Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746

by Glen Lyndon Dodds

  In the meantime Cumberland had received word of the Jacobites’ disastrous night march, and had ordered his men to advance. Consequently, at about 10.00am., the Jacobites were roused when they received news that Cumberland was only four miles away and steps were urgently taken by officers to prepare their men. It can be imagined how despondent many must have felt in the prince’s army when, at about 11.00am., they saw Cumberland’s impressive force of redcoats drawing near with pipers of the Campbell Militia to the fore.

  Charles and his Army

  John Murray of Broughton wrote of Charles: ‘the eldest son of the Chevalier de St George [the Old Pretender], is tall, above the common stature, his limbs cast in the most exact mould, his complexion has in it somewhat of an uncommon delicacy; all his features are perfectly regular and well turned, and his eyes the finest I ever saw.’

  His appearance was certainly prepossessing. But there was more to the prince than good looks. He was for example endowed with great stamina, and as has been seen, could behave with resolution. Moreover he was very compassionate. At Prestonpans, for instance, he called out to the clansmen to spare Cope’s routed men. Furthermore he could be extremely charming and courageous, qualities which he displayed at an early age for in 1734 when only thirteen, while present at the siege of Gaeta, Italy, he stood in the front line trenches with the Duke of Liria who recorded: ‘Neither the noise of the cannon, nor the hiss of bullets could produce any sign of fear’ in the ‘bewitching’ youngster.

  But like all mortals Charles had foibles. Frank McLynn has commented: ‘Always in the prince’s personality there was the lack of a middle path or a golden mean. He was too trusting and lacked normal shrewdness and suspicion when dealing with flatterers. When his suspicions were aroused, they quickly toppled into paranoia.’ Although more intelligent than is often maintained, Charles’ judgement of men and situations was at times strikingly poor and no doubt his susceptibility to flattery was partly responsible. Owing to his mercurial temperament, he could swing quickly from supreme optimism and confidence to despair and then an obstinate, self-destructive streak would manifest itself.

  How strong the Jacobite army was is uncertain. Some historians have stated that it numbered as much as 7,000 men—Charles’ opponents held that it was over 6,500 strong—but others feel 5,000 is more probable. In contrast, Susan Maclean Kybett is of the opinion that: ‘The 4,500 figure usually given for his force at this time is outrageously charitable. A more reasonable estimate is that the Prince had but two thousand bone-weary men left for the Battle of Culloden.’ The army had undoubtedly been weakened by desertion and absenteeism but, all things considered, it seems reasonable to conclude that the prince’s force was at least 4,000 strong and perhaps approached 5,000 men.

  Highlanders formed the bulk of the army. Tactically, they still favoured the old approach of charging ferociously toward the enemy, discharging and then discarding firearms as they did so, before employing swords, dirks and targes in close combat.

  On the hand, as far as the clansmen’s appearance is concerned, it is interesting to note that since the ‘15 rebellion the belted plaid (see page ) had begun to be superseded by the little kilt.

  The remainder of the army consisted of Lowlanders, such as the members of Ogilvy’s Regiment raised in Angus, and Franco-Irish troops such as FitzJames’ Horse, an experienced fighting unit which had recently seen extensive service in Italy and on the Rhine with the French Army. Unfortunately for the Young Pretender only about 70 members of FitzJames’ Horse were present at Culloden, partly owing to the fact that many of the regiment bound for Scotland had been captured by the Royal Navy. Carbines or muskets, pistols and straight brass-hilted swords, were employed by FitzJames’ Horse, and Scottish cavalry regiments in the prince’s army such as Elcho’s Life Guards would have been similarly armed. In addition to FitzJames’ Horse, the Franco-Irish contingent included infantry such as the Irish picquets, drawn from Irish regiments in the service of France and veterans of Fontenoy.

  The Jacobite artillery train consisted of 13 guns of varying calibre, the largest was a 4-pounder, and some of the cannon had been captured at Prestonpans. The differing calibre of the guns must have created an ammunition supply problem.

