibre of 3.5 in. It fired shot of approximately 5 to 6lbs and its point blank range was 360 yards, while at an elevation of ten degrees shot could be fired over 2,000 yards. Lighter cannon such as minions and falcons were no doubt also present.

  Description

  By the late afternoon of Tuesday 2 July 1644 both armies were deployed for battle. They were drawn up in the conventional manner with the infantry in the centre and horse on the flanks.

  According to the Royalist, Sir Bernard de Gomme, Rupert’s force comprised 6,500 cavalry and 11,000 foot, figures which are undoubtedly approximately correct. It was marshalled to the north of the Long Marston/Tockwith road on ground which was mainly moorland. Running north from the road were two lanes, Moor Lane and Atterwith Lane, and between these, separating the moorland from cultivated ground to the south, was a bank which was evidently partly lined by a hedge. The bank was more pronounced at the Atterwith Lane end where it may have dropped as much as 6ft to the moorland.

  To the west of Moor Lane, and on the same line as the obstacle referred to, was a small ditch which seems to have had a hedge running along it, probably on its north side, and again this obstacle separated the moorland from cultivated ground. It has been generally held that the ditch ran virtually parallel to the Long Marston/Tockwith road as far as in front of the Royalist right wing to the west. But as Peter Newman has highlighted it petered out at a point where the moorland and arable converged, forming ‘a plain’ devoid of obstacles, according to Captain Stewart, who was on the allied right wing. Finally, further to the west was another ditch.

  Rupert lined the obstacles with musketeers to disrupt an advance by the enemy before falling back to join the main body of the army drawn up to the north, and presumably musketeers were also stationed to the fore elsewhere to do likewise. Hence in view of the manned obstacles, the Parliamentarian, Simeon Ashe, observed: ‘Our souldiers could not assault [the Royalists] without very great apparent prejudice.’

  The Royalist right wing was commanded by Lord Byron and comprised at least 2,600 horse and some 500 musketeers. The latter were stationed in bodies between the squadrons of the front line. Behind, and somewhat to the right of the line, was the Duke of York’s regiment under Colonel Samuel Tuke. It was divided into four squadrons and had the task of protecting the flank. Further back was the second line proper led by young Viscount Molyneux. Rupert’s regiment of horse was probably to the rear. If not, it would have been to the left of Molyneux.

  The wing was drawn up to the north of the westernmost of the ditches referred to above, and this obstacle was partly manned by mus
keteers and pikemen under Colonel Thomas Napier. Behind, and to their left, was a regiment of horse led by Marcus Trevor.

  The centre numbered about 10,000 men. The front line evidently comprised six regiments drawn up in eight bodies under Major-General Henry Tillier. The regiments belonged to Rupert’s army. The second line (which presumably was commanded by Eythin) included two regiments which likewise belonged to Rupert’s army. The rest of the line consisted of all, or at least some, of the 3,000 or so foot who arrived on the scene at about 4.00pm after being brought from York. There may have been a smaller third line containing infantry belonging to Newcastle’s army under Sir Francis Mackworth, though this seems highly unlikely. To the rear of the foot was Rupert’s Lifeguard, as well as two cavalry brigades commanded by Sir Edward Widdrington and Sir William Blakiston.

  The left wing was commanded by Lord Goring, a flamboyant figure, and probably consisted of some 2,100 horse and 500 musketeers interposed among the squadrons of the front line. To the rear of the left of this line was Colonel Francis Carnaby’s regiment, which was divided into four squadrons, and had the task of protecting the flank. Further back came the second line proper, with Sir Charles Lucas and Sir Richard Dacre leading the right and left of the line respectively.

  Though a plan drawn up on the morning of the 2nd by de Gomme shows that the Royalists had 16 guns, others were brought to the field later in the day, and in all the Royalists had 25 cannon. These were mostly placed between the bodies of foot in the centre, but some were located along the line of the ditch. Furthermore, there was a small battery on a slight hummock before Byron’s position.