  Cumberland and his Army

  The Duke of Cumberland was born in 1721 and was the third son of George II. Like his cousin, the Young Pretender, William Augustus was keen on military matters from boyhood, but unlike Charles, was allowed to pursue a career as a professional soldier. At Dettingen in 1743 he fought on the left of the first line of infantry against the French and as James Wolfe (who was later to gain fame on the heights of Abraham) wrote, ‘behaved as bravely as a man could do . . . . He gave his orders with a great deal of calmness and seemed quite unconcerned.’ Two years later Cumberland was in sole command of the British contingent of an allied force at Fontenoy, and although the battle was lost, received credit for the way in which he enabled his men to withdraw in order.

  A methodical and conscientious commander, Cumberland familiarised himself with the Highlanders’ manner of fighting and did not underestimate them: he was determined that he was not going to be humiliated as Cope and Hawley had been.

  Physically Cumberland was the antithesis of the Young Pretender. He was fat and ungainly, and in some respects his personality was as unattractive as his appearance. He was, for instance, a harsh, unforgiving character. On the other hand, though not noted for magnanimity to his enemies, he did concern himself with the welfare of his men and was popular with them. Certainly Wolfe’s comment regarding Hawley that ‘The troops dread his severity, hate the man and hold his military knowledge in contempt’ could not be said to apply to Cumberland as well.

  At Culloden Cumberland commanded three regiments of cavalry, fifteen regiments of foot, a company of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, and several companies of Campbells. It was a well equipped, well-fed, and generally highly trained force of around 9,000 men with a formidable artillery train.

  On the whole the record of the British Army during the 18th century testifies to its having been a professional and redoubtable force, and despite the humiliating reverses at Prestonpans (where many of the soldiers were raw) and Falkirk, this was true of the army during this period.

  There were two types of cavalry—horse and dragoons. The former were big men on large mounts and carried out charges at a fast trot, with the sword being their principal weapon. The latter were expected to fight on foot as well as when mounted and were proficient in musketry, though they also carried a sword.

  Infantry comprised the bulk of Cumberland’s force. Theoretically, infantry regiments were to total 850 officers and men in ten companies, but in reality they were often well below this. At Culloden, for example, many of the regiments were little over 400 men strong.

  The principal weapon was the flintlock musket, especially the recently introduced ‘Brown Bess,’ and the introduction of the iron ramrod in about 1725 meant that at least three effective volleys could probably be fired a minute, a faster rate of fire than had been possible hitherto. In addition to a musket, bayonet and sword, grenadiers—the elite infantry—also carried three hand grenades.

  In appearance British soldiers of this period differed little from those who had served in 1715. With the exception of members of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, the soldiers still wore red coats, but regimental facing colours, lace patterns and distinctive badges, had been regularised since the accession of George II in 1727.

  The Royal Regiment of Artillery was founded in 1716 and consisted of eight companies, and as noted, one such was present at Culloden. Members of the regiment wore blue coats and their principal weapon was the 3-pounder, a gun with a range of about 500 yards.

  Cumberland was well aware how devastating a Highland charge could be, and so in the weeks prior to Culloden he trained his infantry to meet such an assault. Each soldier was
drilled so that when it came to hand-to-hand fighting he would thrust his bayonet towards the clansman to his right, a move which meant that the bayonet would have a greater chance of striking home than if the soldier thrust at the man in front of him, for the Highlander’s right side was more exposed than the left which was protected to some extent by the targe. Moreover, such a move would take the enemy by surprise.

  Finally, as has been noted, Cumberland’s army included Campbells. They were members of the Argyll Militia, a regiment raised by the 3rd Duke of Argyll at the commencement of the rising. The regiment was approximately 630 officers and men strong at Culloden. The men wore Highland dress, but were identified as being on the government side by having a black cockade and a large red cross on their bonnets.

  Prince Charles had unrealistically hoped that the Campbells, the most powerful clan in the Highlands, would support his rising. The fact that they opposed him has helped fuel the antagonism some people have towards the clan. It is only right, however, to bear in mind that some other clans (the MacKays, Munros and Gunns, for example), served on behalf of the government during the rising and that the loyalties of others were divided. After all, the fighting potential of the Highlands was estimated at 32,000 men, and the Young Pretender never enjoyed the support of even a third of that figure.

  Description

  On Wednesday, 16 April 1746, the battlesite comprised moorland and was bounded to the north and south by walled enclosures. In the late 20th century, under the auspices of the National trust for Scotland, the site has been largely returned to its appearance on the day of the battle, something which necessitated the removal of many trees planted by the Forestry Commission, thereby rendering an overall view of the site possible again.

  For a variety of reasons, including hunger and disenchantment with Charles’ leadership, Jacobite morale was not high. The MacDonalds in particular were discontented. Traditionally they fought on the right of the line but this position had been given to Murray’s Atholl brigade by the prince who refused to change his mind though entreated to do so by three senior MacDonalds, Clanranald, Lochgarry and Keppoch.

  Hence the Atholl brigade formed the right wing of the front line. To its left, and also under Murray’s command, were Camerons and Stewarts of Appin. The centre of the line was commanded by Lord John Drummond. Here were Frasers, and members of Clan Chattan (a confederation of clans which included the MacKintoshes, MacBeans and MacGillivrays), then, beyond a battery of cannon, were more members of Clan Chattan, as well as a regiment of Macleans and MacLachlans. Next in line was a non-clan unit, John Roy Stewart’s regiment consisting of Edinburgh volunteers. Then came the Chisolms. The left wing, which consisted of three MacDonald regiments, was under the Duke of Perth and included some Grants. Cannon were placed on the flanks of the line.

  The second line was not as substantial. From right to left it evidently comprised Lord Ogilvy’s regiment, that of Lord Lewis Gordon, Gordon of Glenbucket’s, the Duke of Perth’s regiment, the Royal Scots (a regiment in the service of France) and the Irish picquets.

  Charles’ cavalry units appear to have all been deployed in a third line, though by this date many of the ‘cavalry’ fought on foot owing to lack of mounts. The prince, who had assumed command for the first time, took up a position on a hillock just behind this line, accompanied by a small mounted escort.

  300 yards or more away from the Jacobite front line was that of Cumberland’s army. (Owing to the alignment of the armies the distance between the Jacobite left and the duke’s right was greater than elsewhere).

  As finally deployed—Cumberland made minor alterations to his dispositions during a cannonade which opened the battle—the duke had seven infantry regiments in his front line, from left to right, Barrell’s, Munro’s, Campbell’s, Price’s, Cholmondley’s, St Clair’s and Pulteney’s. Another regiment, Wolfe’s, was placed a little to the fore at the left end of the line, and at right angles to it, so that flanking fire could be poured into the ranks of attacking Highlanders. The second line had six more infantry regiments, and another such formed a reserve towards the left of the centre.

  On the right flank of the front line were Kingston’s Horse and 60 of Cobham’s Dragoons under General Bland, while on the left flank of the front line, though further from the infantry, were the remainder of Cobham’s Dragoons and Lord Mark Kerr’s Dragoons, under General Hawley, together with companies of Argyll Militia.

  Colonel William Belford, a veteran of Dettingen and Fontenoy, was in command of the artillery which principally comprised ten 3-pounders. These were placed at intervals between the regiments of the front line. Moreover, six coehorn mortars were placed in batteries of three to the rear of the right and left of the front line.

  Cumberland took up a position to the rear of the front line. He was mounted on a grey horse, confident that his ‘brave boys’ would bring him victory.

  It was just after 1.00pm on this cold, rainy day, that the battle commenced. It did so when the Jacobite guns opened fire. Cumberland’s gunners, who were more proficient, responded with sustained fire. As Surgeon Grainger recalled: ‘The thunder of our cannons was perpetual.’ It was not long before the Jacobite guns had been almost entirely put out of action. Furthermore, fire from Belford’s guns cut swathes in the massed ranks of the men waiting for the order to charge. Not for nothing did Grainger record: ‘Most of our shots took effect.’

  The trajectory of at least two of the guns was deliberately such that shot flew over the first and second lines with the intention of hitting the Young Pretender. Soon his horse was wounded and his groom decapitated. Following this the prince withdrew to a safer position and one of his escort, John Daniel, tells us that as he did so he repeatedly looked around ‘to see how his men behaved.’ Just where Charles stationed himself is uncertain, but it was probably near the Culchunaig farm steadings just to the southwest of the battlefield.

  Meanwhile his army continued receiving punishment from Belford’s gunners (who switched from ball to grape-shot during the course of the cannonade), and as Lord George Murray later wrote: ‘The regiments in the front rank were turned so impatient that they were like to break their ranks.’ His men, on the right, likely suffered most severely, for they were closer to the enemy than their colleagues further down the line.

  While the cannonade was occurring, the Campbells and dragoons on the left of Cumberland’s army entered an enclosure in front of their position, (the Campbells pulled down sections of dry stone walling to make way for the dragoons), and some of the Argyll Militia then made their way northward up the sloping ground until they came to the north wall of the enclosure where they halted, ready to pour flanking fire into the Jacobite right flank if it charged. On the other hand, after entering the enclosure, some of the Campbells headed west, accompanied by the dragoons, and made their way through another wall, thereby entering an enclosure close to the right flank of the Jacobite army. Seeing this, Lord George Murray ordered Ogilvy’s regiment on the right of the second line to face them and a fire-fight evidently ensued with the Campbells. The dragoons continued westward, accompanied by other members of the Argyll Militia, evidently with the aim of exiting the enclosure and threatening the right flank or rear of the Jacobite army.

  By about this stage the men facing the bulk of Cumberland’s force had had more than enough of a pounding—they had endured the cannonade for at least ten minutes—and in desperation Murray sent Kerr of Graden to find Charles, requesting that the order to charge be given. The prince evidently responded positively by sending one of his aides-de-camp, young Lachlan MacLachlan, forward with the order to charge but before he could deliver the order he was decapitated by a cannonball. Sir John MacDonald and Brigadier Stapleton were then sent by the prince to give the order.

  Evidently, though, Clan Chattan in the centre of the front line under the chief of the MacGillivrays, Alexander MacGillivray of Dunmaglas,
commenced charging without having received the order to do so. Soon Murray and the right of the line were charging too. However, on the left, the MacDonalds initially refused to charge after being ordered to advance and, when they finally moved forward, did so with little vigour.

  Hail and rain caused the charging clansmen some discomfort, as did smoke which blew into their eyes, but this was nothing compared to the grape-shot which continued bringing death and destruction into their ranks. Nonetheless they kept charging, ‘like troops of hungry wolves,’ states a government soldier, Private Alexander Taylor.

  As the men of Clan Chattan charged they suddenly veered to their right onto firmer ground, and in so doing hampered somewhat the advance of Murray’s regiments. Indeed, Maxwell of Kirkconnel relates that the resulting congestion was such that many of the clansmen ‘could make no use of their firearms’ and so discarded them. On and on the densely packed Highlanders charged. Those on the extreme right, the Athollmen, not only had to brave the grape-shot but also fire from Campbells in the enclosure to their right, and then the fire of Wolfe’s regiment. Thus, not surprisingly few, if any, of them managed to close with Cumberland’s front line. When twenty yards from the waiting Redcoats the oncoming clansmen in general suffered yet more losses when the government soldiers fired a well-timed volley. Many fell, but others pressed on relentlessly and came to blows with the regiments on the left of the line, Barrell’s (which had distinguished itself at Falkirk) and Munro’s.

  The Highlanders’ hearts were filled with anger. Their own ranks had been decimated and they now dealt out death and destruction themselves, wielding their dirks and broadswords with terrible ferocity. Lord Robert Kerr was one of the government soldiers who did not survive. After reportedly bayoneting a Cameron, he was struck down by a Highlander who cleaved his head open to the collarbone. Kerr belonged to Barrell’s regiment, whose commander, Colonel Robert Rich, had his left hand cut off and shortly thereafter his right arm was severed at the elbow.